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
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The Edinburgh Review or Critical Journal

JULY, 1922——OCTOBER, 1922.

To be continued Quarterly

Edited by HAROLD COX

JUDEX DAMNATUR CUM NOCENS ABSOLVITUR

Publius Syrus

VOL. 236.

LONGMANS, GREEN & CO.

London, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras

LEONARD SCOTT PUBLICATION COMPANY, New York

1922

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YAFUJ OZONBAFZ

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
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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

1. **The Great Adventure at Washington.** By MARK SULLIVAN. New York: Doubleday Page & Co. 1922.
2. **What Next in Europe?** By FRANK A. VANDERLIP. George Allen and Unwin. 1922.
3. **What Really Happened at Paris.** The Story of the Peace Conference, 1918-1919. Edited by EDWARD MANDELL HOUSE & CHARLES SEYMOUR. Hodder & Stoughton. 1921.
4. **The Big Four.** By ROBERT LANSING. Hutchinson. 1922.

SOMETHING not themselves seems to compel the people of the United States to take an interest in the affairs of Europe which far exceeds the interest that Europeans take in American affairs. Americans visiting England complain that there is no American news in English papers, and infer from its absence that British opinion is not educated to the point of taking seriously the movements of the American world, or studying its politics and personalities as intelligent Europeans do those of the neighbouring countries in Europe. Yet America cannot or does not make the retort of cultivating a similar aloofness from Europe. American newspapers abound in information about Europe and devote an immense amount of study and criticism to its affairs. There is no getting away from the fact that, though the American may live in America, his spiritual and historical home is Europe, that the standards of comparison which he adopts for himself and his institutions, even for his manners and fashions and ways of life, are still European, and that his instincts compel him to look eastward as no European is compelled to look

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westward. No 'Swadeshi' movement, if one could be imagined, no 'loose from Europe' agitation is able to affect that.

Yet there is a chronic irritation in this relationship. The ignorance of Europeans about America seems a poor compliment to a nation which is obviously leading the world in wealth and material civilisation; the numerous false analogies which the European critic so light-heartedly adopts in his hasty comments on American affairs; his assumption that America may be expected to follow the European lead and his impatience when she does not—all this, either explicit or implicit in the European attitude, is a perpetual exasperation, not merely to the hundred per cent. American, but to the average good citizen of the United States who is anxious to do his international duty on a footing of neighbourliness and equality. In the circumstances it has become almost a necessary part of the duty of every American administration to keep Europe reminded that America is not to be presumed upon, and to make clear to the European peoples that there are American interests and American standards of conduct which must be consulted before she can be expected to play her part in world affairs.

This peculiar relationship with Europe has been illustrated in every phase of American policy from the outbreak of the war till now. Nothing so much chilled America in the early years of the war as the assumption in England and France that she had a positive duty to intervene on the side of the Allies, and was guilty of cowardice or dereliction of duty in not instantly acknowledging it. An American might say it, as Mr. Roosevelt did, and be listened to with respect; but an Englishman or a Frenchman could not say it without instantly arousing antagonism. It was the demand of the vast majority of Americans that, if and when American intervention took place, it should be for American reasons, and at America's own time; and average American opinion holds to this day that President Wilson timed his intervention rightly, and that he could not have been sure of carrying the vast conglomerate population of the whole continent with him, unless he had waited until the Germans themselves threw a definite challenge to the American nation which had to be taken up on American grounds. The election of 1916, which ratified his policy up to that moment, and the all but unanimous approbation of his action in February 1917 speak for themselves

on that point. But, again, it was the resurgence of the American feeling that American policy must be its own and not European which brought about his downfall in 1920. This very cautious man, who up to the critical point was judged to have acted with admirable American prudence, was now supposed to have broken suddenly and without warrant with the most cherished of American traditions. The very people who had condemned him for not entering the war sooner now condemned him for leaving American policy at the mercy of Europe. How, they asked, could the Monroe doctrine be maintained for America if, under the League of Nations Covenant, she bound herself to intervene in Europe to defend the integrity of European States? How could such a pledge be squared with the Constitution and the rights of the Senate in foreign affairs? So once more it was judged, and this time by men who had been foremost in urging American intervention in the war, that Europe had presumed too much, and that Mr. Wilson in his innocence or impetuosity had been beguiled by European statesmen who were endeavouring to use America for their own ends.

This judgment was unfair. Vast numbers of Europeans, and especially Englishmen, who were entirely innocent of any selfish design, had seen in President Wilson the leader they wanted and were waiting for: the leader who would boldly advocate the self-denying ordinances and mutual concessions between sovereign States which were necessary for the peace of the world. These European followers of the President were prepared for all accommodation, including, if necessary, the abandonment of Clause X of the covenant, to disarm American suspicion. President Wilson kept his flag flying and went down with it nailed to the mast-head. Possibly the result might have been different if he had been a little more conciliatory to his opponents, or if he had been able to fight his campaign in the full vigour of bodily health. These are questions of American domestic politics on which an Englishman has no right to express an opinion. The important point now is that we should understand what has happened and interpret it aright. The defeat of President Wilson in 1920 was not a repentance on the part of the American people of their action in the war; nor was it a declaration that they would retire into their continent and take no further part in world affairs. But it was very definitely a revolt against the idea that American

policy should be subject to European, or that European nations should have the right to call for American intervention, apart from the decision of Congress, on a given set of circumstances arising, which might be determined in Europe and not in America.

To the strict theorist of the League of Nations this may seem a discouraging result. If every Government holds to its absolute right to decide its own action in every emergency, and if none will consent to acknowledge in advance any *casus foederis*, then joint action by a League of Nations would seem to be an impossibility. But the practical difficulties are probably less formidable than the theoretical, and in considering them we may get some hints from the theory and practice of the British Empire. All the States of that Empire are indeed involved in a war in which Great Britain is engaged, and all are put on their defence, and become liable to attack. But no self-governing Dominion pledges itself in advance to act outside its own boundaries or waters for the support of the Mother-country or of the other Dominions and Colonies. Nevertheless, all these States have an implicit faith, well justified by experience, that their Parliaments will decide on mutual succour and assistance in all serious emergencies. Conference and consultation for the shaping of a common policy go forward on this basis without friction, whereas attempts to define the conditions and bind the Parliaments in advance arouse suspicion and resistance. The analogy must not be pressed too far, but if America subscribes to any general principles of international policy, the other nations might, I think, have a similar confidence that her Congress would take the necessary measures for their defence, if they were seriously challenged. All democratic States which give their Parliaments control over foreign policy are in the same difficulty about pledging the future, and the liberty to decide on the emergency arising, which they claim as their right, is theoretically as fatal to international control as the sovereign 'will' of the old Prussian State. But in practice there is an immense difference between despotic States asserting their 'will' with millions of soldiers behind them, and democratic States without great armies and professing peace principles. The first are of necessity rigid and unconvertible; the second are open to every kind of peaceful evolution and may reasonably be expected to develop institutions which, though not formally binding, will be acknowledged in practice.

The great hope of Anglo-American relations is that the two peoples will definitely stand together as the two great non-military Powers. So long as they do that, they may differ on a hundred details, but they will be fundamentally at one in their outlook on the world. From this point of view it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of the Washington Conference, and perhaps the most important part of all was not what it did, but what it avoided.

The Americans had it in their power to challenge us at sea. They had wealth which would have bankrupted us, if brought to a competition of armaments; and, had they seriously set themselves to it, they would undoubtedly in time have overcome the difficulties in technique and personnel which have hitherto prevented them from reaching quite the first place. No one who estimates their character aright can doubt that, given the determination to do this, they would have succeeded. It would nevertheless have been an enormous calamity, attended at each stage with the same bitterness and poisoning of relations as accompanied the Anglo-German competition before the war. The British people might have submitted to the superior spending power of their rivals, but they would have felt that this great new naval force was aimed at them and their Empire and that its construction was all but fatal to friendly and mutually respecting relations. Next to the avoidance of this calamity, we may place the fact that we found an honourable way of withdrawing from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance through the Four-Power Pact. No argument, no stipulation that it should not engage us to support Japan in a war with America could ever have made that Alliance look other than an unfriendly act in American eyes. Americans judged that, even if we did not fight them on this issue, we should yet be behind Japan in every contention that she might have with the United States. The naval agreement and the winding-up of the Japanese alliance are capital events in the history of Anglo-American friendship and it is impossible for an Englishman to rate too highly the generosity and daring of American policy on the naval question or its admirable execution in the hands of Mr. Harding and Mr. Hughes. In a few weeks America solved a problem which has baffled Europe for thirty years.

So far, the Washington Conference may be counted pure gain for Anglo-American relations and in one-half of the world the

politics of the two peoples have been placed on a footing which makes conflict or serious friction between them all but impossible. But there is another aspect of this Conference relating to the other half of the world which is less satisfactory, and that needs very careful understanding, if we are to get the right measure of the present situation.

When the Conference opened, the atmosphere seemed favourable to a complete understanding extending to the whole range of world problems. The instantly favourable reception given to Mr. Hughes' proposals encouraged hopes that the same method might be applied in succession to land disarmament and to the political and economic problems which affected the whole world. The cooler and wiser men in the Republican party were of opinion that the reaction against the League of Nations had gone much too far at the election of 1920, and were anxious to find a way back to the necessary co-operation with Europe and even eventually to build a bridge to the League of Nations. In the first ten days of November members of the Administration spoke hopefully of the possibility of 'continuing conferences,' embracing military, political and economic questions, which might follow periodically when the Washington Conference had completed its work.

But on November 21st came M. Briand's intervention, which acted as a douche of iced water on these hopes. The flat declaration that France would not consent to reduce her army, and still more the reasons that he alleged for this attitude, shut the door on land disarmament. M. Briand seemed to say that so long as Germany had young men trained to arms, so long as she had factories which were capable of being used for the production of munitions, and so long as she had wealth or the prospect of gaining wealth which might be applied to military preparations, France could not afford to dispense with a single soldier. Germany, he insisted, was notoriously perfidious: she had not disarmed and could not be trusted to disarm, and her potential resources, even if she were temporarily disarmed, were such that she could only be rendered safe by the perpetual menace of superior force. Apparently, as an American said to me, nothing could satisfy M. Briand, but a Germany without money, without factories, without even men capable of bearing arms.

The effect which the French attitude produced in America

is well described by Mr. Mark Sullivan in his narrative of the Washington Conference (the 'Great Adventure at Washington'), a simple and honest recital of facts and feelings which may profitably be studied by all Europeans. No one who was at Washington in these weeks could be under any mistake about it. Americans were extremely polite to M. Briand, but his argument sank deeply into their minds, and the anti-European party now took up their tale. 'This (they said) is exactly what we told you. 'Europe, on the confession of the principal exponent of its 'continental policy, is still rent by unappeasable feuds and given 'over to an incurable militarism. Stand out of it, and thank 'God for your Stars and Stripes and the thousands of miles of 'stormy ocean which separate you from this impenitent world of 'strife.' The only serious mistake made by Lord Balfour—whose skill and sagacity were in all other respects beyond praise—was, I think, in letting this speech pass with the merely non-committal answer which he made after M. Briand had sat down. He should, I think, have asked for an adjournment and delivered a reasoned reply, not necessarily in a combative spirit, but a reply which would have presented a different picture of Europe to the American public. Left uncorrected, M. Briand's picture was presently heightened and deepened by the attitude of his colleagues on the submarine question, and when the Conference ended, no more was heard of the 'continuing conferences' or of the extension of the Harding principle to include European economics and politics. With the Hearst press raging against the Conference and the West and Middle-West again on the alert against European entanglements, the administration had now to walk warily lest the Washington conclusions should be wrecked in the Senate, which was extremely anxious lest any 'pact' or agreement should be convicted of inconsistency with the election pledges of 1920.

M. Briand's intervention and the subsequent action of the French on the submarine question undoubtedly threw British and Americans together, and contributed to the cordial relations which were maintained throughout between the two Governments. But it had an anti-European effect in which Great Britain is of necessity involved.

For one thing it became evident before the end of the year that the hope of dealing comprehensively with the international

debt situation would have to be abandoned. When I was in New York in December I had conversations with several representative bankers and financiers, and almost invariably with the same result. I said, on my side, that Great Britain was ready to pay her dues and wished only to know in what form America would take them. Would she take them in gold? Not that, for she had far more than she wanted or was at all healthy for the European exchanges. Well then, in goods? Still less that, for the American warehouses were stuffed with unsold goods. But if not gold or goods, what then? What did America really want? Financial America and business America wanted nothing but that the whole situation should be wound up, and the pound sterling brought back to its old parity with the dollar. If that was their view, would they say so? Impossible, for the West and Middle-West, which are not educated in high finance, would merely think it a Wall Street conspiracy to defraud the taxpayer.

The American taxpayer, it must be understood, regards the American loans to Europe precisely as the French peasant regards the German indemnity. He has been assured that it is a good and just debt to be recovered for the relief of American taxation, which, though nothing like on the European level, he regards as oppressively high. He thinks that it ought to be paid, as any other bill is paid, by something that he calls 'money,' and he knows nothing about the disturbances to trade or exchange which would follow from getting this 'money' across the Atlantic. On the other hand, the instructed commercial and financial world desires nothing less than a dump of £25,000,000 worth of British goods without corresponding American exports during the coming autumn, and the first sign of it would probably arouse the latent protectionist instincts of the whole continent. We are, therefore, in the unfortunate position that, if we do not pay, we are liable to be denounced as defaulters, and that, if we do pay, we shall be in danger of a tariff war which may be very disturbing to Anglo-American relations. All the absurdities of our own Safeguarding of Industries Act and the other European legislation which takes elaborate precautions against the payment by Germany in the only way possible of what we are incessantly demanding from her, are likely to be reproduced in America, when any European nation sets itself seriously to pay its debts

or even the interest on its debts. Even now we have a foretaste of what may happen in the shipping legislation, and the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Bill which are before Congress; and the Republican party has yet to discover that its high-tariff policy is fundamentally at issue with the position of the United States as the creditor of all the world.

The British people, largely I think through its quite recent education in the fiscal controversy, has an instinctive mode of economic thinking which brings it ultimately right on these matters, and it is greatly to its credit that it has never for a moment taken seriously the extravagant promises of recovery from Germany which its politicians indulged in during the feverish days of the Armistice. Very few Englishmen think it even a remote possibility that France will repay her debt to Great Britain.

But vast numbers of Americans think that the European nations can and ought to pay what they owe to the United States and are totally unaware of the economic difficulty of payment or of the essential incompatibility of a high tariff policy with the only methods of payment. Some think and say openly that the proper method of exerting American control over Europe is not by Conference or League of Nations, but by a bold assertion of the rights of the creditor nation, so that if the European Governments will not live at peace with each other, they may at least be too poor to make war on a great scale. Pacifists insist that every penny given to Europe will be spent on soldiers or guns, therefore it is the truest kindness to maintain the debt and keep the European reminded that he is spending money which he owes to America.

We have here a highly complicated situation in which politics and economics are intricately involved. But the course for this country is plain. We must not only tender payments, but show ourselves seriously willing and able to make them. The economic consequences will then become apparent and the American public will get the instruction which their bankers and financiers feel unable to give them. Nothing but this touch of reality will bring this question to the point at which it can be amicably and wisely settled, and the sooner we reach it the better. In the meantime, light-hearted talk about the wiping off of these debts should be avoided. The American mind is extraordinarily sensitive on the subject of property, whether individual or public.

A nation which repudiates its debts or which fails openly and cheerfully to acknowledge them is a defaulter in its eyes, and there is no more to be said about it. Default on principle, which the Bolsheviks seem to contemplate, puts a nation outside the pale ; but default from poverty, if morally less reprehensible, is materially only less disastrous. America has no idea of being a harsh creditor to Europe, but she requires that the debts to her shall be acknowledged as legally due, and that whatever concessions, abatements or postponements may be granted shall be of her own giving and accepted as acts of grace. America does not favour remission, and Europeans who speak as if she ought to merely cause irritation.

Those who wish to understand American opinion on the debt question can hardly do better than read carefully the little book entitled 'What next in Europe,' by Mr. Frank Vanderlip, an influential American banker, and former Assistant Secretary to the United States Treasury. Mr. Vanderlip represents the most benevolent opinion in this matter, but he does not propose remission. He suggests a scheme whereby the moneys due to America should be spent in Europe for the benefit of Europe, under American control, and the American taxpayer ultimately get his return from mortgages on these undertakings. Thus Europe in general might in this way get better transportation and a larger development of hydro-electric power ; England might get great scientific laboratories, Italy schools of applied art, and other countries whatever they needed for their development and could not supply in their present impoverished condition. America, instead of being the harsh creditor, would thus become a fairy godmother to Europe. That, in Mr. Vanderlip's opinion, would avoid repudiation or remission and save creditor and debtor alike from the disturbance of trade and exchanges which would follow from the attempt to transport vast sums across the Atlantic.

This is a characteristically American idea and it is economically quite sound. If America is going to exact her dues from Europe, she had far better, in her own interest as well as ours, re-invest them in Europe, just as we before the war re-invested a large part of the earnings of our foreign investments in the countries in which they were earned. That saves an exhaustion of capital on the one side and a plethora of capital on the other. Yet one can

scarcely imagine this scheme being seriously applied to any European debtor, except possibly Great Britain, which has both the means and the intention of paying. The other debtors have, if the truth be told, neither the means of paying nor the expectation of being called upon to pay. A summons to these to raise the money by taxation would scarcely be sweetened by a direction from the United States to spend it on objects which they would declare to be superfluous luxuries in their impoverished condition. The fairy godmother would, I am afraid, not earn gratitude by this kind of benevolence. Sooner or later the American people will have to face the fact that a large part of the European debt to them is irrecoverable, and that the sole question will ultimately be in what proportion the loss shall be shared between them and ourselves. America certainly can exact from us what we have borrowed from her to lend to France, but we shall not recover from France or attempt to do so. In the meantime the maintenance of these claims is an obstacle the more to the just settlement of the German reparations question, for most of the debtors profess to rely upon the Germans for even a remote chance of squaring their account with the United States, and they have plausible ground for not abating their claims upon Germany while the American claim hangs unabated over them.

We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that a prolonged conflict on this unsolved problem may be very disturbing to American and European, and even to American and British relations. But, politics being what they are, everyone seems to be debarred from telling what all instructed people know to be the truth. American financiers cannot tell it for fear of being misunderstood ; the British Government cannot tell it for fear of being supposed to be evading payment ; the French Government cannot tell it without injuring its pride and damaging its credit. A subtle game is being played, in which German reparations and American debts are played off against each other, and all the parties are trying to force each other's hands. America joins England in suggesting that France shall be lenient to Germany ; France retorts that she cannot be lenient to Germany, unless other people are lenient to her. On these lines we shall drift into a thoroughly false situation, and the anti-European sentiment in America will increase. It is, I think, for the British Government to break the spell and tell the truth. Let it put itself on firm

ground by tendering its payments, and then place the whole situation frankly before the American Government and people, with a definite proposal that the inevitable losses shall be shared in fair proportions between England and America. So far as I can see, this is the only way in which the American public can be informed of the facts, and if they *are* informed, they will, I believe, make a generous response. The Bankers' Commission has left three months in which this situation can and ought to be dealt with, and there is no time to lose, if trouble is to be avoided. The idea which prevails in America, that Europe can settle its own problems if America stands aside, has no substance in it. The international debt and reparations questions are one, and can only be settled with American co-operation. America will not submit to have her hands forced by the underground methods of the 'old diplomacy,' and she will not have her consent taken for granted in any European scheme; but she will, I think, listen respectfully to a frank and straightforward argument.

But this after all is only one aspect of the general failure to maintain the war-partnership with America in the making of peace. Had the Treaty of Versailles been so framed that America could have subscribed to it, and had she found it possible to take up her part in the League of Nations, the European situation would undoubtedly have been far different from what it now is. Questions which are all but insoluble when England and France face each other in a fatal equipoise of opposite views would almost certainly have assumed a different and easier aspect if America had been at the table. Questions which can scarcely be raised while America stands aloof would have been naturally on the agenda, had she been for this purpose our Ally. It is useless to go back on the past, but certain facts have to be frankly faced if the future is to be unclouded. Most Americans judge their country right in refusing to subscribe to the Treaty of Versailles. There is no repentance but rather a hardening on this subject as the plight in which Europe is involved becomes more visible.

Further, the tales brought back from Europe and the voluminous American literature revealing the secrets of the Peace Conference of 1919 have created a deep distrust of European diplomacy. Mr. Bullitt's disclosures, Mr. Lansing's 'Big Four,' Col. House's 'What Really happened at Paris,' with

the scathing chapter on Reparations contributed by Mr. Tom Lamont—to mention only a few—have successively and cumulatively contributed to this impression. This testimony is no idle gossip, but the serious deliverance of Americans who played an official part, and it has led Americans to the conclusion that European methods are a compound of duplicity and grasping for which American idealism could be no match. The picture which Mr. Brisbane loves to paint for the readers of the Hearst press of the American lamb fallen among European wolves may raise a smile on the face of the judicious American, but there is still a general belief that simple American statesmanship is helpless before European cunning, and a general desire that no American Government shall expose itself a second time to being outwitted, as Mr. Wilson is supposed to have been. All these sentiments are common to both American parties, and as long as they endure, it is useless to invite the American administration to conferences in Europe. America will confer on her own ground with her own programme, as at Washington, but she will not step out of her ground until she is quite sure of her footing.

That at least is the official attitude and likely to remain so for some time to come. But the 'loose from Europe' movement is unlikely to go far. The idea which a few journalists have broached that America can turn her back upon Europe and find her compensation in her own markets, or in exploiting the Far East, is altogether incompatible with her position as the chief creditor nation, and very unlikely to work among a people which is more and more increasing its intercourse with Europe. Whatever the official policy may be, unofficial America is inextricably involved with Europe. Washington may decide not to go on with economic conferences and to stand aloof from Cannes, Genoa and the Hague, but Mr. Pierpont Morgan comes over as the head of a Bankers' Commission which in effect sits in judgment upon all the Governments of Europe and brings a pressure to bear upon politicians which is greater than any of them can apply to each other. Washington may decide to have no dealings with the Bolsheviks, but the American Good Samaritan is feeding the famine-stricken peasant, and pouring out his charity on a scale that shames the European. The generosity and the vast pitifulness which are the admirable characteristics of the American people are everywhere enlisted for the victims of war. Immense

numbers of Americans are coming to Europe to see for themselves and penetrating into regions which are beyond the usual beat of European travellers and drummers, with the result that New York is better informed than London of potential resources awaiting capital and energy in undeveloped Europe.

The conclusion is not far off that Europe's poverty is America's opportunity, and it would be an extremely salutary one both for Europe and America. That any American administration will in these circumstances turn its back upon Europe either politically or economically is in the highest degree improbable, and the present administration has already made clear that it will act energetically to prevent European monopolies from which America is excluded. But America, let it be repeated, is determined not to be the satellite of any European Power or group of Powers, and she is especially on guard at the moment against the presumption that she is at the disposal of Great Britain. The more her sympathies are in fact with Great Britain, the more careful she will be to make it understood that she arrives at her conclusions on independent and American lines, as indeed she does.

This, I think, is one of the first points to understand, if we desire Anglo-American relations to remain on a good and sound basis. The common talk which regards the United States as 'Anglo-Saxon,' or assumes that because the American people, or the vast majority of them, are 'English-speaking,' its policy must of necessity be Anglophil, is a chronic irritant in America. Americans scent this assumption when a British Government arranges conferences in Europe without consulting America and takes, or appears to take, her acceptance for granted. The Washington Conference proved that the British and American peoples will instinctively think alike on a great range of political subjects. It needed no British propaganda to bring Americans substantially to the same conclusion as ourselves about the French attitude on land disarmament. The Liberal tradition in foreign policy—the tradition which is for moderation in victory, which believes that nations should determine their own destiny, which respects what it calls rights and is totally opposed to their measurement in terms of force—is as natural to the American people as to the British, and left to themselves the two peoples will pool their resources and use their influence to the same ends.

But the partnership must be an equal one without flattery or patronage—two things which frequently go together—on either side, and there must be no suspicion that America is being used for British purposes. The French journalist who thinks to drive a wedge between England and America by declaring Mr. Harding to be 'the dupe of Anglo-Saxonism' knows what he is about. If the charge could be made good, it would be extremely damaging to Mr. Harding. The pervading suspicions on this subject which he finds in the American press may be an unwelcome surprise to an Englishman, but if he will reverse the situation, and try to imagine what he would feel if it were constantly suggested abroad that British policy was American and at the disposal of an American Government, he will get the measure of American feeling.

American policy is, of course, not British and could not be ; and though in these fundamental matters the two nations have the same instincts, there are others in which their divergencies are equally striking. For example, it has been a disagreeable surprise to British Liberals that on the question of Soviet Russia, American influence has been steadily used against the British view. Here we come up against that stubborn conservatism which is a perpetual astonishment to those who suppose that a democratic people must necessarily be radical. A large part of the instinctive reverence, which in old countries goes out to thrones, dynasties and churches, seems in America to be reserved for property. There is an orthodoxy on this subject which is as intolerant of heresy as any ecclesiasticism in the old world. Latitudinarianism about property is the one form of intellectual error on which even the Statue of Liberty seems to frown. To the average American it is positively shocking that he should be asked to acknowledge a Government which not only denies but openly flouts the true faith as held by civilised nations. Pity and charity may flow out to the Russian people in the grip of this tyranny, but for the tyranny itself there can be no mercy until it recants and abjures its error. All that part of the European argument which urges that Soviet Russia will persist in her sins if she is perpetually outlawed, or which warns us of the extreme danger of a union of the outlaws if on one plea Russia, and on another Germany, is placed outside the pale, falls in America on deaf ears. She is not near enough to sense the European peril ;

she has no powerful Labour party with a sentimental belief in the Russian Revolution. Her people are in a state of diffused prosperity which offers opportunities to all of accumulating the property which it is the business of the State to guard. In this respect the American people are nearer to the French than they are to the British, and we must reckon with the fact that their vote is more likely to be given to France than to ourselves on the Russian question.

Further, we have always to remember that (again like the French) the Americans are a protectionist people with as yet, if an Englishman may say so, a somewhat imperfect appreciation of the needs and consequences of an expanding foreign trade. Here, as I have already suggested, the effort at one and the same time to play the part of the great creditor nation, and to maintain a high tariff, may be a disturbing factor in foreign relations. America, like all other countries in a similar position, must eventually make her choice. She cannot get paid if she raises her tariff barriers, and if she wants to get paid, she must bring them down. It sounds simple as an economic proposition, but the experience which brings it home may be slow and painful.

Let me try to summarise some of the main conclusions. The refusal of America to ratify Mr. Wilson's policy was undoubtedly a shock to Europe and to this country. It seemed a queer kind of paradox that Europe should be left without American assistance to work out an American scheme for a League of Nations which America had disowned. For every practical reason it was highly embarrassing that the powerful nation, which emerged from the war the creditor of all the rest, and which has an obvious interest in every decision taken in Europe, should definitely stand outside the Peace and decline responsibility for or partnership in the execution of the Treaties. That situation has been partly but not wholly retrieved at the Washington Conference. The danger, which was serious, that England and America would definitely fall apart, and even engage in an exhausting competition of naval armaments has been averted, and the League of Nations principle established for half the world. British and Americans at Washington developed what may be called a common doctrine on fundamentals, and we may reasonably hope that in time they will so impress it on the world as to secure the essentials of the original League of Nations idea. But America is highly

suspicious of European diplomacy, and her suspicions were rather confirmed than dispelled at Washington.

What she sees in Europe at the present time deepens her conviction that she did right not to consent to the Treaty of Versailles. But she will not and cannot turn her back on Europe, and her position as the creditor of Europe involves her inextricably in European affairs. Expert financial opinion is prepared for drastic action on the debt, but average Americans, especially in the West and Middle-West, consider these debts good assets which should be realised for the relief of American taxation, precisely as the average Frenchman thinks of German reparations. Another school of Americans, though not seriously believing in the recovery of these loans, nevertheless thinks that they give America a power over Europe which she may use benevolently, and which in the interests of the world she ought not to abandon. For us at all events the only possible attitude is that we are ready to pay, whenever and in whatever form America desires. But we are exposed to the possibility that payment on any large scale will raise new and troublesome tariff questions; and it is eminently desirable that we should, if possible, come to an understanding which will both avoid these and get rid of the confused and embittered politics that accompany economic unsettlement. For the rest we have to reckon with the strong sentiment which requires that America's policy shall be plainly of her own shaping, and that she shall not be, or be thought to be, a satellite of Great Britain. To presume her consent to steps on which she has not been consulted, to speak or write as if a British decision will as a matter of course be endorsed by America, to claim her as 'Anglo-Saxon,' or to imagine that the relations of the two countries are sufficiently expressed in the rhetoric of 'old country' sentiment—all this is an irritant to the average American and an offence to his self-respect. English writers and speakers are commonly unaware how often they offend in these respects in American eyes, and they need to be on their guard.

That the American view will on fundamentals coincide with the British and that the world will immensely benefit by their keeping together and acting together is, I am convinced, the firm belief of immense numbers of Americans as well as of Englishmen. The ground is cleared for this co-operation as seldom before in

their history. Their joint action in the war has brought them together ; the new policy adopted by the British Government towards the Irish question has removed an enormous obstacle to good-will and the most potent engine for mischief. It should not be forgotten by those who are impatient about Ireland that the worst injury the Irish could inflict on us would be to induce us to undertake what is lightly called the re-conquest of Ireland.

If the problems ahead of us are rightly measured, there should be nothing to prevent the development and ripening of Anglo-American relations.

But we must remember what America is when we apply European standards to her. She is by far the greatest experiment that the world has ever known in the welding into one people of vast numbers of different races and traditions. If her nucleus is Anglo-Saxon, her mass is all Europe in the process of becoming American. The wonder is not that she has difficulties, or that she develops special idiosyncrasies, but that she has succeeded in imposing unity upon these heterogeneous elements and stamping them with a character and personality all her own. More and more as this process goes forward, her people will consider that the peace and order which they have imposed upon the Europeans in the North American continent can and ought to be achieved by the Europeans in Europe ; more and more they will consider the antagonisms and isolations of the European system to be relics of barbarism. It is the natural rôle of Great Britain to mediate between the old world and the new, and to endeavour, with American co-operation, to spread the great example which she has set of peace and unity extending to a whole continent.

J. A. SPENDER

THE DE-MILITARISATION OF GERMANY

After the War. By Lieut.-Colonel C. A'Court REPINGTON, C.M.G.
Constable & Co. 1922.

A diarist who publishes one instalment of his diary before he begins to write the second is almost certain to find that in the interval something intangible has affected him as an author. The more intimate and the more indiscreet the first instalment has been, the more inadequate will the diarist find himself to be when he prepares for publication the next volume, which is once more to bring together in some unsought but more or less intimate relationship the general public and his own friends and acquaintances. Probably two things have happened to him, although he may be only aware of the fact dimly, and himself be merely conscious of no longer committing to paper incidents and conversations quite so interesting as those he had recorded in his earlier volumes. If the diarist suffers from an unhealthy tendency to introspection, he may torture himself with the ugly thought that he is growing old and so put down to the account of the remorseless process of the years that lack of vitality and freshness which, as a matter of fact, in his case, has nothing whatever to do with the lapse of time. We think that if such a diarist will push his examination of conscience a little further, he will find that the 'barrage' of intangibles which has come down between his earlier work and his later, is due, in the main, to two factors, neither of which can it be altogether flattering to self-esteem to realise: on the one hand criticism of his earlier publication will have cramped his style, and on the other he will discover that somehow people are not quite so confiding as they were.

When we compare Colonel Repington's diary of Europe after the war with his diary of Europe during the war we observe a marked change both in the diarist himself and in the kind of things his acquaintances tell him. Either owing to the effect of criticism, or from the prick of a social conscience rendered less obtuse by recent experience, we find in his new volume a

disposition less aggressively insistent on dragging into the light of day intimacies with which the general public has no concern : fewer ladies are mentioned by their christian names ; less trouble is taken to make clear to the vulgar that the social circle in which the diarist moves is a little different to that of the common ruck of mankind. For this some readers of Colonel Repington's last book may be thankful, though we fear that it may militate against ' After the War ' running into as many editions as ' The First World War,' now advertised as being in its tenth impression.

As regards the second factor we have alluded to, a certain drying up of the springs of confidence, a distinct impression detaches itself from the pages of the volume before us that those who met and talked with Colonel Repington after the publication of his war diary appreciated the fact that they were talking to the public, if not immediately, then at some not distant date, and promptly adjusted their confidences accordingly. It is of course always a matter of interest to learn what eminent persons desire the public to know, or think it is good for it to know, but to the serious student of contemporary events it is far more important to be made acquainted with those thoughts and motives of the eminent or influential which they do not consider it advisable for the world at large to hear about. After all, in peace as in war, the decisions that matter are taken in secret and often in pursuit of a policy which cannot be avowed openly. The seekers for secrets will find in Colonel Repington's new book none which they could not have discovered for themselves by an intelligent study of the press of this and other countries. To say this, however, is far from saying that students of the great problems of the peace will not find Colonel Repington always an interesting and often an instructive guide, provided they do not expect too much of him and are prepared to check his opinions of men and things and his appreciations of political situations in the light of their own knowledge and experience.

Perhaps it will help them if they realise at the outset that the most important information which the book has to impart is a piece of unconscious self-revelation : it is not Colonel Repington's opinions on Europe after the war that matter so much as the effect of Europe after the war on Colonel Repington himself ; of seeing at first hand what the war and the peace have made of the world we live in. The diarist who left Victoria at 8.10 a.m.

on that 'fine sunny day' (Saturday, January 8, 1921) was a soldier thinking of the problems of Europe in terms of force. As we turn page after page of the diary we observe a gradual, but none the less marked, change: the belief in the necessity for force and its importance remains; the soldier—and Colonel Repington is nothing if not an intelligent and whole-hearted soldier—is still the soldier, but something has happened to him. Confronted with the grim realities created by the Treaty of Versailles, an economic consciousness slowly but insistently comes to the surface; the militarist more and more tends to become the economist.

The change in Colonel Repington's outlook is important, because it corresponded in time with the general movement of that portion of opinion in this country which concerns itself with public affairs. So much has happened in the world since Colonel Repington wrote the last page of his diary in December of last year that it is unnecessary to trace in any detail the development of the economic outlook of the diarist, but it is important for his readers to note the fact that development, change, a broadening of outlook, are to be found in the pages of this diary. If the man who in turn was Military Correspondent of such great newspapers as the *Times*, the *Morning Post* and the *Daily Telegraph*—the man who as a writer on war during the greatest of all wars achieved the highest reputation with the public as a military critic—can be led by the force of facts to realise the immense importance of economics in the world to-day, there are grounds for hope that some leaven of sanity will eventually permeate the minds of his readers.

Colonel Repington, however, is not an economist and, though he seems to be on the verge of becoming one, his opinions on questions of economics are those of an amateur. Neither is he a politician, though he has known intimately some statesmen and many European politicians, and for many years has brought a soldier's mind to the consideration of international affairs. On the other hand, just because he is a soldier who has given the best years of his life and the full power of his intellect to the study of war, there is one question, perhaps at this moment the most important question bequeathed to us by the Treaty of Versailles, on which his readers may expect Colonel Repington to afford them valuable guidance in forming their own opinions; it is the

question of the disarmament of Germany in the material plane and her de-militarisation in the moral plane. It is, of course, at this time of day, unnecessary for us to labour the importance of this question : it is common knowledge that French fears of possible German attack in the future are to-day very real and that those fears are the great obstacle to the economic reconstruction of Europe, which is so important to the recovery and future well-being of the economic life of Great Britain. It is not too much to say that the shadow cast by that fear lies dark and menacing across hundreds of our great factories and thousands of the little homes in the Black Country, where it is made manifest in the misery of unemployment and short time ; at the back of the hopeless, uneconomic and debasing Government policy of doles lies the fear felt by France ' that Germany has not been ' crushed and may once more repeat the crime of 1914.'

On the question of German disarmament, Colonel Repington has much to say and quotes freely the opinions of many authorities with whom he discussed the matter. The impression left on the reader's mind by the record of these numerous conversations is that, although much has been accomplished by the Disarmament Commission, Germany has not yet been effectively put out of business as a potential aggressor. For instance, we find General Nolle reported as saying (p. 84) ' that ' the number of rifles undelivered was still in the region of four ' millions and that there were still heaps of machine guns.' Also that ' none of the seven or eight Big Berthas had been found yet. ' They are said to have been destroyed by the Boches, but Nolle ' did not affirm that it was so.'

It is a little difficult to understand how General Nolle can have made the statements attributed to him in the passage we have quoted, unless he was using his conversation with Colonel Repington as a means of influencing the mind of the British public to a sympathetic attitude towards French policy. As a matter of fact General Nolle knows quite well that the Germans manufactured in all some eight million rifles during the war and that of these over four millions have been surrendered to the Disarmament Commission. Further, it is common knowledge that the Germans kept Turkey, Bulgaria and Austria supplied with arms, no inconsiderable drain on the resources of one single country, even so great a manufacturing country as Germany.

The experience of the Allies as regards loss and wastage of small arms during four years of war leads to the conclusion that the Germans probably lost or expended in the field approximately three million rifles. The probabilities are that there are in Germany to-day rather under half-a-million rifles and a few thousand machine guns scattered about all over the country and in the hands of private people ; a situation much less disquieting than that recorded by Colonel Repington. As regards the Big Berthas, in all seven tubes were made and a detailed account of the fate of each one of them is in the possession of the Disarmament Commission. It is to be observed that General Nollet is not recorded as having stated that any Big Berthas are still in existence, only that 'he did not affirm' that they had been destroyed.

On page 75 Colonel Repington reports a conversation with Count de Fretteville who informed him that 'last year (i.e. in 1920) ' he worked for a fortnight at Krupps as a common 'workman, and is sure that Krupps produce guns which escape 'our Commission of Control and that they have been arming 'the Reds against Wrangel.' This is a typical example of the wild stories about German secret armaments which are current in certain circles. It is worthy of note that a few pages later (p. 85) Colonel Repington gives this particular *canard* its quietus on the authority of General Nollet himself, who told him that he had staff officers permanently attached there (as a matter of fact he has had six staff officers at Essen since February 1920) and he thought that they knew everything ; which is quite true. It is perfectly certain that no war material has been made by Krupps since the Inter-allied Disarmament Commission took over control.

The mention of Essen leads to the question of armament and munition factories generally. Colonel Repington (p. 77) reports General Buat, the Chief of Staff of the French Army, as saying that the present advantage of the Allies is largely due to the German lack of artillery, but that when the Commissions of Control are withdrawn there will be no obstacle to the restoration of the old war material or indeed to the manufacture of better material. This is a very important statement, as the question is crucial in regard to the future peace of Europe. The facts are that, thanks to the labours of General Nollet and the large and expert staff of officers of the Allied Armies who have been

working under him, the German armament and munition factories are now practically out of business. Those which could be converted to civil purposes are in process of conversion and the work is very nearly finished ; others which could not be adapted to the purposes of ordinary industry have been destroyed. The powder factories, with one exception, have been destroyed. Without powder and high explosives, guns and machine guns are not so useful as bows and arrows. In the remaining factories Germany has been left sufficient machinery and facilities for her economic life and to enable her to pay her debts : special war machinery has been destroyed and her commercial machinery limited in accordance with these principles, which are the basis on which is founded the work of the Disarmament Commission.

General Nolle and his officers have done their job thoroughly, and the result is that, with the information now in possession of the Allied Governments as to the capacity of manufacture of munitions in Germany the material preparation required for a great war cannot by any possibility be undertaken in Germany without all the world becoming aware of it. Industrial mobilisation for war manufacture on such a scale as modern war requires cannot be carried out secretly, while without such a general industrial mobilisation Germany cannot dream of going to war with France or any other powerful State. In this connection a conversation Colonel Repington had with General Nolle on June 10, 1921, (p. 274) is worthy of note. We find General Nolle saying ' the German Army, like German industry, was ' powerfully equipped. It was his object to break up all the ' army, not only men and guns, but carts, harness, and the ' innumerable categories of warlike stores of all kinds in every ' arm and service. Then the rapid restoration of a modern army ' would be a long, costly and difficult business.' The following figures indicate what General Nolle has accomplished and show what an immense task lies before a country, which is now without armament and munition factories, if it desires to arm and equip a modern army. That it can do so at all is doubtful ; that it can do so secretly is impossible. By the month of March this year no less than 16,900 field guns had been destroyed, in addition to 8,400 field howitzers, and the total of guns and howitzers accounted for amounted to 33,300, while only 122 remained on hand for destruction. The amount of other equipment and

munitions destroyed by the Commission is proportionate to the figures we have quoted for guns and howitzers.

It is a commonplace that national preparation for war comprises the organization and training for war of the man-power of the nation as well as the organization of its industries for the manufacture of munitions and armament on a great scale. With the latter aspect of the problem we have dealt : we have now to examine the position of Germany in relation to the organization and training of her male population for the purposes of a modern war. Colonel Repington devotes many pages of his book to the discussion of this aspect of the problem of the disarmament of Germany. The conclusion he appears to come to is, that a certain degree of organization does exist which would enable the now insignificant armed forces of Germany to expand into an army of considerable size in the event of emergency. That army would be in no way comparable to the German army of 1914, and it would probably require some time for its units and formations to shake down sufficiently to form a smooth working machine. These deductions are probably correct.

It is a disquieting fact that some degree of organization for war of the manhood of a nation can be carried out with a considerable degree of secrecy. Disquieting though it be, history proves it to be a fact, especially German history. The extent, however, to which such surreptitious military organization can become a European danger depends on two factors, the nature and quantity of munitions and armament available for war and the extent to which the nation itself is militarised. As we have endeavoured to show, the work of the Disarmament Commission has made it very difficult, if not quite impossible, for Germany to maintain or equip adequately for modern war on any considerable scale such military organizations as she might conceivably be able to form in secret. When it comes to fighting no amount of organization of man-power will compensate for lack of arms and munitions, using those words in their wide military sense as comprising all those manufactured things which an army requires for war, and a very long list of objects it is, from the heaviest of heavy artillery to the most delicate sound-ranging apparatus, from actual shells to Decauville railways and tins of condensed milk.

The second factor we have postulated as an essential element

in possible danger to Europe, the militarisation of the German people, is psychological. To say that it is psychological is to admit at once, for practical purposes, that it is difficult to evaluate, since no serious student of history will deny that the more important crises in history, those which have deflected the apparently pre-ordained process of the development of nations, have, as a rule, been resolved into the course of events which history records as a result of some fundamental psychological miscalculation made by intelligent men. To take a recent example, the German miscalculations during the Great War were essentially psychological miscalculations; they were wrong about England, they were wrong about Italy, they were wrong about America, and, above all, time after time, they were wrong about France. We have to be very careful, therefore, to see to it that we do not make some blunder in estimating that subtle psychological factor, the militarisation of Germany. Now there is a marked tendency, which is exceedingly natural, to assume that in all fundamentals the Germany of to-day is the Germany of 1914; that a mere change in government from monarchy to republic, has left unchanged the common national character of the millions of human beings we lump together under the word 'Germany.' Put crudely, in the slang of to-day, the tendency may be summed up in the phrase 'the Boche is always a Boche.'

Colonel Repington throws some light on this important psychological factor. He began his tour of post-war Europe in 1921 inclined to believe that Germany was biding her time to hit back at France. By degrees his views modified. On Good Friday, March 25th, we find him recording in his diary this remark about the Germans: 'I do not believe they are dreaming of war, but some of them at one end are certainly longing for a restoration and at the other end for a Commune' (p. 107). On May 12th he writes: 'Personally I cannot conceive how the Germans can dream of war after all their sufferings' (p. 205), while two days later he records an interesting conversation with Captain Florange of the General Staff of the French Rhine Army which must be quoted in full (p. 209):—

'We had a talk over it all. Florange is well posted and has everything at his fingers' ends. I said: "Do you really believe that a people who have suffered so much want war again?" Florange
 "No, the people did not, but the old Imperialist and reactionary

' parties wanted to re-establish a strong Germany, and it was difficult to prevent them from doing so. This disastrous docility of the German people, and the hankering of all but the Socialists for Monarchism, made many things possible. There was all this huge mass of officers out of work who longed for the re-establishment of their prerogatives and these people naturally wished to act soon, as they could not afford to wait. If we could put off the possibility of a war for fifteen or twenty years, until this class and the trained soldiers were *hors de cause*, and the old military spirit had given way to the civil spirit, we might get over the danger of a fresh German aggression.' ;

Of the three extracts from Colonel Repington's diary we have quoted on this point, by far the most important is the last, that embodying his conversation with an able French Staff Officer on the Rhine, and in that conversation the salient facts are two, viz., that Captain Florange agreed with Colonel Repington that the German people had had enough of war and that the danger lay in ' the disastrous docility of the German people ' which left them at the mercy of reactionary elements. But is this statement true of the German people, that they are disastrously docile ? Does history bear it out ? Our reading of German history is different to that of Captain Florange, as we are unable to admit that docility is an essentially German characteristic. In the past the German people have been anything but docile except when under the strict rule of a thoroughly military government.

Until the time when Bismark unified Germany, after three wars in the short space of six years, the outstanding characteristic of Germany was that no two Germans ever agreed on any subject. In fact it was the natural aversion of Germans to obey any order which led to, and in great measure justified, that careful, well thought-out system, embracing every activity of German life, educational, social and military, which we know as militarism. Militarism was not natural to the German ; it was imposed on him by his rulers as the proper corrective to his ill-regulated individualism, so as to make him malleable material for their purposes. Strength in peace and success in war were the immediate objectives of the rulers of Germany ; militarism the necessary means. We think that the Germans endured militarism, perhaps even bent their necks to the yoke willingly, while they believed that militarism was an essential element in national strength and would ensure national victory. Colonel

Repington's observations in Germany in 1921 seem to have led him to the conclusion that crushing defeat after four years of appalling slaughter and suffering, patiently endured by a militarised people in the hope of ultimate success, has disillusioned the Germans.

With that conclusion we agree. If any are disposed to doubt the de-militarisation of Germany, a few days spent in that country, especially in Berlin, ought to open their eyes. To anyone who remembers Berlin before the war, the Berlin of to-day will seem another city. If the visitor is himself a soldier the change will be all the more noticeable, although he may perhaps in his heart of hearts regret the complete obliteration of something which represented the recognised ascendancy of those who followed the profession of arms. Elsewhere in Europe the soldier was tolerated ; in Berlin before the war he was allowed by common consent to bear himself proudly as the embodiment of the national spirit. Pre-war Berlin was quite a nice place for a soldier, even if he did not belong to the German army, for he felt himself breathing an atmosphere exceedingly gratifying to military lungs. To-day all that is changed. Of all cities in Europe, Berlin is the one in which the soldier seems to be least respected. Not many are to be seen in the street and those few are untidy and unconsidered. Their demeanour reflects the attitude to them of the civil population. In 1914 there was no question but that the soldier was on top of the civilian ; to-day the civilian is on top of the soldier, and the German soldier knows it.

This de-militarisation was brought home vividly to a recent visitor to Berlin, a professional soldier who knew Berlin before the war, who was taken one day to see the feeding of the poorer students of the Berlin University. Owing to the depreciation of the currency and general financial inflation it has become impossible for students of moderate means, the sons of officers and of members of the professional classes, to attend the University lectures unless meals can be provided for them at cheap prices, far below those charged even in the more humble restaurants. This visitor was taken to a disused barrack near the University to see the students fed. He was ushered into a great dining hall where a few score youths of the German middle class, untidy, ill-kempt and long-haired (in appearance

embryo Bolshevists) were satisfying their appetites on some unsavoury mess of glutinous cereals. Turning from the unattractive youths before him, he asked his guide to what regiment these barracks had belonged and was told 'Das zweite Regiment vom Garde zu fuss.' Being a professional soldier and knowing something of the traditions, history and fighting worth of that famous regiment, it was perhaps not surprising that suddenly the room seemed full of ghosts hating the interlopers who had succeeded them, ghosts of the dead officers of the Second Foot Guards, and that, at any rate for one brief moment, the de-militarisation of Germany seemed more complete than admirable. When once again in the open air outside the barrack gates he was able, however, to recognise once more that the de-militarisation of Germany was not only an Allied interest and a European necessity but something in itself admirably complete. This incident is recorded merely to emphasize the truth of Colonel Repington's opinion, that the Germany of to-day is sick to death of war.

EUGENICS

EUGENICS, which is the application of biological science to sociology, must at present be judged rather by its aims and promise than by its results. The experts who are engaged in genetical research are agreed in deprecating hasty action. They know the extreme complexity of the problems which they are investigating; they know the jealousy with which nature guards her most intimate secrets. But they are no less agreed that the creation of a new social conscience—I had almost said a new ethics—is imperatively required, if civilisation is to escape utter disaster. The conversion or enlightenment of public opinion would be a great help to the science of genetics. A few thousands of voluntary workers, collecting and tabulating details of their family histories, would be very useful. Galton tried to enlist the interest of the public in this work, but the response was not very encouraging.

Last year, the Minister of Education in the Swedish Parliament, in supporting the establishment of an Institute for Race-Biology, made the following remarks :—

‘ It is doubtless clear to everyone who is awake to the circumstances of the time in which we live, that we cannot help feeling anxious about the future of civilised nations. At the centre of the many powerful forces which are at work to improve and ennoble the human race, many regrettable and dangerous conditions show themselves which threaten to undermine and annihilate the work of these forces. At the same time that the welfare of the people, taken as a whole, is improved, the mortality diminished, the average length of life increased, they are threatened by a deterioration of race. The vigour of the race is destroyed, which is too high a price to pay for the advantages gained by the high standard to which our material and mental culture has attained. For some time endeavours have been made to counteract the destroying forces. But they have been chiefly directed to improving the outward conditions of human life, the social environment. With every appreciation of what has been done in this way, one has had one’s eyes open to the fact, that no decisive victory can be won by these means only, against the evils which we are fighting. We do not rely any longer on the effect of improved conditions of environment. The fact of the importance of heredity for the continuation and improvement of the race is at last getting recognition.’

There is nothing original or striking about this declaration ; but it is significant as coming from a Minister of State. In England we are not so far advanced as the Swedes. At the Galton Lecture last year Mr. Bateson, our leading experimental biologist, referred to what passed on the same occasion in 1919. (It will be seen that I am vain of a compliment from Mr. Bateson.)

'The Dean of St. Paul's delivered an address full of stimulus and penetration, indicating many indubitable consequences which recent legislation must certainly entail upon the composition of our population, results altogether outside the purview of those from whose action they ensue. Sir Auckland Geddes, in proposing the vote of thanks, after sufficiently indicating his own mode of thought by asking us to look with complacency on the danger of over-population—that overwhelming menace to the peace of the world and the stability of civilisation—proceeded to affirm that 'in politics, in the affairs with which Governments have to deal, it is not accurate knowledge which matters, it is emotion,' concluding with an exhortation that we should let ourselves go on the great wave of emotion sweeping the nation towards the millennium which the Ministry of Reconstruction, unhampered by accurate knowledge, was preparing for us.'

A nation which takes for prophets irrationalists like Mr. Kidd and Mr. Chesterton has no right to complain of emotional politicians, who despise accurate knowledge. It has deserved them. The anti-scientific temper is our enemy to-day—a worse enemy than the Germans. It has become shameless and aggressive, taking advantage of certain anti-intellectualist tendencies in modern philosophy, and of dissensions in the scientific camp. The Revolution, which more than a hundred years ago guillotined Lavoisier, 'having no need of chemists,' is now proclaiming that it has no need of 'intellectuals' of any kind. In Russia they have been massacred and exterminated ; in our own country they are ignored and despised. That intellect as such should be spoken of with contempt is a new thing ; it indicates the barbarisation of public and social life. The trained mind finds it difficult to realise how utterly confused are the springs of action in the majority—how self-interest and prejudice and mob-contagion and sentiment and the wish to believe are combined in an irrational jumble, out of which emerges a something which psychologists dignify by the name of the Group Mind, but which is really an undisciplined and unsifted bundle of emotions and prejudices, gathering by preference round a sentiment rather than an idea. Such is the mentality of the

average man, who, strong in his numbers, treats the warnings of science with contempt and spurns all authority.

Eugenists believe that unless civilisation is guided on scientific principles, it must come to ruin. We are ready to give up all our theories, if we can be proved to be in the wrong; but we stand by scientific as against emotional or sentimental ethics. We can understand, though we profoundly disagree with, those who oppose us on grounds of sacrosanct authority. Just as the political economist has no radical quarrel with the man who says, 'Humanity and the fear of revolution make it impossible for us to accept that social system which produces the aggregate 'maximum of wealth,' but has a great quarrel with the man who says, 'Double wages and halve output, and our trade will not suffer at all'; so we know where we are with a man who says, 'Birth-control is forbidden by God; we prefer poverty, unemployment, wars of extermination, the physical, moral and intellectual degeneration of the people, and a high death-rate to any interference with the universal command to increase and multiply'; but we have no patience with those who say that we can have unrestricted and unregulated propagation without these consequences. At this early stage in the science of Eugenics, a great part of our work is to impress upon the public this alternative. Either rational selection must take the place of the natural selection which the modern State will not allow to act, or we shall deteriorate as surely as a miscellaneous crowd of dogs which was allowed to rear puppies from promiscuous matings.

The Swedish Minister of Education said rightly that Nature is more important than Nurture. Professor Karl Pearson has pointed out that in spite of unparalleled and very costly efforts to improve environment, our output of first-class ability is decidedly less than it was a hundred years ago. Our policy of encouraging nature's failures and misfits to multiply, while the better stocks are progressively penalised for their support, is producing the results which might have been predicted. Professor J. A. Thomson says that the ratio of defectives to normal persons more than doubled between 1874 and 1896. Professor Pearson has tabulated a long list of natural characters, and another long list of nurtural characters, and has worked out in each class what is called the co-efficient of correlation, that is to say, the percentage of resemblance between members of the same family in natural

and in nurtural qualities. His conclusion is that the influence of environment is not one-fifth that of heredity, and quite possibly not one-tenth of it. It is only our ignorance of this fact that has led us to disregard nature in the belief that improved nurture must involve racial progress. The Professor ends with an earnest appeal to realise the importance of the problem, since otherwise 'we can give no aid to the working man on the points where he needs most education at the present critical time in our national history. Our working classes need more than ever some other guidance than that of the politician and journalist ; neither of these will lead them to see beyond the horizon of class interest, or enable them to look upon the nation as an ever-changing organization, susceptible of advance or decay, as it obeys or disobeys stern natural laws.'

Professor Pearson is a socialist ; but the socialism of the man of science differs considerably, it will be seen, from the socialism of the platform and the pulpit. His constituency includes the unborn, who are of no use at elections.

Precise knowledge is at present available, in man, for comparatively few characters, and these, such as the inheritance of eye-colour and of certain relatively rare deformities and diseases, are for the most part not of very great importance. Nevertheless, some interesting laws have been discovered, and in one instance, that of mental defect or feeble-mindedness, the results are of very ominous import indeed. Feeble-mindedness follows simple Mendelian rules. It cannot be bred out of a family in which it has established itself, but it could be eliminated by bringing the infected stock to an end. Unfortunately, the birth-rate of the feeble-minded is quite 50 per cent. higher than that of normal persons. Feeble-minded women, being unable to protect themselves, often have an illegitimate child nearly every year. In one workhouse sixteen feeble-minded women had 116 idiot children. The defect, as we might expect, is closely associated with pauperism, vice and criminality. 'Again and 'again,' says Dr. Tredgold, 'in investigating the family history 'of the feeble-minded, I have found that their brothers and 'sisters, if not actually defective, were criminals, prostitutes, 'paupers, or ne'er-do-wells.' Their numbers, in England and Wales, amount to about 150,000. Each of these probably costs the State, on an average, about £1,500. These facts are so certain, and the results so mischievous, that the Eugenics Education Society forsook its usual policy of not meddling with

legislation, and actively supported the Act for the compulsory segregation of mental defectives.

There are many other diseases in which the influence of heredity has been clearly traced. Epilepsy in a family is considered a serious mark of degeneracy, and is often combined with other physical, mental or moral defects. Havelock Ellis has shown, by the way, that the distinguished men who are said to have been epileptic were probably not so. There is no reason, for example, to suppose that St. Paul's 'thorn in the flesh' was epilepsy. Hæmophilia, or bleeding, to which the poor little Tsarevitch was subject, is strongly inherited; but in females it behaves like a Mendelian recessive, remaining latent through life; so that the disease is transmitted through the apparently healthy sisters of a bleeder. Infected males do not often become fathers; if they do, there is some reason to think that their sons escape. Davenport gives the pedigree of a family in which there were nine male and nine female bleeders; this is a very rare exception to the rule that the disease spares the female sex.

In order that it may not be thought that I am accusing the poor only of transmitting hereditary taints, my next example shall be taken from the higher ranks. In 1780 (says Mr. Arnold White)—

'A marriage took place between a wealthy girl in whose family there had been insanity and a healthy man in her own rank of life. The couple had three children, of whom one was an idiot and one was normal; neither of these married; the third child, who was apparently normal, married and produced nine children, of whom the first was insane, the second to the fifth either insane, suicides, or melancholiacs. Of the subsequent descendants no fewer than twenty were imbeciles, neurotic, or otherwise abnormal. Seven more were doubtful, and twenty-five were normal.'

About half the entire stock were tainted, which is what we should expect, and there is no tendency for the abnormality to disappear.


Professor Karl Pearson gives a pedigree of congenital cataract. A blind woman had two daughters blind at forty. Of her five grand-children only one escaped; the other four were blind by thirty. Of her fifteen great-grandchildren thirteen had cataract. Of the forty-six great-great-grandchildren who can be traced, twenty were already of feeble sight at seven, and some lost the sight of both eyes. 'Forty defective individuals in a stock still multiplying, which nature, left to herself, would have cut off at its very inception!'

A pedigree of deaf-mutism, drawn up by the same author, shows twenty-two cases in three generations. In this family there were four marriages between two deaf-mutes, with the disastrous results which were to be expected.

These examples might easily be multiplied tenfold. But it is enough to say that the proof is complete. We do not know how these abnormalities originate ; we do know the only way in which they may be eliminated.

The inheritance of ability is a pleasanter subject, but much more complicated. We have to consider the social advantages enjoyed by the children of a successful man, and the assistance which the father's position may sometimes give to his sons in the early stages of their career. But the evidence is that mental qualities are inherited to exactly the same extent as physical, and advantageous variations to the same extent as unfavourable. Galton's book on the inheritance of genius ('ability' would have been a better word, as he admitted himself) is well known, and all who have studied the subject are familiar with the remarkable pedigrees of the Darwins, with their relatives the Wedgwoods and Galtons, and of the Bach family, several of whom were eminent musicians. The Kembles, in the same way, had a natural gift for acting.

From my own observation I think that no kind of ability is so strongly inherited as scholarship—in the narrower sense of the word. It would be almost safe for a classical examiner to give a scholarship to a youth called Sidgwick, Kennedy, or Butler, without reading his papers. If in this place I give as an example the pedigree of my own mother's family, it is not from conceit or egotism, but merely as an instance of the way in which a quite ordinary family record will confirm the views of Eugenists.



- (1) Archdeacon, Scholar and Divine. Dict.Nat. Biogr.
- (2) Scholar and Divine. Dict.Nat. Biogr.
- (3) Archdeacon, Scholar, Historian, Minor Poet. Dict.Nat. Biogr.
- (4) Resident Fellow of Brasenose. Prominent in controversy with Tractarians.
- (5) Learned Hebrew Scholar.
- (6) Scholar of Eton and King's; Fellow of King's; Canon of St. Albans.
- (7) Proxime accessit for Hertford University Scholarship in his freshman's year; died aged 21.
- (8) Scholar of Eton and Oriel; a Colonial Bishop.
- (9) First Scholarship at Eton; Newcastle Scholar; a Colonial Bishop.
- (10) Scholar, Fellow, and Provost of Worcester College, Oxford.
- (11) See 'Who's Who.'
- (12) Scholar of Eton and Magdalen College, Oxford.
- (13) Archdeacon.

No males who lived to grow up are omitted. It will be seen that in four generations no member of the family failed to win a certain degree of success in scholarship, or theology, or both. Whether my orthodox ancestors would have approved of 'Outspoken Essays' is a very different question.

Many problems of great interest and importance are being zealously investigated, but at present without any very certain conclusions. For instance, many persons think that Eugenics begins and ends with the question: 'Should first cousins be allowed to marry?' Evidence has been brought that various bodily and mental defects result from such marriages; but the prevailing opinion is that when a stock is thoroughly sound there is no risk whatever. When some transmissible defect is present, even in a latent condition, it is obviously undesirable that the next generation should have a double dose of it. A kindred question is whether a national stock is improved by miscegenation. Continued in-breeding in a small society is certainly prejudicial, and all the great nations, not excluding the Jews, have been of mixed descent. But unchecked mongrelising destroys the symmetry of a national type. Probably alternate periods of fusion with immigrants and of stabilising the results give a nation the best chance of producing a fine type of men and women.

The determination of sex is a secret which nature has so far resolutely refused to part with. It has been suggested that femininity is a Mendelian dominant, so that every woman is half male, while every male is purely masculine. A male child results from the union of two male germs, a female child from the union of a male and a female germ, the male character being recessive. But this does not account for the greater number of male births which exists in almost if not quite every country. Still less has any reason been found for the much larger excess of male births in certain races. Among the Turko-Iranians the male children outnumber the female by 1,236 to 1,000. In the white races the proportion is about 1,050 to 1,000; among the negroes the numbers are nearly equal. During the war there was a widespread belief that the proportion of male births had greatly increased. The source of the belief was not observation, but the notion that as Providence is supposed to send an unusually abundant supply of berries for the birds before a hard winter, so the wastage of male lives in the war was being partially made good by an extra supply of boy babies. The forlorn damsels of 1916 were apparently to console themselves with young husbands a quarter of a century later. The strange thing is that when the vital statistics of the war-time became available it appeared that there had actually been a small but appreciable increase (in England and Wales from 1039 to 1046) in the ratio of male births. This phenomenon was common to all the belligerent countries, and extended to some neutrals affected by the war. No explanation is forthcoming; but personally I am inclined to think that insufficient food may have slightly increased the male births. Some experiments with animals favour this theory; but it is right to say that the best authorities reject it.

Another question of great importance is whether the age of the parents at the child's birth has much influence on his future career. Here there is plenty of evidence, but it is conflicting. Vaerting, of Berlin, finds that distinguished men are nearly always the sons of young fathers, if the fathers were themselves distinguished, though undistinguished fathers may have distinguished sons up to the age of sixty. It is therefore a fatal mistake for intellectual men to defer their marriage; their only chance of having children of whom they may be proud is to beget them before thirty. On the other hand, Havelock Ellis, whose

studies in this field are always of the highest value, finds that the distinguished fathers of distinguished sons were above the average age when their children were born.

‘ There have been fifteen distinguished English sons of distinguished fathers, but instead of being nearly always under thirty and usually under twenty-five, as Vaerting found in Germany, the English distinguished father has only five times been under thirty and among these five only twice under twenty-five. Moreover, precisely the most distinguished among the sons (Francis Bacon and William Pitt) had the oldest fathers, and the least distinguished sons the youngest fathers.’

It seems to be established by the biometricians that children who are born after their fathers are fifty seldom attain distinction, and that on the other hand immature marriages do not produce good results. But these are counsels based on averages ; nature refuses to be fettered. Napier, the inventor of logarithms, was the son of a little boy of sixteen.

A very different question is whether alcohol should be added to the short list of racial poisons which may affect the germ-plasm. We have here to be on our guard against the violent prejudice of teetotal fanatics. But my honoured friend Dr. Mjøen, of Norway, who was my guest at the first Eugenics Congress, seems to have demonstrated that pronounced alcoholism in the parent may gravely injure the constitution of the child. The difficulty in this question is that alcoholism is usually a symptom or consequence of degeneracy, so that quite apart from any direct poisoning of the germ-plasm by alcohol, we might expect to see very inferior children from alcoholic parents. Professor Karl Pearson is not convinced that the ordinary heavy drinker does any harm to his children.

It is gratifying to a clergyman to find that not only do the clergy live longer than any other profession (this is conclusively proved by the Registrar-General's statistics), but that they are considered the most desirable of parents. Vaerting and Havelock Ellis agree that the list of distinguished clergymen's sons is long and illustrious ; and Sir Francis Galton told me in conversation that he considered the clergy the very best sires from the eugenic point of view. I will not speculate on the causes of this ; but everyone must have noticed the extremely robust appearance of the old-fashioned parson (the younger clergy are mostly drawn from a different class), and the facts, as ascertained by impartial

investigators, are certainly a strong argument against clerical celibacy. On the other side, I remember an Eton boy who, when asked why the sons of Eli turned out badly, replied, 'The sons of clergymen always turn out badly.' He attributed this startling generalisation to his tutor, who was himself in Holy Orders.

Dr. Schiller, of Oxford, who ought to give us a book on scientific ethics applied to sociology—for there is no one else in England who could write it with so much wit and wisdom—has said that 'civilisation has more than one string to its bow; it is at present bowstringing itself with several.' The most expeditious mode of strangulation is probably war, a ruinously dysgenic institution, which carefully selects the fittest members of the community, rejecting the inferior specimens, takes them away from their wives for some of the best years of their lives, and kills off one in ten or one in five, as the case may be. The loss inflicted on our race by the Great War can never be repaired; the average quality of the parents of the next generation has been greatly lowered, and this evil is irremediable. Hardly less destructive is social revolution, as we have seen it at work in Russia. The trustees of such culture as existed in Russia have been exterminated; civilisation in that unhappy country has been simply wiped out in a few years, and the nation has reverted to absolute barbarism. But there is a third bowstring which, because it is always round our necks, we seldom think of, and which because it seems to be inseparable from civilisation as we know it we hardly think of combating; and this may turn out to be our destined instrument of death.

The differences between man and the highest subhuman animals are so great that there must have been a time when he was progressing comparatively rapidly; the time when he was growing a larger brain and more serviceable hands. From the time when he began to be civilised he has progressed no further. His brain is no larger than it was ten thousand years ago; his natural weapons have atrophied; civilised man is an inferior animal to the finest of the surviving barbarian tribes. To put it shortly, environmental development supplanted intrinsic development; the tool progressed, the user of the tool remained stationary or even went back. This process, which for long ages moved very slowly, has taken long strides forward since the

industrial revolution a hundred years ago. Natural selection, which in uncivilised societies weeds out all nature's failures, has almost ceased to act. A dwarf can mind a machine ; a cripple can keep accounts. The general handiness and adaptability which is second nature to a savage is useless in an age of specialisation. Political changes have deprived the tax-payer of any voice in the disposition of his money, and enormously expensive machinery has been set up to subsidise the incompetent and the wastrel at the expense of the unrepresented minority. The inevitable consequence is that the unfit increase, while the fit decay. As Dr. Schiller says :—

'The particular kind of ability society recognises, the cream the society wants, is always rising to the top ; but when it gets there it is always being skimmed off and cast away. Could there be a more crushing confutation of the pretensions of the civilised state to benefit the human race ? It is continually pumping up from the lower strata the particular sorts of ability that are valued, concentrating them in the upper strata, and there destroying fifty per cent. of them in every generation.'

We are thus faced with a progressive deterioration of our stock, due to the suspension of natural selection, and the entire absence of anything like rational selection. The evil has been greatly increased by the stupidities of ignorant and unscientific class-legislation. We are threatened with something much worse than a regression to healthy barbarism. Let anyone contrast the physique of a Zulu or an Anatolian Turk, or of the Irish savages who are cutting the throats of loyalists on the other side of St. George's Channel, with that of our slum population, and we shall realise that we are breeding not vigorous barbarians but a new type of sub-men, abhorred by nature, and ugly as no natural product is ugly. We cannot find any comfort in the argument that this modification of environment at the expense of natural endowment is in the line of evolution, and therefore not only inevitable but beneficial, 'There is a way which seemeth right 'unto a man, but the ends thereof are the ways of death.' So-called progress, which is a rare episode in human history, has before now led a civilisation into a blind alley, from which there is no escape. Our tools have become our masters ; to all appearance we work for them, and not they for us. They ought to be merely our instruments for realising a good and healthy life ; they are in fact the means of our degeneration. Mechanism is morally

neutral ; it may be turned to good or to bad ends ; and it is character only which decides whether it shall be well or badly used. A degenerate race cannot use its machinery to any good purpose. With its instinctive shrinking from intellectual effort, from exertion and from enterprise, it will concentrate its attention, as it is doing already, on labour-saving appliances to take the place of muscles and brains, till we shall soon have a generation which will call it a grievance to walk a mile, and which will think it the acme of civilisation to be able on every occasion to ' put a penny ' in the slot ' in answer to the seductive advertisement, ' You ' press the button, we do the rest.' It has been proved a thousand times that nature takes away an organ which is not used. All our faculties were evolved during long ages in response to what were then our needs, by the stern but beneficent weeding of nature. In the absence of any systematic race-culture, we shall gradually slide back into feeble and helpless creatures, the destined prey of some more vigorous stock.

This is one of those insidious diseases the advance of which is so slow that it is unperceived. An Englishman of Elizabeth's time would be shocked beyond measure if he could revisit his former rural haunts, now covered with masses of unlovely houses, and contemplate the types of humanity which he found there. But we do not reflect on these things. The new population, supported more and more every year out of the labour of the industrious and capable, are looked upon as voters and as receivers of doles ; we do not think of them either as men and women whom nature intended to be formed ' after God's image,' or as superfluous mouths which ought not to be there at all. The disease is insidious and in a sense painless ; we have many other things to think about.

There are no doubt many who will stoutly deny that there has been any degeneration at all. Perhaps their confidence may be shaken by evidence which has lately become available from the other side of the Atlantic. The Americans, who are generally believed to be behind no other nation in their average level of intelligence, devised very ingenious tests of mental development for the troops whom they mobilised in 1917 and 1918. These tests were applied to 1,726,966 officers and men who were destined for service in Europe. The examination papers were so arranged as to require very little writing. Alternative answers to simple

questions were given, and the men marked with a cross the answer which they thought correct. Most of the questions are so elementary that one may be surprised that they were set to grown men. For instance, the recruits were ordered to decide 'Why cats are useful animals,' and the answers among which they were to choose were (1) Because they catch mice ; (2) because they are gentle ; (3) because they are afraid of dogs. A slightly harder question was, 'Why is it colder near the poles ?' The suggested answers were : (1) Because they are farther from the sun ; (2) because the sun's rays fall obliquely near the poles ; (3) because there is so much ice there.

The examination, though extremely simple, was a comprehensive test of mental alertness and common sense. It is reported to have worked admirably. The men were divided into five grades : A and B, men of superior intelligence ; C, of average intelligence ; D and E, men of inferior or very poor intelligence. It was found by experience at the front that the men who had been placed in the two highest classes were in every respect the best soldiers, braver, steadier, more intelligent and able to learn their duties, more able to take the initiative in an emergency. The two lowest classes were practically useless except for the simplest tasks, and many of them were employed only behind the lines. Class E, it was reported, were a loss to the country ; it was not worth while to send them out.

Now, what are the statistics of these tests of intelligence ? American psychologists usually class the capacity of those whom they examine in terms of 'mental age,' the standard being fixed by the average proficiency of school children at different ages. The two lowest classes were below the mental age of nine, and many of the third class were below the mental age of thirteen, which in civil life is the limit below which an adult is classified as a 'moron,' or feeble-minded person. The men who found their way into classes A and B numbered 12 per cent. ; the average men 66 per cent. ; and the inferior men, below the mental age of nine, 22 per cent. But, as has been indicated, the standard of efficiency was much lower than that which is adopted in civil life. If 'feeble-mindedness' had been made to cover all intelligences below the mental age of thirteen, 47.3 per cent., nearly half the entire draft, would have fallen below the line. This percentage may be taken as applying very nearly to the

whole adult male population of America, since though a few highly educated men were no doubt reserved for intellectual war-work at home, at least as many imbeciles were not admitted to examination at all.

Although it does not bear directly on our subject, it may be interesting to refer to the comparative intelligence of American soldiers grouped by nationality. England and Holland come out at the top of the list, a result which confirms the opinion that the citizens whom we lose to the United States are much above the average of those who stay at home. Of the negro draft, at the lower end of the scale, only 11 per cent. were above the mental age of thirteen, and 80 per cent. had to be placed in the two lowest classes. Among other nations, the Polish draft had 70 per cent. below the mental age of nine ; the Italian 63 per cent. ; the Russian 60. Italy seems not to send out her most intelligent citizens.

America, then, the classical land of democracy, is governed by voters about half of whom are, in intelligence, children of less than thirteen years old. It will hardly be maintained either that our population is more intelligent than the Americans, or that the addition of the female voters would raise the standard. That is what we have come to ; our legislators are chosen, and our policy determined by a body half of whom would be scientifically classed as ' high-grade morons.' And yet both in America and England enormous amounts of public money are wasted every year in attempting to educate those who have proved themselves incapable of education.

This kind of national degeneracy corresponds to senile decay in the individual. Calamities like war and pestilence are soon recovered from if the national stock is sound ; but a nation in such a condition as these figures indicate can certainly not afford to lose three-quarters of a million of its best men. Physicians do not bleed a patient who is dying of pernicious anæmia.

Mr. Hilaire Belloc has lately given it as his opinion that our civilisation is on the wane. I do not know (since, as a Roman Catholic, he is probably an anti-eugenicist) on what grounds he bases this opinion ; but from our point of view he is probably right. Only we need not suppose that the case is hopeless. Our future is in our own hands—to make or to mar. The science of statistics has put a new weapon against disease into our hands.

A nation can now, so to speak, take its own temperature, and make an intelligent diagnosis and prognosis of its own condition. This is an age of science, though scientific ethics have an uphill battle to fight. The results of neglecting the lessons of science are becoming more apparent every year ; and if we do not learn our lesson voluntarily, other nations may force us to face the facts.

But the time for repentance is short. The evils which we deplore are, in their present intensity, a new phenomenon. Dr. Stevenson, in a valuable paper on 'The Fertility of Various Social Classes in England and Wales from the Middle of the Nineteenth Century to 1911,' shows that—

'The increase in range of total fertility from the marriages of 1851-1861, which were 11 per cent. below the mean in the case of class I (middle class) and 3 per cent. above in that of class V (unskilled labour), to those of 1891-1896, which were 26 per cent. below the mean in the case of Class I and 13 per cent. above it in Class V, is very apparent. The table seems to suggest that if the comparison could have been carried twenty years further back a period of substantial equality between all classes might have been met with.'

He adds truly that we have to face 'a formidable fact—how formidable is a question which must be left to the consideration of authorities on eugenics.' 'The difference in fertility between the social classes is a new phenomenon, and on that account the more disquieting.' It is a deplorable symptom of official ignorance or indifference that in the census of last year the questions which would have thrown light on the progress of these disquieting symptoms were deliberately omitted.

It is not contended that the upper and middle classes are necessarily more desirable parents than the self-supporting working class. There is some reason, perhaps, for thinking that the professional class in this country is the best endowed by nature ; but without insisting upon this, we are surely justified in saying that the disproportionate increase of class V is an ominous and dangerous symptom.

Diagnosis is one thing, and treatment is another. In this case, the first requisite is to get the diagnosis accepted. But a writer on eugenics may reasonably be expected to make some practical suggestions, without which he may be accused of uttering mere jeremiads.

Negative eugenics—the prevention of the multiplication of undesirable types—is more important at present than positive—

the encouragement of the better stocks to reproduce their kind. For the country is over-populated—to the extent of ten millions, the Prime Minister is believed to have said. Some effective check upon an increase which—excluding the war period—amounts to about ten per thousand per annum is the indispensable preliminary to social and eugenic reform alike. It is useless, under present conditions, to lecture the well-to-do on the duty of having large families. It is not desirable that they should, and they could not provide for them in their own station. (And here I will say parenthetically that one cause of the small families in the richer classes has never, so far as I know, been noticed. It is assumed that people choose to have small families because they are rich and selfish ; the fact very often is that families have become rich because they are small. The money of a dwindling family tends to be concentrated in the hands of the last survivor ; a prolific family soon ceases to rank among the well-to-do.) What we should aim at is to reduce the average size of the family. The best way to do this would be either to reimpose school fees, or to enact that the State will educate two children in each family free, but no more. Persons with a definite transmissible taint ought not to be allowed to marry or copulate without effective safeguards, such as are now proposed, against conception. But in this matter there are strong prejudices to be overcome.

Positive eugenics must take the form rather of improving the quality than the quantity of births among the fit. Certificates of health as a condition of lawful marriage might be required by the State ; they involve no more ' inquisition ' than life insurance, to which no one objects. It might be possible to combine this requirement with the obligation for both parties to insure their lives, of course for a very small amount ; this insurance might constitute a contributory old age pension. In the absence of such legislation, the custom might be encouraged of demanding a health certificate on both sides before marriage. There have been several cases of wicked deception, in which an imbecile girl has been carefully trained to behave like an intelligent person in society, and an unhappy man has been tricked into marrying her. And of course every bride and bridegroom has a right to know for certain that the other party is in a healthy condition for the married life. These voluntary certificates might come to have a considerable value. They might include not only a medical

certificate of health, but a scientific record of the family history, drawn up by an official board, which could be made self-supporting by fees. An untarnished family history, so certified, would be a source of legitimate pride, and, as public opinion becomes more enlightened, would be of more value to those wishing to marry than five thousand pounds in War Loan. Galton's plan of offering pecuniary inducements to the A1 class to marry and have children is not, I think, practicable. The possession of A1 children ought to be prize enough.

In almost all the higher walks of life, the old are overpaid and the young 'sweated.' The young presumably acquiesce in this system in the hope of becoming fossils themselves after a time. But it is eugenically bad, making early marriage impossible, or encouraging the dysgenic art of fortune-hunting. This evil is not irremediable.

The present system of taxation, and still more of upper-class education, acts as an artificial deterrent to parenthood. The co-education of all classes at the State schools would be a remedy, but the Public Schools of England have been and still are a great national asset, and the loss of them would be a calamity. I notice with great regret that the Oxford and Cambridge Commission proposes to abolish all prize scholarships at the Universities, turning them into sizarships. No money is to be given by the Colleges to which the eleemosynary taint does not cling. This will be another blow to the professional class, and it will be recognised too late that a heavy blow has been struck at liberal education. As a sop to the class which has been taught to expect doles, to ask for them without shame and to accept them without gratitude, great injury has been done to the class which would rather suffer privation than beg for charity. The clever public schoolboy will lose the stimulus which makes him work to secure an honourable and valuable prize, and the pleasure of knowing that he has helped his father and made the home life more comfortable. It is quite right that a rich parent should give back, as a free gift, his son's scholarship money to the College. This has often been done, and would in the future be done still more often; but the recommendation of the Commissioners turns generosity into a fine, and the scholar's gown into a badge of mendicancy. From the point of view of eugenics, it will still further penalise parenthood among our best families.

The prejudices against eugenics are still strong. They find vent in such strange ebullitions as a recent book by G. K. Chesterton, and in frequent denunciations on the part of Roman Catholics. It is however strange that Christians should be anti-eugenists. For though religion is the strongest of *nurtural* influences, the religion of Christ, like eugenics, makes nature, not nurture, its end. It aims at saving the soul—the personality, the man himself—and in comparison with this makes very light of his environment. A man is saved, not by what he has, or knows, or even does, but by what he is. Christianity treats all the apparatus of life with a disdain as great as that of the biologist ; so long as a man is inwardly healthy, it cares little whether he is rich or poor, learned or simple. For the Christian as for the eugenicist, the test of the welfare of a country is the quality of the men and women whom it turns out. He cares nothing for the disparity between births and deaths ; for him quality is everything, quantity is nothing. And surely the Christian, who is taught to fix his gaze on ‘ the Kingdom of God,’ and to pray that it may be set up on earth, is bound to think of the welfare of posterity as a thing which concerns him as much as that of his own generation. And this welfare is conceived in terms of intrinsic worth and healthiness. The Sermon on the Mount contains some admirable eugenic precepts, reminding us that a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, nor a corrupt tree good fruit. ‘ Do men gather ‘ grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles ? ’ Christ may not have been thinking primarily of heredity, but He enunciates a universal law which applies to the family no less than to the individual.

The opposition of traditional religion may be excused on the ground of the intense conservatism of the religious mind, and its reluctance to accept any ethical teaching which does not bear the stamp of its own mint. But what are we to say to the steady hostility of the doctrinaire socialists to any interference with unchecked and unregulated procreation ? We might have expected a very different attitude, both from the advocates of increasing State interference, and from those who find in our present social order a conspiracy against the manual workers. The socialist government of Mexico has refused to interfere with the circulation of the books of Mrs. Margaret Sanger, the propagandist of birth-control, on the ground that the opposition to this movement proceeds from persons who are themselves

in possession of information which they wish to withhold from the workers, in order that there may be a large supply of cannon-fodder for capitalism. This accusation, however unfair, is what one might expect the enemies of our industrial system to bring ; and it is surprising that it has not occurred to our socialists to bring it. It is difficult not to have a suspicion that our revolutionary party are counting on an exacerbation of the economic stress by over-population, and that they welcome the prospect of a condition of things for which there can be no peaceful solution.

Meanwhile, we still hear such silly objections as that we value brawn above brain, and that the eugenic State would prevent the birth of men of genius, many of whom would not pass the eugenic test. It is true that men of genius are not always desirable fathers ; but their parents, who possessed no genius, are, almost without exception, people who would easily pass any ordinary tests. Havelock Ellis has discussed this question, and has found that ' in not 1 per cent. can insanity be traced among the parents of ' British men of genius, and there is not a single instance in which ' the parent had been recognisably insane before the birth of the ' distinguished child ; so that any prohibition of the marriage of ' persons who had previously been insane would have left British ' genius untouched.' A third objection, that ' we do not know ' what we want to breed for,' is not much more serious. We know very well the kind of people whom we do *not* want ; and the question whether general or specialised ability is the greater asset to a nation may be left to a future time, when knowledge is more advanced and public opinion better educated.

It is possible that while we are governed by ' high-grade ' morons ' there will be no practical recognition of the dangers which threaten us. But those who understand the situation must leave no stone unturned in warning their fellow countrymen ; for the future of civilisation is at stake.

W. R. INGE.

THE REALM OF MINOS

The Palace of Minos at Knossos : A Comparative Account of the Successive Stages of the Early Cretan Civilisation as illustrated by the Discoveries at Knossos. By Sir ARTHUR EVANS. Vol. I. Macmillan & Company. 1921.

IT is nearly thirty years since Sir Arthur Evans began a series of journeys in what was then the least known island of the Mediterranean, and collected the evidence for local systems of prehistoric writing. Scientific travellers had ridden through Crete, famous as a hunting-ground for the botanist since the days when it furnished imperial Rome with drugs. Belon and Tournefort, Pococke and many another traveller in the Levant had something to say of antiquities as well as natural products. Robert Pashley, a young Cambridge don, investigated classical remains, copied inscriptions, and wrote a lively and learned account of his journeys in the west and centre of the island, published in 1837; the notes of his visit to the eastern region would be of value if they could be rediscovered. Then came Raulin, the French geologist, and Spratt, as versatile as the best spirits in our navy have always been; his 'Travels and Researches in Crete (1865)' are a safer guide to the interior of the island than the contemporary chart, for which he was partly responsible. Indeed, to this day there is no adequate survey of the island as a whole. The pioneers in systematic archaeology were Italians, Halbherr and others, who copied inscriptions, identified ancient sites, and accomplished some digging under the Turkish régime, followed up in recent years by extensive work at Phaistos and Hagia Triadha, royal seats in the plain, south of Mount Ida.

But Sir Arthur was the first scholar who traversed the island again and again with an eye to possible traces of its prehistoric culture. He had marked Knossos for his own by a purchase of land some years before the opening of excavations there and elsewhere in Crete in the spring of 1900. After generations of warfare between the Christians of the interior and the Moslems of the coasts and lowlands, a warfare of religion rather than race, the Powers had compelled the Turkish garrisons to evacuate the

island and invited Prince George of Crete to govern it as their representative. It was not only the legendary fame of the place that attracted Evans, and scholars of other nationalities too, who at various times cast eyes upon it, Schliemann among them. There had been chance finds and some desultory digging. Walls of massive blocks marked with characters of some pre-Hellenic script, huge oil-jars, painted pottery resembling that of Mycenae, were indications that a palace lay here like those which Schliemann, following Homeric clues, had uncovered on the Greek mainland. And since Greek tradition placed Minos and Theseus and Ariadne in a period some generations before the Trojan War, there was reason to hope that Knossos would illustrate the earlier stages of 'Mycenaean' religion and art, which still needed explaining, though scholars had recovered from their first bewilderment and no longer ascribed the exquisite gold-work of the shaft-graves at Mycenae to Goths or Phœnicians. Moreover, the labyrinth at Knossos had attracted visitors in Roman times, and there was the story told by a late writer calling himself Dictys the Cretan, that in the days of Nero an earthquake had exposed a lead-lined chest containing tablets inscribed with unknown characters. In short there were hopeful indications in plenty, and Sir Arthur Evans made his plans for a long and thorough exploration. The results surpassed all hopes. No one could then guess that the palace with its inner and outer courts, far larger than any corresponding building on the mainland, would be found to cover six acres; or that owing to its immemorial sanctity the Greek and Roman settlements which hem it in had never encroached upon the site; or that, within an apparently natural hillside, the west wing of this palace, founded about 2000 B.C., was still standing two storeys high, buried beneath the ruins of its own third and fourth storeys.

The interest of the full and punctual reports which made known the results of the work from 1900 to 1905 lay for most people in the verification of historical elements in familiar Cretan legends. The central figure in the folk-tales which have preserved for us a confused memory of this remote heroic age is Minos, the king and law-giver, ruler of a wide empire, master of the seas, the friend and confidant of Zeus, with whom he took counsel in the holy cave, the scene of the supreme God's nativity. If we had only the folk-tales relating to King Solomon or

Alexander the Great, we could still discern through the cloud of legend the figure of a great king. In the cycle of stories about Minos and the labyrinth and other marvels wrought for him by Daedalus, we have the memories, compressed and foreshortened and attached to the figure of one outstanding ruler, of a whole vanished civilisation. Minos stands for a dynasty, or more probably a succession of dynasties, and the name may possibly record an hereditary title, like that of Pharaoh, in the lost Cretan tongue. The adjective formed from it, 'Minoan,' is a convenient label for this Cretan civilisation which was developing throughout the Bronze age, and was overthrown by conquerors from the north at the beginning of the Iron age. Its chronology is determined by that of Egypt, thanks to discoveries of Egyptian objects in Crete and of Cretan objects in Egypt. Adopting Eduard Meyer's dating of the Egyptian dynasties, Sir Arthur estimates the duration of the Bronze age (including an early phase in which copper tools were used) at something over two thousand years. He divides it into three main periods: Early Minoan ('E.M.') preceding the foundation of the great palaces, say 3400-2100 B.C.; Middle Minoan ('M.M.') during which Knossos attained the zenith of its prosperity and wealth, 2100-1580; and Late Minoan ('L.M.'), during which the primacy passed to younger cities on the mainland, 1580-1200. These in turn are divided into three sub-periods, conveniently cited as E.M. I, II or III, and so forth.

The richly illustrated volume which has now appeared is the first of three in which Sir Arthur Evans proposes to elucidate this civilisation, and expound his scheme of naming and dating. As the title-page shows, 'The Palace of Minos' is much more than a narration of discoveries at Knossos. Those are described, but they are shown in their due relation to many discoveries made elsewhere, and the result is 'a comparative account of 'early Cretan civilisation,' which furnishes the European culture of to-day with title-deeds going back to the fourth millennium B.C. It is a great theme and beset with difficulty, but the author has gifts that fit him to act as guide through this labyrinth. His chief assistant, Dr. Duncan Mackenzie, has also given a good part of his life to Aegean archæology; he brought to Knossos an intimate knowledge of ceramics and stratification and all the mysteries of the digger's craft, learned during four seasons of

excavation under the British School at Athens, at Phylakopi in Melos. The architects, Mr. D. T. Fyfe and Mr. C. C. T. Doll kept a continuous record in plan and section, and have contributed ingenious essays in restoration. The intricacy of the investigation may be measured by the depth of the stratified remains. Those of the Minoan and later ages occupy about 19 feet, and the Neolithic deposit below them extends for 26 feet to the virgin rock, 'far exceeding in depth and volume that of any known European locality.'

Geographical conditions made Greece and the Greek islands a seed-bed of European civilisation. This ragged, mountainous peninsula, linked with Asia by chains of islands, offered a variety of careers and easy transitions between them. As Myres has pointed out, the Greek could become hill-shepherd or woodman, husbandman or gardener, fisherman or merchant-adventurer, in a climate that was alternately balmy and bracing, favourable alike to contemplation and to action. If Crete outstripped her neighbours in the first laps of the race, it was because she lay nearest to the growing empire of Egypt. Though no convenient islands lay between, as on the routes between Greece and Crete and Asia Minor, yet the voyage was easy in the long summer days when the wind blows steadily from the north.

'We set sail from wide Crete (says Odysseus—he speaks in the character of a Cretan viking) with a north wind fresh and fair, and lightly we ran as it were downstream; yea, and no harm came to any ship of mine, but we sat safe and hale while the wind and the pilots guided the barques. On the fifth day we came to the fair-flowing Aegyptus, and in the river Aegyptus I stayed my curved ships.'

The author believes that in its earliest stages this commerce was carried on by ships from the Delta, and that some part of the older population of Egypt may have migrated to Crete in the troublous times that accompanied the foundation of the first Egyptian kingdom. They traded not only with Crete but with the Cyclades; the Isthmus of Hierapetra, which offers an easy portage across Eastern Crete, was an early centre of progress.

The early Minoan graves at Mochlos in this region, explored by the American excavator, Mr. Seager, were rich in gold jewellery, and in exquisitely carved stone vases, pointing to relations with Egypt on the one hand, the Cyclades and even Troy on the other. The ships which carried to the Delta emery

from Naxos, obsidian from Melos, and other Cycladic products, may have loaded on the south side of the Isthmus. No doubt they also carried oil, the staple article of later Minoan trade, from the ports of the Messará, the plain adjoining Phaistos, where Sir Arthur Evans can point to a strong current of Egypto-Libyan influence. Egypt probably furnished the material as well as the decorative motives for the ivory seals found in the early Minoan 'ossuaries,' great vaulted charnel-houses, of this populous plain. Apes, lions, and scorpions are among the types employed, and one seal represents a draught-board in the Egyptian fashion with its characteristic conical draughtsmen. This interesting proof of borrowed elements in early Minoan culture is confirmed by a contemporary seal-stone which shows a man seated before a draught-board on a table, a draughtsman beneath his hand. It is one of a series of three and four-sided bead-seals with genre scenes. Another facet of the same stone shows a potter moulding a great jar. Elsewhere we have a potter taking a vase from the oven, or counting a row of jugs; a woman-potter at work; and two women, wearing the characteristic peaked collar of the island dress, who seem to be adoring a rayed solar symbol. It is noteworthy that these come from a district still renowned for its potteries, and remarkable for its early progress not only in ceramics but in metal-working—the Omphalian plain of antiquity, called since medieval times *Pediadha*, 'the Plain' *par excellence*. Smaller than the Messara, it lies between Mount Iuktas and the *Lasithi massif*, screened from the northern sea by low hills. Here once more we have a lowland with light and fertile soil, such as primitive men could till without much effort.

On the margin of this plain, near the village of Arkhalochori, eight miles to the south-west of Lyttos, lies a votive cave which was frequented in the Early Minoan age. The spot is devoid of natural grandeur, a narrow cleft less than a yard high running eight or nine yards into a hillside. But it yielded, first to peasants and afterwards to a skilled excavator, the veteran Dr. Joseph Hazzidakis, a profusion of copper sword-blades, knives and double axes, made of metal so thin as to be unfit for practical use. Of seven examples analysed only three contained any tin, the highest percentage being 3.28; and the analysis shows peculiarities pointing to the copper having come from Cretan mines. Some of the double axes are formed of two plates, not

to be recognised in Crete, gave to the whole class the name—now discarded—of 'Kamares' pottery.

The abundance of these delicate wares points to a degree of refinement surprising in that remote age. Accustomed to the daily use of porcelain and glass, we are apt to forget that until the seventeenth century people in this country and in most parts of Europe ate and drank from vessels of wood or horn or leather; the middle classes used pewter; the rich, silver or gold. The potter's craft fell into decay with the decline of the Roman Empire, and thereafter earthenware was little used at table until Chinese porcelain began to be imported and imitated. The classical world was better supplied. From the sixth century before Christ for nearly a thousand years the mass-production of table-ware was carried on at a succession of busy centres. Athens succeeded Corinth, South Italy wrested the trade from Athens and then it passed to Arretium in Etruria. Arretine cups, modelled on contemporary fashions in silver plate, reached Britain along with Italian wine before the Claudian conquest. Soon the industry took root in Gaul; a consignment of South Gaulish bowls, newly delivered in Pompeii before the catastrophe of A.D. 79, shows that provincial factories were already capturing the Italian market. In the second century Central Gaul and the Rhine provinces took the lead, and although the decorative skill of these factories was poor, they continued to produce cups and bowls of good technical quality, covered with a cleanly and wear-resisting ferruginous glaze. Inferior to the china and glazed earthenware of our own day, the crockery of Greek and Roman households was superior to anything available during the Middle Ages and long after. It is with these wares, the result of a long process of evolution, that we must compare the pottery of the Cretan Bronze Age, and it comes triumphant out of the test.

What of more spiritual things than cups and platters? Civilised man should be able to express ideas in writing. The most significant advance which accompanied the foundation of the first palace was the development of a regular hieroglyphic system of writing out of the 'pictographic' types current in the Early Minoan period. It appears on a large number of seals, which Sir Arthur Evans has already discussed in the first volume of his 'Scripta Minoa,' published by the Oxford University Press. The evidence is chiefly found on steatite bead-seals, three or

four-sided, and to a small extent on clay seal-impressions. Crete was now in occasional contact with Babylonia as well as Egypt, for a Babylonian hæmatite cylinder of about 2000 B.C. has recently been found in a tomb near Gortyna 'with pottery of the mature 'M.M.Ia class,' thus affording an excellent synchronism. It was undoubtedly due to Asiatic influence that the Cretan scribes adopted the use of clay tablets. At the same time the seal-engravers were borrowing a variety of motives from scarabs of the Egyptian Twelfth Dynasty, such as the *ankh* or 'life' sign, the *wax* or sacred papyrus stem, and the formidable figure of the hippopotamus-goddess Ta-urt, out of which late Minoan art was to evolve a characteristic genius or demon. The author's derivation of the last named type is new and convincing; it disposes of the theory which explained the monstrous demons on the Mycenaean gems as human worshippers masquerading in the skins of animals. These Egyptian borrowings link the close of the First Middle Minoan period with the beginning of the Twelfth Dynasty, approximately 2000-1900 B.C.

From the first we can trace the presence of a religious element in the palaces at Knossos and Phaistos. Sir Arthur Evans holds that they were temples as well as palaces and compares them with the great sanctuaries of Anatolia in which 'the priest not only 'represented the god, wore his dress, and wielded his authority, 'but often also bore his name.' At first the mother-goddess was worshipped on high places, natural peaks; the holy caves were more closely associated with her male consort. The typical example of such a hill-top sanctuary is that of Petsofa above the Minoan port of Palaikastro, where a peak, of no great height and in no way conspicuous, except that it overlooks the town, became a place of sacrifice and pilgrimage in the M.M.I. period. The votive terra-cottas, found in the excavations of the British School in enormous numbers, show that the Mountain-Mother was one to whom her worshippers could draw near for comfort and healing—figures of men and women; many separate limbs and parts of the body, modelled like the votive offerings in pilgrimage churches to-day, to express the dedicator's special need; all kinds of domestic animals, offered presumably with a prayer for their welfare and increase; and all the wild life of the mountains, badgers, stoats and hedgehogs.

Excavations were made in 1909 on Mount Iuktas, which was

probably frequented for similar purposes and at the same period by the people of the Knossos district. It is a notable mountain, rich in religious tradition, for from time immemorial it has been pointed out as the tomb of Zeus and is still known under that name to the peasants. Situate some miles inland from Knossos, the craggy ridge soars steeply to a height of 2,450 feet and dominates all the surrounding valleys. Its most impressive characteristic has been well described by a recent traveller :

‘ Whether the ancients were led by the form of this mountain to ascribe to it the honour of being the resting-place of the Father of Gods and Men, history does not say ; but certain it is that the human mind cannot conceive of a more sublime monumental sepulchre. Rocks and mountains often bear a likeness to human lineaments ; every traveller can recall many such resemblances, but none that I have seen have the convincing dignity of the face on Iuktas. The bearded face and the drapery or pillow on which the head reposes occupy the whole of the mountain-top. Seen in the flatness of the mid-day light it is an interesting outline and no more, but at turn of the sun the sculpturing begins. The sun works in masses, as Michaelangelo worked ; it carves out the planes of the face as Donatello carved them, letting detail go. So the chiselling continues, a high light here, a deepening shadow there, till with closed eyes the head has sunk down upon its pillow just as the sun is low. The face of Zeus on Iuktas, seen from the sea at close of day, is infinite in the pathos of power wearied, infinite in the beauty of peace. The man who can study it unmoved must be made of hard metal indeed.’*

The first modern writer to mention this marvel of natural sculpture is Buondelmonti, who visited Crete in 1415. The traditional sanctity of the mountain was then affirmed by three churches, perched on the colossal profile, only one of which is in use to-day—the successors of a Minoan sanctuary built on the northern summit of the ridge, that which overlooks Knossos, at about the same time as the First Palace.

‘ Here, it is natural to suppose, was the sacred peak of the Mother Goddess who presided over the Palace Sanctuary itself—the prototype, we may believe, of the lion-guarded pinnacle of rock on which she appears on the sealings of her central shrine, adored by a youthful male satellite—and within which her cult might naturally be associated with that of her divine son.’

The precinct is enclosed by a ‘ Cyclopean ’ wall of rough hewn rocks, still standing sixteen feet high in places. Within, as at

* Aubyn Trevor-Battye, ‘ Camping in Crete ’ (1913), p. 164.

Petsosfa, the offerings of the First and Second Middle Minoan periods were found in and about a deposit of grey ashes, marking the site of a rude altar of burnt-offering. To this there succeeded on both sites a small shrine without architectural pretensions, 'a little house of shelter and refection for the Goddess on her mountain-top, a *Casa Santa*, like that miraculously transported 'from Bethlehem to Loreto.' The offerings, disturbed and dispersed by treasure-hunters, have the same character as those of the East Cretan site, figures of men, women and animals, parts of the human body, and 'prayer pellets' conveying petitions which could not be expressed in plastic form.

We cannot divine the process by which the religious awe attaching to these natural mountain sanctuaries was transferred to the palaces in the plain, but we may suppose that it was the policy of the priest-kings to enhance their own authority and prestige by elaborating the ritual of their domestic shrines. These at first were small and simple. The inner sanctuary at Phaistos is a room measuring twelve feet by nine, with a low bench along three of its walls; of its furniture there remained an earthenware 'table of offerings' stamped with the figures of many oxen, clay lamps, a libation bowl carved in blue steatite, a large painted jar and a conch-shell trumpet. In a niche beneath one end of the bench were found stone pounders, 'as if for the preparation of barley.' Two stone mortars stood on the bench, and there were some painted cups. It looks as though the central rite had consisted in some kind of sacramental meal. We know that the triton-shells found in this and other shrines were used as trumpets, for a gem found in the Idaean cave shows a votary standing before an altar and blowing such a conch; on the altar are a pair of sacred horns, and trees in the background suggest that the scene is a cypress-grove. Such shells were sometimes buried with the dead at this period, as at Palaikastro, or built into the door-jamb of a house, presumably by way of consecration, and they were reproduced in earthenware, marble, and liparite. The secular use of the shell-trumpet continues in Crete and Turkey, and within recent years it was sounded in the Cathedral of Genoa and elsewhere in North Italy during the services of Holy Week.

At Knossos the continuous development of the cult within the palace is illustrated by a series of finds of ritual objects

belonging to successive periods in a circumscribed area of the west wing. The earliest group, from a pit sunk in the Neolithic clay underlying the palace pavement, belongs in part to a period before its foundation. Here we have samples of the offerings brought to an older shrine, exquisite goblets with spiral bands in white and vermilion, thin-walled vases of marble and alabaster, faïence beads and plaques for inlay-work of faïence and white shell, and the arm of an image wrought in vitreous paste. A few yards away were found what Sir Arthur calls the Temple Repositories, two strongly-walled pits in which the treasures of the shrine were stored three or four hundred years later. One was built of massive limestone masonry, the other lined with huge slabs skilfully dove-tailed together. The plunderers who sacked the palace at the close of the Middle Minoan age had burst them open—two battered stone hammer-heads lay among the debris—and removed whatever objects of precious metal they contained; but they left behind a marvellous series of images, plaques and vessels delicately wrought in tinted faïence, a developed and perfected variety of the vitreous paste that was present in the older hoard. The images represent the supreme goddess of the Minoan world grasping a serpent in either hand and wearing serpents twined about her body and tall head-dress. The most perfect of these statuettes, reproduced in colour, forms the frontispiece of the book. The tradition of such temple-treasuries survived in Crete throughout the classical age. In the Python at Gortyn and in the Asclepicion at Lebena the 'safe' of the sanctuary took the form of a subterranean chamber of massive masonry, constructed in the latter case not later than the fifth century B.C., entered from above through an aperture closed by a stone slab with an ingenious fastening.

The question as to the relation of the palace cults to those of the mountain sanctuaries may in part be answered by the nature of the offerings found in the famous Kamares cave on the south side of Mount Ida. This is a vast portal opening in the mountain side nearly 6000 feet above the Messara Plain and conspicuous to-day from the whole region of Phaistos, though it is probable that in antiquity the cave and its surroundings were veiled by forest. Those who resorted to it were not in quest of personal salvation or healing, for the figurines and votive limbs so abundant at Petsofa and Iuktas are absent here; in their place

we have jars and bowls of earthenware, some of them exquisitely painted, others of cheap and humble ware, together with evidence that they had contained offerings of grain. Evidently the worshippers who made this laborious journey were cultivators from the plain below, and brought the first-fruits of their crops to a deity who controlled the rainfall on which they depended. The offerings cease towards the end of the Middle Minoan period. Sir Arthur Evans has located, but not yet explored, a cavern containing votive pottery of the same age in the hills at Skoteino, three hours' ride to the east of Knossos. It seems likely that the priest-kings, the personal representatives of the god, gradually substituted for these pilgrimages to distant caves religious ceremonies performed within the palace itself. Thus there was developed a theocracy based on a contract by which the divine king guaranteed the due succession of the seasons, with rain and sunshine as required, in return for a proportion of the crops themselves. For it is clear that the Cretans of the Bronze Age were not mere serfs tilling for a pittance the lands of a despotic ruler; rather they were a nation of freemen giving willing allegiance to the head of a State that was also a Church. The statuettes of Petsofa represent sturdy peasants, clad in waist-cloth and high boots, each wearing in his belt a dagger which is certainly not the badge of a serf. The elaborate costume of the women, curiously modern in its general effect, suggests that a high standard of comfort prevailed even in that remote district. The same inference may be drawn from the remains of country towns and villages which have been excavated in recent years. The houses have a surprising number of rooms and their arrangements betoken a high degree of refinement. Much of this evidence applies to the late Minoan period (1580 B.C. onward) rather than to the Middle Minoan which we are discussing, for the older houses are for the most part buried under the later; but the street plan at such a place as Palaikastro persisted with but little alteration, and the type of the houses appears to have been much the same.

At Knossos itself certain houses adjoining the palace, which may have belonged to nobles or officers of state, have been explored and are seen to reproduce its architectural features in miniature. What little is known of the town indicates that the houses of the commonalty were like those of other districts:

roomy and solid, well-supplied with cooking utensils and table-ware, though here again the available evidence is Late Minoan. Fortunately, however, we have a most instructive record of the appearance of a Middle Minoan town in the so-called Town Mosaic, a mass of faience tablets representing the houses, towers and gates of a town, with figures of warriors and captives on a larger scale, the remains perhaps of an inlaid chest.

‘Unexpected as have been many of the revelations of this ancient Cretan culture the appearance of these house façades with their two and three storeys and roof attics and their windows of four and even six panes of a date not later, probably, than the last half of the eighteenth century B.C. is perhaps the most astonishing. In view of the generally grandiose character of the palace itself, the indications in it of upper storeys appear natural enough. But in the houses of the Mosaic we can hardly fail to recognise the dwellings of the ordinary Minoan citizens. That these should have already attained the tall proportions of a modern street-front points surely back to long generations of civic life.’

The masonry represented consists of large blocks with distinct interstices between them, evidently indicating the clay bedding which was in use at this time and was replaced in the Third Middle Minoan period by closely jointed ashlar. Other houses exhibit timber framing, tinted brown, the bricks that filled the spaces between the timbers being covered with plaster. Some of the tablets represent houses ranged along the city wall, built of massive masonry with openings only in the upper storey. Towers and gates are there recalling the castellated structures of the clay sealings found by Dr. Hogarth at Zakro. The Town Mosaic formed part of a larger composition representing Minoan warriors and dark-skinned captives, wild goats, trees and other details unfortunately less well preserved than the tablets representing the town. Sir Arthur Evans believes that ‘the theme of a beleaguered city,’ which reappears some generations later on the well-known fragments of a silver vase from Mycenæ, had been sung by Minoan bards and illustrated by Minoan craftsmen long before it took shape in the Tale of Troy.

However that may be, the rulers for whom this masterpiece was wrought seem to have reaped what they had sowed. Shortly before 1700 B.C., about the time of the break-up of the old Egyptian kingdom, the Palaces of Knossos and Phaistos were laid waste through some common disaster in which there is reason to

think that the ruling dynasty went under. They lay for a time in ruins, but the traditional sanctity of the sites must have precluded the creation of new capitals elsewhere. They were rebuilt on the old ground-plan, with a more ambitious architecture and richer decoration: sawn slabs of gleaming white gypsum being used for pavements and dados, and wall surfaces decorated not only with elaborate fresco paintings but with high reliefs.

A significant change under the new régime, which points to the accession of a new dynasty, is the disuse of the old hieroglyphic writing and the adoption of a more advanced linear system not directly derived from it but presumably evolved at some other centre, and the introduction 'of new types of signet and new 'methods with regard to sealing.' The former kings seem to have come of a markedly brachycephalic Anatolian stock, such as Dr. von Luschan has recognised as the oldest indigenous type in Lycia. Sir Arthur Evans can point to the life-like heads of a Minoan king and his young son associated on seal impressions of the Second Middle Minoan period: the high skull, aquiline nose, and full lips of father and son are decidedly 'Armenoid.' It may well be that the unification of the Cretan kingdom was due to the practical ability of rulers of Asiatic race; the forceful Armenoid type, so closely related to that of the Hittite and the Jew, is still to be found in certain villages of the Sitia province. In central Crete, however, it was always in a minority, the bulk of the population from Early Minoan times onwards belonging to the long-headed Mediterranean stock.

It is vain to speculate on the course of events which preceded the rebuilding. The era which now begins, the last treated in the present volume and the most important, extends from 1700 to 1580 B.C. It witnesses an extraordinary outburst of naturalism in Minoan art, as though some chilling and constraining influence had been removed and the genius of the race could for the first time express itself freely. The creative impulse manifested itself above all in the fresco paintings which adorned the palace walls. The technique of this important branch of Minoan art has been investigated on the spot by Mr. Noel Heaton, whose analyses show that the method used 'was a true fresco process, in its 'execution akin to the *buon-fresco* of the Italians.' While the choice of pigments and the draughtsmanship may have owed something to Egyptian models, the pure lime plaster on which

they were applied was independently evolved on Cretan soil. In all countries where walls are built of sun-dried brick some sort of plaster is devised for their protection, and as early as the middle of the Third Millennium B.C. Cretan builders had adopted a coating containing forty per cent. of pure lime. During the Middle Minoan age the proportion of lime is increased and the quality of the plaster is refined 'till the surface layer becomes 'practically pure and beautifully white in section, though this is 'generally applied to a coarser backing.' Where the backing consisted of gypsum slabs, the fine stucco was applied direct and varied in thickness from one-half to one-sixteenth of an inch. The material, containing ninety to ninety-four per cent. of carbonate of lime, was obtained by burning limestone quarried in a hillside two miles from the palace. The subterranean workings extend far under ground, like those near Gortyna which for centuries have been shown under the name of the Labyrinth. The Knossian quarry seems to have been forgotten until the English excavators rediscovered it. It must have furnished much of the building stone as well as the lime used in the palace.

The Minoan palette included white, black, red, yellow and two different blues, one of which, a brilliant cobalt, 'is identical 'with the blue pigment early in use in Egypt and may be regarded 'as an Egyptian product.' The colours were applied while the stucco was still moist and were so completely incorporated in it that they have resisted the action of the soil for 3,500 years, and of sun and air during the years that have elapsed since their disinterment. Unhappily the secret of this wonderful lime plaster was not transmitted to classical times; of the frescoes of Polygnotos and his contemporaries and successors, known to us by the descriptions of Greek writers, hardly a vestige survives. On this ideal surface the Minoan painters drew with the rapidity and confidence which the true fresco process requires. They confined themselves to outlines and successive washes of flat colour without shading; but for subjects of especial importance, such as the life-size friezes of bull-hunts, they trespassed on the domain of sculpture and modelled the chief figures in low relief. Their work enjoyed such prestige that it influenced all the minor crafts. Henceforward goldsmiths, gem-engravers and vase-painters take many of their subjects and decorative motives from the grand art of the palace walls.

Naturalism had not been unknown at an earlier stage. Nothing could be more life-like than the lean, crop-eared dog roughly carved on a green steatite lid from Mochlos. The potters too would sometimes model a shell or a beetle or other living creature on the shoulder or rim of a vase. But the noble design of palm-trees drawn in white on the black ground of a great M.M. II jar comes as a surprise, so rhythmical and yet true to nature are the simplified forms. Presently conventional plant-forms are replaced by recognisable types, such as olive-sprays and crocuses. Early in the M.M. III period certain jugs, meant perhaps to hold beer, have graceful ears of barley modelled on the shoulder, and a little later a series of tall jars is decorated with white madonna lilies; in this case the derivation from a wall-painting is evident, for clumps of lilies drawn in the same fashion appear on a fresco elsewhere. The fragmentary remains from Knossos show exquisite details, groups of reeds, olive foliage and the like. The better preserved decoration of a room at Hagia Triadha consisted of 'a series of scenes of animals amidst ivy-covered rocks and various kinds of plants and flowers,' including the well-known group of a cat stalking a pheasant. The author shows from fragments that a similar scene was depicted at Knossos, and traces the idea back to the Egyptian pictures of cats hunting water birds. A pendant to the garden-scene with its drama of two exotic pets—for cat and pheasant alike must have been imported curiosities, like King Solomon's apes and peacocks—would be a sea-piece representing a school of dolphins or flying-fish skimming over the waves. Of larger pictures, representing men and women, we have tantalising fragments, drawn with exquisite firmness of line.

The chapter dealing with the engraved signets of this period (M.M. III) stands out from the rest for several reasons. It deals with designs which range over the whole field of Minoan life and beyond it into a world of imaginary monsters, and for the most part these designs are preserved entire. Unlike the older seals which bore groups of signs denoting the owner's name and rank and other personal details, those of the new class are pictorial and when they were used for sealing the owner countermarked the impression with his name written in the new linear script. The new seals were either of stone, 'lentoid' in shape and perforated, in which case they were worn by a string about the

wrist, or of gold, engraved on the oval bezel of a ring. Sir Arthur Evans has been able to draw much illustrative material from his own collection of gems, formed during his early journeys in Crete. Moreover he has made free use of the hoards of seal-impressions found at Knossos in the West Temple Repository (over 160), at Zakro in Eastern Crete (about 500) and at Hagia Triadha (450). They are clay nodules which had been used, as we use sealing-wax, to secure threads attached to documents or larger strings affixed to parcels or chests. The documents themselves, of papyrus or parchment, had perished; but we infer the existence of regular archives in which deeds executed by private citizens could be deposited, for the five hundred impressions found by Dr. Hogarth at Zakro include 144 different types and this variety makes it improbable that they are official documents. Half of them belong to a curious local class of fantastic types, not of religious or mythological significance but deliberately devised, Sir Arthur believes, to baffle forgers. 'Of the existence of such forgeries, indeed, we have an actual proof from the Knossian Palace, where, in addition to a series of impressions apparently from a large gold signet-ring, a baked clay matrix was found moulded on one of these.' Some of the Knossian designs have a beauty comparable with that of Greek coins, and there is one strangely modern piece, showing three leafless trees bending before the wind.

Reference has already been made to the representations of bull-hunts in stucco reliefs on the palace walls. The bull or the bull's head appears again and again in close association with the divine emblem, the Double Axe. Over a wide area of the ancient world we find the bull adopted as the sacred animal of the supreme god, whose fertilising powers, whether of sky or sun, he typifies or embodies. A point hitherto overlooked is the monarchical organization of the wild or semi-wild herd, which is led and ruled by a king-bull; he wins his place by vanquishing his predecessor and holds it until vanquished in his turn—a type of primitive kingship. Except the wild bull and the boar, Crete had no dangerous fauna. Consequently the bull, 'noblest of all the beasts of chase,' is prominent in religious symbolism, and also in realistic friezes, painted or modelled in low relief upon the palace walls. Fragmentary remains of three such compositions have been found at Knossos, but in order to recover the complete

design we must turn to minor works of art inspired by them. The gold cups from Vaphio, found in a tomb near Sparta but certainly of Cretan workmanship, represent two contrasted scenes, the capture of wild bulls in nets in wooded country and the taming of them with the help of trained decoys. It is not so long since the hunting of wild cattle was a recognised sport in Wales. 'I have also seene good pastime in hunteing and killing the wild bull, wild oxe and wild calfe, by horsemen and footmen,' says George Owen in his 'Description of Penbrookshire' (1603), 'whereof there is yett some store, reared upon the mountaines, 'thoughe lesse than heretofore, the owners findinge more profite 'by the tame than pleasure in the wilde.' But the essence of the Cretan sport was that the bull should be taken alive and that the hunter who overpowered him should be unarmed. There can be no doubt that this restriction originated in rules relating to the provision of wild victims for sacrifice. A similar *taboo* was observed in certain Hellenic sanctuaries. Moreover, in the 'Critias' of Plato, which embodies faint traditions of the Minoan world, we have a detailed account of the capture of bulls for sacrifice at a festival by the kings of Atlantis who went down unarmed into the arena. The most explicit record of Minoan ritual, the Hagia Triadha sarcophagus, depicts the sacrifice of a bull which lies bound on the altar in a sanctuary of the Double Axes. The same emblems are prominent in Knossian frescoes representing the grand-stands, thronged with gaily dressed ladies, about a circus where the prowess of the bull-hunter was exhibited in public spectacles. The performer pursued a bull let loose in the arena, clung to its horns and eventually brought it to the ground. In our own day the skill and daring acquired by cowboys on the great ranges of the Pacific coast has produced a similar type of festival, the cowboy sports, for which enormous arenas have been built at various centres in Oregon and Idaho. One of the events, known as 'bulldogging,' consists in wrestling with a steer; the cowboy gallops alongside a racing steer, throws himself upon its horns and in a few seconds levers it over upon its back. The Minoan contest was in its essence the same, except that the horse took no part. We also have representations of a more artificial performance, acrobatic in character, in which male and female toreadors turned somersaults over the backs of trained bulls.

The author devotes some illuminating pages to the other contests of the Cretan amphitheatre. On the steatite rhyton from Hagia Triadha pairs of boxers are seen in combat before a background formed by the pillars that supported the spectators' seats; some wear helmets, probably of leather, and all have some kind of wrapping, glove or cestus, about hand and wrist. Whatever the covering for the hand, it could inflict a formidable blow, for one of the pair is generally represented sinking helpless to the ground, or rolling heels over head. But Hagia Triadha has also furnished evidence of a more deadly sport. A seal-impression shows a spearman, naked save for a crested helmet, thrusting at another who sinks backward as though wounded. 'The parallelism with the boxing scenes is, moreover, carried further by the figure of the fallen champion behind, here, too, supporting himself on an arm and with his head bent downwards. 'The attitude is instinct with pathos and manifests an artistic mood comparable with that which in a much later age produced the "Dying Gaul."' A pillar in the background shows that this scene too belongs to the palace arena. It seems then that gladiatorial combats were a feature of Minoan festivals. Fifteen hundred years later the Romans were to build amphitheatres and reintroduce this savage sport in Crete and the Greek East. But it was always repugnant to Hellenic feeling, and Athens, as we know, would have none of it. Was there some lingering memory of the bull-fights and gladiatorial combats in the epithet *ὀλοόφρων* applied to Minos by Homer, and in the Athenian tradition that he was ruthless and cruel? Pasiphaë in a recently discovered fragment of Euripides' play 'The Cretans' taunts Minos with 'murderous deeds and butcheries of men' and accuses him of eating human flesh, whereas the normal Greek story made him just and holy, a law-giver who held personal converse with the Most High.

The feud between Knossos and her subjects on the mainland, reflected in the story of Theseus, goes back to the close of the Middle Minoan age. The author shows that the disaster with which the present volume ends, the sack of the palaces and plundering of the lead-lined treasure-chests beneath the pavement of the magazines at Knossos, was probably the work of raiders from Mycenae and other daughter-cities. The richest of the Mycenae shaft-graves belong to this time, and it is argued that

the grave-goods of the mainland chiefs, plainly of Knossian workmanship, represent the spoils of the capital. The accumulated wealth of the priest-kings was no doubt derived from taxes and tribute imposed on an ever-widening empire, and from trade which touched all the shores of the Mediterranean, so that faience beads from the Knossian factory formed a kind of currency among the coast-tribes of Spain and Portugal, 'which thence found its way by inter-tribal barter and native seafaring enterprise to the British Isles. The natural reflex of this would be the trade in tin.' The author's life-long study of prehistoric problems helps him not only to trace the foreign relations of Crete with Egypt and a wide horizon of still barbarous lands, but to infer the existence of other civilised states which have yet to be located. The Phaistos disc, for example, a clay tablet inscribed, or rather printed, on both sides in characters entirely foreign to the Cretan systems, is shown by acute analysis to be a literary document, perhaps a *Te Deum* of victory, emanating from some allied city in south-western Asia Minor.

The succeeding volume will deal with the First and Second Late Minoan periods (1580 B.C. onwards), which gave to the palaces the form in which we now see them and produced the bulk of the inscribed tablets and many of the best works of art. An age of continued colonisation and expansion, it witnessed the growth of new Minoan States on the mainland and islands, destined to outlive the mother-city, perhaps to take part in its final overthrow. The author will no doubt develop further a thesis, to which he has already devoted some eloquent pages, that not only the artistic but the literary debt of classical Greece to the Minoan world was greater than has been supposed, and that the Achaean conquerors who occupied Minoan castles at Mycenae, Athens and Thebes, entered upon a spiritual heritage like that which the Norman lords in Brittany and Western England took over from their Celtic predecessors. It has long been recognised that certain episodes of battle in the Iliad belong to an older day; the armour of the heroes, bronze swords, helmets garnished with boar's tusks and tower-like shields, are Minoan. The works of art which Homer describes are also foreign to the middle age in which the epic took its present form. If these are fragments of an older epic, translated into the tongue of the invaders, is it not likely that much of its spirit as well as its

form, its superb similes and even its metre, may have descended from that enchanted past? The second volume of 'The Palace of Minos' will therefore be awaited with even greater interest than the first. The material for reconstructing the later palace and its life and art is relatively abundant and complete, whereas the story of the earlier periods has had to be pieced together from evidence gleaned at haphazard by trial-pits and soundings beneath later buildings. The threads that archaeology has put in Sir Arthur Evans' hands are of necessity tangled, faded and broken; yet his learning and intuition have enabled him to weave them into a coherent whole that is almost history.

R. C. BOSANQUET.

THE DECLINE OF THE ABBASID CALIPHATE

The Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate. Original Chronicles of the Fourth Islamic Century. Edited, Translated and Elucidated by H. F. AMÉROZ and D. S. MARGOLIOUTH. 7 vols. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1920—21.

THE historian often finds a difficulty in assigning an exact date to the disappearance of a political institution. The Roman Empire is generally said to have come to an end in the West in 476 with the resignation of Romulus Augustulus, but for all practical purposes it had surely ceased to exist as a living political institution many years before, and it is a mere fiction to assign the year 476 as the date of its death. It is similarly difficult to fix the date of the expiration of the Holy Roman Empire. Did it come to an end when Francis II resigned the Imperial dignity in 1806 and assumed the less comprehensive title of Emperor of Austria; or is it not more correct to say that the claim of the House of Austria to the possession of the proud title of Emperor of the Romans had ceased to have any meaning for several generations before that event?

The chronology of the great rival political system that with equal assurance laid claim to world domination—the Caliphate—presents difficulties of much the same character. The historian asks himself: When did the theory of the Caliphate cease to find living expression in the organization of the Muslim State, and become a mere pious opinion in the minds of Muhammadan theorists? This is a question that Muhammadan thinkers themselves have been forced by examination of actual historical facts to ask. There have been some of their theologians who have given to the Caliphate a brief existence of thirty years, in accordance with the saying, traditionally ascribed to the Prophet: 'For thirty years you will be under the guidance of my successors (Caliphs); then you will come under the rule of a tyrannical prince.' The period of thirty years here referred to begins with the reign of Abu Bakr, in the year 11 of the Muhammadan era (i.e. 632 A.D.) and goes on to the year 40 (661 A.D.) when the death of Ali brought to an end the apostolic period of Muslim history, that of the four 'rightly-directed' Caliphs. This

tradition obviously expresses the hostility that many Muslim theologians felt towards the Caliphs of the Umayyad dynasty, whom they regarded rather as Arab chiefs ruling after the manner of the pre-Muslim heathens than as true exponents of Muslim life and political theory.

Though this doctrine of the brief existence of the Caliphate would appear to be contradicted by the facts of history, yet it was embodied in the great collection of Muhammadan traditions, accepted by all Sunni theologians, and it remains a pious opinion which from time to time finds expression in the writings of some of the great Muhammadan thinkers. The historian, Maqrizi (ob. 1442), adopted it, and held that, after the death of Ali and the founding of the Umayyad dynasty, the Caliphate became a mere kingdom, characterised by violence and tyranny. More remarkable still is it to find that this doctrine was embodied in the authoritative Ottoman code of law, compiled by the Turkish jurist, Ibrahim Halabi (ob. 1549); in adopting this doctrine he followed the great legist of the Hanafi school, an-Nasafi (1068-1142), whose exposition of Muslim doctrine is still an accepted textbook in Turkey, and has been commented on by successive generations of Turkish jurisconsults. It is in consequence of the permanent place given to this tradition in books of Turkish law that the Turkish 'Ulama' refrain from describing their Sultan as Caliph in official documents that bear the character of religious pronouncements.

But political theory often follows obediently in the train of actual political achievements, and, naturally, such a limitation of the duration of the Caliphate did not find favour either with the Umayyads or their successors, the Abbasids. But even those thinkers who assign a longer lease of life to the Caliphate are not in agreement as to the date of its disappearance. Ibn Khaldun, who was chief judge of the Maliki school in Cairo at the time of his death in 1406, held that after the reign of Harun ar-Rashid there was nothing left of the Caliphate but the name, because by that time it had become transformed into a mere kingdom, and that with the disappearance of the hegemony of the Arab race the office of Caliph had ceased to exist. A later writer, Qutb ud-Din, who died in 1582, is equally definite in his statement that this political institution had ceased to exist, but he dates the disappearance of the Caliphate from the death of

the last Caliph of Baghdad, who was put to death by the Mongols in 1258. Before Qutb ud-Din died, four successive Turkish Sultans had, according to modern popular belief, held this exalted title implying the headship of the Muhammadan world, but this Muhammadan historian, even as he represents the Caliphate as having come to an end at least three centuries before, so he more than once maintains that the Abbasid Caliphs of Cairo, the last of whom, Mutawakkil, was banished to Constantinople in 1517 by the Turkish Sultan, Salim I, were Caliphs in name only, and that there was no meaning whatsoever in their being so styled.

But the Muslim theorists—legists and theologians—were unwilling to abandon a theory that occupied so important a place in their system. They had elaborated an ideal presentation of Muslim society as forming a corporate unity under the leadership of the Imam who was the successor (Khalifah) of the Prophet. The Imam-Caliph was represented as the source of all administrative and judicial authority, and as appointing all governors and judges; like the Prophet, whose successor he is, he was to lead the faithful in the public performance of divine worship; as head of the military organisation, he was to defend the frontiers and proclaim war against unbelievers. Unperturbed by discrepancies between their theories and the facts of the external world, they went on assuming that the Muslim community was undivided in allegiance to a single Imam, though one province after another declared its independence, and rival Caliphs in East and West anathematised each other. Dazzled by their recollections of the Arab empire, extending from the Indus to the Atlantic and from the Caspian Sea to the Sahara Desert, they shut their eyes to the accumulation of disasters that overwhelmed the Abbasid Caliphate, and their ideal presentation of the Muslim State and its organization has formed part of the religico-political theories of the Sunnis to the present day.

Even they, however, could not ignore the existence of rival theories, the two extremes of which are found in the legitimist Shiahs and the democratic Khawarij. The first of these refused to recognise any Imam who was not of the family of Ali; in the opinion of the latter, the exalted office of the Caliph was open to any one, even though he were a slave, who might be elected to it. It is possible to find as many divergencies of theory in

regard to the Muslim Caliphate as in the Christian world in regard to the Holy Roman Empire, but the orthodox Sunni doctrine, elaborated under Abbasid rule in the historic capital of the once undivided Muslim empire, maintained that the Caliph must always be of the tribe of the Quraish, the tribe to which the Prophet himself belonged, that his functions were the defence and maintenance of religion, the waging of war against the enemies of Islam, and the administration of the Muslim State.

Simple as this doctrine is, it has been singularly misunderstood in Christian Europe, mainly in consequence of misleading analogies instituted between the position of the Caliph and that of the Pope. The Caliph has been described as the spiritual head of the Muslim community, and has had ascribed to him an authority and an ecclesiastical status such as are incompatible with Sunni theology. The fact is that the two institutions—the Caliphate and the Holy Roman Empire—are fundamentally different, and any comparison can only be instituted between them by persons ignorant of the relation of the Muslim faith to the organization of Muslim society. Christianity made no claim to establish a State or to found political institutions. Born under the Roman Empire, it inculcated obedience to Cæsar as ruler and head of the secular government, and even when, under Constantine, Christianity became the State religion, the fundamental principles of law and administration that heathen Rome had bequeathed to its successors, still maintained their authority. The codification of Roman law by Justinian gave full recognition to laws and enactments that were known by everyone to have had an historical origin prior to and distinct from that of the Christian faith. With Islam the case was entirely different. The eternal Word of God, which was of supreme authority in all matters of religious dogma, was at the same time the foundation of law. The Qur'an, which demanded acceptance of the doctrine of the Unity of God and threatened unbelievers with the pains of hell, also fixed the proportions in which a man's property should be divided among his heirs, prescribed the punishment for theft, and laid down a number of other legal precepts. In other words, details of law and administration had the same divine sanction as the dogmas of the faith.

Thus Islam implies not merely a creed but an organized society, and the believer is not only a member of a Church but of a State also. Consequently, there is not in Islam the same opposition between the secular and the religious sphere as there is in Christianity, and the absence of any priesthood, as a body of men set apart for the performance of functions unattainable by the laity, logically implies the impossibility of any one Muslim laying claim to spiritual powers which his brethren in the faith do not possess.* The Caliph therefore possesses no spiritual authority; he cannot forgive sins like the Christian priest, nor are special powers of absolution reserved for him as they are for the Pope; he can administer no sacraments, for Islam knows nothing of any sacraments whatsoever; he can promulgate no new dogmas, nor is he ever an authority in reference to the interpretation of accepted dogmas. He is the secular head of a religious society united by the ties of a common faith. As supreme ruler he protects his co-religionists and punishes evil doers, appoints all the officers of government, collects taxes and administers the public funds; he defends the religion by waging war against unbelievers and guarding the frontiers of the Muslim territories. As Imam he may lead the prayer during public worship, but this religious function may also be performed by the meanest of his subjects; he is only the great Imam, as distinguished from the little Imam. Obedience to him as head of the State is a civil duty, but at the same time (and herein lies the difference between Christianity and Islam) it is a religious duty. A tradition represents Muhammad as saying: 'Whosoever obeys me obeys God, and whosoever obeys the Imam obeys me; he who rebels against me, rebels against God, and he who rebels against the Imam, rebels against me.' Thus inextricably, in the system of Islam, are civic and religious duties bound up together. The distinction between the worldly and the spiritual is indeed recognised in the Muslim system, but it is not the Christian distinction between the secular authority of the civil government which is unrelated to the dogmas of the faith, and the spiritual authority of the church, mysterious in its origin and independent in its sanction.

* The miracles of the saints and the spiritual powers claimed by many Sufis would seem to constitute an exception; but, apart from the fact that orthodox Islam has often regarded these with suspicion, they do not concern the position of the Caliph.

Indeed, the more closely Islam is studied, the more apparent become the fundamental differences between the Muslim doctrine of the State and any that has ever been current in Christendom. A sounder appreciation of the doctrine of the Caliphate may therefore be gained by a study of its origin and historical development, than by any attempted comparison with the Holy Roman Empire. As is well known, Muhammad made no arrangements before his death for the appointment of any one to take his place as leader of the Muslim community. When, after the election of Abu Bakr, it became necessary to invent some official designation for the new leader, Abu Bakr gave orders that he should be described by the modest title of 'Successor (Khalifah) of the Apostle of God.' 'Umar who followed him was at first called 'Successor of the successor of 'the Apostle of God,' but such a title was soon found to be too clumsy for practical use, and he became known merely as Khalifah (Caliph). That this simple title of 'Successor' should have acquired so much dignity, is due to the rapid extension of the Arab conquests, and to the enormous wealth and power which these conquests brought to the ruler of the newly-established empire. The theologians were not slow to find the title in the sacred text of the Qur'an, and it thus received divine authority. The armies of 'Umar tore from the Roman Empire some of its fairest provinces in the East, annexed the fertile land of Egypt, and pushed their way westward along the coast of North Africa. After crushing the armies of the Persian king, they established Arab rule over practically the whole of the old Persian Empire, until they reached the banks of the Oxus in the extreme north-east. Well might such an empire add lustre to the title of the ruler of it!

What may be termed the apostolic period of Muslim history came to an end when, forty years after the death of the Prophet, Mu'awiyah founded the Umayyad dynasty in 661 A.D., with its capital in Damascus. The jurists and theologians of the Abbasid period were wont to regard the Umayyads, who held the reins of power for ninety years (661-750), with righteous horror. They considered that Mu'awiyah, instead of preserving the piety and primitive simplicity of the Prophet and his companions, had transformed the Caliphate into a temporal sovereignty, animated by worldly motives and characterised by luxury and

self-indulgence. It is true that when the capital of the empire was moved from Medina, the City of the Prophet, to Damascus, the old heathen sentiment of Arab society was able to assert itself. In place of the theoretical equality of all believers in the brotherhood of Islam, the Arab pride of race caused them to appear as a dominant aristocracy ruling over subject peoples, and they boasted as much of their genealogies as in the heathen days, before Islam came to condemn such vainglorious self-assertion. The Umayyads were accused of having secularised the supreme power in the very midst of Islam, and of having exploited the inheritance of the Muslim community for the benefit of their own tribe and family.

Among the circumstances that paved the way for the successful revolt of the Abbasids was the narrow tribal sympathy shown by the members of the reigning house to their fellow-tribesmen, and the exasperation of the converts and the children of converts at their being kept in a condition of humility and being robbed of that equal place in Muslim society which their new faith gave them a right to claim. These circumstances, of course, only formed part of a complicated situation, into all the details of which it is impossible to enter here ; but, speaking generally, the change from the Umayyad to the Abbasid dynasty may roughly be described as the substitution of Muslim rule for an Arab kingdom. The converts of Persian stock came to the front, and the transference of the capital from Syria to Mesopotamia and, ultimately (762 A.D.) to Baghdad, marks the recognition by the new dynasty of its reliance upon its Persian supporters, and consequently the chief offices of State came to be held by men of Persian origin. Whereas the symbols of Umayyad rule had been the sceptre and the seal, under the Abbasids increased emphasis was laid on the religious character of their dignity, and the mark of their exalted office became the mantle of the Prophet.

This sacred relic was worn by the Abbasid Caliph on the day of his succession, when his subjects first took the oath of allegiance to him, and on other ceremonial occasions, as when, for example, he appeared in the mosque to lead the prayer in public worship. Theologians and men of learning (which in Muslim society means pre-eminently religious learning) received a welcome in the Abbasid court such as they had never enjoyed under the Umayyads. The precepts of the religious law were

more zealously upheld by the head of the government and the officers of State appointed by him, and all branches of learning connected with religious dogma and law received a great impetus under the generous patronage of the State. Several of the Abbasid Caliphs delighted in being present at religious discussions, invited men of learning to their court and had a theological education imparted to their sons. At the same time they showed their spirit of orthodoxy by the persecution of heretics.

This emphasis laid on religious considerations reacted on the status of the Khalifah himself. The phrase 'Khalifah of God' had not been unknown as applied to some of the Umayyad Caliphs, and they did not feel the same horror in having such a title applied to them as Abu Bakr had felt, when this pious Caliph refused to allow men so to describe him. But it was under the Abbasids that this designation came into common use, and it was typical of the hieratic character with which the office of Khalifah had become invested. Further, just as the Caliph was hailed as the Khalifah of Allah, so he came to be spoken of as the 'shadow of God' upon earth, and one of the Abbasids (al-Mutawakkil, who died 861 A.D.) was compared to the cord stretched between God and His creatures.

It is in accordance with the growing awe with which the Caliph was regarded, that emphasis came to be laid on the title 'Imam.' This title first appears on coins and inscriptions in the reign of Ma'mun (813-833), and the various traditional utterances ascribed to the Prophet in regard to the obedience due to the Imam, are significant of the added dignity with which this title had become invested. Thus, Muhammad is credited with saying: 'Whosoever is under the authority of the Imam should obey him in every way possible, and if any man sets himself up in opposition to the Imam, then cut off his head forthwith.'

These peremptory injunctions of obedience were made all the more impressive by another characteristic of the Abbasid court which distinguished it from the more patriarchal character of the Umayyad court, namely the presence of the executioner by the side of the throne. The Umayyads, as true Arabs, retained something of the frank intercourse of the desert, and would condescend on occasion to bandy words with their subjects, but approach to the Abbasid Caliph was hedged round with more

pomp and ceremony, and by the side of his throne stood the sinister figure of the executioner with a strip of leather to catch the blood of the victim. Summary executions became characteristic of the administrative methods of the Abbasids, and many a man summoned to the Palace took the precaution of carrying his shroud with him. The elaboration of court etiquette which developed alongside with this autocratic exercise of authority tended further to enhance the awe with which the office of the Khalifah was regarded, for the Abbasids adopted the servile ritual of the old Persian court and made their subjects kiss the ground before them, or in the case of higher officials or more favourite personages, permission was given either to kiss the Caliph's hand or foot or the edge of his robe.

As the actual power and influence of the Abbasids declined, the etiquette of their court tended to become more elaborate and artificial, and the Caliph himself came to be regarded as a mysterious personage, and was approached with superstitious reverence, even though his influence in matters of State at times sank to almost nothing.

It was under the Abbasids that the decline of the Empire set in. The year 800, the date of the coronation of Charlemagne in Rome and the establishment of the Holy Roman Empire, may be taken as the culminating point of the prosperity of the Abbasid Empire; though a prince of the Umayyad family, who had fled to Spain, had already made that country a separate kingdom in 756, and North Africa was practically an independent kingdom under the governor who founded the Aghlabid dynasty and made his post hereditary in his family.

One province after another made itself independent. Egypt and Syria in this way were cut off from the empire, and separate dynasties were established in Persia. By the tenth century the authority of the Abbasid Caliph hardly extended beyond the precincts of the city of Baghdad. The Caliph himself was at the mercy of his foreign troops, who were for the most part of Turkish origin and were lawless and undisciplined. The Caliph Muqtadir (908-932) was twice deposed, and at the end of an inglorious reign, marked by drunkenness, sensuality, and extravagance, was killed in a skirmish with the troops of one of his generals; his head was stuck upon a spear and his body left lying on the ground where he fell.

The degradation to which the Caliphate had sunk during this reign was signalled by the great schism which established a rival Caliphate in the Sunni Church. Up to this period the Umayyad rulers of Spain had made no attempt to claim for themselves that headship of the Muslim world which their ancestors in Damascus had enjoyed during the great days of the Arab conquests, and had contented themselves with such titles as 'Amir,' 'Sultan,' or 'Son of the Khalifah.' But now the great Abdur-Rahman III, who during his long reign, brought Muslim Spain to a loftier position than it had ever enjoyed before, decided himself to assume the title which the Abbasids in Baghdad appeared no longer worthy to hold. Accordingly in the year 928 he ordered that in the public prayer and on all official documents he should be styled 'Khalifah' and 'Commander of the Faithful.' He might well have looked with pity and contempt upon Muqtadir, the representative of the rival house, who still continued in Baghdad to use such high-sounding titles.

After the death of Muqtadir, his brother Qahir was elected to succeed him, but after a reign of terror of two years was deposed, and his eyes were blinded with red-hot needles. He was tortured to induce him to reveal the place where his treasures were hidden, and when he remained obstinate in his refusal, was thrown into prison and kept there for eleven years. After his release he was seen begging for alms in a mosque in utter destitution, though his own nephew sat upon the throne. The conspirators set up in his place Radi, a son of the murdered Muqtadir, and for seven years he was the helpless tool of powerful ministers, 'having nothing of the Caliphate but the name,' as a Muhammadan historian puts it. He is said to have been the last of the Caliphs to deliver a Khutbah at the Friday prayer. On his death in 940 he was succeeded by his brother, Muttaqi, another son of Muqtadir. But a few months later a revolt of the Turkish mercenaries compelled Muttaqi to flee from his capital and take refuge in Mosul, where he sought the protection of the great Hamdanid princes, Sayf ud-Dawlah and Nasir ud-Dawlah, who in their brilliant courts in Mosul and Aleppo extended a generous patronage to Arabic poets and men of letters.

These two brothers were renowned for their splendid military achievements, and they restored the fugitive Caliph to his capital,

but there they had soon to leave him in order to look after affairs in their own dominions.

Another conspiracy compelled the unfortunate Caliph to flee from Baghdad a second time, and, after fruitless appeals to various Muslim princes for assistance, he rashly placed himself in the hands of the Turkish general, Tuzun, who had been the cause of many of his troubles. Though Tuzun at first received him with all marks of outward respect, he subsequently blinded the unfortunate Caliph with a hot iron and compelled him to abdicate. Tuzun then set up another puppet Caliph, Mustakfi. In the following year, Tuzun died, but the Caliph only passed from the hand of one master to another, for he was presently compelled to welcome in his capital the Buwayhids, who in their victorious progress southward from Persia challenged the authority of the Turkish troops that had for so long terrorised the population of Mesopotamia. The Buwayhid prince feigned respect for the Caliph Mustakfi, and received from him titles of honour ; but the real power rested with the new conquerors of the old Muslim capital, and presently Mustakfi, too, was blinded.

Thus there were at that time living three Abbasid princes who had held the high office of the Caliphate, all cruelly blinded, all robbed of their wealth, and in their blindness dependent upon charity or such meagre allowance as the new ruler cared to dole out to them.

The history of the Abbasids now assumed a new character ; for during the next two centuries the Caliphate became entirely subordinate to some powerful and independent dynasty that thought to add to its prestige by taking the helpless Caliphs under its protection. The first of these dynasties was that of the Buwayhids, already mentioned. They were a Persian family who took their rise in the north of Persia and gradually extended their authority southwards, until in 946 A.D. their troops entered Baghdad. For nearly a century the authority of the Buwayhids was paramount in Baghdad and the Caliphs were merely tools in their hands, set up on the throne or deposed according to the will of their captors. Humiliating as the position was, it was rendered all the more galling by the fact that the Buwayhids were Shiah, and therefore did not really recognise the claim of the Sunni Khalifah to the supreme headship of the Islamic world.

But to all orthodox Sunnis the Caliph was still the Commander of the Faithful, and as Successor of the Prophet he was the source of all authority and the fountain of honour. The Caliph by his very name led men's thoughts back to the founder of their faith, the promulgator of their system of law, and he represented to them the principle of established order and authority. Whatever shape the course of external events might take, the faith of the Sunni theologians and legists in the doctrines expounded in their text-books remained unshaken, and even though the Caliph could not give an order outside his own palace they still went on teaching the faithful that he was the supreme head of the whole body of the Muslims. Accordingly, a diploma of investiture sent by the Caliph, or a title of honour conferred by him, would satisfy the demands of the religious law and tranquillise the tender consciences of the subjects of an independent prince, though the ruler himself might remain entirely autonomous and be under no obligation of obedience to the puppet Caliph.

To this strange political fiction there is a parallel in the history of the Holy Roman Empire during the fifteenth century. While the unfortunate Emperor, Frederick III, having been driven out of Vienna, was wandering about from monastery to monastery as a beggar, making what money he could out of the fees paid by those on whom he conferred titles, a contemporary jurist, Aeneas Piccolomini (afterwards famous as Pope Pius II), could write that the power of the Emperor was eternal and incapable of diminution or injury, and that anyone who denied that the Emperor was lord and monarch of the whole earth was a heretic, since his authority was ordained by Holy Writ and by the decree of the Church.

The claims made by the Muslim legists for the Caliph, even in the days of his deepest humiliation, were equally extravagant, and accordingly the Buwayhids, though their occupation of Baghdad was the culmination of the rapid growth of their extensive dominions, and though the Caliph was their pensioner and practically a prisoner in their hands, found it politic to disguise their complete independence under a pretence of subserviency and to give a show of legitimacy to their rule by accepting titles from the helpless Caliph. It is worth while to supplement with further detail the summary account of the events that followed the capture of Baghdad by the Buwayhids in 946 A.D. Ahmad,

the youngest of the three Buwayhid brothers, but the real conqueror, contented himself with the humble title of Mu'izz ud-Dawlah ('Strengtheners of the State'), while his brothers, Ali and Hasan, were designated respectively, 'Imād ud-Dawlah ('Pillar of the State') and Rukn ud-Dawlah ('Prop of the State'). But under this pretended show of submission, Mu'izz ud-Dawlah did not hesitate to exert his authority whenever stern measures seemed called for. In less than a fortnight, after he had taken the oath of allegiance to the Caliph, he was alarmed by rumours of a plot directed against his own authority and resolved to depose the Caliph. Going to the palace of Mustakfi, who was on that day to receive an ambassador in solemn audience, he kissed the ground before the throne; he then kissed the Caliph's hand and remained standing before him for a while talking. When he had taken his seat, two of his officers came forward and the Caliph thinking that they too wished to kiss his hand, stretched it out to them; but they pulled him ignominiously from his throne, twisted his turban round his neck, and dragged him along the ground to the palace of Mu'izz ud-Dawlah, where he was kept a prisoner and his eyes put out.

His cousin, Muti', was set up on the throne of the Caliphate in his place, but though he held the office for twenty-eight years (946-974 A.D.) he was a mere cipher in the State, and living on a scanty pension might well complain that nothing was left to him but the Khutbah, the bidding prayer in which his name was mentioned during the Friday service. But even this last symbol of his exalted office might be taken away. The successor to Muti' fell out with the Buwayhid prince, 'Adud ud-Dawlah ('The Arm or Support of the State'), son of the eldest of the three Buwayhid brothers mentioned above. In revenge this prince caused the Caliph's name to be omitted from the Khutbah in Baghdad and other cities for two whole months. But even though the actual power of the Caliph was thus reduced to zero and he became a mere puppet in the hands of his Buwayhid master, the same pomp and show were observed on ceremonial occasions when it was considered necessary to impress on men's minds the majesty and dignity of his exalted office.

Under 'Adud ud-Dawlah, who had inflicted such humiliation upon the Caliph, the Buwayhid kingdom reached the culmination of its greatness. Before his death in 983 A.D., he had become

master of all the lands from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf, and from Ispahan to the borders of Syria. While his father was still alive he had already given vent to his ambitious schemes by taking advantage of the difficulties into which his cousin, Bakhtiyar, had fallen in 'Iraq on account of the insubordination of his Turkish mercenaries. He occupied Baghdad in 975, and rescued his cousin, but afterwards threw him into prison and seized his lands. Hereupon 'Adud ud-Dawlah's father interfered and insisted on the release of Bakhtiyar and the restoration to him of his dominions ; but the breach between the two cousins naturally continued and 'Adud ud-Dawlah showed his vindictiveness in every possible way. The Arab historians tell a long story of his having robbed his cousin of a favourite Turkish page-boy, the loss of whom appears to have reduced Bakhtiyar almost to a state of imbecility, so that he shut himself up and refused to eat, spending his time in weeping, even neglecting the most important function of an Oriental monarch in that period of giving public audience at court. In the following year, on the death of his father, 'Adud ud-Dawlah again attacked his cousin, defeated him and put him to death. 'Adud ud-Dawlah thus became master of 'Iraq and overlord of the helpless Caliph in Baghdad.

It has been necessary to make this excursion into the troubled politics of the Buwayhid family in order to illustrate the position that the Caliph still held in the economy of the Muslim State in spite of his entire lack of political power. In order to celebrate his victory, 'Adud ud-Dawlah made use of the Caliph, Ta'i', as his instrument for his own glorification. Since by theory the Caliph was still head of the whole Muslim world and the fountain of honour, if 'Adud ud-Dawlah had invented some new dignity for himself public sentiment would not have been impressed. Accordingly the Caliph, doubtless much against his will, conferred upon 'Adud ud-Dawlah a robe of honour, like that of a sultan ; crowned him with a jewelled crown and bestowed upon him other insignia of royal rank—bracelet, collar and sword—and presented him with two banners, one of them decked with silver such as was carried before an Amir, and the other decked with gold such as was carried before the heir apparent. What was the whole purpose of 'Adud ud-Dawlah in making the captive Caliph present to him such a banner is not quite clear. Such a banner had never been given to anyone before, and it would seem to

indicate that 'Adud ud-Dawlah contemplated the ultimate seizure of the Caliphate for himself. A diploma of investiture as heir apparent had also been drawn up, and to the horror of the courtiers it was read aloud. This was a breach of the etiquette of the court, for on all previous occasions it had been the custom for such a diploma to be handed to the heir apparent unopened, and for the Caliph to declare : ' This is the diploma I have granted ' to you. Take care that you act in accordance with it.'

But 'Adud ud-Dawlah was still not content, and in the following year he made a still further encroachment on the imperial prerogatives of the Caliph by compelling him to give orders that the drums should be sounded at the gate of the prince's palace three times in a day—morning, sunset, and nightfall—an honour that hitherto had been reserved only for the Caliph himself. More than this, the Caliph even made a further concession by permitting the name of 'Adud ud-Dawlah to be inserted in the Khutbah and pronounced in the mosque on Friday. This insertion of the name of a monarch in the Khutbah was a symbol of the assumption of sovereignty, and it marks the lowest depths of degradation that the Caliphate in Baghdad had ever reached.

The infliction of such humiliations on the Caliph is in striking contrast with the honour and reverence paid to him whenever it was politic to bring him forward as the supreme head of the Faith.

In the very year after 'Adud ud-Dawlah had extorted from the Caliph the privileges above mentioned, an ambassador arrived from Egypt. He was received with impressive ceremonial. The troops were drawn up in serried ranks, and nobles and officers of the state were arranged in order of their dignity in the place of audience, but the Caliph was invisible behind a curtain. When 'Adud ud-Dawlah received permission to approach, the curtain was raised, and the spectators could see the Caliph seated on a high throne surrounded by a hundred guards in magnificent apparel and with drawn swords. Before him was placed one of the most sacred relics in Islam—the Qur'an of the Caliph 'Uthman ; on his shoulders hung the mantle of the Prophet ; in his hands he held the staff of the Prophet, and he was girt with the sword of the 'Apostle of God.' 'Adud ud-Dawlah kissed the ground before this spectacle of imposing

majesty, and the Egyptian envoy, awestruck, asked him : ' What 'is this? Is this God Almighty?' 'Adud ud-Dawlah answered : ' This is the Khalifah of God upon earth,' and he continued to move forward, seven times kissing the ground before the Caliph. Then Ta'i' ordered one of his attendants to lead him up to the foot of the throne. ' Adud ud-Dawlah continued to make a show of reverence before such unapproachable and impressive majesty, and the Caliph had to say to him : ' Draw near,' before he would come forward and kiss the Caliph's foot. Ta'i' stretched out his right hand to him and bade him be seated. 'Adud ud-Dawlah humbly asked to be excused, and only after repeated injunctions would he consent to sit down in the place assigned to him, after first reverently kissing it. After this elaborate ceremony, Ta'i' said : ' I entrust to you the charge ' of my subjects whom God had committed to me, in the East, ' and in the West, and the administration of all their concerns, ' with the exception of what appertains to my personal and ' private property. Do you, therefore, assume charge of them.' 'Adud ud-Dawlah answered : ' May God aid me in obedience ' and service to our Lord, the Commander of the Faithful.' This solemn farce ended with the bestowal of seven robes of honour upon 'Adud ud-Dawlah, who kissed the ground on the presentation of each, and then took his leave followed by all the rest of the great assembly.

It is typical of the unreality that marks much of the history of the institution of the Caliphate from this time onwards, that 'Adud ud-Dawlah, as a Shiah, did not accept the claims of the Caliph before whom he made such a pretence of submission and reverential awe. But as an administrator he had to deal with a Sunni population which regarded the Caliph as Imam and as head of its faith, and like Napoleon he found it politic to make concessions to the religious prejudices of his subjects. He may also have wished to show the Egyptian ambassador that (though a Shiah) he rejected the claims of his master to be descended from Fatimah. The man who in this public manner had showed such signs of slavish respect to the majesty of the Caliph, was capable the very next year when returning to Baghdad from a journey, of so insulting the Caliph, as to send a messenger bidding him come out of the city to meet him, and the helpless Ta'i' was unable to refuse, though it was unprecedented for the Caliph to go out of Baghdad to meet anyone.

Fresh materials for the study of this unhappy period of the degradation of the Abbasid Caliphate have recently been made available by the publication of historical material for the reigns of successive Caliphs from Muqtadir (908-932) to his grandson Qadir (991-1031), who took the place of his cousin, Ta'i', when the latter was deposed. These annals are all the more valuable as coming from the pens of writers who were contemporary witnesses of the events they record ; one of them, Miskawayhi, born in the reign of Muqtadir, died in that of Qadir, and the other, Hilal, born in the reign of Muti', lived on to a great age into the reign of Qadir's successor. For the reigns of Ta'i' and Qadir the chronicle of a later historian is also printed, who based his narrative on a portion of Hilal's history that has not come down to us. The Arabic texts have been edited by Mr. H. F. Amedroz and translated by the Reverend David Samuel Margoliouth, Professor of Arabic in the University of Oxford.

These texts give a vivid picture of the misgovernment that prevailed during this period, and the consequent sufferings of the subject population. The elaborate system of canals on which the prosperity of Mesopotamia largely depended, had become disorganized ; the water-channels got silted up, and the area of cultivated soil consequently diminished. Appalling famines are recorded in which mothers devoured their own children, and the poor, migrating in search of food, perished by the wayside. A disorderly soldiery made life and property insecure, and pillaging and bloodshed were constantly recurring incidents in the life of the cities in which they were quartered. The administration had become demoralised, and the government officials made haste to enrich themselves before a change of ministry brought about their dismissal. In such a case, the discharged Vizier ran the risk of being tortured to reveal the whereabouts of his hidden treasures, and his assistants might share the same fate. These volumes contain many interesting details about the fiscal organization of the State, and the methods of farming the revenue that ruined the prosperity of the country. They paint in vivid colours the decay of what was once the centre of a great empire, and it is a matter of surprise that more than two centuries should have elapsed before the last pitiful remnant of Abbasid rule was swept away by the Mongol invasion.

T. W. ARNOLD.

THE BEST-SELLER PROBLEM

WE propose to remedy a serious injustice in the courts of literature. Everybody must have noticed that books are divided roughly into three kinds. There is first the work of pure fact, such as the directory, the time-table, the current text-books, and the kind of volume which issues from the university presses: 'A History of the Trade in Broad and Horse Beans from the Reign of Ethelred the Unready, with a Graph of the Price of Haricot Beans during the late war, and an Appendix on Butter Beans.' These vast accumulations of learning are only consulted by most people under the pressure of dire necessity; they are to letters what the thirty-nine articles are to religion, what the study of counterpoint is to music, and what the gloomy dungeon and the hideous dragon with bloody jaws are to the fairy story—that is to say, they are absolutely unavoidable evils, but frail human nature does not want to encounter them more often than it need.

But in the happier fields of imaginative literature a curious division has made itself felt rather than seen. There are the books which everybody reads but nobody reviews; and we strongly suspect that when the awful secrets of the publishers are revealed on the day of judgment, it will be found that there are books which everybody reviews and nobody reads.

It is with the first of these classes that we are concerned. Miss Berta Ruck and Miss Ruby Ayres are on every bookstall, but Mr. Gosse dissects Henry James or Thomas Hardy. Miss Ella Wheeler Wilcox is in every home, but Mr. Squire, who is a poet as well as a critic, prefers Young's 'Night Thoughts' to this talented lady's day-dreams. And Miss Marie Corelli is read by thousands to whom Shakespeare is only a name, but Mr. Murry deserts the quick for the dead, and knows more about Falstaff and Iago than 'God's Good Man.'

Probably the average popular writer is not greatly concerned over these critical idiosyncrasies. Unlike the reviewer, who at least tries to maintain a standard of literary values, he takes the cash and lets the credit go; and if he is assailed by any

momentary pangs of envy or remorse, he may retort that the critics themselves are the most fallible of men. How many great works have they traduced or ignored at birth? How many 'undying masterpieces' of ten years ago are now forgotten by the very authorities who hailed them? There are more temporary stars in literature than in the heavens; and if any further consolation is needed, it will be found in the reflection that the critic is himself the most ephemeral of all writers, and only in proportion as his wares cease to be criticism does their chance of survival increase. The only reviewer of a century ago who is still read is Macaulay, but it is very doubtful if Macaulay read through every book which he professed to review.

What makes the popular author? The schools of journalism, which teach literature from the angle of the pass-book, do not seem to have the recipe; or if they have, the secret may be so precious that it is not publicly announced, and only imparted to a few favoured initiates after a long and arduous training in commercial letters. It is true that the best-seller is sometimes denounced as an invention of the publishers, who are supposed to puff and advertise a book into public favour. But, as a rule, it is nothing of the kind.

'If Winter Comes,' which took the town by storm last autumn, was not conspicuously advertised until it was already a great popular success, and we doubt if it was reviewed at any length. Its author has himself admitted that he was surprised at its extraordinary vogue. 'If a man sat down deliberately to write 'a best-seller,' said Mr. Hutchinson to an interviewer, 'he probably wouldn't. A book just happens to take people's 'fancy.' It is not by taking thought or advertising space that the best-seller is made; the 'book of the season' is made by the public. It must interest people sufficiently for them to talk about it on the golf-course or at the dinner-table. If it pleases them, good; if it displeases a few, better still—it will lead to discussion and correspondence in the newspapers. If it gets very well known, a bishop may mention it apologetically in the pulpit; if it is quite extraordinarily successful, a great comedian may use it as a gag on the stage. But the publisher and author can no more reach these dizzy heights of fame by their own exertions than Buonaparte's parents could have arranged for the battle of Jena.

The fact is that the publisher's business is essentially what commercial circles call a gamble in futures. For serious books he can often estimate the demand with some precision, but the novel defies calculation. Many an excellent story is stillborn. The majority live a few weeks, are read by a few hundreds, and are then overlaid by their successors. But every now and then a book appears which only gets a few perfunctory lines from the reviewers, and which is apparently doomed to the same fate as nearly all its contemporaries. It need not be a good book; it is often a very bad book, but it catches on and spreads. It becomes a best-seller; and as a prairie fire can only be extinguished by another blaze, so a best-seller can only be killed by the appearance of another best-seller.

But the best-seller cannot be identified in advance. It is on record that a great firm of publishers rejected 'East Lynne.' It is generally understood that 'A Window in Thrums' was refused. At least one book which has reached a tenth edition since the war has been turned down by competent judges in manuscript and damned by the reviewers on its first appearance.

Superior critics are apt to use the term 'best-seller' as a synonym for mere ephemeral popularity, and contrast Martin Tupper and Samuel Smiles, best-sellers of the Victorian age, with the permanence of Marcus Aurelius. It must be admitted that they are generally right. But popularity is not necessarily ephemeral. The 'Decameron' and the 'Imitation of Christ'—a curious pair—were the most popular books of the later middle ages; the 'Pilgrim's Progress,' which is still read, was the best-seller in Restoration times. There have been long periods when the Bible was the best-seller in England, as indeed it deserved to be. Apart from all religious and doctrinal aspects, some of the best stories—and the best told—in all literature are to be found in the Bible. Scott and Dickens were the most popular writers of their day, but they are certainly not ephemeral. Landor and Pater, who could never by any stretch of the imagination be called writers for the million, are far more likely to be forgotten in a hundred years' time than 'Rob Roy' and 'David Copperfield.' Most of Stevenson now wears a little thin, and another generation may possibly find him more skin than bone, more style than matter; but for all that we doubt whether 'Treasure Island,' the best boy's book ever written except 'Robinson Crusoe,' will easily lose its vogue.

Admittedly these are exceptions, like Shakespeare and Virgil ; the greatest are for their own time as well as for eternity. But a vast mass of popular rubbish is produced in every age and now ignored even by the most meticulous annalists of letters. It is not quite journalism, but most assuredly it is nothing like literature. Probably only Professor Saintsbury is familiar with the dead best-sellers of the Georgian period, and even his voracious appetite has turned away from the most successful authors of the present day.

Judged by the simple test of quantity instead of quality, Miss Ethel Dell is the greatest modern writer. Even Nat Gould, we fancy, runs second to the reigning favourite. Miss Dell has conquered two, if not three, continents. Readers order her books in advance. Publishers pass sleepless nights waiting for her next romance, and editors tremble lest a short story from her pen should go to the rival magazine. Miss Corelli has sold her thousands and Hall Caine his tens of thousands, but Miss Dell's admirers are counted by the million. If that is not success we do not know what success is. It may be true, as jaundiced reviewers suggest, that her star will not last. But neither did that of Napoleon.

Her methods, like those of all great conquerors, are simple. Her subject is that of almost every novelist—the way of a man with a maid—a rather brutal man with a yielding, intimidated woman. The hero crushes the unwilling heroine to his breast ; she screams, as any lady would in the circumstances, and says she hates him ; he replies that he does not ask for her love, but she cannot stop him from loving her. Bruised and breathless and possibly battered, the heroine sighs, yields, and in the end rejoices ; it is for man to conquer and for woman to obey.

It may be thought that we have exaggerated. A quotation from ' The Bars of Iron ' will show that, if anything, our summary is too bald :—

' Open the door ! ' he repeated inexorably.

Again that force reached her. It was like an electric current suddenly injected into her veins. Her whole body quivered in response. Almost before she knew it she had started to obey.

She faced him with all the strength she could muster, but she could not meet those awful eyes that mocked her, that devoured her.

She lay in his arms, spent and quivering and helpless. The cruel triumph of his voice silenced all appeal.

He went on deeply, speaking with his lips so close that she felt his breath scorch through her like the breath of a fiery furnace.

'You are bound to me for better—for worse, and nothing will ever set you free. Do you understand? If you will not be my wife you shall be my slave.'

Quiveringly, through lips that could scarcely move, she spoke at last: 'I shall never forgive you.'

'I shall never ask your forgiveness,' he said.

Miss Dell has probably been surprised at her own success. But it is clear that she supplies a long-felt want: the primitive passionate lover who frankly conquers by strength. In the ordinary world man proposes, but God so disposes of his tongue at the critical moment that he stutters and stumbles, and the lady of his heart has to guess the appropriate moment for the shy acceptance or the tearful refusal. Miss Dell's heroes have no such weakness; they go for the quarry like a bull at a gate. We only hope that after marriage they do not argue with a poker.

We do not deny that there are men like this. Bluebeard was the first of a long series of strong, silent men in fiction, and no doubt Bluebeard was an ardent lover until the honeymoon was over. Yet the story of Bluebeard is founded on fact; its modern counterpart is Landru, recently guillotined.

It is not for us to laugh at these ingredients. Granted that they are no more literature than margarine is butter; but more people eat margarine than butter, and more people read Miss Dell than Mr. Conrad. And a greater even than Miss Dell has used an essentially similar situation in the wooing of Anne of Warwick by Richard III. Shakespeare's hero certainly refrains from physical force, but the ardent feminist may argue that Shakespeare was a man, and was therefore interested in concealing a portion of the horrid truth about his sex. Unluckily for this theory, the Dell romances are not only written by a woman, but it is notorious that they are read almost exclusively by women. It is a serious prospect for the lover of the future; Miss Dell has set a standard of ruthlessness that the ordinary man simply cannot live up to. If that is the sort of treatment women like, we fear that they will have to emigrate to Central Africa or the South Sea Islands.

Fortunately, there are other novels on the bookstall, more suitable for the gentle male. Miss Gene Stratton-Porter, whose circulation approaches but hardly rivals Miss Dell's, is less

Prussian in her methods of courtship. Her heroes love, but they worship rather than command. Her heroines succumb, but the fluttering heart has no torn laces to lament. In the Dell world none but the brutes deserve the fair. In the Stratton-Porter régime there is some chance that the heroine may get a gentleman for a husband.

We turn to a very different author, who is read, one imagines, almost exclusively by men. The story of adventure still appeals; it and its cousin-german the tale of terror, with the 'blood' and the shocker, pirates and head-hunters, cannibals and treasure-trove, friends of our youth—these are the pabulum of the grown-up schoolboy. And in this vein Mr. Edgar Rice Burroughs has carried everything before him with his 'Tarzan' series and 'The Gods of Mars.'

Mr. Burroughs dispenses with style and probability, but he gives us plenty of other things—one-eyed men, warriors with arms like trees, heroes who love heroines in another planet, and Martians who are sufficiently civilised to talk American-English.

Great artists from Homer to Swift and Coleridge have not disdained the grotesque and horrible, but it is the misfortune of Mr. Burroughs that in his hands these qualities become merely ridiculous. His books are a kind of addled H. G. Wells: that is to say, he gets an idea which Mr. Wells would have made into a brilliant fantasy like 'The First Men in the Moon,' or a piece of stark realism like the terrible 'Island of Dr. Moreau,' and he treats the idea as Miss Dell's heroes treat her heroines—he crushes it, he bruises it, he mangles it in page after page of turgid and slipshod English until the performance merely disgusts.

These deplorable novels are badly constructed and badly expressed; they are full of bad grammar, impossible situations, and absurd sequences. We do not say that they are the worst books ever written, but assuredly they are the worst books ever published. A primitive taste can enjoy Miss Dell, a sentimental taste can revel in Miss Stratton-Porter, but only a half-educated person could find anything to admire in 'The Gods of Mars.' Unluckily there are enough half-educated persons to make a reputation on both sides of the Atlantic for Mr. Burroughs. Edition after edition of this hopeless nonsense and still more hopeless sequels has been called for. Anybody who wants to discover to what depths of folly the human mind can sink will

be well advised to spend a few shillings on the author of 'Tarzan.' The spiritualists and occultists, whom we had hitherto considered as the very dregs of the literary intellect, are almost brilliant by comparison with this nauseating stuff.

There are hundreds more authors on the booksellers' counters—Rafael Sabatini, Sax Rohmer, Rex Beach, Phillips Oppenheim, Olive Wadsley, and others as well or better known—and most of them turn out the regular novel of commerce, some rather better, some a great deal worse. Two or three books a year, to say nothing of several short stories, is the average output of the popular writer. Most of this work is scamped or hasty: hardly any of it lives. But it is read, as the film is watched, by a vast indiscriminating public which knows its favourites, recognises their particular touch, and applauds their constant and calculated repetitions.

Indeed we are informed that in these lower depths of literature, as in Milton's Hell, there exists a deeper still. It is credibly reported that in the neighbourhood of Fleet Street there are wholesale factories of weekly and monthly fiction where the modern principle of mass production is employed. Plots, situations and characters are standardised, and heroes, heroines and villains kept in stock by the dozen. All that is necessary to the professors of this dreadful art is a certain facility of words, an unhesitating rejection of the original idea, an extreme regularity of mechanical production, and an ability to end each instalment with a startling curtain, to ensure the purchase of the next number. There are said even to be definite codes for these slaves of the pen to obey: the hero must mix in county circles, the heroine must be poor but virtuous, moderately religious but on no account a nonconformist; crime may be suggested but never actually committed without special permission from the editor; a mock marriage may be celebrated but not consummated, and the last instalment must contain orange-blossom and wedding-bells. The whole may run to a hundred and fifty thousand words, and be begun anywhere by the discriminating reader who has digested a ten-line synopsis of the chief characters. The public swallows the mixture greedily and asks for more.

Some of the professional critics, who have dipped into this astonishing Sargasso Sea of literature where strange monsters flourish and abound, emerge panting and breathless, and proceed

to write indignant diatribes against the intelligence of the public. The indictment is something too general. If the British public have swallowed Tarzan and other absurdities, they have also revelled in that most charming and delicate of all romances, better than anything Stevenson ever wrote, 'The Blue Lagoon.' If they have worshipped at the shrine of Mrs. Barclay and Charles Garvice, they can hardly be said to have neglected Wells and Bennett and Kipling.

It is true that there are fashions in fiction as in other matters, and even the greatest have not been exempt from the caprice of popular taste. In our day sentiment still reigns supreme, but the Stratton-Porter and Ruby Ayres brand is not quite the same as that of William Black and R. D. Blackmore, and very different from the Sir Charles Grandison type which even Dr. Johnson condescended to admire. The ghost story has gone out since psychic research came in; Sir Conan Doyle's *poltergeist* seems to have killed the headless horseman and the spectral bride. The historical novel has fallen on evil times, and knights, cavaliers, and highwaymen sleep their long sleep alongside forgotten sermons in the twopenny box. Tales of adventure persist, but the purely business novel appears to flourish only in America, where the story of the virtuous village youth going straight from a New England Sunday-school to corner the market in Wall Street has an undying vogue. No English novelist seems ever to have heard of Throgmorton Street or Mincing Lane, and the average home-grown hero only works for his living in his spare time.

That fact alone gives us the key to much of the popular literature of the time. The great writer draws men and women as they are; the merely popular writer as they would like to be. His characters are no more true to life to-day than the endless stories of gallant knights rescuing forlorn damsels were true to medieval life; but they are not meant to be. They are literary dope, and the right way to study popular literature is an indication of the kind of dope that people like. Fortunately it is an opulent world, and so long as the characters are recognisably human the bookstall can supply all reasonable tastes.

In other words, the average novel is a narcotic. For nine readers out of ten, existence is probably rather a dull and drab affair, and what is wanted is not so much a reflection of life as a sublimation of romance, a something not quite ourselves that

makes for illusion, a convex mirror in which we can see ourselves ennobled or beautified, or at any rate magnified. The last thing the Brixton bank clerk wants to read about is Brixton or bank clerks ; he prefers Meredith's fine gentlemen or Rider Haggard's adventurers. The last thing the suburban domestic wants to read about is kitchens ; she revels in haughty duchesses and baronial halls. The lonely spinster and the neglected spouse turn as naturally to the story of pure sentiment as a cat to cream ; it cannot be too thick for their starved appetite—Mrs. Barclay is the Mecca of these pilgrims. So too the childless wife cries happily over something with babies and nurseries in the final chapters.

As we survey this vast mass of popular fiction, hastily produced and voraciously devoured, we confess to a feeling of astonishment that no learned professor has written a book on the one serious omission in the Darwinian theory—the fact that what chiefly distinguishes man from the rest of creation is the faculty for telling stories. Many animals resort to deception from necessity, and act a lie to trap their dinner or to save their skins ; man alone tells stories for pleasure and profit. Great is the truth, and it shall prevail, cries the preacher ; but so conscious was the moralist of the weakness of the flesh that he had to lead up to his adage by telling one of the best stories in Hebrew literature. Man respects the truth, and generally stones the truth-teller ; but he loves and honours the maker of stories from the cradle to the tombstone.

The thesis could easily be defended that man is a story-telling animal. No doubt the original story-teller was a myth-maker, and men of lesser imagination accepted as truth the fictions which he invented to account for the perceived facts of the external world. Hence the eponymous hero everywhere, the demi-god of the classics—whose degenerate successors we see in the supermen of current fiction ; legends such as that of Sodom and Gomorrah, and much that everywhere passes current for serious history. The story of Adam and Eve—Satan intervening—is the original triangle drama, and the Flood is the first tale of terror. The primitive novelist, who entertained his fellow cave-men, seized a situation or dramatised an event and so improved it out of knowledge by his fancy that the tale has been accepted and the truth, if it was ever known, has been forgotten.

To this day we are bondslaves of our imagination. King Arthur is more real to us than Alfred, and the Middle Ages, according to Scott, are better known than the Middle Ages according to Hallam. The battle of Waterloo recalls Becky Sharp at least as vividly as the Duke of Wellington, and the time is coming when Napier's 'Peninsular War' will be superseded by 'The Dynasts.' According to a German historian, the Trojan War was really an economic struggle, and Helen merely the figment of a poet's brain; in which case one can only wish that Marx and Mill had followed suit, and pictured Capital as Circe. But the process is as old as history itself; the Piltdown skull and Neanderthal man are only known to anthropologists, but Noah's Ark is famous in every nursery.

The one thing that matters in popular fiction is the ability to tell a striking story; it must hold the attention throughout, and there is only one sure way of doing this. The incidents may be impossible or absurd, the characters may be types or puppets, but so long as they move and keep on moving all is well. Reflection may be trite and obvious—it is of no consequence so long as action is continuous.

The best-seller must interest all the time, and crowded incident is the easiest way to interest the ordinary reader. Other novelists may indulge in discursiveness, or brilliant conversation, or even analysis of character; but the popular writer must keep the pot boiling—or perish. One incident must follow another, descriptive passages must be cut down to the minimum, and the moral must be conveyed by the story or not at all. There are many scandalous passages in Boccaccio, the best-seller of his time, but assuredly there is not a dull page. There is nothing scandalous in Miss Ethel Dell, but she has the same gift of keeping things on the move. Mr. Rice Burroughs does nothing else; his characters move so fast that his syntax never catches up to them.

The weakness of the popular writer is, not that he cannot tell a story, but that he dares not attempt the greater themes. The convention of the happy ending kills him. We all love comedy better than tragedy. But tragedy lasts better than comedy, because comedy is of manners, and manners change, whereas tragedy is the very stuff of life and death, and these persist.

Nearly all the great stories that have survived have been tragedies. The middle ages had their comedies of conventional love and chivalry, but who now reads the 'Romance of the Rose' or 'Amadis de Gaul'? The greater masters of the old school made their stories end in tragedy—and both Lancelot and Guinevere and Tristan and Isolde are household words to-day. Even Abelard and Heloise are remembered, not because their story happens to be true, but because it ends unhappily. It is the same in music. Every third-rate composer sets a sentimental ditty to a sentimental tune, but only the supreme genius achieves the funeral march.

It is even worse with popular poetry. There have been good ballads and bad ballads—plenty of both are to be found in Percy's 'Reliques'—but the ballad was simply a story in verse until it became literary and artificial, when it incontinently died, killed by its own refinement, as the more precious stylists have done their best to kill the masculine strength of English prose. Since the ballad died popular verse has been confined to the religious and the sentimental, or a medley of both; and here it seems that the public invariably prefers the worst, so long as it is sugary enough. It is the very apotheosis of unreality and the happy ending. Fortunately there is no need to make an anthology of this sorry stuff. Much of it has already been selected for a different purpose under the title of 'Hymns Ancient and Modern,' and the rest may be studied in the collected works of Miss Ella Wheeler Wilcox.

It is the fashion to sneer at the popular taste, and in its choice of verse it seems past praying for; but in fact we are all miserable sinners, highbrow critics and servant girls alike. The great painter will probably revel in the penny dreadful. The musician will admire a picture that might have been painted by a pavement artist, because it 'tells a story,' which Rembrandt and Velasquez never do. And the most sensitive literary palate will whistle a trashy tune that makes a musician shudder. In the arts, as in the nursery, the primitive appetite instinctively makes for sweetmeats.

A. WYATT TILBY.

THE VOGUE OF CHINESE POETRY

1. **A Hundred and Seventy Chinese Poems.** Translated by ARTHUR WALSEY. Constable & Co. 1918.
2. **More Translations from the Chinese.** By ARTHUR WALSEY. New York: A. A. Knopf. London: George Allen & Unwin. 1919.
3. **Pir-Flower Tablets.** Translated from the Chinese by FLORENCE AYSOUGH. English Version by AMY LOWELL. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin Co. 1921. London: Constable & Co. 1922.

IT seems quite probable that in years to come the influence of the Far East on the poetry of the Western nations will be important and far-reaching. We are witnessing to-day the beginnings of a movement towards the appreciation of the poetic art as it has long been practised in China. The imperfect knowledge of the language is still a very serious impediment. Apart from a few enthusiasts who seem to work more for display than for enlightenment and education, Western people care very little for the Chinese language and for what its knowledge implies. We see this clearly exemplified in the many journals devoted to the study of Far Eastern life. No doubt they are scholarly; so much so indeed, that not infrequently even a Chinese scholar will shake his head and wonder if centuries of research and investigation by his predecessors have not been all labour lost. For these journals have an especial flair for incidental obscurities, unusual and out-of-the-way phenomena, to which we can afford to be indifferent without impairing our knowledge of what is vital and essential. They even take part in such controversies as generations of Chinese scholars themselves have been unable to settle to their satisfaction. This kind of scholarship may be useful at a stage when a foundation of general knowledge has been laid. But in the early stages of the understanding of a new culture, it hardly serves any purpose at all. What is needed at such a time is comparatively a simple thing—sound knowledge of the most important phases of Chinese culture, and a sympathetic and appreciative criticism of its essential features and peculiarities. The aim should be to arouse a wide interest in that culture and to promote sound knowledge of it. And to do this, we must try to dwell on the central points rather than on the accessories.

Unfortunately sound ideas on things Chinese are up to the present woefully lacking. (As regards painting there is, it is true, a steadily growing body of able criticism; but here language forms no barrier. There is a direct aesthetic appeal, and given a keen faculty of appreciating what is beautiful, one is quite safe in pronouncing judgments. Ignorance of certain minor differences in the artistic principles may sometimes impair the judgments, but over and above those principles is the artistic quality which appeals to what is common to all humanity.)

(In poetry the situation is necessarily different. Here the language is everything. If the language is imperfectly understood, the appreciation of the poetry becomes inadequate, and the translation of this poetry even more inadequate.) But it is a sign of great promise that even at this stage of the imperfect knowledge of the Chinese language there is a very considerable interest in, and enthusiasm for, Chinese poetry. One is drawn to the conclusion that as soon as sinological scholarship begins to concern itself more with things of general interest, with (the interpretation and criticism of the psychological motives which underlie Chinese life and literature, interest in Chinese poetry will become still wider and the appreciation of its qualities, its strength and its weakness, more genuine and sure. (To be concerned with that poetry alone without sufficient knowledge of the circumstances and surroundings out of which it grew, or of the inner forces which were responsible for its development and evolution, is not sufficient to ensure appreciation of the qualities which make for its permanent survival.)

That is why it is necessary to discriminate—in spite of all the present enthusiasm for Chinese poetry both among readers and poets—between a genuine appreciation of its beauty and mere impressionistic liking for it. A genuine appreciation born of a sound and thorough understanding of things as they really are is solid and permanent, whereas impressions, so long as they are only impressions, have but a momentary and ephemeral existence.) I fancy that a great deal of what at present passes for admiration of our Chinese poets is purely impressionistic; and (unless these impressions are strengthened by substantial knowledge and thereby transmuted into an appreciation which has a solid foundation, they are liable to dissolve at any moment into thin air. It is clear that a sound criticism of Chinese life,

especially of that of the Tang and Sung periods, out of which most of the poetry is taken for presentation to the Western public, is extremely important.)

(We have been told that the last twenty years have witnessed one of the most amazing poetic developments in the history of English literature. Perhaps the English people are not so conscious of it as their cousins across the Atlantic. The Americans are, on the whole, justly proud that they are responsible for the spread of a great movement in poetry which they brand as the 'new poetry.' Whatever it stands for, there is one feature of this movement which is of great interest—the recognition of the potency of Oriental influence. It is best, I think, to give the words of one of the leading figures of the movement herself. Miss Harriet Monroe is the distinguished editress of 'Poetry,' which is the one outstanding American magazine devoted exclusively to the development of the movement.

('This Oriental influence (she says) is to be welcomed because it flows from deep and original streams of poetic art. We should not be afraid to learn from it, and in much of the work of the imagists and other radical groups, we find a more or less conscious, and more or less effective yielding to that influence. We find something of the Oriental directness of vision and simplicity of diction; also now and then a hint of the unobtrusive Oriental perfection of form and delicacy of feeling.')

It would appear, therefore, that the present spread of Chinese poetry has an intimate connection with the growth of this new movement in English poetry. (This connection may possibly prove to be a handicap to the chance of Chinese poetry winning a wider popularity, for the new movement in English poetry may only be a literary fad and may at any moment lose its popularity and drag down Chinese poetry with it. Therefore, every lover of Chinese poetry will rightly say that it should be judged entirely on its own merits. It has its own beauties and supreme qualities which must be studied apart: no one can either increase or decrease its value by linking it with something else with which it has no real connection.) (But if Chinese poetry is to gain a hold on the Western mind, there must be really first-rate translations, and such translations can only be the product of a deep understanding of the fundamental character of the Chinese people and of their poetic art, acquired through a patient study of their language.)

(Unfortunately, some of the translators seem principally anxious to use the Chinese poets as witnesses in support of their own theories of the poetic art, and the spirits of the Chinese poets are not infrequently summoned to vindicate the translators' several positions.) Among the readers too, there sometimes lurks the thought that Chinese poetry is the early prototype of the contemporary poetry with which they are familiar. The complaint is frequently made against Victorian poetry by the contemporary poetic radicals that it is vague and too eloquent—eloquence that is bred of pomposity and verbiage—that it has no individuality, no distinct personality of its own, because both its diction and its rhythm follow a definite pattern; that there are too many rules and formulæ which encumber the poetic spirit rather than allow it a free and spontaneous expression. These poetic radicals—*vers-libertines*, as they are wittily called—would therefore struggle for more individuality, for a more concrete and immediate realisation of life, and, above all, for greater simplicity and clarity of expression.

I am not concerned with the merits of this new poetic creed. But why should people say that in the Chinese and Japanese poetry they find the real embodiment of these very ideas? There was at first a very lively interest in the Japanese *hokku* for instance, then in the *uta*, and latterly in the many forms of Chinese poetry, all of which are sometimes taken as the prototypes of many of the new ideas of the contemporary poets. (But it is true also that other schools of poetic thought may likewise find in Chinese and Japanese poetry examples of *their* ideas.) The Victorian might say that the Chinese poets followed rules as much as they did, and even a representative of the days of the heroic couplet might say that between him and his brother poets in China there is after all some similarity in the rigidity with which they both followed the accepted formulæ of their art. The truth is that Chinese poetry, like the poetry of other countries, is an extremely complicated affair. It has a very long history behind it, certainly much longer than that of the poetry of any other country in the world, and naturally it has passed through various stages of development so that it is absolutely unsafe to make any generalisations about it to cover all its periods. Even the work of an individual poet could rarely be described in a few general epithets. Certainly no one would attempt so

to deal with the work of Shakespeare. And yet this is the fatal tendency of many of the writers on Chinese poetry. Of course, there are certain broad features which give a more or less specific character to one nation's poetry as distinguished from another nation's, but they are so broad that they have to be dealt with in a delicate manner and handled with flexibility.

Here is the first complaint that one must make against Mr. Waley. I have never known a bolder critic than he. But it would certainly be more prudent for him to be less bold, and therefore safer from attack. An impatient reader who knows something about Chinese poetry might easily lose his temper and even say that what Mr. Waley has given us in his 'Introduction' is arrant nonsense. For my part, I only wish that Mr. Waley had been more careful, more reserved and more judicious. What he undertook to do was a necessary part of his work. A reader who knows practically nothing about Chinese poetry, naturally expects the translator to give him a few general comments on its peculiar qualities; but a thoughtful writer should not go to the extent of committing himself, as Mr. Waley has done, to categorical pronouncements: he should realise that his comments cannot be complete, and that if they are too precise and emphatic they may easily lead his readers astray and cause them to form prejudices and definite opinions which are not really warrantable.

In five pages, Mr. Waley tells us all the 'limitations of Chinese literature.' That is a remarkable feat; but how much of it is true? 'To most Europeans the momentary flash of Athenian questioning will seem worth more than all the centuries of Chinese assent.' (p. 3.) This is too much a compliment to the Chinese people if the spirit that denies, as Goethe tells us, is the devil. The world is now beginning to find out that the Chinese people are not so angelic as Mr. Waley evidently wants us to believe. 'In the poems of Po Chü-i no close reasoning or philosophic subtlety will be discovered.' (p. 4.) This is a very unsound generalisation. It is sufficient to say that few men expect to find in any poetry metaphysical and dialectical disquisitions. They do not know what poetry is if they do. And finally, before we dismiss the 'Introduction,' let us have this delightful bit of extravagance. Mr. Waley was speaking about the life of the poets, and he would have us believe, I suppose,

that for all of them there was a definite life-pattern which is divisible into three distinct periods and arranged so fatalistically that there was practically no way of escape. At least, Mr. Waley did not suggest one.

'The poet, then (he says) usually passed through three stages of existence. In the first we find him with his friends at the capital, drinking, writing, and discussing: burdened by his office probably as much as Pepys was burdened by his duties at the Admiralty. Next, having failed to curry favour with the court, he is exiled to some provincial post, perhaps a thousand miles from anyone he cares to talk to. Finally, having scraped together enough money to buy husbands for his daughters (*sic*), he retires to a small estate, collecting round him the remnants of those with whom he had shared "the feasts and frolics of old days."'

If anyone desires to find a *locus classicus* for the Greek idea of *μοῖρα*, or the Anglo-Saxon idea of *wyrd*, or the modern conception of determination in its most rigid form, he has it in this passage of Mr. Waley's. The whole introduction is literally filled with just such strange remarks which are entertaining to the man who knows what Chinese poetry is, but which lead astray anyone who surrenders himself to be guided through an unknown territory. What Mr. Waley should have done is a very simple affair. In his two volumes, he has given us translations mostly from the poets of the T'ang Dynasty (A.D. 618-905); and among these, he has paid the greatest amount of attention to Po Chü-i. All that was necessary was to give an account of the poetical works of this one poet whom he has singled out for special treatment, and in addition to discuss a few characteristics of Chinese poetry in general which not only make it different from the poetry of other nations, but also form its peculiar distinction. For, as I said, Chinese poetry, which began to be created more than two thousand years before Christ, is very complex; and all that can be done for general purposes is to treat a few aspects which are common to the greater part of its historic development, and to ignore practically everything else.

(It seems to me that there are two especial features of Chinese poetry which are worthy of note, and I should like to deal with these exclusively because for my present purposes I cannot deal with any more. These two features are simplicity of expression and intimacy with Nature.)

It is important to bear in mind that we are concerned here

solely with lyric poetry. The Italian philosopher and Minister of Education tells us that all poetry is, and must of necessity be, lyrical. But let us be clear of all philosophical niceties, and follow the distinction made by the Greeks. (Now, when we examine Chinese lyric poetry at its best, what impresses us first is the unusual economy of words with which the most subtle thoughts are expressed. The number of words to a verse varies from three to nine, the most common being five and seven (I refer particularly to the *lü-shih*); and four of such verses often go to make up a complete poem. But within the limit of these few words a skilful artist is able to reveal his whole personality, the intensity and magnitude of the moods or thoughts which possessed him at the time when he wrote. Every poem that he composes is the expression, moreover, of a whole range of feelings which he has pondered over and recollected in tranquility. What he aims at is not the pure expression of his feelings, because he knows that too much spontaneity in such expression without due regard to their careful adjustment and synthesis is apt to be crude and finally to defeat its own end; for an excessive out-pouring of the natural temperament would soon exhaust itself.) Examples of such complete abandonment to natural impulses are found in many of the European poets at the beginning of the last century.

But the Chinese poet is different. He realises, it is true, and he has been told by critics from the earliest days, that the primary interest of poetry is to be found in the feelings and the passions. But he realises also that these must be subjected to the powers of the imaginative reason so that when they emerge, they no longer remain in their original state of crudity, but have been suffused, refined, and transmuted. The product becomes, to all intents and purposes, a new thing more rich in content. It is a co-ordinated mass of material delicately fused together and unified.

And in expressing his feelings, the Chinese poet takes care not to give a complete account of the feelings and passions with which he deals: it is left to the reader to create in his own mind that impression of completeness and of totality which the poet wishes to convey. The reader is not a passive being who only receives what is given to him. He ought to be a creative artist himself, and is presumed to be as personally attached to the poem as the poet who composed it. (The poem itself is not a rigid product of the poet: it is supple and flexible, and consists

frequently only of a few flashes of insight or of intuition into the mysteries of life and nature.) A comprehension of the inner forces of our being is what the poet constantly struggles to attain ; and when he has attained it, all he does is to express a few of its more essential phases, from which the reader is expected to construct for himself the complete experience which these phases represent. A great deal of poetic appreciation thus depends upon the reader. If he is sensitive to the fine touches of the poet, if he is susceptible to the delicate impressions that are furnished to him, and, above all, if he is a poetic soul himself full of activity and energy and responsive to the notes which are, as it were, casually thrown at him, then the experience which he can obtain from the poem is fraught with real meaning and significance. The function of the poet is to convey to the reader the ecstatic impression which he has himself experienced ; but in trying to convey it, he leads the reader to the original experience itself, rather than gives him a careful account of it. For in order to feel the intensity and real power of that experience, what is necessary is to have as direct contact with it as possible. (A description, however subtle and careful, is not adequate : it is at best a false secondary power.) The reader has to be considered a sort of human æolian harp, which is delicately made and is at the same time capable of giving response to what is presented to it. It catches the notes which the poet lets loose, and then renders them again into the delightful music from which these notes have escaped.

I think it is this special quality of Chinese lyric poetry which gives it such infinite power and variety, and provides it, above all, with a sustained and inexhaustible charm. I say the charm is inexhaustible because it is extremely elusive to the understanding. An exquisite little poem, if it deals profoundly with the essence of life, may be interpreted both by the poet and by the reader to embody so much truth and beauty that the more they ponder over it, the more they find it unfathomable and limitless. It may deal with a definite aspect of life—true poetry usually deals with an essential aspect—and yet deal with it with just that degree of indefiniteness which persuades us to inquire further into its secret and charm. The form is all the while simple, the substance with which it deals apparently sensuous ; and yet there is a profundity and an intimate contact with the ultimate reality

which it reveals only in parts, allowing the reader himself to comprehend the whole.) A higher type of lyric poetry is, I think, scarcely to be found. It approaches that ideal which an eminent æsthetic critic once said all art aspires to—the condition of music. And Pater significantly adds, ‘the very perfection of such poetry (lyric) often appears to depend, in part, on a certain suppression or vagueness of mere subjects, so that the meaning reaches us through ways not distinctly traceable by the understanding.’

(This is the reason why, of all poetry, Chinese poetry is so difficult to translate. It is a truism that no translation can convey the beauty of the original; but in the case of Chinese poetry, the form, which is the language, is so firmly welded with the substance that it becomes not only a necessary adjunct but an indispensable part of the poetic beauty itself. The sound of the words, the rhythm which they produce, and even the very form and structure of the words by their visual appeal, have all a very important part to play in the consummation of the poetic beauty, so that their translation into the English language, where the words are made up of syllables and are consequently apt to have more sound than the original, impairs, of necessity, the beauty of the Chinese. For example, the familiar little poem of Li Tai-po, of which Miss Lowell has given us an English version, consists in the original of twenty monosyllables:—

‘tsuang tsien—kan yü kwang,
yi she—ti shang suang;
chü tó—wang san yü,
ti tó—sz koo shang.’

Miss Lowell translates it as follows:—

‘In front of my bed the moonlight is very bright,
I wonder if that can be frost on the floor?
I lift up my head and look full at the full moon, the dazzling
moon.
I drop my head, and think of the home of old days.’

Miss Lowell is more happy in translating other poems, but in this case her translation is deplorably deficient. She has undoubtedly given us the ‘idea’ of the poem. The poet had passed a convivial night and evidently went to bed in a somewhat confused state of mind. On waking from his sleep, he saw the bright moonlight on the floor and thought that it was frost. And then raising his head to gaze at the moon, he began to think

of his home. It is not to be denied that Miss Lowell's translation conveys to us pretty accurately the meaning of the original, but it is overburdened with a mass of verbiage. And as regards the music, she herself would not for a moment deny that it has been almost entirely lost in the translation. In the original, the first, third and fifth words receive a heavier stress than the rest; and between the second and third words there is a slight pause. These characteristics are not peculiar to this special poem. They are generally true of a majority of the poems of this type and form. The movement and rhythm are therefore quite regular. It is not a rapid movement, as Miss Lowell's translation suggests; but is on the contrary rather slow and very melodious. It seems to me, therefore, that if any attempt be made to approximate to the music of the original, it would be best to employ a metre that also produces the effect of a slow and gradual evolution. Miss Lowell is an advocate of the 'new poetry' discussed above, and is probably prejudiced against the traditional verse-forms, but I think that the iambic metre would best give a hint of the original music. As a contrast I would reproduce here a German translation of the same poem, which I do not say is perfect, but which is certainly much better than Miss Lowell's rendering:—

' Vor meinem Bett ein lichter Mondenstreif,
 Als wär' der Boden ganz bedeckt von Reif.
 Ich heb' mein Haupt, zum hellen Mond gewandt,
 Senk' es und denke an mein Heimatland.'

The last line is questionable, but the first three lines are, I think, as good a translation as could be made into any European language. The reason is that they convey to us the meaning of the poem and also a part of the music with great simplicity of expression. It is worth noting that Miss Lowell calls her poem 'Night Thoughts,' and the more skilful German translator takes the title 'In stiller Nacht,' at once rendering the original meaning and suggesting the mood of the Chinese poet.

A good experiment to test the effectiveness of a translation is to absorb oneself in the original for some time so as to be more or less habituated to its movement and rhythm, and then to turn away from it and read the translation. The best translation would be the one that least repels, because it is the one that approaches nearest to the original. I realise fully that with the difference in the very structure of the language, as well as in the

complications of the mental background, it is impossible to give what is commonly known as the original flavour. And yet I think that if the translator could be skilful enough to observe strict economy of words, trying at the same time to preserve as much as possible the meaning and the intention of the original, something like a satisfactory translation is not wholly impossible.)

It seems to me that if there is any European poetry which can be compared to Chinese poetry, it is German poetry. In some of the best lyric poems of the Romantic period, where the feeling of the poets does not run wild but is carefully kept under the formative power of the imaginative reason, there is much that resembles the spirit of Chinese lyric poetry. I have in mind particularly some of the lyrics of Goethe, of Heine, and more especially of Wilhelm Müller. Both in Goethe and in Heine there is probably too strong an element of pagan joy which breaks forth in full force and spontaneity as the warbling notes of the lark in its ecstatic mood; but in Müller, in whom (the lyrical quality is sometimes interfused with an element of pathos which seems to be concerned with the more serious aspects of life,) there is much that resembles the general atmosphere of Chinese lyric poetry more than anything else I know of. Müller's poems are full of suggestiveness, and their movement and rhythm do not drag. But the most important thing in these German lyrics is their stark simplicity; and that is the quality which must above all be kept in mind in rendering Chinese poetry into a foreign language. The Germans have not given us many specimens of Chinese translations, but I think they will succeed best because they have examples in their own poetry to offer them help.

In both Mr. Waley's and Miss Lowell's translations, what one feels is the lack of this very quality of simplicity. Probably the translators themselves felt that what they have given us is the irreducible minimum, but who will deny that there are too many words in the above quoted lines from Miss Lowell, and also in these lines of Mr. Waley's first book. (p. 54.)

'The man in the Book of Odes who was given a quince
Wanted to pay it back with diamonds and rubies.
When I think of all the things you have done for me,
How ashamed I am to have done so little for you !'

But putting aside this serious defect of too much wordiness, I think there is much in the two translations which is very

commendable. Mr. Waley has the advantage of knowing the Chinese language, although it is easy to tell that his knowledge is not fully adequate. There are many places where very simple words are misunderstood. A few examples of such misunderstanding may be given before we pass to the merit of the translation as a whole. In the first volume (p. 135), 'The Two 'Red Towers' is rather a satire on the spread of clericalism than on clericalism itself. A very simple word for 'waist' Mr. Waley has rendered into 'arm,' a mistake which becomes all the more inexcusable when it is commonly known that a woman's small waist is often called 'a willow waist' to describe both its slenderness and its flexibility. Two simple Chinese characters for 'a poor man,' Mr. Waley took for 'a sick man.' In the next poem 'The Charcoal-seller' towards the end, the word for a Chinese weight was rendered into 'a thousand pieces' when it should have been 'a thousand catties,' which we may choose to imagine in terms of pounds and tons. And 'The Old Man with 'the Broken Arm' is again a satire on frontier warfare rather than on militarism in general, as Mr. Waley would have us believe.

But these are comparatively unessential details, and ought not to detract from our recognition of the great accuracy on the whole of the translations and their closeness to the original. There is also a great deal of tact shown in sometimes dropping off certain words whose presence would have made the translation more grammatically correct but certainly less close to the original; and it is owing to this faithful reproduction that the effect of the Chinese is frequently carried out. It would be wiser therefore to do away with rhymes altogether, because it often happens that rhymes are retained at the expense of other far more important things. Not only does the structure of the original run the danger of being impaired, but the very simplest meaning is sometimes lost.

One of the notable features of Chinese poetry which Mr. Waley has preserved is the fondness of the Chinese poet for more or less parallel constructions. To give parallels is a little art by itself, and is a very common literary amusement among the Chinese people; but whereas, for purposes of amusement and incidentally too for many other purposes as, for instance, the writing of verses for a funeral service, the parallels are rigid and perfect parallels, the construction in ordinary poetry is different. For

what is there aimed at is to give a vivid impression of the object which the poet wishes to describe by portraying, as we have said, a few important aspects, leaving all the other aspects to the imagination of the reader. The usual kind of Chinese poetry does not therefore concern itself with narration. I do not mean to say that it has not dealt with narrative themes in a narrative way at all. But pure narration is largely confined to another type of poetry called *fu*, which many Western critics maintain is the prototype of polyphonic prose. At any rate, there is a real difference between *fu* and the ordinary types of poetry, the *ku-shih* and the *lü-shih*. The *fu* is frequently spoken of as a development from the *ku-shih* itself, but it has a distinct function to perform. As a critic of the Sung Dynasty (A.D. 960-1278) said: 'One writes poetry (the ordinary type) to express his thoughts, but one writes *fu* to see the evolution of his thoughts,' which is another way of saying that *fu* gives an exposition of events and directly narrates them, a function to which it was very early assigned. In Mr. Waley's translations, the non-descriptive and non-narrative character is distinctly brought out. The translations show that Chinese poetry is peculiarly meditative and reflective. This is in fact one of the greatest differences between the eastern and the western conceptions of the poetic art. The main emphasis in western poetry, as clearly shown in Aristotle's 'Poetics,' is on action, and so we have the wonderful dramatic literature of Greece. The main emphasis in Chinese poetry is on contemplation, and contemplation gives us no climax or anticlimax, which one critic complained was lacking in Chinese poetry.

Aside from a selection of contemplative poetry, Mr. Waley has also given us a variety of other types of poetry, notably that of Po Chü-i, who is rightly singled out for special study and translation. Po's language, in the first place, is much simpler than that of most of the other poets, and he is also a very powerful and versatile poet usually ranked with Li Tai-po and Tu Fu, undoubtedly two of the greatest poets in Chinese literature. His sympathies are very broad, and he deals with such a variety of human subjects that, as the critic and poet Yuan Chen pointed out, no one could help being overwhelmed by his extensive and many-sided interests: 'In his satirical poetry, he is keen and pointed, in his pathetic poems there is depth of feeling, in his

'longer poems there is fulness and comprehension, in his shorter poems delicate sensibility; his odes are noble and fitting to the occasion.' Po is a poet of the people, because he not only wrote *for* them, but also *of* them; he entered profoundly into their feelings and shared with them the sufferings and enjoyments of life. It is his own belief that there is a spirit which animates all living things 'from the sage down to the meanest person, and from human beings to non-human beings.' That spirit responds when it is stimulated, and the function of the poet is to interpret its activities.

Different from Po Chü-i is Li Tai-po, whom Mrs. Ayscough has helped Miss Lowell to render into English verse. The translation is on the whole excellent, and in many places it is very musical and poetical. It is true, I think, as Mrs. Ayscough says in the 'Introduction' that it 'is the first time that English translations of Chinese poetry have been made by a student of Chinese and a poet working together,' and the work is certainly a success, in spite of the obvious difficulty in such a division of labour. I feel somewhat puzzled, however, with the introduction of some queer and strange imagisms. It is of course a recurrent phenomenon among students of a foreign language to take the most ordinary and the most simple word for one full of uncanny qualities. The words for 'the blue sky' are the simplest in the Chinese language. The second *tien* is the very first character that a child in China learns. And yet the translators have endowed the words with some mysterious element which makes them look awe-inspiring instead of being two innocent little words. 'Green Heaven' is the translation, and even a sophisticated person, seeing the words so capitalised, would rub his eyes as if he had been ushered into a mythological realm of unfamiliar deities. Finally the frequent use of the first personal pronoun 'I' is obtrusive, at least, to anyone who has not yet been initiated into the beauties and subtleties of the imagist art. One is apt to fancy, with the excessive number of these 'I's' that the Chinese poets must be the greatest egoists in history.

But it would be ungrateful to belittle the value of the translation. It is not only literally correct, but it has also living qualities because, as rendered by an eminent poet, it has real poetic flavour. As with Mr. Waley, so with Mrs. Ayscough and Miss Lowell—they have given the world the best translations so far produced

of some of the most representative Chinese poets. While Mr. Waley devoted his attention to translating Po Chü-i, Mrs. Ayscough and Miss Lowell have given us a good selection of Li Tai-po and of many of Tu Fu's poems. In Mr. Waley's translation, owing to the preponderance of the works of Po Chü-i, the element of which I spoke as one of the two distinctive qualities of Chinese poetry, namely the intimacy with Nature, was only partially brought out. In Miss Lowell's renderings, we find it in full force, because in Li Tai-po as in many of the minor poets also, the sentiment for Nature is an essential part of the poetic content.

(The passion for Nature among the Chinese poets, and we might say among the Chinese people in general, has always been strong. It is not a form of elemental feeling, nor is it an intense enjoyment of the sensuous: it is a chastened and subdued product of reflection, for it regards Nature not as a physical phenomenon endowed with numerous qualities which are worthy of exciting our fondness for them, but as an animating soul which is in intimate relation with life itself. The poet therefore does not remain satisfied with a faithful reproduction or representation of what he sees and feels; he wishes to render its more subtle and essential aspects, for in them he believes he finds the way towards the appreciation of the law of our being and of the universe as a whole. Call it pantheism if we choose, but it is a view of the cosmos which is commonly held, and is traceable mainly to Lao-tse.) On the practical, every-day life of the people, there is little doubt that Confucius exerts a tremendous amount of influence. But the poets who constantly aspire to a larger vision of things feel the limitations of a regulated life. They desire to relate their own individual existence to a more comprehensive whole. It is only natural that they should resort to the philosophy of Lao-tse, which conceives of Nature as in an infinite process of self-creation, where one stage of development is succeeded by another more perfect and in greater proximity to the ultimate reality. There is a gradual unfolding of its manifold powers which is spontaneous, as the law of its being is the law of becoming without any conscious self-assertion. The problem of human life for Lao-tse is thus easily solved. Being a part of Nature, all that is necessary for the human being is to do nothing and to be carried along in the mighty current of the cosmos.

Such in general is the basis which a number of the Chinese poets hold for the exercise of their poetic faculty, but it is the scope of this philosophic creed, its amplitude in embracing the entire universe in its ken, that is after all for them the most important thing. Few, if any, became the faithful disciples of this school of wise passivity and followed its views through their numerous ramifications. For the humanising philosophy of Confucius which is preoccupied with man himself, and declares that man begins where Nature ends is also accepted by them. And the combination of these two views of life has sometimes produced poetry of great moral profundity. The imagination comes to lose the idyllic quality which the view of Lao-tse tends to exalt, and to be associated with a human element which is essentially ethical and moral. The degree and intensity of this human quality as compared with that of the natural varies with the different poets, but where it is the master and therefore more predominant, there we have great poetry. Such was Li Tai-po's poetry, although by such a strict moralist as Su Chi, he was considered to be more on the side of nature and as having paid slight attention to the moral principles of life. But too deep a preoccupation with these moral principles as an object of thought is apt to end in pomposity and grandiloquence as it did, for instance, in the famous ode of Wordsworth. Li Tai-po realised this danger. What he sought to do was to strike a perfect balance between the human and the natural, and to approach the universe through this human element. Specially is he fascinating because he so successfully fused the two elements and made them blend with one another. With less skilful artists, the attempt to reveal the wonders of life and nature takes the form of crude allegorising which creates a duality between the thought and the image or the representation of the thought; but Li Tai-po in his inspired moments combines the two and makes his art symbolistic.

CHANG HSIN-HAI.

This article expresses a Chinese writer's personal opinions of recent translations of Chinese poetry.—EDITOR *E.R.*

IRELAND'S ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES

1. *A Short History of the Irish People.* By MARY HAYDEN & G. A. MOONAN. Longmans, Green & Co. 1921.
2. *The Economic History of Ireland from the Union to the Famine.* By GEORGE O'BRIEN. Longmans, Green & Co. 1921.
3. *The Economic Case for Irish Independence.* By DARRELL FIGGIS. Dublin: Maunsel & Co. 1920.

IF it be true that those countries are happy that have no history, then Ireland is indeed unhappy ; for no country has a history longer, more crowded, more complicated, or more difficult to understand in its practical bearings on the problems of the present. It is, indeed, for the latter reason that the writing of a really satisfactory short history of Ireland is impossible. For there is scarce a phase, scarce even a fact, in Irish history—certainly in its later stages—which, if set down baldly and without reference to the general spirit and particular policies of the times, is not liable to be misunderstood or capable of being wrested for the purpose of creating prejudice in minds ignorant of historical values. Thus it comes that, to the average man in England and in the world beyond, Ireland and the Irish question remain puzzles which the text-books have done little enough to solve, while in Ireland itself these text-books have too often had no other object than to cull from the records of the past only those things which, in the opinion of the writers, serve to discredit British rule and to exalt the reputation of the ' native ' Irish.

No such charge can, indeed, be brought against the authors of the ' Short History ' which stands at the head of this article. It is a scholarly work and, though its point of view is mildly ' Gaelic,' there is every evidence in it of a studious effort to be strictly scientific. It is this very fact that illustrates the truth of what has been said above. This ' Short History ' runs to 559 large and closely printed pages ; it will by reason of its good qualities be of great service to those who desire to turn their attention to Irish history ; yet it will not enable those who have no previous knowledge of Irish conditions really to understand the situation in Ireland to-day and the causes which

have produced it. One reason is that lack of space has compelled the authors to do little more than suggest the economic factors which have played a large, if not a determining part, in the history of Ireland, and more especially perhaps since the Union. This defect was inevitable in such a work, and it would be dangerous to suggest that the writers might have remedied it had they given less space to the early history of the country. For popular memory in Ireland is long, popular imagination lively; and historic legend and legendary history exercise a contemporary political influence hard to be understood by the average Englishman, who knows and cares little about the past, perhaps because he has in general been so well content with the present. Mr. Arthur Griffith could in the Dail, without exciting ridicule, compare the Republican 'die-hards' with Dermot MacMurrough, 'the greatest traitor in Irish history'; it would hardly have occurred to a 'die-hard' at Westminster to accuse Mr. Lloyd George of being as bad as Earl Tostig.

History and legend, then, have played and are playing their part in determining the Irish point of view. But, though all national revolutions have had their historic and legendary backgrounds, the driving force in all of them has been largely economic; and in this respect the Irish revolution is no exception. The Home Rule movement made no great headway until the genius of Parnell combined it with the agitation for agrarian reform. It was certainly not the ideal of a Gaelic State, or any passion for the revival of Gaelic culture, that won over the hard-headed and close-fisted peasants of Ireland to Sinn Fein, but the promise to relieve them of the irksome burdens imposed by the war, and a vision of the day when, the heel of British tyranny removed from their necks, taxes would be no more and every man would have all the land his heart desired. England as the economic enemy, indeed, loomed larger in the popular imagination than England as the pedantic upholder of alien conceptions of law and order. Ireland remains as prolific of myths as her mountains are of mists; and even out of the prosaic statistics of her trade relations with Great Britain the Irish imagination has built up a legend which has had, and is likely yet to have, very unfortunate effects. The legend is set forth with all seriousness by Mr. Darrell Figgis in his 'Economic Case for 'Irish Independence,' and it must be taken in all seriousness,

for Mr. Figgis is a conspicuous figure in the Sinn Fein movement, perhaps indeed its most characteristic figure. His versatile genius—he is poet, novelist, critic, historian and economist—raised him to high influence in the councils of the Free State, and he acted as vice-chairman of the committee appointed to draft the new Constitution. It is clear, then, that what he publishes has a very peculiar authority as representing the views of the now dominant party in Ireland.

Mr. Figgis, rapidly surveying the tale of nationalities oppressed by Russians, Prussians and Austrians, comes to the conclusion that none has been treated with such gross and deliberately malicious injustice as Ireland. He contrasts, for instance, the economic stagnation of Ireland with the economic vitality of Finland, and of the latter he says that 'whatever injuries she received as a nation those injuries were never intended to lay her economically in ruins; and it has never been suggested, by the severest judges of Czarism, that it ever sought such injury as a principle of government.'

'Ruin in one form or other has been the principle of government in Ireland. . . . England has always regarded Ireland as an economic outlander to be stifled and strangled lest it prove a rival; and as this has involved the evacuation of population, she has undertaken this by every means, the mildest being local grants in aid of emigration. Not always has she looked her acts straight in the face. She has appointed parliamentary committees to enquire into the evils her administration caused, lest the right hand should see what the left hand did. But to the law of her government she has ever been faithful, first and last, parliamentary enquiries notwithstanding. And the result is that Ireland, alone among subject nations, has not only been oppressed, but blighted and ruined.'

As a crowning proof, not only of Ireland's artificial poverty, but of England's selfish exploitation of her fettered sister island, he prints in leaded type the fact that in 1913 Great Britain's trade with Ireland amounted to £135,000,000, a figure only exceeded by that of her trade with the United States. 'It would,' he comments, 'not be true to say that this colossal irony, traversing all true economic experience, was despite Ireland's poverty and ruin. It would be exactly true to say that Ireland, because of the ruin to which design had brought her, became one of England's richest possessions.'

Now, whatever the economic condition of Ireland may be

at the present time (and the picture which Mr. Winston Churchill gave in the House of Commons on the 31st May last of its disastrous decline since the signature of the Treaty was not exaggerated), at the time when those words were written, Ireland, greatly enriched by the profits made out of a war which had left her practically untouched, was probably the most prosperous small country in Europe. If then a writer of Mr. Figgis' prominence could speak of her as 'blighted and ruined,' the phrase must clearly not be taken literally, but must be understood as implying a comparison with the vision of her as she might have been but for the malevolent activities of her jealous rival England, namely, a wealthy industrial country, bristling with chimneys, choking with smoke and the fumes of chemicals, and with a population of nearly 38,000,000 souls.

The importance of this is that Young Ireland firmly believes the legend that Great Britain has always sought the economic ruin of Ireland as a principle of government, and equally firmly believes that when once 'British rule' is removed, there will begin for their country, behind the cover of unassailable tariff walls, an era of unexampled prosperity. The latter belief is a matter of speculation and hope which need not detain us. But the legend itself is not only of great political importance, but intimately concerns the good name of England, and it therefore deserves some examination.

The material for such examination is supplied in rich measure by Mr. O'Brien in his 'Economic History of Ireland from the 'Union to the Famine.' This is not, like Mr. Figgis' brochure, a piece of 'war' propaganda; it is an academic thesis and, though affected by the Catholic and Sinn Fein atmosphere of the National University, is obviously informed with the desire to be strictly scientific and impartial. It has thus a peculiar value as presenting the indictment against England in her economic relations with Ireland in a moderate and reasoned form that commands respect, if not always assent. For, in truth, no legend, however fantastic, is ever without some basis in historic fact. To arrive at the facts overlaid by the fiction is one of the tasks of critical scholarship, and in no case is this task of more practical importance than in that of the legend here in question.

It may at once be conceded that at the time when this belief in the inveterate hostility and selfishness of the British first took

root in the Irish imagination it was not without reason. No one now would care to defend the principles which determined the economic relations of England and Ireland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nor yet the barbarous penal laws against the Catholics to the effects of which Mr. O'Brien ascribes much of the continued economic stagnation in the Catholic parts of Ireland. These things have a vast historical importance, since the memory of them still largely determines the Irish attitude ; but this importance is in great measure due to the fact that Irishmen cannot see them in their true historical perspective. Yet it is only when looked at in this perspective that they can be correctly judged. They were no disgraceful exceptions, but the translation into practice of principles universally accepted at that time, when dependencies were generally regarded as existing for the benefit of the dominant Power, and in Turkey alone was a contemptuous tolerance of dissident creeds thought compatible with the safety of the State. Ireland was treated in this sense as a dependency. In so far as British legislation hampered and destroyed Irish industry, this was dictated, not by any ill-will towards Ireland, but by the supposed necessity for protecting the staple industries of England against a ruinous competition, and efforts were early made to compensate for the industries thus destroyed by the encouragement of others which did not seriously compete with those of England. If the woollen industry was deliberately suppressed, the linen industry was as deliberately encouraged. The policy was, from our present point of view, wrong-headed and unjust, but it is as absurd as it is untrue to say that its aim was the ruin of Ireland.

One of the declared objects of the Union was to raise Ireland from the position of a dependency to that of a full political and economic partnership with Great Britain, and this was achieved, to all seeming, under the terms of agreement between the two countries, which were now to be regarded as one. It was not to be expected that the new status of Ireland would at once cure the economic ills inherited from the system of the past, but there can be no doubt that those in both countries who were responsible for the Union looked forward with confidence to a rapid amelioration of these ills as its result. It becomes then an interesting subject of enquiry to what extent, and in what ways, these expectations were realized and, conversely, what basis of

truth there is to the charge vehemently brought forward by Irish Nationalists of all complexions, that it was the Union that was responsible for the economic stagnation of the greater part of Ireland.

The latter is the thesis that Mr. O'Brien sets out to prove. He contends that the Union, so far from placing Ireland in an equally favourable economic position with Great Britain, deprived her of the protection given to her nascent industries by the legislation of the Irish Parliament since 1783, and ruined these industries by exposing them to the full competition of the more fully organized and wealthier interests of England. He argues—and this argument at least is familiar—that the financial provisions of the Act of Union were, though unintentionally, unjust to Ireland and led to gross over-taxation. He ascribes the miserable condition of the Irish peasantry, which culminated in the great famine of 1846, not to over-population, but to the unjust distribution of the produce of the soil (excessive rents) and the failure to bring waste lands under cultivation; and he blames the British Government for its economic pedantry (it was the age of *laissez faire*) in doing nothing to increase the resources of the country and, instead, assisting depopulation by its legislation. It is proposed here to examine only the first and last of these contentions, for the question of the over-taxation of Ireland, apart from its being too complicated to deal with summarily, has been more often and more fully discussed than the others. The question of depopulation may conveniently be taken first, as it is certainly that which has most deeply affected the popular imagination in Ireland and excited the most bitter feelings against England.

It may be noted at the outset that Mr. O'Brien is too sound a scholar to assert baldly, what has been repeated a thousand times in the speeches and pamphlets of Sinn Fein propagandists, that the population of Ireland has been halved under the Union. In fact, during the first forty years of the Union the population nearly doubled, rising from about 4,500,000 in 1800 to about 8,500,000 in 1845; it was only after the great famine that the decline began. The causes of this rapid growth and decline are set out with great clearness by Mr. O'Brien, and with a restraint commendable in an Irishman writing about so overwhelmingly tragic an episode in the history of his country. He points out how

the demand for cereals during the Napoleonic wars encouraged the change from pasture to tillage and the immense multiplication of small holdings ; how the low standard of living among the peasantry, who had grown accustomed to subsist upon potatoes and butter-milk alone, led to a vastly rapid increase of the population, with indefinite subletting and subdivision of farms already too small to support a family in any decency ; and how by this means, combined with inefficient and slovenly methods of agriculture, it came about that the great majority of the Irish cultivators were living on the very verge of starvation. The perils of the situation were disguised by the artificial conditions then prevailing, which made it possible to work even the smallest holding at a profit. It was rendered yet more perilous by the reckless, but understandable, competition for land, which in spite of utter insecurity of tenure (yearly tenancies were the rule) and of the custom by which (except in Ulster) all 'improvements' lapsed to the landlord without compensation, led to the proffering of rents of which the payment could, in the most favourable circumstances, leave to the cultivator no more than a bare subsistence. Then, with the conclusion of peace in 1815, came the fall in the price of corn and the consequent 'swing of the pendulum' back from tillage to pasture, favoured by the new facilities offered by steam-ships for the exportation of cattle.

It is at this point, according to Mr. O'Brien, that the responsibility of the British Government for the depopulation of Ireland began. Economic orthodoxy demanded a system of farming on a large scale ; the Irish landlords were tempted by the changed demand of the times to clear their lands of the swarms of ragged tenants and concentrate the holdings into farms of the size which sound economy seemed to demand ; and many of them, themselves embarrassed,* carried out this process with

* Lord Clarendon said in 1839 : 'The landlords are the real obstacle to improvement, and their condition generally is deplorable. As a body they are insolvent. Many of them lack the first necessaries of life, and, though still exercising the rights of property, they can perform none of its duties.' On the other hand, the Devon Commission reported in 1845 : 'Undoubtedly, when the landed proprietor is possessed of an unencumbered estate, or has the command of money, he may give assistance and encouragement to his tenants in the most advantageous manner ; and a duty belongs to his position in this respect, which we find to be most faithfully performed in many cases.' 'Digest of Evidence.' ii. p. 1123 (1848).

a ruthless disregard for the fate of the unfortunate people evicted. The charge which Mr. O'Brien brings against the Government is that, agreeing in this matter with the landlords' point of view, it passed legislation to facilitate the process of eviction, legislation which culminated in the Poor Law of 1838—which provided the workhouse as a refuge for families evicted from their holdings—and the famous Gregory clause (10 Vic. c. 31), which laid down that no person in the possession of more than a quarter of an acre of land could be deemed to be destitute, and that it was not lawful for the guardians to relieve such persons—rules which had tragic consequences during the great famine.

In criticising both what he considers the faults of commission and the faults of omission of which the Government was guilty Mr. O'Brien, unlike most Irishmen writing about past grievances, makes allowance for the general spirit and temper of the times, which were those of the triumph of the doctrine of economic non-intervention or *laissez faire*. But he none the less condemns the Government for failing to see that the cure for 'the apparent' disproportion between the population and the resources of 'Ireland,' was to be sought, not in diminishing the population, but in increasing the resources. This, indeed, is the belief held as a prime article of faith by triumphant Sinn Fein, and if certain assumptions be granted, it is doubtless true enough now and was true at the time of which Mr. O'Brien writes. Mr. O'Brien's assumption is that the agrarian problem, at a time when Ireland's population was over 8,000,000, could have been solved if the waste lands had been brought under cultivation with Government aid, and his main charge against the Government is that it spent money in getting the surplus population out of the country instead of spending it on settling them in the country. The assumption is, that is to say, that the soil of Ireland, properly developed, was capable of supporting in reasonable comfort a mainly agricultural population of some 8,000,000 souls. Yet Sir Horace Plunkett, who is generally esteemed a unique authority on Irish agrarian problems, wrote in 1903 :—

'Even if all the land in Ireland were available for redistribution in equal shares, the higher standard of comfort to which it is essential that the condition of our people should be raised would forbid the existence of much more than half a million peasant proprietors.*'

* 'Ireland in the New Century' (1904), p. 50.

Moreover, even had there been waste lands enough to provide all possible claimants with holdings, the reclamation of these lands would have taken not only a great capital, which might have been supplied, but a long time, which—as the famine of 1846 disastrously proved—the urgency of the case could not afford. The violent resentment of the Irish at being forced to emigrate can be understood by those who know how passionately the Gael, whether in Ireland or Scotland, clings to the soil on which he has been born and bred ; and, in the case of the Irish, political sentiment and the awful memories of the famine have kept alive and exaggerated a grievance which the Scottish highlanders have long since forgotten. Yet it was neither the selfishness of the landlords, nor the deliberate policy of the Government, nor even the effects of the great famine, that gave the strongest impulse to the mass emigration from Ireland during the second half of the nineteenth century. It was above all—as Father MacDonalld has pointed out—the opening up of the Mississippi Valley. Not only could Old World tillage not hold its own against the flood of corn that poured in from these vast spaces of virgin soil, but the lure of this soil attracted thousands of emigrants, not from Ireland only. After all, why should the Irish peasant be content to eke out a precarious existence on a patch of barren ground when he could have a homestead of 160 acres for the asking in a country where the soil only needed to be scratched to produce in abundance ?

‘ It was not the Union that caused either emigration or immigration ; but the development of steam power, with the opening up of so much new territory. This led to the consolidation of holdings ; with evictions from rich lands ; and something of the same kind in poorer soils, for the production of butter ; the whole coming at a time when land was to be had for nothing in the Mississippi Valley, gold could be picked up by California rivers, and one could get fabulous wages without going beyond New York. Low prices at home and abundance overseas—this, not the potato blight, was the true cause of the stream of emigration that set out from the shores of Ireland.’*

Twenty years ago a prosperous Irish-American sheep man in Wyoming summed up the Irish Question to the present writer

* ‘ Some Ethical Questions of Peace and War,’ by Father Walter MacDonalld, Prefect of the Dunboync Establishment, Maynooth (1919), p. 213.

in a single sentence: 'There's only one thing the matter with 'Ireland,' he said, 'she's too small.' Settle the agrarian question, or the industrial question in Ireland as you please, and still—to quote Sir Horace Plunkett again—'the evergreen question, "What shall we do with our boys?"' remains to be answered.' It is certainly no answer to keep them forcibly in Ireland, without occupation, without money, and without prospects, and to train them in the irresponsible use of the revolver.

Sinn Fein offers as the solution of this problem the industrial development of the country; and this brings us to the further charge made against England, that she has, after as before the Union, consistently used her preponderant power to arrest and stifle this development. Now, without doubt, certain industries—e.g. woollen, silk, glass manufactures—which had begun to revive under the protective system established by Grattan's Parliament, succumbed more or less rapidly to British competition after the Union. Others, on the contrary,—e.g. the linen, cotton and ship-building industries—while they died out in the south of Ireland, grew and flourished exceedingly in the north-east counties of Ulster. Since Ulster was in no way specially favoured by British legislation, this phenomenon seems at first sight to cut the ground entirely from under the feet of those who maintain that the Union ruined Irish industries. Indeed, even in the south, while certain manufactures decayed, others—e.g. distilling, brewing—sprang up and flourished. It is easy indeed to show from statistics that the effect of the Union, so far from ruining Ireland, was greatly to increase her wealth. One example may suffice. Between 1790 and 1800 the value of Irish exports had sunk by £109,357; in 1826 their value was £4,438,942 more than in 1800, the year of the Union. This increase was due partly to the rapid development of the linen industry and of distilling, but more especially to the growth of the export trade in agricultural produce, for which industrialised England now offered a convenient and steady market.*

* For tables of statistics see Martin, 'Ireland before and after the Union' (ed. 1848), and Thom's 'Statistics of Ireland' (1852). In 1800 the total value of exports from Ireland was £4,015,976, and that of imports £4,299,493. In 1919 Ireland's exports were valued at £176,000,000, and her imports at £159,000,000. Of the exports 99% went to Great Britain, and of the imports 85½% came from Great Britain.

The vast increase in the agricultural prosperity of the south, accentuated as it has been by the operation of the Land Acts and the economic effects of the war, does not however in the eyes of Irish Nationalists compensate for the loss of that industrial and commercial prosperity to the past existence of which the decayed glories of many of the cities bear witness. Mr. Figgis finds it humiliating that southern Ireland should have been degraded into serving as England's 'larder,' while Mr. O'Brien's whole aim is to give a reasoned support to the Sinn Fein view that its industrial and commercial independence may again be set up behind the protection of a tariff wall. It is precisely this view which, more than anything else, has made it practically impossible to reach an accommodation with Ulster on the question of Home Rule; for Ulster lives and flourishes on free trade, and as a Belfast business man said to the present writer: it is not bigotry or intolerance that inspires the *non possumus* attitude of the north, but 'fear'—fear that under a Parliament of United Ireland the trade of Ulster, and the credit upon which it rests, would be ruined by wild and visionary fiscal experiments. The matter is thus one of urgent practical importance, and in so far as Mr. O'Brien's work throws light upon it, this is cordially to be welcomed.

There can, indeed, be little doubt but that the dying out of so many industries inflicted great hardships on the working classes in the southern towns; that the agricultural development has brought them very inadequate compensations; and that the communist movement organized by the Transport and General Workers' Union, with the sporadic establishment of local Soviets during the present anarchy, is largely the outcome of the miserable condition of the town labourers as well as of the landless men in the country. The question is where the responsibility for this condition of things lies. Mr. Figgis, giving voice to the sentiments of revolutionary Sinn Fein, ascribes it to the deliberate, selfish, and malevolent policy of Great Britain. Mr. O'Brien's argument is more sober, his charges against the Government being of 'non-feasance' rather than of 'malfeasance'; but in effect it comes to much the same thing. It was only in appearance, he argues, that the act of Union established economic equality between the two islands. The industries of Great Britain had been firmly established by a century of rigid protection; those

of Ireland, long suppressed by the action of the penal laws and the commercial code, were only just struggling into life ; and to break down the protective barriers between the two countries was therefore to deliver the weaker hopelessly into the hands of the stronger. The temporary measure of protection (10 % on certain classes of goods imported from Great Britain) allowed by the terms of the Act was wholly inadequate, and when these duties were removed certain Irish industries—e.g. silk weaving and glass making—at once perished, while others—e.g. the manufacture of woollens—died a more lingering death. In short, 'the opening of free trade between the two countries, which stood on such different industrial planes, operated simply to confer a preference on the more developed,' since the British manufacturer, 'because of the greater capital at his command, and the superior processes which he had adopted,' could undersell his Irish rival in his own country.

The force of this contention is weakened by the fact that it applies only to southern Ireland. No such decay followed the removal of protection from the Protestant north, whither indeed, some of the dying industries of the south migrated, to flourish on a more congenial soil. Of this somewhat serious rift in his argument Mr. O'Brien is fully conscious, and he does his best to repair it. If north-east Ulster flourished while the rest of Ireland decayed, this was not, he argues, the result of any superior quality of its inhabitants, but because in Protestant Ulster alone had the 'Ulster custom' in land tenure made it possible for the people to accumulate capital, since there 'the practice of the landlord's taking the whole surplus produce of the land did not prevail.' Want of capital, he says, was the trouble in the south. The landlords as a class were ostentatious and improvident, while 'the penal laws had condemned the vast majority of the people to a life of idleness and poverty ; the land laws had deprived the agriculturists of all inducement to industry and thrift ; and the commercial code had compelled the best Irish manufacturers to emigrate, if they were not to starve at home.' 'The lord,' as Sir Robert Kane put it, 'was above industry ; the slave was below it ; and hence, though the circumstances of a fertile soil, easy access to markets, and abundance of motive power, were, in themselves, favourable, the blessings which nature presented were unutilized, by the ignorance and inertness

' of the people.'* Mr. O'Brien quotes the first two clauses of this sentence, but not the rest. Yet, in all probability, it was the 'ignorance and inertness' of the people that was the cause of the whole trouble. The Act of Union may have deprived certain struggling Irish industries of the props that maintained them in a precarious existence; but it is more than doubtful if they would have survived even if the Act had never been passed. Mr. O'Brien quotes from a pamphlet published in 1804:—

'In spite of the high duties and the disadvantage of the rate of exchange, English manufactures of all kinds, except linen, are imported into Ireland, and sold there at a lower price and of a better quality than those of the country.'

He ascribes this to the Union. It would surely be sounder sense to ascribe it to the industrial revolution, already far advanced in England, which would have operated to the disadvantage of the old-fashioned methods of Irish industry even if there had been no Act of Union. Mr. O'Brien himself says that hand-weaving was doomed; that where the new processes were adopted, i.e. in north-east Ulster, the weaving industry increased; and that where the new processes were not adopted it ceased to be. If the industry of distilling flourished, it was because of 'improved' methods introduced by Scottish distillers settled in Ireland. Want of capital cannot alone be pleaded in excuse for the failure of old-established businesses, for where there are going concerns under capable management they can always obtain capital. If the southern Irish manufacturer succumbed, it may be suspected that this was often due, not to lack of opportunity, but to the 'ignorance and inertness' which made him cling to outworn methods through sheer conservatism or dislike of taking trouble. This was the opinion of Father Walter MacDonald, based on the experience of a long life spent in southern Ireland.

'In Kilkenny, for instance, which I know best, there had been a considerable manufacture of woollens, starch, and leather; but the manufacturers continued to use old-world machines and methods; with the result that they were beaten in competition. The woollen mills, moreover, depended wholly on the water-power of the Nore, which, of a dry season, may be little more than a trickle, for weeks at a time. Ten miles away, at Castlecomer, they had some of the finest steam coal in the world, but they lacked the brains, or the spirit, to turn it to account. Is it any wonder they went down?

* 'Industrial Resources of Ireland' (1844), p. 322.

When anyone tells me that the Union is responsible for the non-development, or even the decay, of Irish industries, I am wont to ask him, please, to tell me what law was passed, or not passed, by the Imperial Parliament to keep the Suir from being as great a centre of industry as the Lagan ; and I never heard of any. There—in the Suir—we have a noble river ; tidal from the Tower of Hook to Carrick—a stretch of thirty miles or more ; with the Barrow running northwards, no less fine and tidal, for twelve other miles. The two are as near to the coal and iron of Wales as is Belfast to those of Scotland ; why is not Waterford another Belfast ? Why did the Vulcan Foundry, the Graving Dock, and the glass industry fail ? Because, I suppose, they were not dry-nursed from the public exchequer : as if Harland and Wolff's, or Goodbody's jute works, or Jacob's biscuit factory, were fostered in that way.

The fact is, I fear, that we Gaels have not the business turn of mind, and so do not build factories even now, anywhere : on the banks of the Hudson or Mississippi any more than on the Suir or the Liffey.*

This unbusinesslike, happy-go-lucky temper, which is perhaps one of the more attractive qualities of the southern Irish as contrasted with their somewhat dour brethren of the north, may—as Father MacDonald suggests—be due to their Gaelic blood (though the proportion of this is a somewhat uncertain quantity) ; it may be due to the effects of the soft and enervating climate ; but it is certainly also due in part to a factor of which Mr. O'Brien makes no mention, though it is one that has exercised an immense influence on the economic life of Ireland. This is the factor of religion. Long ago, Sir Horace Plunkett pointed out the great part played by this in determining the economic fortunes of the two divisions of the country :—

' Protestantism has its stronghold in the great industrial centres of the north and among the Presbyterian farmers of five or six Ulster counties. The communities have developed the essentially strenuous qualities which, no doubt, they brought from England and Scotland. In city life, their thrift, industry, and enterprise . . . have built up a world-wide commerce. In rural life they have drawn the largest yield from relatively unfertile soil. . . .

Roman Catholicism strikes an outsider as being in some of its tendencies non-economic, if not actually anti-economic. These tendencies have, of course, fuller play when they act on a people whose education has been retarded or stunted. . . . The reliance of that religion on authority, its repression of individuality, and its complete

* *Op. cit.* Appendix. pp. 214, 216. Jacob's biscuit factory is one of the still flourishing industries of Dublin. The Goodbodys and Jacobs are Quaker families.

shifting of what I may call the human centre of gravity to a future existence . . . appear to me calculated, unless supplemented by other influences, to check the growth of the qualities of initiative and self-reliance, especially amongst a people whose lack of education unfits them for resisting the influence of what may present itself to such minds as a kind of fatalism with resignation as its paramount virtue.*

Now, to say that a religion is not economic is not to condemn it as false ; for, as Cardinal Newman pointed out long since, the test of true Christianity is certainly not material prosperity. But the precept : ' Take no thought for the morrow ' is certainly uneconomic, and the command : ' Lay not up for yourselves ' treasures on earth,' if conscientiously obeyed, would prevent the accumulation of capital and so hinder industrial development. In view of the devout habit of mind of the Catholic Irish, then, we are justified in looking somewhat closely into Mr. O'Brien's argument that Irish industries in the south decayed because the land system made the accumulation of capital impossible. In this matter, indeed, he contradicts himself ; for he tells us that Catholics amassed large fortunes as graziers, as merchants in the town, and as usurers in the country. What then became of these ' large fortunes ? ' Usually, we are told, they were invested in land. But there was another form of investment, not of this world, which absorbed a disproportionate amount of the nation's savings. Sir Horace Plunkett says :—

' It is not alone extravagant church-building which, in a country so backward as Ireland, shocks the economic sense. The multiplication—in inverse ratio to a declining population—of costly and elaborate monastic and conventual institutions, involving what in the aggregate must be an enormous annual expenditure for maintenance, is difficult to reconcile with the known conditions of the country.'†

This was written some twenty years ago. But nearly sixty years earlier Martin—the ' Unionist pamphleteer ' Mr. O'Brien calls him—wrote, as a striking proof of the prosperity brought by the Union,

' At a period of the Union there was but one respectable Roman Catholic chapel in Dublin—now there are twelve handsome chapels, one of which has cost £40,000 for its erection. Throughout Ireland we everywhere find noble structures raised by our Roman Catholic fellow-subjects, equally indicative of their piety and their augmenting wealth.'‡

* *Op. cit.* pp. 98, 102.

† *Op. cit.* p. 108.

‡ Martin, *op. cit.* p. 41.

It would be interesting to know, and much to the point, how many millions have been spent on similar noble structures since Martin wrote. It is at least very unfair to cast all the blame on Great Britain for the effects of this neglect of the service of Mammon for that of God. The choice of service is, of course, wholly a matter of taste, the carnal man taking one view and the spiritual man another. The late Monsignor Benson, in that amazing book 'The Dawn of All,' gave us his vision of the Ireland of the future as the 'island of the saints' once more, wholly peopled by monks and nuns. This is decidedly not the vision of Young Ireland, as represented by Sinn Fein, which is largely in revolt not only against the material domination of Great Britain, but also against the spiritual domination of the Church. It sees in the undeveloped resources of Ireland the possibility of vast economic progress. Ignorant of the true motives that govern the movements of capital, it ascribes the failure to develop these resources—e.g. the coal-fields—to the jealousy of British rivals as determining the attitude of the Government, and believes that, once the shadow of the British Upas-tree is removed, foreign capital will pour into the land, turn its waste places into smiling gardens, and revive the decayed glories of its cities.

The experienced business men of the north do not share this expectation. They know well enough that capital is little apt to be directed one way or another by sentimental considerations, national or other, and that it will be placed wherever there is a reasonable hope of good returns. They do not believe that it would help Ireland to be 'cut adrift from the strongest commercial power in the world and have to rely on her own resources in the welter of economic trouble' which the war has left in its wake. Recent experience has proved the correctness of their view that 'Dominion Home Rule' in Ireland would not produce conditions favourable to the economic development of the country. Capital is the most sensitive and timid of plants. It will root itself where it is sheltered, and in favourable soil will multiply an hundredfold. When exposed to storms it wilts away. Considering the perennial disturbance, at least on the surface of Irish life, for generations past, the wonder is not that so little, but that so much 'foreign' capital has been invested in the country; and when it was so invested the reason probably was that the credit of Ireland was backed, for better or worse, by the vast credit of

the United Kingdom as a whole. Ireland is now thrown back wholly upon her own credit ; and the immediate results should help to bring home to those who have assumed the government of the Irish people some elementary economic truths. For the prevailing anarchy, the wide-spread violations of the rights of property, and the all but universal disbelief of the people in the capacity of those in office to produce a better state of things, are rapidly draining the country of its economic life blood. Trade languishes, and traders are not replenishing their stocks ; capital, so far as it is fluid, is flowing out of the country, and so far as it is fixed is quickly depreciating in value ; even the farmers—so I am told—threatened with the seizure of the whole or parts of their farms, are neglecting cultivation, and something like a famine over wide areas is spoken of as possible, if not probable.

All this, of course, may be only temporary, the natural result of a political revolution but half accomplished. It is to be hoped that this is the case. But one thing is certain, namely, that the great economic prosperity, which Ireland as a whole enjoyed before the revolution and the separation from Great Britain, can only be restored by the setting up within a measurable time of a Government that can govern.

W. ALISON PHILLIPS.

THE AMERICAN SHIPPING BILL

1. A Bill to amend and supplement the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, and for other purposes. 67th Congress, 2nd Session. S.3217.
2. Address of the President of the United States to a Joint Session of the Senate and House of Representatives. 67th Congress, 2nd Session. House of Representatives. Document No. 201.

IN the final report of the Departmental Committee on Shipping and Shipbuilding after the War the Committee raised the question: 'Should British shipping be accorded preferential 'treatment over the shipping of other countries?' Among the reasons they gave for rejecting any such proposal was one of more than national significance:—

'International commerce will be more than ever necessary after the war, and it would be deplorable to set out on a course which would hamper the natural flow of trade and lead to endless quarrels among the maritime nations of the world. Freedom of the seas, in the sense of equal treatment of all flags in all ports, should therefore be a cardinal principle in our post-war policy.'

Since that principle was laid down, nothing has happened to impeach, much has happened to confirm its wisdom. The need for allowing full freedom to 'the natural flow of trade' was never more evident than it is to-day. One half of the world is hungry for goods, the other half is hungry for markets. Because the flow of trade has been checked by the political and economic consequences of the war, whole populations go short of the necessaries of life, while, in the countries which could supply their needs, the unemployed are reckoned, literally, by millions.

At a time when the supreme need of all peoples is for the re-establishment of the shattered machinery of production and exchange, the folly of interposing artificial barriers to the flow of international commerce would seem self-evident. Unhappily, there is evidence in every country, including our own, that it is not. The latest, perhaps the gravest proof of how ill the lesson has been learned, comes from the other side of the Atlantic.

In February last, there was laid before the Senate of the United States 'A Bill to amend and supplement the Merchant Marine Act 1920, and for other purposes.' The object of this

modestly entitled measure is two-fold. In the first place, it provides for the payment of subsidies to American shipowners on a scale exceeding anything yet recorded in the annals of shipping. In the second place, it lays down a system of flag discrimination so extensive and so drastic as to suggest that its ultimate aim is to secure for American shipping a practical monopoly of the import and export trade of the United States.

If the subsidy clauses of the Bill stood alone, we in Great Britain should have little to say; they are a matter for the American people. The provisions for flag discrimination stand on a different footing. They constitute a menace, not only to our own position as carriers, but to every hope of re-establishing international credit and international commerce.

Let us see exactly what is proposed. In the first place, the United States Shipping Board is authorised to set aside a sum of \$125,000,000 for loans to assist American citizens in the construction or equipment of shipping. Such loans may be granted up to two-thirds the cost of a vessel, and the rate of interest fixed at any figure not below 2% per annum. Further to encourage shipbuilding, it is provided that American shipowners shall be relieved for a period of ten years from income tax on the net earnings of their vessels, on condition that they set aside an equivalent amount for the construction of new vessels in American yards.

Secondly, it is proposed to pay all American vessels engaged in foreign trade, a subsidy varying from a basic rate of half-a-cent per ton gross for each hundred nautical miles travelled, to 2½ cents per ton to steamers of 23 knots and over. For this purpose, steamers and motor vessels between 1,500 and 5,000 tons gross are to be rated at 5,000 tons. Under certain conditions the subsidy may be earned in the inter-foreign as well as in American trade, and the Shipping Board have power to double the subsidy in order to assist the establishment of new services. No subsidy will be paid to any owner unless 75% of all tonnage operated by him either as owner, charterer, or agent, is under the American flag. Should the profits for any year exceed 10% the excess is to be equally divided between the owner and the Shipping Board, until the subsidy for the year has been repaid.

The total annual cost contemplated by the President in his address to Congress will be anything up to \$30,000,000 a year.

This will be provided partly by setting aside 10% of all import duties received, partly by appropriating for this purpose all receipts from tonnage duties, taxes, or fees imposed on vessels entering American ports, and all such duties, taxes, or fees are to be doubled from the date on which the Bill becomes law. This is an ingenious method of getting round the provisions of existing commercial treaties, which prevent the imposition of discriminatory duties. The doubled duties will be paid by American and foreign vessels alike ; but while the American shipowner will receive the money back in the form of subsidies, foreign shipping will, in effect, be heavily taxed for the benefit of its American competitors.

Still more important as an aid to the American owner, and far more menacing to the world at large, are the proposed measures of flag discrimination. In order to ensure that steady stream of third-class passengers which is the foundation of the North Atlantic liner trade, it is provided that 50% of the aliens of any nationality admissible in any year under the immigration laws shall be licensed only on condition that they are carried in American ships.* In order to secure for American ships the lion's share of both the import and the export traffic, it is proposed to allow to all persons or corporations subject to United States income tax a rebate equal to 5% on all freights paid by them in respect of goods carried, either outwards or inwards, in American ships. Finally, the United States Shipping Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission are directed to take such steps as may be necessary to 'co-ordinate fully and completely rail and water transportation.' What this means is made clear by the President's address to Congress : 'We can and will make effective the spirit of section 28 of the Jones Act of 1920, providing for preferential rail and steamship rates on through shipments on American vessels.'

Before examining the probable effect of these provisions, a word must be said as to the circumstances in which the Bill was introduced, and the arguments by which it is supported.

Prior to the Declaration of Independence, the American States were a maritime community. At first protected by the

*It is now understood that the clauses relating to immigrants have been withdrawn from the Bill itself, but that it is intended to bring them into operation under the immigration laws.

British Navigation Laws, their shipowners and builders were later stimulated by the large profits to be made by evading the restrictions of the Colonial System. After the War of Independence, American shipping increased apace, and from about 1790 to 1860 its competition was severely felt by our own shipowners. During that period the natural resources of the interior were, comparatively speaking, undeveloped, and American capital and enterprise found a natural and profitable outlet in the carrying trade. Then came a sudden change. The process of expansion was checked by the coincidence of the Civil War with the change from wood and sail to iron and steam; and after that war, the immense and rapid internal development of the United States absorbed all the capital and energy available. It became more profitable for the States to be producers than to be carriers, and the immense expansion of British shipping which followed the repeal of the Navigation Laws, gave an ample supply of tonnage. In June 1914 the United States owned under 5% of the world's gross tonnage,* and of the immense volume of their foreign trade, nine-tenths was carried under foreign flags, among which the British predominated.

Then came the war, and American shipowners and builders were naturally stimulated to greater exertions by the height to which freights were forced through the withdrawal of a large proportion of British shipping from commercial to naval and military employment. It was not, however, until after the United States entered the war, that the real boom in shipbuilding began. The Emergency Shipbuilding Programme was undertaken as a means of defeating the submarine. It left the United States, at the end of the war, with an enormous fleet afloat or on the stocks, and in June 1921 nearly 24% of the world's steam and motor tonnage flew the American flag.

The larger part of this great fleet was Government owned, but three years' experience has convinced Americans that, in the President's words, 'The outstanding lesson is that the Government cannot profitably manage our merchant shipping.' The losses, in fact, had reached the staggering figures of \$16,000,000 a month.

The ships, therefore, had to be sold; but there was little prospect of their realising anything like the cost of their

* Excluding steamers plying on the Great Lakes.

construction. Throughout the world, shipping was a drug on the market. An unparalleled slump in freights set in towards the end of 1920, and even yet has hardly run its course. Much of the tonnage constructed during the war was ill suited to compete in the ocean freight markets. Operating costs for American shipping have always been exceptionally high. Ship-owners of long experience were few. To quote an American newspaper :* 'Economically speaking, our merchant marine is 'a dead duck.' It is to galvanize this 'dead duck' into artificial activity that the present Bill has been introduced.

What then are the arguments for not only piling subsidy on subsidy, but seeking to restrict the free operation of the freight markets, in order to secure for American shipping a larger share of the world's carrying trade than it could gain in open competition ?

In the first place, there is the familiar argument that, owing to the higher cost of construction of American ships, the higher wages paid, and the higher standard of feeding and accommodation, American shipping, unless heavily subsidised, cannot compete successfully with that under other flags. We need not discuss this question, for it is not with the direct subsidies that we are mainly concerned. We have faced subsidised competition in the past, and we have seen, again and again, that the most heavily subsidised lines—the Austrian Lloyd was a notable example—have been remarkable neither for the efficiency of their services nor for the success of their operations. If the American people are prepared to find \$30,000,000 a year for this purpose, it is their own concern ; but it is not surprising that a strong note of opposition comes from the farming districts of the Middle West, whose main object is to place their wheat as cheaply as possible on the European markets. For there is no pretence that the purpose of the Bill is to lower the world level of freights. Its object is to secure high profits for American shipowners. The average dividends of a representative list of British cargo-boat companies for ten years before the war worked out at 4½%, but American shipowners are not to be asked to repay any portion of the subsidies granted under the new Bill until the yearly

* Springfield, Mass., *Republican*; reproduced in *New York Journal of Commerce*, March 7, 1922.

profits exceed 10%. With this provision in mind, they are not likely to take the initiative in lowering freights, except for the temporary purposes of a rate war.

All this, however, concerns mainly the American taxpayer and merchant. A second argument put forward to justify the Bill has a wider and more disturbing significance. Both in the President's address to Congress and in the American press, special emphasis is laid on the importance of the mercantile marine as the second line of naval defence, and the Bill itself contains provisions for the establishment of a Merchant Marine Naval Reserve.

We cannot, of course, deny the right of the United States to take whatever measures they consider necessary for their safety. We may be permitted to regret that, at a time when peace is more and more clearly recognised as essential to the very existence of civilisation, the one great Power which stands aloof from the European turmoil should think it necessary to wrest even its economic development to preparation for war.

Most strongly of all, however, the President stresses the contention that 'there is not a record in all history of long-maintained eminence in export trade, except as the exporting nations developed their own carrying capacity.' The best answer to this contention is to be found in the history of the United States themselves. It was precisely at the period when American shipping declined, that the great expansion of American exports began. During the ten years before the war alone, those exports increased in value from £299,000,000 to £452,000,000, though American ocean-going shipping was both small in total and almost stationary as regards development. No country was ever better served by the shipping of the world; no country can rely so securely, for the provision of carrying power, on an open freight market; for no other country produces so much without which the world cannot satisfy its needs.

Admittedly conditions have changed since the war. In his address to Congress the President pointed out that before the war the United States were a debtor nation, and a large part of their exports represented interest on and repayment of loans. To-day the situation is reversed, but—so runs the address—'It is our high purpose to continue our exchanges, both buying and selling, but we shall be surer of our selling, notably our foodstuffs, if we maintain facilities for their transportation.'

This argument is hard to follow. In a world which needs American grain, and minerals, and manufactures, commercial inducements will always procure sufficient tonnage for the transportation of every cargo that can be financed, but it is difficult to see how shipping under the American flag can be used to force upon buyers goods which they do not require, or for which they cannot pay. Shipping is not the master but the servant of commerce. It is called into being and activity by the demand for carrying-power arising from the exchange of goods, and if the exchange of goods is checked, shipping must languish.

It is perfectly true that the transition of the United States from a debtor to a creditor nation has created formidable problems for the American manufacturer. To maintain the standard of living prevalent before the war, the American people must continue to export on a large scale. With about 6% of the population of the world, they produce about 25% of the world's food supply, about 33% of its mineral products, about 33% of the total output of manufactured goods. For their surplus products they must find markets, but they no longer receive or require from Europe the financial services in payment for which a large proportion of the surplus was formerly shipped. At the same time, European countries are unable to produce, and the States themselves are unwilling to receive, a corresponding stream of exchange commodities; yet as the Presidential address very truly said: 'Continued trade must be reciprocal. We can not long maintain sales where we do not buy.' The one great problem facing American producers to-day is the inability of their foreign customers to pay for that surplus production on the sale of which the prosperity of American industry depends. This surely is no argument for measures calculated to drive out of trade with the United States all but American ships. The carriage of American trade is one of the most important methods by which the European countries, and Great Britain in particular, can discharge their obligations to the States and pay for American exports. It is useless to talk of maintaining sales, if the buyer is to be prevented from paying for his purchases.

The chief need of the great producing classes is the economic restoration of the world. If credit and commerce revive, American shipping, whether subsidised or not, will find, in common with that of other countries, ample and remunerative employment;

but this revival will not be brought about by restricting the freedom of the ocean freight markets, nor by preventing the people of other countries from paying for American goods with whatever services they can render.

This brings us to the root of the whole matter. It is for Americans alone to decide whether they are incapable of running their ships, without subsidy, in open competition, and if not, how far they will be wise to divert capital and enterprise from those fields of mass production in which they are specially qualified to excel. It is a different thing when we come to measures having for their object to impose—in effect—special taxation on foreign shipping, to restrict the right of immigrants to choose the line by which they will travel, to use income tax rebates and differential railway rates for the purpose of diverting traffic from foreign to American ships.

Throughout the whole of the arguments used, officially or unofficially, in advocating the Bill, runs an underlying assumption that both the export and the import trade of any country are in some way an exclusive national possession. No fallacy could be more gross, none has been more frequently exposed, to none do Governments and peoples cling with a stranger constancy.

To every transaction in international trade, as to every transaction in internal trade, two parties at least are necessary—a buyer and a seller—and both parties are equally interested in the transaction. It is for the mutual benefit of buyer and seller that trade is carried on, and if it ceases to be mutually beneficial, it will cease to exist. On paper these are accepted truisms; in practice they are continually denied. They are denied, by implication, in the provisions of this Bill.

By what right can a monopoly in the carriage of American grain be claimed for American ships, except on the assumption that the receipt of the price by the farmer confers a national character on the trade, and the receipt of the grain by the buyer does not? By what right can such a monopoly be claimed in respect of American imports, except on the assumption that trade derives nationality from the buyer alone?

The dilemma is complete, and it arises from ignoring the plain fact that trade between nations is international. It is, no doubt, competent for any State to restrain its subjects from trading with foreigners; but if trade with foreigners is allowed,

it must be admitted for what it is. There is no justification either in equity or in common sense for an attempt to impose a national monopoly on an international traffic.

It is no answer to say that a monopoly is not, in fact, claimed ; for the provisions of the Bill, if logically enforced, must end by driving all but American ships from trade with American ports. If both the importer and the exporter are, in effect, to be penalised in competition with their rivals, every time they ship a cargo in a foreign vessel, open competition will soon be a thing of the past. The methods of the Bill are indirect, while those of the British Navigation Acts were direct ; but its intent goes further than theirs. Those Acts admitted imports in ships belonging to the country of origin on equal terms, save for the payment of duties insufficient to check the traffic. They laid no restrictions on exports in foreign bottoms. They aimed at a total exclusion of foreign shipping only from traffic with British possessions abroad, which the commercial theories of the time recognised as a domestic trade. The American Bill is directed towards securing, in both directions, a national monopoly of an international trade.

What then will be the effect of the Bill, if it becomes law ? If, and so far as, it is successful, it will destroy freedom of competition in the ocean freight market, and thus tend to increase the cost of transport ; it will prevent foreign countries from discharging their indebtedness to the United States, or paying for American goods, by the services of their ships as carriers. In both ways it will 'hamper the natural flow of trade' and interpose yet further barriers between those who need so sorely to buy and those who are so eager to sell.

This is not all. It can hardly be expected that other countries will accept unchallenged the American claim to domination over an international trade. It is as competent to Great Britain, or France, or Italy, as to the United States, to claim that their traffic with the States is a purely national interest, and to offer inducements for the carriage in their own ships of cargoes to or from that country. The inevitable result will be a war of subsidies and imposts, of restrictions and retaliations, in which the true character of international trade will be more and more obscured, and the volume of exchanges more and more restricted.

Further, we know that the Navigation Acts were fruitful in 'endless quarrels among the maritime nations of the world.'

Is the present attempt to create a monopoly by indirect means less likely to cause ill-feeling? We can hardly be hopeful, especially when we remember the bitterness aroused by the application in Germany of two of the very measures now proposed—control of the emigrant traffic, and differential railway rates.

The Bill is not yet law. It has been read twice in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Commerce. Its fate seems likely to be decided by the attitude of the Farmers' Party, and Senator Capper, the leader of the party, has indicated that their assent may be purchased by Government support for the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Waterway project. It is not unlikely that they may procure postponement of a final decision on the Bill until after the Congressional elections in the autumn. Meanwhile there are signs that commercial opinion in the States is awakening to the dangers of a measure which must inevitably react injuriously on the American export trade.

It is profoundly to be hoped that, in the interval, the American Congress and the American people may realise that the interests at stake are not merely sectional, but national and international. It will be a disaster for the world at large if the Power which initiated the Washington Conference should take the lead in a reversion to the system of restriction and exclusion which produced so much political friction in the past. It will be a bitter comedy if the greatest exporting nation in the world, the nation to which the world looks for its economic restoration, should strike so heavy a blow at freedom of exchange. We on this side shall do well in the meantime to keep our heads and our tempers, to avoid talk of retaliation, and to concentrate on making clear the issues. It is our business not to take up a challenge but to help, if possible, to avert a disaster, by strengthening the hands of those who are fighting for that principle of 'freedom of the seas, in the sense of equal treatment of all flags in all ports,' on which our own policy has so long and so successfully been based.

C. ERNEST FAYLE.

LANGUAGE *v.* GRAMMAR

THERE is a growing discontent in the public mind with the results of modern linguistic education ; and with reason. Whatever the language taught, the average student can put his knowledge of it to no kind of use in after life. The schools advertise that they teach the various languages and literatures, but at the end of his course all that the ordinary man has to show is a small vocabulary, a lot of rules and some idioms, none of which he can use in any practical way. On the modern side he is not fluent in any foreign language, because he never escapes from his own language, having to translate the words backwards and forwards as he uses them. Consequently he cannot sustain the most ordinary conversation, and he can read with difficulty only the plainest narrative. A foreign joke, or the simplest play upon words, is quite beyond him. Fine shades of meaning and comprehension of exact statements are denied him, so that he cannot use what knowledge he has for either literary or scientific purposes. Parents resent having to send their sons abroad to acquire a language, which they were supposed to have been learning for eight or ten years at school.

If the teaching of modern languages is bad, classical teaching is far worse. The average educated man, after his student days are over, very seldom opens a Greek or a Latin book again. He never learnt to read them with any ease ; very soon he ceases even to be able to understand or place a quotation. He abandons the whole business. This is neither his fault nor his intention. He simply cannot go on with the classical studies of his student days. Once away from his tutor, and left to his own resources, he finds his linguistic equipment utterly inadequate. He has neither the time nor the inclination to puzzle out classical prose or poetry at the rate of three or four hours to the page, as he used to do at college. He is condemned to stand stock still at the place he reached with his tutor. It is idle to tell him of the glories of Greek literature, when at all his attempts to enjoy it he finds himself standing helpless before the text. Is it any wonder that he takes to chess, archæology, or bridge, or anything

with a medium his mind can move in? Without a real linguistic competence he cannot appreciate the great and dynamic literature of the ancients; much less absorb their culture. Every fresh volume opened would only mean a fresh prospect of mental exhaustion after a fearful struggle with the language. This is not the road to that classical 'kingdom of fine shades,' of which Mr. Livingstone writes with such affectionate enthusiasm.

Of literary sense the ordinary student has little or none, for nearly all his time has been occupied with verbal analysis, and the books he has read have been treated not as examples of literature but of grammatical nicety. The university teachers write enthusiastically of the magnitude and quality of the Greek ideas; but the schoolmasters one and all devote nearly the whole of their time to teaching the languages in such a complicated tabular form, that the vast bulk of the students get lost in the verbal maze, and never reach the ideas at all. Languages taught with these results are of no value to anyone. As soon as a man begins to do any serious thinking, he must compare his conclusions with what his predecessors have written on the subject. He wants to know what they have to say to him easily and quickly; not to have to pick it out word by word with a dictionary and grammar. The languages, as he has been taught them, do not give him access to what he really wants—the literature of which they are only the framework. In after life many thousands of thinking men regret and resent this. They feel they have a just cause of complaint against the system which has left them thus stranded; for they perceive that it is too late to retrace their steps, and to learn afresh in a rational manner,

The ultimate cause of the present failure is that it is psychologically unsound to teach languages through their grammars. Teachers as a body, know very little of the organs they are training, of their conditions, capacity, and methods of production. It is as if an engineer were ignorant of his engines. Some educationalists are apt to deprecate this kind of knowledge as 'materialism;' but, after all, thought is a natural product, emanating from the human body; and ideas, after they have taken form and substance from muscular movements, become phenomena, just as much as chemical reactions are. All that we know of the mind is dynamic, the results of its action. We have to judge of its condition and capacity, by the quantity and

quality of its products. Like every other natural process it must function in favourable conditions and under its own laws. It is idle to dispute with nature, or to prescribe rules for her; she has her own, and her apparatus is specially designed to work under them only. It does not matter how attractive an educational scheme may be, or how coherent the supporting argument; if it is not founded on the actual practice of the mind, as it lives and moves in every one of us, it is sure to fail.

The following psychological considerations have a bearing on educational methods :—

(1) The smallest amount of material with which the mind can work, the least stimulus which will set it in motion, its unit of production, is an idea, a formed thought, a notion, in logic a proposition. The unit of language therefore is the sentence; the least number of words that can contain an idea, and not the single words. The mind must move and produce, or it does nothing useful. This is best shown in detail. Thus, the mind reacts hardly at all to detached words; very slightly to general propositions; but strongly to particular propositions, i.e., to complete ideas. If I say to you 'Book,' you would say 'Yes,' and your mind remains unmoved; there is no reaction worth speaking of. I then go on and say 'Books have leaves'; you would say 'Yes, what then?' and the reaction is very slight to the general proposition. But if I say 'Books have leaves a foot thick,' you would say 'What nonsense; no one could use such things'; your mind has reacted strongly to the particular proposition, exhibiting its characteristic product, an idea, a conclusion; in this case a dissentient one. The primary function of the mind is to produce ideas. If asked to work with less, though it may make great efforts, the result will be disappointing. If asked to produce less, the result will always be a kind of idea, though deformed and distorted.

(2) The mind makes its ideas out of materials admitted from without, or partly or wholly taken from its storehouse—the memory. The process is analogous to a chemical reaction, in that the product may resemble none of its components, but contains elements from them. The mind is in business as a factory of ideas; and as it constructs its ideas, it has to display many of them, or they would be of no use to the individual, neither could he trade with them. It therefore approaches the

motor area of the brain, which under its orders sends impulses to the muscles, producing co-ordinated movements. These impulses mostly go to the larynx and diaphragm resulting in ordered sounds, i.e., words ; but the whole body may and often does participate. According to its needs the mind will make extraordinary efforts to manifest its ideas. If words are insufficient, or it is short of them, it will add gestures, demonstrations with small objects, or even drawings. It prefers words as quicker and easier, and it is astonishing what it can do with very few ; so eager is it to get its idea out into the world, and cognizable by other intelligences. It is so hungry for words, that it will take them from anywhere, their sole qualification being that they can be used to display its product, to clothe its ideas. This explains why a person acquires the dialect of his neighbours. If they use rough forms so does he, to make his ideas cognizable by them. If they comprehend and use refined phrases, he conforms for the same reason.

The primary objective of the mind is the formation of ideas, and secondarily the exhibition of them clothed usually in words. These actions are practically simultaneous and inseparable. Consequently an idea must always be present in the mind, for it to hang words on, before it can deal with them. In clothing an idea, the mind does not build up the sentences word by word according to the grammatical rules. They are all there no doubt, and deducible from speech ; but it does not consciously use them. Having formed a thought, it looks round for words, and they flash up in ordered companies. It selects the most likely, rearranges them somewhat, adds a few more, and thus expresses the nascent idea. These sections of words or sentences moving together, act like the molecular groups, well known to the chemists. If they were written under single signs, we should have ideographs, such as are used by the Chinese, who seem to have formed their written language on a recognition of this action of the mind. We really read, write, and speak by the sentence, and that being the practice of the mind, it is the only sure way of teaching languages.

(3) The memory is the storehouse of the mind ; but it is very careful what it puts in there. When the individual is young, the mind's capacity is very limited. The mind selects things of which it has proved the worth, which it has used, and for

which it knows it can find work ; able-bodied ideas, incidents, words, etc. For detached words and general propositions it has little care, because they affect it so slightly. If forced to admit them, it drops them out again very quickly. As in itself it deals only in ideas ; it regards words as of quite secondary importance, necessary for display, but only of scenic value. It snatches greedily at those it wants to clothe its ideas, but declines to lay in a general stock. It gradually acquires a stock however, by keeping those words that have proved useful. The shape and size of the packets has an influence. The mind likes rhymes, alliterations, and sometimes bizarre notions ; hence the value of *memoria technica*. Educationalists have not sufficiently investigated this matter of memorial preferences. The way to verify these things is to watch the primitive action of a child's mind, and see it select and remember the words it can put into its little sentences.

(4) The avenues to the mind lead through the senses. If an individual is born deficient in the principal senses, he is then mindless. The technical name is 'idiocy by deprivation.' Persons so affected are sometimes found in asylums. Of the senses only two, sight and hearing, can normally convey complete ideas ; the others are auxiliary. In making mental impressions the senses reinforce one another. Observe the eighteen months' old infant. His mother holds up an object, and says ' See baby, ' ball.' The child stretches out his little hands and seizes it. First he feels it all over, then he looks at it, then he puts it to his mouth, not only to taste it but because the tip of his tongue is the most sensitive tactile organ he has ; then he will smell it, and sometimes he will put it to his ear. These movements are not purposeless ; by employing all his senses, he is getting the best impression he can of the ball, and of the word for it. A day or two later he will hold it up and say ' Ball.' Presently he will begin to make little sentences about it with the two or three words he has. This deepening of the impressions explains the effectiveness of pictorial advertisements and the influence of the theatre.

The failure of grammatical teaching to provide a useful working command of any language, arises from neglect of these elementary psychological considerations. The basic error, prolific source of most of the others, is the assumption that

because the word is the active element of the sentence, it is the working unit of the mind. The mental objective is the idea, to which everything else is subordinate. All its energies are directed to turning these out in good and effective condition ; and it should be the aim of education to train the mind to this end. By concentrating on one part of the mental process, the verbal embellishment, and neglecting the idea-making department, grammarians have disturbed the balance of the machine, causing it to work as it were against a brake, producing friction and heat, but very little output. Under this misguided influence linguistic teaching has mostly degenerated into pedantry, the gentle art of manipulating words void of ideas. The junior mind cannot deal with them in this condition. The experienced one knows the futility of trying. Hence we have the spectacle, that after centuries of grammatical teaching, no one has yet devised a plan whereby a reasonable command of a language can be acquired through grammar. An intelligent lad can obtain more control of any language in twelve months' use, than is possible by ten years' study of it through grammar. Nature often seems perverse, as the scientists know to their cost. Many a finely conceived experiment fails, when apparently by all logic it should succeed ; but it is always found that some essential factor has been overlooked. By not recognising the peculiar method of the mind, in clothing its ideas in ready-made groups of words, grammarians have been led to approach their pupils' minds with long lists of detached words and general propositions, i.e., rules, to which the mind cannot respond. Then the teachers are astonished at the small reaction they get, and call their pupils idle and dull. The teachers forget that they have not set their pupils' minds in motion ; and that unless the mind moves it can receive no useful impression. Teachers are asking for the impossible, and are wearing out their pupils' minds to no purpose.

The remedy, simple in principle, is to discard all pedantry, and teach by the idea. This is the 'association' method ; that is learning the language by use in conjunction with practitioners of it. In the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (9th Ed.) Prof. Sayce writes—

'The unit of speech is the sentence ; and it is with the sentence therefore, and not with lists of words and forms that the pupil should begin. . . . The method of nature and science alike is analytic, and

if we would learn a foreign language properly, we must learn it as we did our mother tongue, by first mastering the expression of a complete thought, and then breaking up this expression into its several elements.'

Teachers should remember that the small boy beginning to learn a foreign language is in exactly the same position with respect to it, as he was with his own tongue at eighteen months old ; and that his mind is so constituted, that he can learn it only as he did that mother tongue. He has no verbal groups waiting for employment, and he has no experience in managing the few odd words in his possession. Teachers should therefore proceed just as the young mother does with her first child. It is beautiful to see how her instinct keeps her psychologically true. She does not concern herself with grammar, even if she knows any. She teaches entirely by the idea, demonstrating every word, both noun and verb ; and the child learns to use them in little sentences. As he gets experience, he makes experiments in variation under her guidance, acquiring new words the while. Anyone can see the process in full work anywhere, and can note how eagerly the child responds, stretching out his few words to cover his ideas, until they become intelligible, and his speech has performed its function. It is the prettiest picture of a natural force acting under favourable conditions, and accomplishing comparative wonders.

So the teacher speaking the language himself (say, Latin) in the simplest phrases, should encourage his pupils to make ideas about some object right there in front of them, and cover them in the strange words. He should do this, because the boy has very little else than sensory impressions out of which to make his ideas. After a while the little three-word present-tense sentences will become historical, then descriptive, and finally opinionative. Progress will then be rapid, for he is getting bilingual, and that is what is wanted. After that it is only a question of time and use for him to become a linguist, able to understand and express any ordinary ideas within his vocabulary. Then the literature will lie open, the books can be studied for the thoughts that are in them, and a comparative estimate of their value formed. It is a mistake to think that languages acquired by the 'association' method are necessarily of an inferior or colloquial quality. An opinion can be expressed in exactly the same words written as spoken. It is all a matter of careful idea

formation. As Montaigne said: 'It is a natural, simple, unaffected speech that I love, so written as it is spoken, and such upon the paper as it is in the mouth. . . .'

The 'association' method succeeds because the whole mind is continually employed, covering its own ideas with words to make them cognizable to other intelligences; a very different thing to transferring ideas from one language to another, to see if the verbal formations are correct. In the 'association' scheme, idea-construction must immediately precede speech, as intended by nature, consequently the machine works smoothly and at great speed. If grammar is taught at all, it should come very late. Like all statistical deductions it is of use only to practitioners or senior students, and then only for reference. It codifies information they already have. It is suggested that a language cannot be learned by itself. Something will have to be taught in it. Thus Cæsar's Gallic War might be presented for the story of the campaign, with large maps and many comments, all in simple Latin. For the mind goes with the tale, and acquires the language along with and as part of the ideas. Maybe grammar has persisted for the convenience of some of the teachers. It is easy for anyone, with the book before him, to teach from a tabular statement, and to examine, by setting little traps amongst the categories. It is not suggested that a polyglot is necessarily an educated man—many are not—but he has an easier access to raw materials for the mind, and he can get a wider and more stereoscopic perspective of life.

The true objective of education is to train the mind through its own motion, by its own methods, to proficiency in the generation, management, and exhibition, of its own peculiar product—ideas. It is the quality of these that matters. There are certain master propositions, which the student cannot help using; and he requires to know the genesis and development of them. They are to be found in the various literatures, and they come with greater force and clearness from the great writers, if read in the original languages. It is therefore the business of the teachers to provide their pupils in the easiest and quickest fashion with a working knowledge of the languages, and to introduce them to the works of the great masters of thought as early as possible. It is probable that classics have retained their educational position, because the authors read were so

superlatively good, and their ideas were of such quality that even incidental contact with them was beneficial. If the humanists could turn out their students to be classical linguists as well as accurate thinkers, all would be well. If without hindrance from the language they could get into intimate contact with the great minds of antiquity, plenty of men would take the classical course, and there would be no lack of students or of interest in the subject.

The results of learning languages by the natural 'association' method as compared with the artificial study of grammar are amazing, for the linguistic capacity of the human mind, when approached by its own methods, is enormous. Witness the common continental polyglot with his five or six languages and often a literary knowledge of three or four of them. It should be borne in mind that it is not only possible but normal to obtain command of a language for literary or any other purpose, without any knowledge of the grammar whatever. We English always do it with our own tongue, and so do other nations with theirs. The French verb is an elaborately inflected thing, yet anyone can hear French children of eight or nine, who have never seen a grammar, using verbs—regular and irregular—in all their moods and tenses, with perfect correctness. A studious, intelligent English boy of fifteen, a pupil of one of our best schools, was transferred to the Elizabeth College, Guernsey. He had been learning French since he was nine with the usual result, that he knew a lot of the grammar, and could do nothing with the language. In conversation he could not put two sentences together, and he could not read a French newspaper. Yet, in the bilingual atmosphere of the place, after less than a year he had acquired the language, and was greedily devouring the best French literature. It is safe to say he would never have done any such thing at his English school.

In the Middle Ages, though grammar was taught, 'association' was the effective method. Erasmus spoke Latin as elegantly as he wrote it. Aldus Manutius, the scholar printer of Venice, made Attic Greek the language of his household. Fine golden-age Latin was Montaigne's mother tongue up to the age of six, and he had a command of it all his life. His method of quotation is interesting. He cites the ancient authors till we weary of them, but always for the whole idea, never for a tag or epigram. He

was master of the language, and could deal with it in bulk. The method survived partially down to comparatively recent times, and produced scholars like Gibbon, who could read the classic tongues as easily as English, as anyone can see from the footnotes to his history. The writer once knew an English child, aged twelve, born at Patras, Greece, who could use English, French and modern Greek interchangeably in reading, writing, and speaking. She also had a considerable knowledge of the ancient Greek idiom, and could read Xenophon and Herodotus into English or French, as quickly as she could speak. She might not have known the names of the words and constructions she was using, but she could employ them, and make corrections in her mind by varying the phrase. They were in her service, not she in theirs.

This is the kind of knowledge that is wanted for culture, and could be had, if the right objectives were chosen and the right methods followed. It is for the teachers to devise a scheme for the collective teaching of languages on natural lines. It should not prove impossible. The army instructors had at short notice to find a substitute for the old mechanical drill; and by taking the men into their confidence, and teaching by the idea, they brilliantly succeeded.

The main issue now seems to be the educational objective. Is the average student to leave college content with the mental training supposed to be conferred by the grammatical method, plus acquaintance with a few samples of the foreign authors and a knowledge of intricate but useless verbal analysis? Or, is he to have, as a positive possession for life, a fair working knowledge of the languages, with which to explore their literature, and extend his culture?

A. W. BURRELL.

THE FASCISTI

Ils proclamaient avec furie le droit ; ils voulaient, fût-ce par les tremblements et l'épouvante, forcer le genre humain au paradis. Ils semblaient des barbares et ils étaient des sauveurs. Ils réclamaient la lumière avec le masque de la nuit.—V. HUGO.

IT is unfortunate, and curious too, that the Fascisti movement has been and is so little understood, or rather so completely misunderstood or even ignored in England. Even in Italy you will seldom find an Englishman who has anything but the vaguest idea of how the movement originated and what it imports ; yet, even if we do not accept in their entirety the claims of the members of that organization, it cannot be denied that it is among the most interesting of the movements which have influenced the life of Italy during the present or the previous generation.

Even men who should know much better, group it with the Neapolitan Camorra or the Mafia of Sicily ; or, if they are hampered with a little treacherous knowledge, with the Fasci, which in Crispi's time spread misrule through that island, and speak of the Fascisti as of members of a secret society whose object is to subvert the constitution and substitute club law for the law courts.

Nothing could be more contrary to the truth. The object of the associations referred to is by threats and violence to promote the private advantage of their members. They sacrifice all consideration of public welfare at the altar of selfish greed. The weaker and more venal are the law courts and the legislature, the better for their purposes. They thrive on corruption. Their influence is destructive. Where it extends, the bonds of society tend to disintegrate. As against this the aims of the Fascisti are constructive ; their policy is to support the reign of law. They have no doubt been guilty of many deeds which are liable to a contrary interpretation. They have reacted against violence by violence, and in their fights with their Communist enemies they have sometimes, perhaps often, been the aggressors. But these exploits, of which the more earnest members of the society are ashamed, are extravagances which do not invalidate their

claim to be, on the whole, a party of order; and indeed in their early days one of the main endeavours of the Fascisti was to protect soldiers no less than the national flag from insult and abuse. In that evil time soldiers were constantly hissed or shot at in the streets, and officers were assaulted merely because they wore a uniform, which was regarded as a symbol of the Capitalist State and of the war it had waged, and the Tricolor was hauled down from public buildings and replaced by the Red Flag of Revolution. The troops, disorganized because they feared that the Government would not stand by them, hardly dared to use their weapons to protect themselves. The Fascisti took the matter in hand with vigour, perhaps even with excess of zeal. They were ready to take risks and to disperse subversive mobs by the use of club and revolver. They tore down the Red Flag from public buildings and Socialist clubs and, when the garrisons of the latter defended themselves, were quite ready to storm the building and burn it to the ground.

Desperate remedies, they said, must be used against desperate diseases. At the same time it would be idle to deny that some Fascisti have disgraced themselves and brought merited obloquy on the movement by acts of brutal violence, which, if they can be explained as natural reprisals directed against enemies guilty of similar outrages, cannot but be condemned by all who accept the view that to substitute for legal action the vindication of your supposed right by violence is a lapse towards barbarism.

The fact is that, however honourable the motives which inspired the earlier Fascisti, that happened to them which invariably happens to every body of men who appeal to force to right abuses. From the days of the Cave of Adullam onward the earlier enthusiasts are quickly joined by followers of baser metal who under the mask of patriotism look only for opportunities of gratifying their greed or paying off old scores of party or private rancour. Hooligans also are attracted, who are delighted to put a cloak of respectability over their life-long quarrel with the police. Judgment has often been passed on the Fascisti because of the excesses of the marauders who have enrolled themselves among their camp-followers, with no more justice than that with which we might stone David because some of the dwellers in the Cave of Adullam were cattle-lifters, or Garibaldi because some men in his legions robbed hen-roosts.

What then, it may be asked, are the tenets of the Fascisti? Political philosophy may seem a big term to apply to the doctrines of men who by common repute are more occupied in handling clubs and revolvers than in refuting their opponents by eloquence or logic; who are more at home sitting in a motor-lorry on their way to raid a Socialists' club than they would be in passing resolutions at an orderly political meeting. But though no Fascista would deny that he and his friends have taken part in, or permitted, deeds that could not be justified had they been committed in normal times, in times when law is enforced always and everywhere with strong and impartial hand, he may with some reason plead that extraordinary emergencies must be met by extraordinary remedies, that conditions in Italy since 1918 have been extraordinary, and that the nation could only be rescued from imminent risk of dissolution by the work of such truly patriotic associations as that organized by the Fascisti.

But as the emergency passes so will pass, is indeed passing, the need and the excuse for extra-legal action, action which so far from being of the essence of the Fascisti movement is at bottom quite alien to it. When the spume and passion of the moment have been forgotten there will remain, so they claim, the axioms on which the Fascisti base their theory and practice of national existence.

Members of the Latin nations, when dealing with politics, have always had a tendency to lay down some broad abstract maxim and from it to unfold by deductive reasoning an harmonious logical scheme of government. Such a broad postulate which the Fascisti assume as the basis of their creed is this: that the nation is prior to and above the State. In direct negation of the Hegelian doctrine they maintain that the State exists for the sake of man, not man for the sake of the State; that the form of State is relatively of small importance, that what is of importance is that the State should interfere as little as possible with the development of the individual. Here they come into direct antagonism to the Socialist, and still more to the Communist ideal and practice.

Withal they are dominated in all their activities by the splendour of the tradition of ancient Rome, that unique entity which during laborious centuries established the rule of law first

over Italy and then over the whole of Europe. To quote Claudian's well-known lines :

Hæc est in gremium victos qua sola recepit
 Humanumque genus communi nomine fovit,
 Matris non dominæ ritu ; civesque vocavit
 Quos domuit, nexuque pio longinqua revinxit.*

The Fascisti are determined not to prove unworthy of this great inheritance. The third Italy is, like the first, to shine as an example to other countries ; to carry on the tradition of Rome which even in the anarchy and disunion of the Middle Ages was never quite lost to memory. What has been well said of Italian architectural developments during the Renaissance is equally true of political tradition. ' However little of the authentic Roman strain they might legitimately boast yet by the origin of their culture they stood firmly planted in Roman civilisation.' There has been in Italy a continuity of tradition which has lived through the ruin and revival of political institutions and racial changes, and is to a surprising extent a living motive in the heart of many Italians. *Cives Romani sumus* is to them something more than a mere phrase.

Inflated vanity, sceptics may say, or overweening patriotism ; but it is no small thing for a nation, even if it marches with faltering footsteps, to march under the flag of high ideals, such ideals as inspired the finer spirits who revealed Italy to an astonished Europe in the Risorgimento of Cavour and Mazzini. And indeed some echo of the spirit of the Risorgimento is caught by the Fascisti. As the former devoted their lives to freeing Italy from the domination of the foreigner, so the latter have fought to deliver Italy, now united and free, from political corruption in high places, and from the truculence of selfish or ignorant mobs which threaten to cast away the advantages which Italy had so dearly bought by the blood of her sons shed in the war, substituting party feud and the selfish warfare of class against class for the single-hearted endeavour of a united nation. In 1920, as in 1860, leaders have been discredited by the excesses

*The following translation may be suggested :

She alone to friendship drew the tribes that vanquished came ;
 She as mother not as lord, gave all a common name,
 Linking far-off lands with love a son would feel for home,
 Greeting newly conquered foes as citizens of Rome.—EDITOR.

of some of their followers. It is inevitable that this should be. In no revolution recorded by history have the leaders, however high-minded and unselfish, been able to inspire all their followers with their own high standards of conscience and conduct, and if we are to judge the Fascisti fairly we must take account of their sober political action at least as much as of the turbulence of their more notorious rowdyism. The Fascisti indeed have not produced any leaders who can be compared to such men as the big three of the Risorgimento, but the best among them are, if on a smaller scale, animated by the same love of their country, and the same determination to free her from enemies, not now external, but of her own household.

How and why, it may be asked, did the Fascisti come into being? After the defeat of Caporetto when Italy from the Alps to the Ionian Sea was overwhelmed with grief, disappointment, and something very like despair, when the patriotism of the past months was replaced by mutual recrimination and petty intrigues, a group of Deputies, the most active of whom were Ceesia and Cesarò, founded the *Fascio Parlamentare*, and endeavoured to re-awaken in Parliament and the nation a sense of what was due to their own honour and to the memory of those who had given their lives for a great cause. At all costs the Italian people must be saved from the ignominy and loss of a great betrayal. It was grievous that precious lives had been sacrificed, doubly grievous it would be if by the treachery of survivors that sacrifice should prove to have been made in vain.

The efforts of these patriots were crowned with success, the plague of the 'defeatists' was stayed. Under the healthy impulses of the *Fascio Parlamentare*, the spirit of Italy recovered its elasticity and the stain of Caporetto was redeemed by the triumph of Vittorio Veneto.*

With similar name and similar attitude towards the main questions which agitated the country, a new group arose in 1920. The *Fasci di Combatimento* were not a direct emanation of the *Fascio Parlamentare*, but both groups sprang into being to combat the antipatriotic sentiments of a large section of the community. The *Fasci di Combatimento* did not seek to move the nation

*How gallantly the Fascisti fought is proved by the fact that of the 42 surviving holders of the Gold Medal for valour 26 are Fascisti.

through Parliament, but Parliament through the nation. To them there was nothing sacred in the name of Parliament. If Parliamentary government served the needs of the country, well ; if not, let a substitute be found. They did not believe that the life of the nation was bound up with its Parliament. Anyhow, they were convinced, and rightly, that the state of a large part of the country was such that it could not be restored to wholesome vitality save by drastic measures, and they were minded to apply such measures to secure respect for law, freedom of speech, freedom of meeting, freedom at elections, the stamping out of corruption in political and municipal affairs, and the suppression of all antipatriotic demonstrations.

The Socialists as a body had, during the war, though some individuals to their honour disassociated themselves from the majority, been altogether opposed to the national cause ; they had, as far as possible, avoided military service ; they approved and instigated the disturbances which in Turin and other towns had hampered the Government in the vigorous prosecution of the war. While the flower of the nation fought and bled they had worked behind shelter to destroy what the others had sought to build up—National Unity. When the soldiers returned from the trenches they found the Socialists had greatly strengthened their position because they had been able to work almost unhampered by opposition. The men who would, in the ordinary course, have held the Socialists in check had been busy on the frontier fighting against the foreigner. The soldiers' task had been made far more arduous by the disaffection which had been countenanced if not stimulated by the Socialists. And when the soldiers returned the Socialists who had delayed and jeopardised their victory sneered at the men to whose self-sacrifice and courage it was due that their own lives were safe and that their homes had not been ravaged by foreign soldiery.

Having utilised the days of war in strengthening their organization throughout the country, the Socialists now openly propagated the view that the war had been purposeless and wicked, that the men who had fought in it had really fought on behalf of capitalists and against their own class, and that the one advantage that might ensue from it would be that by the efforts of those who used neither rifle nor bomb, the yoke of the Capitalist government might be shaken from off the neck of the

proletariat. In the country districts they worked on lines resembling those of the Irish Land Leaguer, the object they kept in view being to reduce rents to a minimum and to deprive landlords of all power over the management of their estates ; the land to go to the labourer, while at the same time they opposed the development of peasant proprietorship, believing with good reason that as soon as he owns his freehold the peasant becomes a Conservative. In the country as in the towns by propaganda and by intimidation they worked without scruple to secure the election of their nominees in both municipal and political elections. The real and effective control of the State seemed to be passing into the hands of the Socialists. They enjoyed that most dangerous prerogative—power without responsibility. The executive, either from want of power or want of will to check it, looked on apathetically at this development of an *imperium in imperio*, and while the formal attributes of government remained as an appanage of the so-called constitutional parties, the real control of the State was passing into the hands of the Socialists.

The culmination of this surrender was seen when, under Giolitti, the 'occupation' of workshops was permitted, and the Minister of the Interior frankly confessed that any forcible repression of this anarchical assault on property could not be attempted save at the risk of a revolutionary movement—a risk which he thought it imprudent or impolitic to face. He may have been right in his analysis of the situation, but such an admission of impotence was glaring proof that the government had abandoned the primary and elemental duty of any government which has the responsibility of rule—to enforce the obedience of all classes to the law as it exists. The law may be faulty but till it is amended it must be observed under penalty of a dissolution of the bonds which differentiate an organized community from a horde of barbarians in which every man does what seems right in his own eyes. That Italy has escaped from drifting into the terrible situation which developed in Ireland during the years when Mr. Birrell, with a light heart, allowed the substitution of mob rule for orderly government, was in great measure due to the action of the Fascisti. And the peril was great.

Revolutions are as a rule carried out, in face of an apathetic or even hostile population, by the resolute action of a small but determined and unscrupulous minority. So it was in France in

the 18th century, so it was in Russia in the 20th century. In Italy also the conditions that make for the success of such a movement were present. The population as a whole was exhausted by the effort of the war ; it was utterly disheartened ; it had lost faith in the power and the prescience of its rulers ; it distrusted its Parliament and was aghast at the burden of taxation. A minority, inspired by the dramatic success of Sovietism in Russia, was determined to make a *tabula rasa* of all existing institutions and on the ruins to build up a structure of communism. The movement was led by men, of whom a few were honest enthusiasts, others mere selfish adventurers who believed that the more the waters were troubled the larger the draught of fish that would come to their nets. Revolution was in the air. A fear of coming anarchy was widely spread. People not much more timid than their neighbours prepared to convey their movable property into France or Switzerland, and to seek shelter there for themselves from the coming storm.

The Government did not dare to repress the manifestations of anarchism by severity. Perhaps they thought that by giving the enemies of public order rope enough they would hang themselves. Be that as it may, for weeks and months armed bands marched at will through the streets of important towns, issuing orders to a terrorised population, and dominating the farm labourers. As an instance of the rule of terror, take the Florentine outrage of February 1921, when a bomb was hurled at a procession of students passing through Piazza Antimori : by the explosion two men were killed and eighteen wounded. The same day incendiary fires broke out in several parts of the town ; a policeman was assassinated as he was on his way home from duty, other youths were thrown into the Arno. The whole series of outrages was organized by anarchists and Communists. Malefactors such as Malatesta defied the law, and even if brought to trial and convicted, were set at liberty again in deference to the clamour of the mob and threats of strikes and reprisals. ' *Viva Lenin* ' was scrawled on walls of towns and villages, and it seemed for some time quite possible that Soviet rule would be established. In the towns terrorism was supreme. In the country self-appointed committees compelled landlords in terror for their lives to abandon contracts, and by threats and boycotts and the free use of pistols and bludgeons forced labourers to strike with or without reason.

It was in the midst of this welter of anarchism that the Fascisti took their stand. Their organization partook on one side of the Boy Scout movement, on another of the Western Vigilance Committees. It may be urged against them that they merely opposed mob law to mob law : that the illegal methods (for of course their methods were illegal) by which they fought against their Communist enemies were no less subversive than those which they confronted ; that they were indeed kindling the flames of civil war. There is unquestionably some truth in these contentions. It was not possible in a time of strain and stress for the leaders to look too closely at the tools which they employed, and doubtless some men joined in the Fascist expeditions whose motives were rather to take revenge for private injuries or to gratify old-standing party rancour than to re-establish order. Reprisals inevitably led to reprisals, and in some cases it would be difficult to determine which of the opposing parties was most to blame for the terrible episodes of intimidation and bloodshed. If, however, we take a dispassionate view of the whole tragical story it cannot be seriously questioned that the Fascisti were on the whole engaged in enforcing the rule of law and, in spite of their occasional excesses, had behind them the goodwill and the support of the best elements of the population.

It would serve no good purpose to dwell in detail on the conflicts that shook the framework of society especially in Lombardy, Tuscany and Emilia. These are now of the past. Though paragraphs appear in the newspapers week by week telling their readers of sporadic explosions of violence, the real conflict is over, the rule of law has been restored. The rioting in Rome towards the end of May and the almost contemporary disturbances at Bologna might seem to invalidate this statement, but it is not really so. In Rome a procession of unarmed men returning from the funeral of a war hero was assailed by rifle and revolver shots, fired from a Socialist club. Somewhat serious rioting followed, in the course of which three men were killed and 40 wounded. The Government acted with laudable energy and quickly restored order, enforcing on all parties a cessation of hostilities. The general strike which the leaders of the proletariat organized was likewise suppressed—a hopeful indication that the Government intends with vigour to enforce obedience to the law on all alike.

The Bologna disturbances arose out of an old standing quarrel between Socialists and Fascisti over the agrarian question. Throughout the whole of Emilia the Socialist-agrarian trades unions had during the war become a dominating power. They boycotted workmen who did not join their unions and got absolute control of the rural municipalities. Through these they secured for the advantage of their members the subsidies granted by Government for carrying on works of public utility, paying them high rates of wages; and at the same time they endeavoured to compel private owners to employ only such workmen as they apportioned to them and for the hours and at the rates of wages which they fixed. These arbitrary, uneconomical measures had the inevitable result of increasing the unemployment which is chronic in the province. They also ran counter to one of the main tenets of the Fascisti, that each individual shall be free to employ his own energies to his best advantage. Even members of the Socialist unions became discontented and many of them—30,000 according to one report—went over to the Fascisti. All the elements for a violent clash of parties seemed to be present.

At this juncture the Prefect of Bologna issued an edict which seems singularly ill-advised, and which has been emphatically denounced by the well-known economist Prof. Einandi as a shameless attempt to enforce in the twentieth century the medieval rule of villeinage and servitude of the soil. By the provisions of this edict no workman was allowed to migrate from one parish to another in search of work. It is asserted, with some show of reason, that this edict was issued at the instigation of the Socialists, whose hold on the population it seems designed to strengthen.

The Fascisti at once protested against this edict by the most vigorous action. As a demonstration they concentrated on Bologna 50,000 men, who encamped either in the town or the adjoining villages. The leaders did not indeed intend anything more than a peaceful display, but unfortunately not a few acts of violence were committed by the Fascisti on their march, and serious conflicts arose between them and the Socialists. Signor Mussolini, who personally directed the enterprise, negotiated with the Prefect and urged on the Government his immediate removal to another province and the revocation of the edict. It was, of course, impossible for the Government to yield to

intimidation, but the desires of the Fascisti were so far met that Signor Mussolini ordered the evacuation of Bologna and the return of his men to their homes—an order that was carried out with military exactitude.

The Government meanwhile has been encouraged by the general support of the country to act with more decision in maintaining its authority. As an instance of this change, one among many, we may note that the railway strike of May 1st last was firmly met, and 'for the first time for many years the leaders 'of the "Red Syndicate," who for a long time were outside and 'above the law, were prosecuted in the law courts.' It is of course disputed how far this welcome change is due to the action of the Fascisti. It is at any rate certain that the gradual withering of the Leninist upas-tree synchronized with the development of their organization. There are even signs that the Fascisti are getting a hold over manual workers, who were till quite lately enrolled under the Socialist banner. This is shown by an admission, or complaint, of the 'Confederation of Labour' that the number of its members has diminished by 50 per cent., and that in some districts those affiliated to it have passed over wholesale to Fascismo, whose claim to represent Labour is, according to the Socialists, entirely without foundation.

The movement has now entered on its second phase. The dynamic period has been succeeded by the static. The repression of the cosmopolitan anti-national movement has been almost, if not altogether, carried through, and the leaders of the Fascisti are now looking forward to the continuous action of the party as a permanent factor in political life, its purpose being the purifying of politics, and the substitution of permanent well-defined constitutional parties for the selfish and sterile rivalry of groups. Like most other thoughtful men the Fascisti realise that the 'group system' is the negation of any genuine parliamentary government. Whether after the stress of their tempestuous origin they will be able to maintain their organization and use it for the development of a continuous policy in normal times is a question full of interest. That parliamentary government in Italy is sick is but too obvious. One administration after the other comes and goes, each too weak and ephemeral to carry out a consistent policy. The Fascisti think that they can effect a cure.

Of what nature then is their organization, and what are the

immediate objects of their endeavour? It must be borne in mind that when the movement started it was primarily as a fighting body. Force they were convinced must be met by force, intimidation by intimidation, for till the violence of the Communist agitators had been definitely checked there could be no room for the free expression of its views and desires by the majority, and the majority must rule if anything which can be called true democratic government is to exist.

An ambiguous use of terms which is a puzzle to many who try to understand Italian politics should here be cleared up. While the Fascisti and Socialists were fighting their battles, there were beside them two bodies which went by the name of *Arditi*. First there were the *Arditi della Guerra*, picked soldiers who had volunteered from the army for dangerous work: forlorn hopes enrolled as a special organization for the duration of the campaign. These men to some extent held together after the end of the war. Their politics as far as they were interested in politics were distinctly anti-bolshevist and anti-revolutionary. They were thus in sympathy with the Fascisti, and many of them joined the movement. Opposing them stood the *Arditi del Popolo*, militant Communists recruited partly from the ranks of the fanatical adherents of communism and partly from among irresponsible hooligans. The *Arditi del Popolo* formed the spearhead of the opponents to the Fascisti. It was almost a matter of course that these latter, considering the work which they set themselves to do, should have a military organization, and we find accordingly that such an organization has been worked out in careful detail.

The real founder of Fascismo, and the present leader—not to say autocrat—of the party, is Signor B. Mussolini, deputy for Milan. Curiously enough he was before the war a prominent leader of the Socialists, but he supported the war zealously, came to repudiate the Marxist dogma, and maintained that the State must not be the appanage of any one class, whether Proletariate or Borghesi, but belongs of right to the nation as a whole. He advocates 'co-operation by categories,' these categories being corporations modelled on the medieval guilds.

In consonance with the aim of the Fascisti to reach back to the traditions of Ancient Rome as model, he and his friends have framed their organization according to that of the Republican

army. Their primary unit is the *squadra*, representing the Roman maniple, and consisting of twenty to fifty men led by a *capo squadra* having two decurions under him. Four of these *squadre* constitute a century under the command of a centurion (captain). Four centuries form a cohort commanded by a *seniore* (major). From three to nine cohorts go to a legion, at the head of which is a consul (general), and one or more legions are included in each zone. The whole of Italy is for the purposes of the Fascisti divided into four zones : (1) Lombardy, Piedmont and Liguria ; (2) Venetia, with Emilia and Romagna ; (3) Central Italy and Sardinia ; (4) South Italy and the Colonies. Each of these zones is under the control of an inspector-general, and these four inspectors constitute the headquarters staff, with Signor Mussolini at its head.

The railway workers have organized among themselves a body of some 40,000 Fascisti Sindacati. These are opposed to the political strikes, which are fomented by the Red Railway Union, partly with a view to raise their wages, partly to control administration in the interests of their class. It is but too well known how frequent these strikes have been and how disastrously they have disorganized the railway service. The Fascisti Sindacati are pledged to act on the Fascist dogma that the nation is above any class, and therefore above the railway employees, and that when the interests of the two clash the latter must give way.

In elections the policy of the Fascisti has so far been rather to give their support to 'constitutional' lists than to aim at running candidates of their own, and there are but thirty-five Fascisti deputies in the chamber, and these form a highly disciplined group, tending to the Right. It seems likely however that in future elections they will run more candidates of their own with a view to getting that weight in Parliament to which they are entitled by their numbers* and organization. Besides their determination to secure freedom of speech and freedom of voting, which has been referred to above, the most important practical

*The most recent information shows that the Fascisti number as a whole 500,000 members who are divided as follows : workers on the land 250,000 ; railwaymen 50,000 ; post office 20,000 ; shipping 40,000 ; learned professions and writers 10,000 ; theatrical 10,000 ; clerks in private employment 40,000 ; various (not classified) 80,000.

points in their political programme are : firstly, to develop production by fostering co-operation and goodwill in agricultural and industrial enterprise between the capitalist, the technical expert, and the manual labourers ; and secondly, to limit the extension of governmental activity beyond what they consider to be its proper sphere. They would, as soon as possible, restore railways and telephones to private enterprise, for, they urge, the monopolising of these by Government leads not only to inefficiency and extravagance, but, what is even worse, to political corruption, and to stunting individual enterprise and independence.

It is hardly going too far to say that they are in this respect whole-hearted disciples of Herbert Spencer, and would reduce the functions of the State to that of the policeman, leaving all other activities to individual initiative. Many people will for this denounce them as reactionaries ; but is not the flowing tide with them ? Are not people generally getting wearied of the methods employed in other countries as well as in Italy by State functionaries to spread their net over the whole sphere of man's life, and to strangle individual action by the pressure of their too affectionate embrace ?

A last question arises which it is not easy to answer. Will the Fascist movement have lasting life ? As has been said, it bears some resemblance to that of the Boy Scouts, in this if in nothing else, that it is altruistic, and without some altruism there can be no progress. It has been said of religion that men will fight for it, suffer for it, die for it, anything but live for it. The Fascisti have shown that they can fight, suffer and die for their creed—will they be able to live for it ? If so, their work will be of enduring value.

E. STRACHAN MORGAN.

FISCAL POLITICS IN CANADA

1. Proceedings of the Tariff Commission of 1920.
2. Report of the National Liberal Convention of 1919.
3. The New National Policy. Canadian Council of Agriculture.
4. Canada as a Field for British Branch Industries. Department of Trade and Commerce.

THE fiscal question may slumber in Canada, but it never dies. Critics have pointed out, with an accent of complaint, that tariffs and their by-products form the staple ingredients of politics in most of the Dominions, and actually absorb the attention of their parliaments to the detriment of the consideration of other equally serious problems. But the fact is more or less inevitable while a country is in the formative stage and the lines of its development are being discussed and planned. There are some innocent souls who fondly believe that it is possible to remove tariff questions from the realm of politics by the establishment of a permanent commission, but it is vain to expect that an issue which so seriously affects the business interests and social life of the whole community will ever be allowed to pass from the control of popular assemblies. Washington indeed possesses a permanent Tariff Commission, but at the present moment the tariff is one of the live political issues in American politics. In autocratically ruled countries the removal of the tariff from the political arena may be feasible, but it is quite impossible in countries like the British Dominions which enjoy democratic institutions.

During the war the fiscal issue was practically dormant in Canada. The Borden Government made the necessity of raising extra revenues the excuse for a general increase of the tariff, seven and a-half per cent. being added to the general and five to the British preferential rates; and while the Liberals criticised this increase, they eventually acquiesced in it. For the first three years of the war the Government of Canada was carried on by the Conservatives, but by the beginning of 1916 their administration had lost the confidence of the country and was drifting to disaster. After much intrigue and prolonged

negotiations a coalition government, consisting of Conservatives and of Liberals who supported conscription, was formed under Sir Robert Borden. It won the general election of December 1917 and successfully carried on the national war effort till peace came. The Coalition had enjoyed the support of the great majority of the western farmers, and Sir Robert Borden and some of his colleagues had cherished the hope that out of it would be formed a permanent new party. Therefore for the conciliation of the westerners the increases of the tariff duties which had been imposed in 1916 were abolished in the first session after the Armistice, but this concession was not sufficient to placate the low tariffites, and the eastern Conservatives would go no further.

Accordingly, in June 1919 Mr. T. A. Crerar, who was the acknowledged leader of the agrarian movement, and had been serving as Minister of Agriculture, resigned his seat in the cabinet. With him there seceded a group of western members who thenceforth sat on the cross benches of the House of Commons. In the autumn of the same year there was drafted and published to the world by the Canadian Council of Agriculture a political programme known as the New National Policy. It embodied a list of advanced reforms and its fiscal planks declared for reciprocity with the United States, an immediate increase of the British preferential rates to 50 per cent. of the general tariff, and their further diminution by gradual steps until free trade with Great Britain was attained. A general reduction in other duties was also proposed. The Government had still retained the allegiance of a number of western members who had low tariff constituencies, and to justify their position, Sir Thomas White, then Minister of Finance, promised a general revision of the tariff following an investigation by a royal commission. When the next budget was drafted, Sir Thomas had given way to Sir Henry Drayton, and the latter offered as an excuse for the failure to appoint a commission the plea that the unsettled condition of international trade and finance precluded any satisfactory evidence being given or sound conclusions being drawn. But by the spring of 1920 it was apparently thought that a more stable atmosphere had arrived, and a Tariff Commission, consisting of Sir Henry Drayton (the Minister of Finance), Senator Robertson (the Minister of Labour), and Mr. S. F. Tolmie (Minister of Agriculture), was then appointed.

The Commission began its work in an atmosphere of anxiety. Canada's reserves of free or cheap land had practically disappeared, the inflow of European capital had shrunk to very modest dimensions, the war had left an onerous legacy of debt, and there had been through greedy waste and exploitation a serious depletion of the public heritage of natural resources. The old reckless habit of securing funds by the mortgage of natural resources and meeting the obligations when they matured by fresh borrowings, was no longer possible. The Canadian people were confronted with economic realities and it had become a matter of paramount importance to decide whether the economic system, under which the national business was co-ordinated, enabled Canada to develop the maximum possible prosperity and to sustain health and efficiency for the mass of her population. The people of Canada had reached a mood where they wanted to be shown just how far many of their institutions were beneficial or harmful to them, and when they were willing to seek and even demand drastic readjustments in their political and economic systems. Leaving Ottawa on September 11, 1920 the Commission visited every corner of the Dominion, and held at least 30 meetings till its sittings ended at the beginning of January 1921. At every meeting delegations and individuals representing a variety of interests appeared to present their case and a great mass of evidence was accumulated. The manufacturers lost no opportunity of advancing their views, and were represented by their leading officials and some of the ablest counsel in the Dominion. Their spokesmen invariably advanced the time-honoured arguments about the value of the home markets, the need for national self-sufficiency, the demand for other careers than agriculture could afford, and the necessity of maintaining 'key' industries. In general, the manufacturers took the view that the tariff was their exclusive concern, and that whoever touched it would do so at his peril. They gave little indication of any willingness to consider the point of view of the other sections of the community. They were eager, however, for the remission of duties on machinery and other commodities whose price was increased for them by the existing tariff.

The Commission from the very first was repeatedly confronted by the dilemma, inherent in all protectionist systems, that the raw material of one industry is the finished product of another, and

the duties designed to protect the one constitute a burden upon the other. In British Columbia, for instance, there cropped up certain complaints about the effects of a duty on tinplate, established by a stroke of the pen in the 1919 budget as an inducement for Baldwins, Limited, to take over the Imperial Munition Board's plant at Toronto and manufacture tinplate there. Its immediate effect was to raise the price of tinplate and consequently the cost of production in various national industries. The salmon canners of British Columbia, the fish packers of the Atlantic coast, as well as the representatives of the paint, jam and other industries, all made vehement complaints about its evil effects. In the canning business at that time the cost of the containers was about 25 per cent. of the finished product, and this little kindness to Baldwins, Limited, was clearly shown to have materially raised the cost of living in Canada.

At various sittings of the Commission, isolated individuals appeared to protest against the tariff. Mining men in British Columbia demonstrated how the duties on mining machinery and flotation oils prevented the development of low-grade mines, and it was clearly shown that the protection afforded to a paper combine placed British Columbia fruitgrowers at a great disadvantage compared with their American competitors by raising the price of the paper needed for wrapping fruit. Many manufacturers complained about the handicaps imposed on them by duties on machinery. In some cities, women witnesses, often enthusiasts in social welfare work, came forward to explain that the tariff intensified the problem of poverty and to ask for redress from the operations of combines. But the main assault upon the tariff came from the organized farmers whose general staff, the Canadian Council of Agriculture, arranged for representative deputations to present their case at every possible sitting. In British Columbia and in certain districts of Ontario where fruitgrowing and market gardening are the staple rural industries, farmers were to be found expressing sympathy with protection; but elsewhere the rural community spoke against it with a surprisingly unanimous voice.

The main counts of the farmers against the existing fiscal system were that it acted as a burdensome handicap upon what must always be the primary industry of Canada, agriculture, and the other natural industries. Canada, they all argued, had

special capabilities for the production of grain, livestock, forest products and minerals, but their utilisation was retarded by the effect of tariff duties which increased the cost of the implements of production and forced wages upward by raising the cost of living. Under the shelter of the tariff there had been established in Canada a number of industries which had no real place in the economic life of the country, and whose maintenance was a constant strain upon the natural industries.

In answer to the manufacturers' contention about the value of cities and towns as a home market, the farmers' spokesmen declared that only 50 per cent. of the farm produce of Canada in 1919 was consumed by the home market. They pointed to the very damaging statistics of rural depopulation in places like Prince Edward Island and the finest agricultural counties of Ontario, and contended that one result of the tariff had been to draw population from the country to the towns, the protected industries being able to offer artificially high wages with which the farms could not compete. More and more workers were thus withdrawn from agricultural occupations and the rate of increase in the farm production of Canada had been slow and very disappointing. The tariff had failed to accomplish the purposes for which its sponsors claimed credit; it had not given Canada a favourable trade balance, it had not eliminated unemployment, and it had not prevented industrial unrest. It afforded a shelter behind which incompetent and lazy manufacturers could make a living at the expense of the consumer; it fostered class organisation and class selfishness, and it tended to increase political corruption.

The spokesmen of the farmers specifically challenged the claim that the tariff had been responsible for the expansion of Toronto, Hamilton and other industrial centres. They pointed out that the protectionist system was established in 1878 and that for the next twenty years the growth of these industrial communities has been very slow. But when the immigration boom and the era of railway development filled the west with new farmers and producers, the need of supplying their wants created a demand for manufactured products and the manufacturing towns forged rapidly ahead. On the other hand, as soon as rural expansion was checked by the war, the progress of these towns was also checked. Therefore, argued the farmers'

representatives, the credit for the industrial development of Canada should be given not to the tariff but to the expansion of agriculture. The Dominion, they went on to argue, had now reached an *impasse*. The cities and towns could not grow until farmers became more prosperous and more numerous, and this change could not take place till the urban industrialists abated their pretensions to take heavy toll of the farmers' profits. The farmers were also able to point to two striking examples of industries which flourished in Canada without tariffs. The duties on binder twine and cream were removed many years ago, but these commodities are still successfully and profitably manufactured in Canada. The case of the organized farmers against protection in Canada can best be summed up by the quotation of two paragraphs from a memorial presented in Winnipeg by the Council of Agriculture to the Commission. They run as follows :—

We suggest to you that to continue the tariff in anything like its present form is a direct contradiction of the purpose of those who originated the protective tariff. Its purpose was to build up and establish manufacturing industries. To bring this about the consumers were asked to endure the higher prices entailed. There is no sense of proportion in giving to an industry fully established the same assistance that was given to it when it was striving to secure a foothold.

We suggest to you that profits secured to any industry by an unjust law are like a gambler's gains—easily diverted to improper uses. The revolt of the farmers against both traditional political parties is due in part to the widely-held belief that each has been bonused by the protected industries, and so indirectly bribed to uphold protection. At the present time large sums of money are being expended in advertising propaganda; whole pages in the daily press are filled repeatedly. No one is soft enough to think this is being done to promote the nation's interests; it is inconceivable that a nation-wide propaganda of this kind would be entered upon and its heavy cost defrayed except to retain sectional privileges inimical to the general interests.

One of the most arresting phenomena disclosed by the sessions of the Tariff Commission was the extent of the permeation of Canadian industry by American capital. The fisheries of the maritime provinces, the pulp and paper mills of Quebec, and the lumber and mining industries of British Columbia are largely in American hands. Many of the grain and elevator companies of the prairie provinces are American in origin or possess American

affiliations, and the same is true of the packing business. In the Montreal area and in all the industrial centres of Ontario the branch factories of American corporations are to be found at every turn, and the great growth in recent years of places like Hamilton and the Border Cities is mainly due to their advent. The Border Cities, which is the name given to the 'five town' area centring round Windsor, is virtually an annex of the great American city of Detroit. Thanks to the expansion of the motor industry the latter city has grown enormously in the last decade, and as its business centre lies along the waterfront, the opposite Canadian shore offers many advantages both for residential and industrial purposes over its own hinterland seven or eight miles back. To-day there are thousands of people who work in the United States and live in Canada, and once the number is swollen tenfold, as it seems liable to be in 1940, the situation will present some difficult problems. Sherbrooke, which is near the American frontier in Quebec, is a favourite resort for the branch establishments of New England firms, and when the Tariff Commission sat there, out of seven manufacturing witnesses who testified, five were Americans, and a sixth was the Scotch manager of a well-known American corporation.

There is little doubt that the inflow of American capital into Canadian industry has been accelerated since the war, and that the system of Imperial Preference, which Mr. Austen Chamberlain established as an act of filial duty, has played its part in the acceleration. Many American corporations have found it profitable either to acquire or establish Canadian factories, because they are thereby enabled to secure access on more favourable terms to the markets of the British Empire. Many of them are now filling a large part of their export orders from Canadian establishments. Now it may be highly desirable to force American capitalists to invest their capital on Canadian soil, and imperialists who have periodic attacks of nerves about the Americanisation of the prairie provinces by farmers from the United States apparently welcome American activities in the industrial field. But they either do not or will not see that a measure designed to promote closer ties with the mother country is simply increasing the American stranglehold over Canadian industry. The exact facts of the situation are fully set out in an admirable handbook 'Branch Factories of British Firms in

'Canada' which gives the following statistics about the proportion of British, Canadian, American, and other capital invested in industries in Canada. The tables are calculated from data collected for the year 1919, and the authors of the handbook declare that the American ratio has materially increased in the last two years, and hazard the guess that to-day the proportion of American capital in Canadian industries has increased from 34 to 50 per cent.

STOCKS, BONDS AND OTHER SECURITIES HELD BY INCORPORATED AND JOINT STOCK COMPANIES ENGAGED IN THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES OF CANADA IN 1918—PAR VALUES.

Owned by 8,130,368 individual holders in				
Nature of Security	Canada	Great Britain	United States	Other Countries
	\$	\$	\$	\$
Stocks	790,512,678	136,686,566	494,706,199	13,838,322
Bonds	144,246,283	15,104,859	60,961,360	2,614,200
Other securities .	10,684,697	1,966,400	275,618	768,800
Totals	945,443,658	153,757,825	555,943,177	17,221,322
Approximate percentage	56	9	34	1

N.B.—There are in addition to the securities above mentioned, 'Bearer Bonds,' to the value of \$25,984,786, and 'Bearer Stocks' to the value of \$3,395,000, the location of which cannot be definitely stated.

But the critics of the present fiscal system can find their best ammunition in the figures of the 1921 census which have recently been published. The 1911 census showed Canada to possess a population of 7,206,643, the gain in the previous decade having been 1,800,000 souls, or 34 per cent.. This constituted a very satisfactory increment, but when the volume of the tide of immigration which had flowed in was taken into consideration, the figures were regarded as disappointing and there was disturbing evidence that Canada was not retaining her population. The returns of the 1921 census give abundant confirmation of

this fear. According to them, Canada, on June 1, 1921, had a population of 8,769,630, and after every allowance has been made for the effects of the war, this figure is far short of the expectations which had been formed. In the decade 1901-1911 the excess of births over deaths in Canada was roughly 1,150,000. Since competent authorities estimate that the war cost Canada 125,000 actual or potential lives, the native increment should have been 1,025,000. The immigration figures shew that in the decade 1911-21 about 1,800,000 people entered Canada with the intention of taking up permanent residence. If the Dominion had been able to keep all her natives and immigrants within her bounds, her population in 1921 should have been as follows :—

1911 Population	7,206,643
Native increment, less loss			
through war	1,025,000
Immigrants	1,800,000
			10,031,643

It is plain therefore that there is a clear deficiency of a million and a-quarter, and some explanation must be found for it. Mr. R. H. Coats, the able head of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, admitted in a recent speech the existence of this loss, and expressed the opinion that between 60 and 65 per cent. of the immigrants who had come to Canada had not stayed in the country. He thought that the exodus of native-born Canadians to the United States which had been steadily going on for generations was still proceeding, and that it accounted for about 150,000 of the loss, being, however, as natural and inevitable as the annual exodus of Scots to England. The rest of the loss he accounted for by the incapacity of Canada to retain more than 700,000 out of the 1,800,000 immigrants who had entered her gates since 1911. Unfortunately Canada keeps no records of emigration, but the American immigration returns shew that there has been on the balance of migration between the two countries a decided gain to the United States. The cold truth is that the annual exodus from Canada has reached disconcerting dimensions. If its scale were applied to the British Isles they would be losing each year over half a million population, and while many British politicians and economists would welcome this rate of emigration, it is an infinitely more alarming phenomenon in a new than an old country.

The motives which take this mass of migrants out of Canada are many and varied. The severity of the winter plays a very great part. The Canadian winter has many pleasant aspects, but it would be folly to deny its rigours and minimise the dislike which many incomers feel for it. Only a small proportion of English people born south of the Trent will ever be really happy in the prairie provinces of Canada and northern Ontario, and the natives of even milder climes simply will not stay there. The successful settlement of these areas must largely depend upon immigrants from countries where the winter climate approximates in severity to the Canadian. Such people will easily adapt themselves to their new surroundings, and become contented and prosperous. But the others will drift away to more genial climes and be lost to Canada. To-day the cables bring continual reports of a comprehensive scheme of Imperial migration, but it is doubtful if its sponsors realise that Canada has already lost two-thirds of her immigrants of the past decade. Yet the climate does not account for all the exodus. May not a large share of the blame be laid at the door of a fiscal system which develops the secondary and artificial industries and allows the protected manufacturers to levy upon the pioneer settler a monstrous toll, and to reduce to a disheartening level the financial gains which would have reconciled him to his hardships and the severance from old associations ?

The report of the Tariff Commission had not been made public when Mr. Meighen decided to go to the country last autumn. He proceeded to bend every effort to force a single track election upon the issue of the tariff, and while his election manifesto made some pretence of a general survey of the past record of the Government and its coalitionist predecessor, and contained some meagre references to foreign affairs and current problems, its main substance was a re-statement in general terms of the protectionist theory of 1878 with a summary of the benefits which it was alleged to have brought and would yet bring to Canada. Thereafter in every one of the numerous speeches which he delivered, he laboured manfully to convince the electorate that the tariff was the supreme issue of the election and that its destruction at the hands of the opposition group would spell economic devastation for the Dominion. Let it be said to his credit that he did not trim his sails upon the fiscal

question, and that he lost his own seat in the west by making the same sort of protectionist speeches as he delivered in Toronto. In this respect he shone in happy contrast to Mr. Mackenzie King, the new Premier, who can easily be convicted of adapting his fiscal views to the geographical locality of his speech.

But Mr. Meighen's consistency brought no reward. At the date of the election it was estimated that Canada had an army of 200,000 unemployed, and the tale that a tariff was the only insurance against unemployment fell coldly upon their ears. 'Through good times and bad,' said Mr. Meighen, 'we have taken the strong self-reliant course and have been able to pursue that course and maintain our prosperity regardless of the policy of any other nation.' But critics arose to ask why the country was wallowing in the trough of a most acute industrial and agricultural depression. Mr. Meighen's explanation was that the persistent anti-tariff campaign of the Progressive Party had unsettled business conditions and produced unemployment and loss to all classes, and he asked for a decisive verdict to give the signal 'for returning confidence, for renewed productive activities, and better times.'

During their period of office from 1896 to 1911 the Liberal party had been justly accused of practising a shameless opportunism in respect to the fiscal question. In 1917 that party had been shattered by the conscription controversy and only retained reasonable strength in the regions lying east of the Ottawa River. When therefore, a National Liberal Convention was summoned in 1919 for the purpose of electing a new leader and drafting a new party platform, the Liberal leaders saw that chances of the revival of Liberalism as a national force depended upon their success in conciliating the farmers of western Canada, who had in 1911 strongly supported Laurier on the reciprocity issue but had subsequently given their allegiance to the Coalition Government elected in 1917. In 1919 the Progressive party was still a vague threat upon the political horizon and had not taken material shape. So the Liberal leaders hoped that an advanced Liberal platform which promised drastic reductions of the tariff would stave off the advent of a third party and lure the restless westerners back within the Liberal fold. With this end in view the Liberal party in its 1919 platform pledged itself to drastic tariff reforms; it promised to put all implements of production

and foodstuffs on the free list, to prosecute the idea of reciprocity with the United States and to bring about substantial reductions in the general schedules. The protectionist wing, which is very strong in Quebec, grumbled at these items in the platform but acquiesced for the sake of the party advantage which they promised.

But the hopes and expectations on which these tactics were based were not realised. The organized farmers, remembering the betrayal of the Liberal platform of 1893, refused to treat the new platform seriously and their suspicions were enhanced by the spectacle of notorious protectionists retaining high place in the councils of the Liberal party. They undertook the organization of the new party known as the Progressive, which took its stand on 'The New National Policy,' and soon revealed itself at by-elections as able to compete with the two historic parties on equal terms in Ontario and Western Canada. When the election campaign developed, the Liberal leaders were aware that the bait held forth in their 1919 platform had been left untouched and that the radical nature of their tariff professions was certain to cost them votes in the industrial centres. Accordingly a process of jettisoning the tariff planks in the platform was initiated and went merrily ahead. At a party banquet held in Montreal, Sir Lomer Gouin and Mr. Rodolphe Lemieux, two of the most influential Liberals in Quebec, made in the presence of Mr. Mackenzie King frankly protectionist speeches and declared that the schedules of the Laurier tariff must not be materially altered. Mr. King did not openly endorse these sentiments but he avoided the fiscal issue as much as possible; he talked vaguely about a tariff for revenue which would meet with equal success the needs of the consumer and producer and he gave distinct pledges that the vital industries of the country would not be incommoded by changes. At Brantford he spoke in support of a bizarre Liberal candidate who assailed Mr. W. F. Cockshutt, the star protectionist of the whole Dominion, for a too feeble championship of protection, and managed to defeat him. Writing on the eve of the election the *Canadian Forum* thus described the Liberal position :—

'From the general attitude of the Liberal party, it appears probable that in the event of their return to power history will repeat itself . . . the principles enunciated by the Convention of 1893 resemble closely

those enunciated by the Ottawa Convention of 1920. The campaign speeches of Mr. King and his followers appear to indicate a similar tendency to regard the anti-protection platform as a 'chart' or pious wish, to be forgotten when the battle is to be fought with privilege. Mr. King must be more direct if he is to remove the impression that he is leaving the way open to the support of the protected interests.'

The conduct of the Liberal leaders certainly encouraged voters in the industrial centres to believe that they could safely visit their resentment upon the Meighen Government without endangering the safety of their tariff schedules. But their tactics widened the cleavage between the Liberal and Progressive parties, and the hopes cherished at one time of an arrangement to avoid three-cornered contests which might let in Government candidates, had to be abandoned. The Progressives held to their radical programme and managed to attract the support of many electors in the cities and towns especially of the western provinces. But they had been unable in the time at their disposal to organize any serious invasion of Quebec, which was the great Liberal stronghold, and were weak in the maritime provinces. Their comparative helplessness east of the Ottawa River rendered their attainment of a majority impossible for they only ran candidates in 144 out of 235 seats. But their appearance upon the political scene appreciably invigorated the atmosphere of the election and profoundly disturbed the plans and calculations of the managers of the two historic parties.

The result of the general election held on December 6, 1921, did not, however, yield a clear majority to any of the parties. The general expectation was that the new Parliament would contain three groups of almost equal strength, but the Liberals, running ahead of their form and profiting greatly by good luck in three-cornered contests, secured 117 seats, the Progressives carried 66, the Conservatives 50, and Labour 2. Unfortunately for the Liberals, this did not constitute a clear majority, and Mr. Mackenzie King, the Liberal leader, when called upon to form a cabinet, entered into negotiations with the Progressive leaders with a view to their co-operation. He offered the Progressive leaders terms which promised the immediate translation into legislation of a considerable part of their programme, but his insistence that they must adopt the Liberal label and abandon the separate identity of their party, combined with a revolt among Liberal protectionists in Quebec brought the negotiations

to an end and he was compelled to form a government out of the resources of his immediate following.

A minority Government was a completely new experiment in Canadian federal politics and obviously its tenure of office was bound to be precarious unless it secured the good-will of one or other of the opposition groups. The Cabinet contained a powerful group who regard the Progressives as dangerous radicals and would have preferred co-operation with the Conservatives, but another section merely looked upon the new party as separated brethren who ought to be humoured as much as possible and eventually brought back into the Liberal fold. The majority of the Ministry apparently accepted the latter view, and the obvious political strategy was to devise a course of action which would ensure the good-will of the Progressives. Yet there was considerable surprise when it suddenly became known in Ottawa in the closing days of February that Mr. W. S. Fielding, Minister of Finance, was in Washington and engaged in conference with President Harding and influential members of his administration. His pilgrimage was immediately interpreted as an effort to revive the negotiations about reciprocity.

Mr. Fielding had been one of the chief promoters of the reciprocity agreement of 1911 and had gone down to personal defeat with the Laurier Government on that issue. He had never wavered in his belief that its rejection was a cardinal blunder on the part of the Canadian electorate, and that reasonably free commercial relations with her neighbour were absolutely indispensable to the prosperity of the Dominion. He had always insisted that the treaty had not been rejected in 1911 on its fiscal merits, but through the successful and misleading use of the 'loyalty' cry, and by a gross misrepresentation of what the pact actually involved. Reciprocity with the United States had been kept as an item in the Liberal platform which was drafted in 1919 and occupied a prominent place in the programme of the Progressives. Senator Dandurand, now Government leader in the Senate, related in a speech how at the request of Sir Wilfrid Laurier he had in 1913 undertaken a special mission to Washington and requested President Wilson to keep the American legislation upon reciprocity on the statute books, because Sir Wilfrid Laurier intended to make his next election campaign upon the issue in full confidence that the verdict of 1911 would be changed.

It is an open secret that Mr. Fielding, still unwearied by the long years he has devoted to political life, cherishes as his fondest ambition a desire to finish the work which he had begun in 1911. In the session of 1921 he endorsed a resolution in the House of Commons urging that the Canadian Parliament should immediately enact the Reciprocity Treaty before it was removed from the American statute books. The Meighen Government resisted and defeated the resolution, but Mr. Fielding took into the lobby with him the united strength of the Liberal and Progressive parties. Accordingly, when he made his southward pilgrimage to Washington, he was merely following his own firm convictions and at the same time making a judicious bid for Progressive support in the approaching session. Unfortunately for Mr. Fielding the changes in the American political situation which had occurred since 1911 were not calculated to improve the prospects of reciprocity. It is true that the Republican party which negotiated the former treaty is once more in power, but there has been an alteration in the forces which control it. In 1911 the eastern manufacturers and financiers were all-powerful in its councils, and when they discovered that the Payne-Aldrich tariff was exciting widespread discontent, they welcomed and supported an agreement which would permit of access to more abundant food supplies and lower the cost of the living.

To-day there is a completely new orientation at Washington ; almost a majority of the Republican party in both houses now belong to what is known as 'the agricultural bloc.' This group, which has some Democratic adherents, is composed of representatives of agricultural constituencies, who have banded themselves together to promote measures favourable to the farming interests and thwart legislation inimical to them. Under skilful leadership they have proved a very effective force in American politics during the past year, and on many occasions have successfully opposed the plans of the Harding administration, or forced it to accept their own policies. The average American farmer in the days of Bryanism and the Populist movement was a stern critic of the tariff system, but to-day, faced with a difficult period of readjustment, he attributes the fall in prices of farm products to foreign competition, and has adopted a protectionist outlook. To this sentiment the 'agricultural bloc' is perforce

responsive, and it has been mainly at their dictation that the Emergency Tariff Law was passed and the clauses in the Fordney Bill which make agricultural protection permanent have been drafted. They are specially designed to deal with Canadian and Argentine competition, and under such circumstances, President Harding, who has a wide range of contentious problems on his hands, naturally declines to risk further quarrels with the bloc. To observers who were familiar with the situation at Washington, there seemed little likelihood of any immediate success for Mr. Fielding's mission, and the event has proved the correctness of the forecast.

Mr. Fielding returned from Washington a few days before the first session of the fourteenth Parliament opened, and in a public statement frankly admitted that the reinstatement of the reciprocity negotiations was at least for the time being impossible. He had held conferences with President Harding, Mr. Fordney, and other Republican leaders, and while they professed warm friendship for Canada and appreciation of her great value as a customer, they were unanimous in declaring that the old reciprocity treaty could not be revived. Its formal existence on the United States statute books was admitted, but the general sentiment was that the hostile vote of the Canadian electorate in 1911 had rendered it a dead letter. The Fordney Tariff Bill which is now under consideration by Congress contains a clause specifically repealing the reciprocity legislation, and it is plain that if negotiations are ever renewed they must start on a completely fresh basis. In any event the original terms had become obsolete in many respects. The Borden Government, for instance, had reduced the Canadian duties on agricultural implements to a level below the scale provided in the reciprocity agreement. Mr. Fielding, however, is not prepared to abandon hope of his pet measure. He has pointed out that the Fordney Tariff contains a clause authorising the President to enter into fiscal negotiations with any country which will offer reciprocal treatment to American commodities, and he claims to have been assured on high authority that the sponsors of this clause had Canada specially in mind when they inserted it. However the project must simmer and await political developments at Washington.

The Fordney Bill makes slow progress and is encountering

many obstacles ; its provisions are regarded by most economists of repute as quite incompatible with the changed economic position of the United States and opposition to it is violent in circles where high protectionism was two decades ago a sacred faith. In due course it will become law, but it will be subjected to the same torrent of popular criticism which rolled up the Payne-Aldrich tariff twelve years ago. When the Presidential campaign of 1924 draws nigh, the Republicans, as in 1911, will be in search of some method of conciliating low tariff sentiment, and it is not improbable that they will follow the example of Mr. Taft and turn to the idea of a reciprocity treaty with Canada.

As long as Mr. Fielding lives the project of freer trade relations between the two countries will be kept in the foreground of Canadian politics and he will eagerly respond to any overtures from Washington. It is probable, however, that the terms offered in 1911 will be no longer available. The old treaty contemplated complete reciprocity in natural products and scarcely touched the sacred schedules of the manufacturers. Indeed, many Canadian free traders were lukewarm to it on the ground that it did not go far enough. To-day, American negotiators are certain to demand freer access for their manufactures to the Canadian market than they sought in 1911, and naturally many Canadian Progressives and Liberals will be willing to make this concession. In 1911, both Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Mr. Fielding warned the embattled manufacturers, who had thrown all their weight against them, that they were making a profound error and would at some future date have to accept a much more distasteful reciprocity agreement. If they are faced with demands for a sacrifice of their preserves they can chiefly thank themselves.

Meanwhile the speech from the throne at Ottawa contains the following fiscal reference :—

‘ You will be invited to consider the expediency of making some changes in the customs tariff. While there are details of revision, the consideration of which will require time and care that are not at present available, there are features of the tariff which it is felt may be properly dealt with during the present session.’

Protectionist writers have claimed that the election of December 6th was a signal triumph for their theories because less than one-third of the members elected to the House of

Commons were pledged to the removal of protection. But on the other hand all the new House of Commons, except the 50 Conservatives, are committed by the programme which they endorsed to radical reductions of the tariff, and if the King Government hopes to stay in office it must make some sort of fiscal changes. The Progressives advocate the immediate increase of the British preferential rates to 50 per cent. of the general schedule, and it may be that Mr. Fielding will convert his colleagues to sanctioning the change. It might yield him double profits in conciliating the Progressives and in stimulating American interest in a reciprocity treaty. An increase in the British preference to 50 per cent. would mean the displacement of a large volume of American by British goods, and United States merchants and manufacturers who found their Canadian orders declining would soon become zealous advocates of reciprocity. An increase in the British preference might bring some advantage to the Canadian consumers, if they could realize its full benefits. But there is ground for the suspicion that in many lines it merely operates as a subsidy to British manufacturers and exporters. In these days of great commercial combinations, competition is less keen than of yore and British firms exporting a certain class of goods to Canada often arrange to fix the selling price at a small margin below the price sought by American manufacturers, after the latter have paid the full tariff duty. At the same time the freight and steamship companies have a pleasant habit of capturing for themselves part of the preference spoils.

No preferential arrangement within the Empire can ever be an adequate substitute to Canada for comparative exclusion from the greatest market in the world which lies at her doors. In 1911 confidence in a flowing prosperity, which proved only temporary, and sentimental considerations induced her to reject an agreement which would open the gates, but if it comes again, it will not be scorned. For many imperialists in both Canada and Great Britain this is an unpleasant prospect, and they may organize a stout campaign of resistance. But after the events of the war and the evidence gained of the innate unity of the British Commonwealth, the cry that a commercial treaty with the United States spells the political absorption of Canada in that puissant State cannot expect a hearing. Far stronger is the case for the reverse argument. For, if Canada can secure

reasonable access to the American market, the last motive for political union with her wealthy neighbour will have vanished.

In considering the relations of Canada and the United States, the history of Great Britain itself should not be forgotten. At the end of the seventeenth century Scotland, like Canada to-day, was sparsely populated and poor compared with her rich southern neighbour. Intermittent efforts had been made in the preceding half century by William Paterson and others to secure the removal of the tariff barriers between the two countries, but they had always failed. At one time it was the Scotch tanners and salt-makers, the owners of the 'infant industries' of the day, who objected, and at another it was the graziers of the north of England. But after the Darien fiasco, access to the markets of their southern neighbour became an absolute necessity for the Scots, and England insisted that the Union of the Parliaments must be a condition precedent to the abolition of tariff barriers. The national prejudice of the Scots against England *circa* 1700 was much stronger than any anti-American sentiment now to be found in Canada, but the Scots abandoned it to secure commercial advantages. When British imperialists bewail the dangers of reciprocity between Canada and the United States, they should not forget that the prolonged denial of reciprocity might have just the results which they dread.

J. A. STEVENSON.

CURRENCY PROBLEMS

AMONGST the problems with which the lately belligerent nations of Europe have now to contend and which they must solve, if conditions of stability and progress are to be restored, is that of their currencies. Owing to over-issue, inconvertible paper money has everywhere depreciated, and in some instances, as in Russia, has become practically worthless.

In considering how this evil can be remedied and how European monetary systems can once more be brought back to a sound gold standard, it is pertinent to inquire if in modern times similar conditions have elsewhere arisen from similar causes and if any measures were taken to rectify them and if so whether those measures were successful. Luckily we have a very notable and instructive instance of how one nation tackled the problem in a fashion as statesmanlike as it was drastic and with conspicuous success.

When in 1879 war broke out between Peru and Chile the value of the Peruvian dollar—or *sol*—was 26d. As the fortune of war went more and more against Peru, and as government issues of paper money went on increasing, the value of the *sol* continued to fall until it touched $1\frac{1}{2}$ d. What next followed was very noteworthy, and the example of what Peru then did to bring her currency back to a sound metallic basis might now well be followed with advantage by all such European countries as are labouring under the incubus of inconvertible paper money.

One morning, without any previous notice, the Finance Minister issued a decree to the effect that paper money would no longer be legal tender and that it would be redeemed by the State. The conditions offered, with no option of refusal, were that for every hundred soles brought in, the State would give a bond for 100 soles silver, redeemable by tender, such bonds to bear interest at 1% per annum. Taking the customary rate of interest for small amounts at 12% per annum, and in view of the not very high credit of the government, one *sol* of annual interest might be calculated as representing a capital value of 8 soles silver, which at the then rate of exchange for bills on London,

say 37½d. per sol silver, would work out at 3 pence per paper sol. As a matter of fact when the paper money was withdrawn and the bonds were issued these were quoted at about 8.20 soles silver. As the public saw the government keeping its bargain and the redeemed paper money being burned in the public square every week, the quotation steadily rose. That the government should have redeemed the paper money (for all of which it was responsible) at a rate higher than that current in the market was only fair, as the value that the government had received for it varied from the first issue—when it was worth 26d.—till the last when it had dropped to 2d. When the Chileans occupied Lima the issue of Peruvian paper money ceased and was not renewed when they left. A fair amount of silver was also in circulation alongside the paper. It may be laid down as axiomatic that the suspension of any further issue of inconvertible paper money is the first essential step towards the return to sound currency. Consequent on the withdrawal of all paper money, Peru's currency became a purely silver metallic one. Banks were not allowed to issue notes of any description. The absence of notes and gold necessitated at times the carrying of an inconvenient weight of silver coin, and if a party of friends met, say in the evening for a game of cards, each one would have about one and a-half pounds weight of silver distributed amongst his various pockets, besides coming provided with a small cheque in case luck went much against him.

The inconvenience of having to carry a quantity of silver dollars was most felt when journeying by mule-back into certain parts of the interior, and the principal bank sought to obviate this, and oblige its customers, by giving cheques of the manager drawn on his own bank to bearer. These cheques were eagerly sought for, but the government promptly prohibited them, rightly considering them as an infringement of the law; so for some ten or twelve years Peru's currency continued to be a purely metallic and silver one. One consequence was to make bank accounts more general amongst the public than they had been, and cheques were tendered in payment of small accounts more freely than was previously the custom.

During this period the exchange value of the Peruvian sol varied with the price of silver and fluctuated violently, especially in the first years—the Bland Act in the U.S.A. for instance drove

it up. After that Act fell through the fluctuations were not so great. Experienced business men, trading in silver-using countries, can, when they wish, cover themselves against 'loss in exchange,' and if there are some who prefer to speculate on the prospect of a rise or fall, they are as much at liberty to do so as they are free to bet on a horse race. Those however who are not in trade but depend on a fixed income are not equally able to protect themselves, and the social and economic state of a country can never be on a sound footing when the price of commodities is controlled by currency fluctuations and not by the supply and demand of the commodities themselves.

Acting on this sound economic principle it was decided to establish in Peru the gold standard and a law was passed to that effect. It met with but little opposition. The change was easily brought about and occasioned neither disturbance to trade nor any inconvenience to private individuals nor trouble in the keeping of accounts.

A new coin was simply added to those already current. This new coin was of gold and was called *Libra peruana* (Peruvian pound). It was exactly equal in weight, size and fineness to the English sovereign, and it was decreed that ten silver soles were the equivalent of one Peruvian pound, making thus the legal value of the sol 24d. As a silver sol contains .782 of standard silver its intrinsic value would be 24d. when silver was selling at 30.7 pence per ounce. At the time the gold standard was set up in Peru silver was about 27d. an oz. and the sol thus became in reality a token coin, its intrinsic value being only about 21d. This led to the importation into Peru of Peruvian silver dollars which were then rather abundant in Panamá, the object being to obtain for the silver, which was worth only 21d. in Panamá, the 24d. it was worth in Lima. Though this movement was not of much importance the government prohibited the importation of silver coin.

The scheme on the whole worked very well, as long as silver was under 31d. or 32d. an oz. ; but when in the latter part of 1916 silver began to rush up, the intrinsic value of the silver sol passed 40d. (it much exceeded that later) and all silver coins in Peru immediately disappeared. They had reached the melting point. There remained no coins under a pound in value, except copper coins of 1 and 2 cents. To meet this great inconvenience, small notes were printed.

Some months after the Great War broke out there happened in Peru what has happened in so many other countries, where, what I can only style a superstitious reverence and an ignorant importance are attached to the material possession of gold. The free circulation of gold was stopped ; all the stock—a considerable amount—was lodged in the hands of certain custodian banks, and notes were issued for the same amount against the guarantee of the gold.

For several months these notes kept their value and Peruvian money, being on a gold basis, was quoted at a premium over sterling, or in other words a bill on London for £100 could be bought in Lima for 80 Peruvian pounds. This did not last. After a great boom, which during the war had enriched so many people in Spanish America, the slump came. The government has been hard pressed to pay its way and the rate of exchange has turned the other way ; it is sterling, and not Peruvian currency, that is now at a premium.

The summary which I have here given of the currency history of Peru will not appear of much significance to those who think that no lessons can be drawn from the experience of small States. But economic laws hold good all over the world, and an examination of how certain factors have worked in Peru may enable us to judge how similar causes may in Europe produce similar beneficial results. The often cited, though clumsy and not very accurate phrase, collapse of the foreign exchanges, may be taken to mean the present depreciation in the value of the inconvertible paper money all over Europe, except in Switzerland, Holland and Sweden, which have maintained the gold parity. From articles and letters frequently appearing in the press for many months past the opinion seems to be general that this depreciated paper currency is a hindrance to the revival of international trade. This view, however, is quite erroneous, for however bad the effects of a paper currency may be on the interior economy of a country it in no way prevents an active and increasing foreign trade being carried on. Facts prove this.

Over a period of very many years most of the South and Central American republics have at one time or another suffered from paper money. Some have suffered for many consecutive years ; most are still suffering, and are likely to continue to suffer, from the incubus ; yet all have steadily progressed and are continuing to progress so far as their foreign trade is concerned.

As a matter of fact, certain manufacturing industries, and more especially those industries which develop a country's resources, animal, mineral and agricultural, may for a time receive a certain stimulus from a depreciated currency, but in order that this stimulus should continue it is necessary that the depreciation should be progressive and not stationary.

Mr. Keynes pointed this out in an article in the *Sunday Times* of August 28, 1921 and he is the only person who seems to have appreciated this fact, to the truth of which my own personal experience enables me to testify. His words are :—

'Export trade is subsidised, not by a depreciated exchange, but by a depreciating exchange. When the external purchasing power of the mark is falling faster than the internal purchasing power German exporters benefit at the expense of the rest of Germany. And even a depreciating exchange is no help when deterioration has gone beyond a certain point.'

This very happily expresses what I believe to be the precise facts. It may not be amiss to give a practical illustration of how a depreciating currency can help export trade.

Let us take the case of a German sugar manufacturer. He has a well equipped mill and draws his supplies of beetroot from the farmers around him whom he also finances. He obtains a loan from his bankers of 9,000,000 paper marks, the exchange being then at the rate of 1,000 paper marks to the sovereign. He calculates to sell his sugar in Liverpool for £10,000, producing 10,000,000 marks, and that on the completion of the operation he will have a profit of one million paper marks—or £1,000.

Should, however, on the sale of his sugar in Liverpool, the exchange have depreciated say to 1,200 marks to £1, then for his £10,000 he will receive 12,000,000 marks, and his profit will be three million paper marks, or the equivalent of £2,500. Conversely, were the exchange to go against him, that is, were the mark to improve in value, he would lose.

One result of this is that in paper money countries there are always many members of the community who are in favour of the continued issue of inconvertible paper, among them those who sell their products for gold and pay their labourers in paper. This is perhaps the principal reason why Chile has for so many years adhered to paper, though her resources and revenue have been amply sufficient to enable her to establish the gold standard

had she really wished to do so. Further, in paper money countries the finance ministers are seldom enthusiastic for 'hard' money—they find it so simple to balance their budgets by means of the printing press. Of course when a sharp depreciation in exchange takes place and the cost of living goes up, a demand for higher wages follows, and some nasty strikes have taken place in Chile.

Looking at this question from every side it is unquestionable that an inconvertible paper currency is a serious detriment to a country internally, while prejudicing it to a lesser extent in its external dealings. A statesman's duty therefore should be to get rid of inconvertible paper money as quickly as possible, whether the depreciation be only slight, as in England, or very serious, as in Germany.

International trade is the exchange of the products of one country for those of others, and can be profitably carried on without regard to the present or prospective value of the inconvertible paper money that may be current in one or both countries. If credit enters into the calculation, as is general in large wholesale transactions, all that is necessary is to have some common measure of value, which in Europe to-day may be taken as the pound sterling, for, although it is about 10% below par, it is sufficiently stable to afford a safe enough basis on which to make sales and purchases. A bill on London is the most general means for the settlement of international accounts.

Many years ago international trade between countries with different and fluctuating currencies was carried on by means of the Mark Banco, which was an arbitrary unit of account of a fixed and standard value and not a coin, though based on gold and silver coin or bullion.

As the amount of specie that passes between nation and nation in the settlement of international trade is in relation to its volume infinitesimal we arrive at the conclusion that the quantity of gold or silver required for the currency of a country does not depend on its foreign trade, be the same great or small, but solely on the requirements of the home market and on the extent to which the banking instinct is developed amongst the people, that is to say, the readiness to pay and receive small cheques in settlement of small accounts. Economy of coin can be effected and is effected in those countries where banks get into closest touch with the greatest number of the people.

From the preceding statement it follows that the restoration of a sound currency by the complete withdrawal of inconvertible paper money is not so difficult as many persons seem determined to believe. Let us take Germany and consider how her currency could be handled.

It is of course imperative that the country interested must above all be honestly desirous of putting its finances on a sound basis, and that it must have the courage, confidence and resolution necessary to carry to completion a carefully thought out scheme. It must not let 'I dare not' wait upon 'I would.' The difficulty lies not in the scheme itself but in finding a man with the ability to execute it.

According to the 'Almanach de Gotha' for 1922 the population of Germany on October 8, 1921 was 59,267,510 after making all deductions for territory lost as a result of the war. The population of the German Empire before the war was increasing rapidly.

In 1905 it was	60,641,278
„ 1910 „ „	64,925,993
„ 1914 „ „	68,500,000 (estimated.)

In view of these figures we may take Germany's population in 1922 as 60,000,000.

In the *Times* of April 7 last the total note issue in that country is given at 139,371,000,000 Marks, which is the present equivalent of about 100,000,000 English sovereigns or 90,000,000 gold sovereigns. This works out to 30 shillings (gold) per head of population which considered as a capital liability of the nation is not a heavy amount, the more so when we consider that our own liability for currency notes is about £6 per head.

To ascertain the value in gold that the German Government received for this 139 thousand million marks of paper it would be necessary to know the amounts issued at each successive date and the rate of exchange ruling at the time. It is very doubtful if the Treasury in Berlin or the Reichsbank could furnish such particulars. We must however assume that the effective value received was much more than 90,000,000 gold sovereigns. Were the German Treasury therefore to redeem its paper money for that amount it would be acting unfairly and harshly towards its people. To redeem it at par would err in the other direction.

As during the course of eight years the initial losses have been suffered, borne, recovered or forgotten, rough justice would

be satisfied were Germany to recognise her paper currency as an internal obligation for double its present market value, making it 180,000,000 gold sovereigns, or 3,600,000,000 gold marks, i.e., in round numbers one mark gold for 40 marks paper, or whatever figure might finally be arrived at.

All the paper should be withdrawn and funded into 'Currency Conversion Gold Bonds,' bearing say 4% interest and 1% (cumulative) sinking fund. This would entail an annual charge of £9,000,000 gold which is certainly not too high a price for Germany to pay in order to put her monetary system on a sound footing.

Two problems would remain to be faced :—

(a) The provision of coin ;

(b) The basis on which debts or contractual obligations would have to be calculated in the restored gold currency.

(a) Were we aware of the exact amount of gold coin and bullion in the German treasury, banks, and private hands we could calculate more accurately how far it was sufficient for the needs of her internal trade. The total gold and bullion in the Bank of Germany was stated to be 1,019,017,000 Marks on 7th April this year. Of course the calling in of all the inconvertible paper money does not imply that no bank notes should be issued, but it would have to be a condition *sine qua non* that all such notes should be changeable for gold on presentation by the holder. No note smaller than 10 marks should be issued.

The movement of gold should be free, subject to no restrictions of any kind on its importation or exportation, for the less controlled is the movement of gold, the more freely it circulates and the less likely it is to be hoarded. When restrictions or limitations are put on its movement the great mass of the public is encouraged by this very Government action to attach to it a certain superstitious importance and this stimulates hoarding.

The withdrawal of paper money would lead to a great increase in the use of silver coin, and such increase would help to alleviate any inconvenience that might at first be felt were gold scarce. The German silver mark .900 fine contains .174 oz. standard silver (not mond nickel silver) worth at 35d. an oz., 6.09d., or a little over half the value of a gold mark. The coinage of silver would therefore leave the German Mint a very large profit and

there would be no objection to as much silver being coined as the country could absorb, but strict care should be taken that nothing in excess of this should be issued else the country might drift into a silver standard and so substitute one economic problem for another. To avoid an excess issue of silver the mint should keep its finger so to speak on the silver pulse of the country, while silver should be legal tender to a limited amount only.

I am of opinion that in three months or even less, after the withdrawal of the inconvertible paper money, German currency would be working smoothly on a gold basis. It is important to note that a country can put its own currency on a sound basis without the co-operation of any other country. On the other hand artificial measures designed to give a fixed value to paper currencies by any international agreement or by any combination of bankers cannot prove successful. Some such schemes, though not on international lines, have often been talked of, have sometimes been tried, and have never been successful.

(b) Those who seem so very nervous about the results of 'deflation' give, as a principal reason for their apprehensions, the disturbing effects which such a change would have on the relations between debtor and creditor, were it carried out too suddenly, and are therefore very insistent in advocating a 'carefully graduated deflation of paper currency.' In other words they prefer to prolong the agony rather than tackle the evil boldly and promptly.

Of course it is evident that were those who owed paper marks, when seventy of them were only worth one gold mark, bound to pay the same number when their value had increased to 40 to one, they would be heavy losers and their creditors would be great gainers at their expense. As a result of the depreciation in the currency many in Germany are innocent sufferers and their loss is often the gain of others. All those who invested in German national securities are receiving to-day a paper mark where they originally got a gold one, so that a small bondholder who had an income equivalent to say £600 per annum now receives the equivalent of only £10. A landowner who had a mortgage on his estate, contracted in pre-war times, can now pay it off by the sale of a small part of his annual produce, the original lender being a heavy loser.

A little reflection will show that Germany's national wealth has not been diminished owing to the issue of inconvertible paper money, nor does 'the purchasing power of our best clients' depend on the 'stabilising of exchanges and reversion to gold.' What has happened is that the distribution of that wealth amongst different sections of the community has been very materially altered, to the benefit of some and to the great injury of others. It is thus a matter of expediency, in order to put her home trade on a sound footing, that Germany as well as all other paper money countries, should get back to gold quickly ; it is a matter of honour and justice to her own people that the hardships many of them have suffered and are still suffering should be alleviated, and that all contractual obligations should be liquidated in an honest manner.

To restore the gold currency presents no insuperable difficulty ; but to compose the differences that paper money has brought about between debtors and creditors will tax the skill of those who may have the courage to undertake that task. It is not possible to dogmatise as to how this composition might best be brought about, as we are not in possession of all the facts and figures without which no workable scheme can be formulated. Broadly speaking the interest on all government loans should be paid in gold when contracted in gold and, if contracted in paper, at the rate of exchange ruling for gold on the date the loan was issued. Private loans or contracts should be converted into gold at the rate ruling when the transactions were entered into.

Although the salaries of all public officials, as well as the pay of the army and navy were, in pre-war times, much lower than those ruling in England, on putting these once more on a gold basis an all round reduction might be effected. The naturally thrifty spirit of the German middle classes would impel them to prefer a moderate remuneration, if sure, to the uncertainties of paper pay.

The decision to get back to gold would divide the country into inflationists and deflationists and if these coincided with two opposing political parties the difficulty, not only of restoring the gold currency, but more especially of establishing the basis on which contractual obligations should be liquidated, would be accentuated. The existence of a difficulty in any problem is however but an added reason for bringing more courage and determination to its solution.

The return to gold would be much facilitated if all restrictions on its movement were now swept away. Its export and import should be unhampered, it should be openly bought and sold on the Stock Exchange, and it should be legal for employers and employees, landlords and tenants to make salaries and rents payable in gold. Contracts in gold for operations—such as building—whose execution extended over some time should also be recognised, such recognition eventually to be applicable to all transactions. Under such a system very soon only small retail business would be for paper money, and retail prices based on gold would fluctuate from day to day in harmony with the varying price of gold on 'Change.

The scheme which I have here in broad outlines suggested for the re-establishing of the gold currency in Germany is equally applicable to France, Italy, Austria and all those countries in Europe which now suffer under an inconvertible paper currency. The opposition to carrying to completion such a scheme will on examination be found to be not economic but political.

A government constituted as is that of Germany to-day is insolvent and is paying its way by continuous issues of inconvertible paper money for the eventual redemption of which it is apparently making no provision. It is under the necessity of making such issues, because the revenue derived from taxation is not sufficient to defray expenses. Deprived of the power of issuing paper money the German Government would either have to impose fresh taxation, while cutting down all possible expenditure such as salaries and subsidies, or become bankrupt. It has not the courage to face the odium which higher taxation and lower salaries would expose it to, and so continues the unsound methods which if persisted in will lead to greater disaster.

We must also recognise that, with what can only be called crafty dishonesty, Germany is trying to produce an impression of poverty and distress on the world and on her creditors, and for this reason purposely refrains from taxing her people to anything approaching the limit of their taxable capacity. Were she to do so the myth of her 'inability to pay' would be quickly dissipated.

The very obvious inference is that Germany will make no serious attempt to put her currency on a sound basis as long as she is encouraged to expect that, by trickery or by intrigue, she

can secure a reduction in the amount she has to pay for reparations. Once she is convinced that she has no such reduction to hope for, nor any future increase to fear, she will face the situation with energy, and her return to her former and even greater commercial prosperity will excite the wonder of all those who do not understand 'the rapidity with which countries recover from a 'state of devastation and the ravages of war.'*

Were we in possession of full and reliable statistics regarding Germany's external trade and particulars as to her revenue and taxation, and as to how this revenue is spent, we could more precisely estimate her ability to pay. The fact however is that at no time could absolute reliance be placed on figures made public by the German Government, and the safer method now is not to lay much store on figures but to conduct our examination on *a priori* or first principles.

We may assume with certainty that for some years before the war Germany was making great strides in commercial prosperity and was rapidly increasing in wealth. Her foreign trade which was in 1902 £520,000,000 reached in 1912 £1,060,000,000, and the total revenue—Imperial and State—which was £232,000,000 in 1905, had reached £350,000,000 in 1913.

In estimating any country's potentialities for wealth we must consider how far it is possessed of the three factors which are essential to produce wealth and what relation these factors bear each to the other, for an undue preponderance of one over another may act as a hindrance, whereas a nice adjustment promotes greater prosperity. These factors are Land, Labour and Capital, and if we can determine how these are represented in Germany we can determine her ability to create wealth and to pay reparations.

As regards land Germany's pre-war area was 208,000 square miles, and is to-day 182,000, a reduction of just over 13%. This compares with an area of 121,000 square miles for the United Kingdom.

Her estimated population in 1914 was 68,500,000, and is to-day 60,000,000, a reduction of just under 12½%.

The population of Great Britain in June, 1921 was

* Mill's 'Political Economy.' Book I. Chap. v., s. 7.

42,767,000. Comparative densities of population are shown in the following table :—

Germany (1922)	..	329	to the square mile.
England (1921 census)		701	" " "
Wales	" ..	295	" " "
Scotland	" ..	160	" " "
Ireland (1911)	" ..	136	" " "

In considering Germany's territory the fact must not be overlooked that she has lost as a result of the war very valuable mineral deposits in Alsace-Lorraine, Poland and Silesia. This loss will to a certain extent hinder her development, obliging her either to obtain from abroad raw materials she formerly supplied herself or to develop more intensively the less rich deposits still remaining to her. Owing to more intensive cultivation by the application of more labour to the land than is usual in Great Britain the agricultural product obtained is actually greater than that of more fertile countries. The desire to recuperate any loss suffered during the war will act as a stimulus for still more scientific methods, and agricultural industry will suffer no set-back in Germany.

As regards the second factor, labour, Germany is neither under nor over-populated, and when we compare her 329 per square mile with England's 701, it is easy to understand how it happens that in times of stress unemployment is so very much greater in the latter country than in the former.

The German worker is to-day working for very low wages and working hard. He is enabled to do so partly through the receipt of Government subsidies—direct or indirect—and partly because the paper money in which his wages are paid has a greater purchasing power in the home market than it has abroad, where it can effect purchases only when calculated at its gold equivalent. That the German capitalist also is working for a very small profit is clearly seen by a comparison of dividends to capital, when the former are reduced to their present and the latter is taken at its original gold value.

The great point is that the Germans—both master and man—clearly recognise that the only way to recover their former prosperity is by hard work, and not only common sense but patriotism impel them to this course. In disquisitions about the evil effects of German competition too little attention is paid to these two great driving forces and far too much stress is laid on

'the collapsed exchange.' The latter will—a little sooner or a little later—disappear, the former will remain. Wages in Germany will steadily increase; common sense and patriotism will not diminish. German power of competition in foreign markets is facilitated by high costs of production in this country. Measures like the Safeguarding of Industries Act and the too lavish distribution of doles all tend to increase manufacturing costs, send up the cost of living and make labour less efficient. Our adherence to such methods is playing into Germany's hands.

In pre-war times her rate of increase was over 850,000 per annum. Allowing for a diminished rate of increase we may safely calculate that her population will amount to 70,000,000 in 15 or 20 years; so that whether for military adventures or for industrial enterprises Germany will not be deficient in man power, a fact more clearly appreciated by public men in France than by those in this country.

As regards fixed capital, Germany has suffered little. While with malignant design she ruined French and Belgian workshops, factories and mines, her own escaped the ravages of war. The very heavy strain put on her railways during military operations caused them to deteriorate, and when the armistice was signed they were not up to standard efficiency. Three and a-half years of peace have however afforded time to restore them to good working order. If we are to judge from the increased working capital which many important German undertakings have recently asked for and obtained there are no indications of any lack of capital. Any apparent scarcity will be due, not so much to any real scarcity as to its diversion from one section of the community to another, a phenomenon which is one of the results of inconvertible depreciated paper money.

This brief examination of Land, Labour and Capital, in their relation to present German conditions, demonstrates very clearly that that country is in a sound state with all the essentials requisite for a speedy recuperation, a fact that is again more clearly recognised and understood by the leading men in France than by those in this country.

Were Germany's ability to pay the only consideration, the recovery of reparations from her would be assured, but willingness to pay is equally important. Whatever agreement Germany may enter into, we must never forget that she will only keep such agreement if she thinks it to her interest to do so, or if she is

constrained to do so. In the matter of reparations she will evade payment on any pretext, no matter how dishonest or futile, or however solemn and explicit her pledged word may have been. When we consider that the reparations asked for—under £7,000,000,000 (seven thousand millions sterling)—only amount to about four years of her pre-war national income, and that that sum only represents a fraction of the damage caused by her as a consequence of the war, there need be no scruple or hesitation about stating the penalties for non-compliance and putting them into force if necessary.

It is most unfortunate that the Treaty of Versailles was dominated by the much too lenient spirit towards our defeated enemy that was manifested by our negotiators. If they imagined that leniency on our part would meet with a generous response on the part of Germany, they only proved that, after four years' experience of war, they understood the German temper as little as they had done during the years that preceded it. A plain intimation to Germany that the occupied territories will not be evacuated until the stipulated reparations—capital and interest—are paid in full is all that is necessary to bring that country to reason.

Such a penalty is implicit in the Reparations Sections, Annexe II, Paragraph 18 of the Treaty of Peace, but a clear and positive statement that a prolonged occupation would follow any default would have had greater force and would have been simpler and more statesmanlike. The knowledge of the exact nature of the penalty and the conviction that such a penalty would be enforced would have done more to secure payment from Germany than the many conversations and conferences, which so far have cost time and money and have been so barren of results. As Bismarck occupied portions of France till the indemnity demanded from the latter was paid, Germany could have raised no valid objection to the Allies following in an open straightforward manner the precedent established by her greatest statesman.

Finally it may be said that international loans for the rehabilitation of any of our late enemies should not be countenanced. Germany and Russia will never recover until they are made to recognise that they must rely solely on their own efforts.

J. RUSSELL GUBBINS.

EMPIRE MIGRATION

1. **The Population Problem.** By A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS. Oxford: University Press. 1922.
2. **The Revolt against Civilisation.** By LOTHROP STODDARD. Chapman and Hall. 1922.

IN the course of the present year considerable progress has been made in the development of schemes for assisting the overcrowded inhabitants of Great Britain to migrate to the under-peopled Dominions. Not only has Parliament passed an Act authorising the expenditure of £3,000,000 per annum on schemes of assisted emigration, but a considerable newspaper propaganda has been organised in support of the general proposition that it is desirable to make efforts to secure a better distribution of the Empire population. With this general proposition few people will disagree. The contrast between the overcrowded slums of our great towns at home and the millions of acres of untilled good land in the Dominions is one that ought instantly to appeal to the imagination of every patriotic citizen of the Empire. Without question, the Empire would be stronger for defence, and its citizens happier and healthier, if the population were better distributed.

It is however always necessary to approach general propositions with a certain amount of caution. Above all things, it is desirable not to use in support of a fine ideal arguments that will not bear investigation. Many of the most prominent advocates of schemes for imperial migration seem to have forgotten this requisite for sane propaganda. In particular they have, in the hope of creating popular interest in their schemes, first laid stress on the admitted evils of over-population in Great Britain, and then suggested that these evils would be mitigated, if not altogether swept away, by transferring population to the Dominions. Such a contention will not bear serious examination. Of the various schemes now under consideration the most prominent is that put forward by Mr. Amery. In his speech in the House of Commons on April 26th last he estimated that his scheme would provide for an annual exodus of 60,000 to 80,000 a year. It is

only necessary to look at the figures of our population to see that such an amount of emigration can do nothing whatever to reduce the present evil of over-population. For in England and Wales alone in 1921 there was an excess of births over deaths of no less than 390,000. That figure is fairly representative of the growth in the population before the war. But if our population—already overgrown—is receiving by excess of births over deaths an annual addition of 380,000 to 390,000 it is quite clear that the over-growth cannot be diminished by an emigration scheme which only estimates for the annual removal of 80,000 persons. Such a removal would indeed to a slight extent diminish the yearly increase in our already excessive population, but it does nothing to diminish the present total, or even to prevent that total from increasing rapidly. It is extremely important that this point should be made clear so that the public mind is not deluded with false hopes.

The point is touched upon by Mr. Carr-Saunders in a recently published book mainly devoted to a careful study of the historical aspects of the population problem. The author is rather a critic than a follower of Malthus, but he sees clearly the possibilities that result from the 'strength of human fecundity,' and rightly declares that increased skill in production cannot keep pace with these possibilities, and that 'migration 'likewise only draws off an insignificant fraction of the possible 'additions to the population.'

The question of mere numbers, however, is only part of the problem. The special evil from which we suffer in England, and to a slightly less extent in Scotland, is the aggregation of such a large proportion of our population in urban areas. In round figures no less than 80 % of the present population of England and Wales is urban. London alone, that is to say Greater London within the Metropolitan Police area, contains a population of 7,476,000. The population of the Australian Commonwealth is only 5,437,000, and the population of New Zealand, excluding Maoris, is 1,218,000, so that Greater London has a larger white population than Australia and New Zealand put together. Apart from London, there are in England and Wales exactly one hundred towns with a population of over 50,000. These towns had in 1921 an aggregate population of 18,693,000, or very nearly half the total population of England and Wales. Beyond this, of

course, there are a great many smaller towns ; while many of the areas classified as rural are, especially in the mining districts, virtually urban centres possessing all the evils of overcrowding and bad air.

The evil results of this aggregation can hardly be exaggerated. It means for millions of people a relatively unhealthy condition of life ; it means that the physique of the nation is lowered, and also to a certain extent it means that the intellectual capacity of the nation is lowered. For there can be little doubt that children bred in the overcrowded streets of great towns, with little chance of employment except in purely mechanical operations, have no understanding of the real facts of life, because their own lives are so entirely artificial. Children reared under such conditions may, it is true, be in a certain sense quick-witted ; they learn the repartee of the streets ; but they have not the solid sense and the solid character of the country-bred man, who is daily face to face with the facts of nature and has to trust largely to his own intelligence in dealing with difficulties. A very interesting illustration of this contrast is given by Mr. Lothrop Stoddard in his latest book, which he has significantly named 'The Revolt against Civilisation.' The main purpose of the book is to insist that under present conditions the inferior types of humanity are being encouraged to multiply their numbers while the superior are prudently refraining from producing more children than they can afford to bring up decently. As a necessary consequence there is a tendency for the average standard of the race to decline. But while pressing this point he is careful to add (p. 227) that it must not be inferred that the higher racial types are only to be found in the higher social classes. On the contrary, he says, 'the lower social strata unquestionably contain multitudes of valuable strains which have not yet displayed themselves by rising in the social scale.' As an example he quotes the records furnished by the American Army Intelligence Tests, which show that 'some of the best scores were made by illiterate, ignorant, southern mountaineers, who had never before been outside their native valleys.' Mr. Stoddard attributes the relative intelligence of these illiterate mountaineers to their descent from a high-grade Anglo-Saxon stock. That may have much to do with the matter, but it is at least equally probable that their intelligence was due to the fact that they were living self-dependent lives in healthy

surroundings, instead of being cooped up in over-crowded towns and spending their days in the mind-destroying monotony of repetition machine work.

So far, at any rate, as physical qualities are concerned, it is notorious that the physique of the country is better than the physique of the towns. On this point ample evidence has been published again and again in various reports of the Ministry of Health and of its predecessor, the Local Government Board. Dr. Brend, who dealt exhaustively with the whole subject of national health in his book on 'Health and the State' in 1917, insists that of all the causes of lowered vitality in the nation urbanisation is the most prominent. That in spite of the evil effects of urbanisation a considerable number of town-bred boys were trained to be efficient soldiers is true, and is a testimony to the extraordinarily recuperative power of an open-air training. Nevertheless, the greater proportion of the men rejected by army medical boards as unfit for military service came from the towns.

A year or two ago our politicians were immensely impressed, to judge by their speeches, with the danger that this large C₃ element in our population presented to the nation. Comparatively little has been heard of the subject lately, but the evil remains and all that has hitherto been done by the Government tends to increase the C₃ element by making it easier for the weaklings brought into life in our slum districts to survive. Nor is there any reason to hope that any emigration schemes can appreciably diminish this evil. On the contrary most of those schemes seem more likely to increase the relative proportion of our urban population by diminishing the actual numbers of our rural population. On no point are colonial spokesmen more emphatic than on their desire to obtain from England and Scotland men suitable for rural work, and such men are obviously not to be found, except in very rare instances, among town dwellers.

Take for example the declaration made by Sir Clifford Sifton, speaking at Toronto early this year. To quote the report given in the *Canadian Gazette*, published in London on March 9, 1922, Sir Clifford Sifton, himself formerly an Immigration Minister in Canada, 'insisted that Canada did not want mechanics from 'the Clyde nor artisans and labourers from southern English 'towns. These people were not farmers ; they hated the country

‘and country life ; and it takes two generations to turn such a ‘population into agriculturists.’ Again, Mr. Stewart, the Minister of the Interior, speaking at Montreal in March last, stated ‘that an extensive programme of encouragement to ‘immigration could not be undertaken at present on account of ‘the amount of unemployment prevailing. The present need ‘was for farmers with capital and for farm labourers. The ‘Government would not be stampeded into a policy of looking ‘at numbers rather than quality’ (*Morning Post*, March 24, 1922). Again, according to a telegram from Montreal, appearing in the *Morning Post* of May 25, 1922, the Canadian Minister of Immigration ‘informed Parliament that every effort was being ‘made to secure from Great Britain every farmer who can be ‘induced to come to Canada.’

The same note comes from Australia. In an advertisement appearing in the *Times* of May 24, 1922 the High Commissioner for Australia declares in large type that ‘Australia wants Farmers ‘with Capital, Farm Workers, Lads who will Work on Farms.’ There is little here to appeal to the lad or young man who has lived all his life in a town and has absolutely no understanding of anything connected with a farm.

It is needless to multiply such evidences of the Dominion attitude towards the problem of Empire migration. What the Dominions want is to draw upon the rural population of Great Britain to add to their own rural population. Such a policy cannot in the least diminish the urban overcrowding of England, and it would be much better if English advocates of inter-imperial migration would face this fact boldly and consider how its consequences are to be dealt with, instead of half-suggesting that Empire migration can solve the problem of England’s overpopulation. The plain truth is that on this matter the Mother Country and the Dominions have quite distinct desires. The Mother Country wishes to get rid of the slum dwellers who are a burden upon the taxpayer and upon the nation ; the Dominions wish to import agriculturists to develop their unpeopled lands.

The practical question then to ask is whether there is any means by which these two totally distinct ideals can be reconciled. The most hopeful scheme suggested is that of Colonel Beckles Willson, who proposes to take town boys when they are quite young and train them on English farms until they are fit to qualify

as incipient farmers for the Dominions. Colonel Willson argues that if a lad is taken from the town young enough he can be taught to appreciate the country and to become proficient as a farm worker. Much indeed has already been done in this direction by voluntary agencies, such as Dr. Barnardo's homes, the Church Army and others. These organizations have farms of their own on which they train young lads and then send them out to Australia or Canada. The promoters of these organizations have appreciated the fairly obvious truth that if you want to turn an individual to an entirely new kind of life you must take him young. Already a large amount of public money both here and in the Dominions has been spent in providing assisted passages for ex-soldiers and others who expressed a desire to emigrate. In a great many cases the men who were so assisted have discovered that the conditions of life were not as desirable as they imagined and have found their way home. No doubt the Governments concerned have taken this lesson to some extent to heart, and great stress is now being laid on the care with which emigrants are selected; but whatever care be taken it is extremely difficult to be sure in advance that a man, when it comes to the actual point of experience, will be able to change his whole manner of life and settle contentedly on a remote prairie farm, when he has been accustomed to live in a thickly peopled country like England. Consequently if adult emigrants are sent out with Government money there will always be a danger of them drifting into urban employment when they reach the other side, or of their struggling to get back to England again.

It is the former danger which creates the underlying hostility of the trade unions, especially in Australia, to the whole policy of immigration. Judging by past experience, the Labour organizations in Australia are afraid that the influx of immigrants will mean increased competition with the town artisan. In a recent debate in the Australian House of Representatives the Labour Party bitterly attacked the Government on the subject of immigration. The Melbourne correspondent of *The Times* telegraphs: 'Prominent members of the Party described it as 'cruel, disgraceful and criminal to bring out immigrants while 'unemployment was widespread.' (*Times*, June 30, 1922.) No doubt the same feeling operates in Canada but the Labour unions are apparently less powerful there than in Australia. If on the

other hand the migrant, after inspecting conditions in Canada or Australia, wants to get back to England, the money spent upon his passage and outfit is a dead loss to the taxpayers of both countries.

This consideration specially applies to schemes for emigrating whole families. There is a certain superficial plausibility about such schemes. It can be plausibly argued that individuals will be less likely to resent new surroundings if they travel with their old companions ; but, on the other hand, if the family on arrival finds that it is unfitted for the hard conditions of life on an isolated farm in Australia or Canada, it is certain that the members of it will either want to get back to England or to find some urban occupation. In this connection it is worth mentioning that the Dominions themselves are not altogether free from the evil of urbanisation which so seriously affects Great Britain. In Canada, according to figures in the Canada Year Book of 1920, the increase in the urban population between 1901 and 1911 was 1,259,165 as compared with an increase in the rural population of 576,163. In Australia the position is very striking, for the six capital cities alone of the Commonwealth of Australia already contain a population of 2,338,000 out of a total of 5,437,000 for the whole Commonwealth.

In view of this existing distribution of population in the Dominions there is certainly a very grave danger that wholesale schemes of immigration will only further increase the size of these already large colonial cities and do comparatively little for the development of the rural districts. That of course is a danger which presumably the Dominion authorities are taking steps to guard against, and it is on that account that they are all so emphatic that they do not want English town dwellers as immigrants. If therefore the Home Government is to subordinate its desires entirely to the desires of the Dominion Governments we must only send abroad qualified agriculturists, of whom we have not more than enough at home. Even so, there is a danger that men accustomed to the comparative ease of English life will be unwilling to face the severe hardships of agriculture in undeveloped areas.

Broadly speaking, the whole idea of moving adults at the expense of the State is a mistake. If a grown man chooses at his own expense to try to mark out for himself a new life in a

new land, by all means let him do so ; the very fact that he is willing himself to make the experiment gives ground for hope that he may succeed. It was indeed this spirit of personal enterprise that mainly built up the Dominions. Undoubtedly, it is true that there were in past generations certain State-aided schemes for colonial settlement, especially in the case of New Zealand, but beyond question the large majority of Englishmen and Scotchmen who have found their way to the Dominions went at their own expense and of their own volition, and just for that reason they were welcomed and helped to build up the strength of the new lands which they had made their own. There is no reason to believe that this spirit of individual enterprise has become non-existent in Great Britain. The still continued efforts to expand our trade, in spite of the difficult times through which it is passing, show that the true spirit is still with us ; and one of the great dangers of State-aided schemes for emigration, or any other purpose, is that they tend to kill that spirit.

There would be more to be said for Mr. Amery's scheme if there were any reason to believe that it could be relied upon to reduce the volume of unemployment at home, as its sponsor contends. In an address delivered at the Royal Colonial Institute in March last Mr. Amery laid stress on the mischief which is being done to the population of Great Britain at the present time by the system of relief works and doles. He said :—

' At the present moment we are spending on relief of unemployment of one kind or another at the rate of at least £100,000,000 a year. The whole of this great expenditure affords a purely temporary relief. It effects no permanent cure. On the contrary, it aggravates the situation by the crippling burden that it imposes upon industry and by the extent to which it prevents natural economic adjustments and undermines energy and self-reliance.'

He went on to refer to the Poor Law Commission of 1834 and drew his conclusion that the remedy to-day should be as it was then ' a drastic check on doles and a systematic policy of empire settlement.'

The trouble is that there is so far no evidence that Mr. Amery's colleagues in the Ministry are prepared to accept the necessity for a drastic check on doles. Doles are popular with the electorate because they meet the immediate necessities of a considerable number of voters without any regard to future difficulties. Therefore few Members of Parliament and fewer

ministers will have the courage to attack the policy of doles so long as the claimants continue numerous—and claimants will remain numerous so long as the doles are lavishly distributed.

It is this consideration which makes the whole position at present appear so hopeless. If, however, we could by chance secure a Government which had the courage to follow the policy adopted when the Poor Law was reformed in 1834 we could then proceed with more hopefulness to consider schemes of Empire settlement. But as the situation now stands it is certain that money spent on Empire settlement will only be an additional charge on the taxpayer without relieving him in any way of the costs which he has to meet for doles to the unemployed. Indeed it may be that the official schemes for which the country is asked to pay may actually have the effect of increasing the unemployment problem at home. For if the Home Government should, in obedience to Dominion pressure, only send our best men abroad, the relative efficiency of the nation will be *pro tanto* diminished; yet ultimately it is on our national efficiency that the activity of employment depends.

The same objection does not apply to schemes for training young boys—and also it is to be hoped young girls—for colonial life. There is indeed much to be said from the point of view of the Mother Country as well as of the Dominions for removing town children from the unhealthy and unnatural surroundings of their present life and giving them agricultural training in the country. For these reasons it might be worth while for the State to contribute to the cost of rural training for urban children, by giving grants to the different voluntary organizations already engaged upon this work.

In view, however, of the financial condition of the country it ought to be made an absolute condition that no money should be spent on this, or any other new scheme, unless simultaneously large savings are made in the expenditure on other forms of public assistance.

EDITOR.

No. 482 will be published in October, 1922.

Printed in Great Britain by ROFFBY & CLARK, Croydon.

The Edinburgh Review

OCTOBER, 1922

No. 482

AIR DEFENCE

'GIVE peace in our time, O Lord.' There was never greater necessity. The fuller the experience, the more complete the knowledge of its possibilities, the more glaringly futile and disastrous war is seen to be. But unfortunately war will not cease because of its futility. Even if in our generation there may not be another great international conflict, memory of the horrors we have known and the bereavements we still feel will gradually pass, and unless in the meantime peoples learn to realise that war can only bring misery to all engaged in it, another and yet more awful conflagration will destroy the civilised world. On the assumption then that as there is as yet no prospect of an elimination of war and that it will still occur, it is desirable, however much the task may be against our national grain, that we should scientifically consider how best to uphold by force the ideals of our country, should it be necessary to do so.

The root principles of war are constant. The object—to impose the will of one people upon that of another with the result that the Government of the beaten nation will sue for peace in the shortest possible time—is attained by means of a combination of instruments to exert direct and indirect pressure on the hostile population. With the evolution of warfare since the times of inter-tribal fighting, the instruments employed, though differing widely in their composition, have been armies and navies. To these two instruments

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must now be added that of air forces which, combined with chemistry, can be more easily, cheaply and secretly prepared than the other two and will be increasingly difficult to withstand.

The principle of warfare is still the same ; a nation whose fighting elements remain on the defensive cannot hope to force its opponents to its will. The weapons of the enemy must be struck and broken, so that they in their turn cannot strike. And this which is true of armies and navies, is also closely applicable in the case of air forces. In the event of war armies will continue to meet and defeat armies, fleets to sink or capture fleets ; and, on the same principle, one objective of air forces will be to attack and gain complete superiority over air forces. The three services also start with a common basic necessity. They must mobilise and they must move to attack. In mobilisation, the time factor being of the utmost importance for all, the greatest efforts will be made to shorten it. But, however well prepared an army may be in peace, the period necessary for military mobilisation must be an affair of at least days. Hitherto, owing to our command of the sea we have been singularly fortunate in obtaining time for the mobilisation of our land forces. Naval mobilisation can and must be carried out very much more quickly. But while speed of mobilisation is of vast consequence to the older services, it is vital for air forces : for the first aerial blow may be struck *before* the actual declaration of war, and on its result the very possibility of naval and military mobilisation may depend.

The methods and objectives of the three arms in their mobilisation and movement to attack and to exert pressure on the opposing nation are, however, widely divergent, and the air has added an entirely new factor to the problem. For armies are in this first period peculiarly vulnerable to aerial attack. Marshal Foch says : ' The nation which goes to war again, and thinks it ' will be able to shelter behind a line of trenches while it creates ' a new army, will meet with disaster.'

Fleets (and especially their bases) also are open to aerial attack ; but they have the whole sea as their theatre and can cover as much distance in hours as armies can in days. Air forces, with the immense advantage of three dimensions in which to work, flying from, but necessarily returning to friendly bases without stopping, will dash out and back again great distances at three or four times the speed of the fastest surface craft. The days when wars were

thought of as 'land' or 'sea,' or 'combined naval and military' are over. In the case of continental Powers they will be land and air; and, where a sea-power is concerned, all three services will be employed. Strategy will be amphibious.

Let us now briefly consider the growth and functions of air forces under war conditions, and the rapidly increased value of aircraft in tactics and as the right-hand of strategy. The groupings into which they most naturally fall are: (a) strategic aerial-striking fleets, both for battle and bombardment; (b) forces to act in direct conjunction with the army and navy.

The development of flying has been very remarkable. Gun-powder perhaps excepted, no invention that the world has seen has had such a radical effect on the conduct of war as aviation; yet our knowledge of its potentialities is still quite rudimentary. It may be useful to recall a few facts. The world's first aeroplane flight was made by the Wright Brothers in December 1903; Bleriot drove the first machine across the channel in 1908; in 1909 a record height of 500 feet was attained; in 1911 the first and very experimental seaplane rose from water in this country, and an aeroplane took off successfully from the deck of a cruiser at anchor; in 1912 a flight was made from a ship under weigh; in 1913 a 14-in. torpedo was carried by a seaplane.

With the beginnings of war in 1914 each country threw in a handful of machines as the untried, but immediately proven, handmaid of reconnaissance. Our Royal Flying Corps was smaller than the air service of either France or Germany, and its machines were little better; British pilots, however, were very much the best and achieved invaluable results by the accuracy of their reports which, amongst other things, enabled Marshal Joffre to frustrate Von Kluck's efforts to enforce a British Sedan. In 1915 it is probable that had the British air service at the Dardanelles been maintained at anything like adequate strength the Straits could have been forced by the army and navy with its assistance, and Constantinople taken. In the same year three enemy ships were destroyed by torpedoes from British aircraft. Aerial wireless, photography, fighting, bomb dropping, armament, and so forth were rapidly developed.

Then there was the problem of home defence. It was seen to be quite impossible, apart from the waste of men and material, to defend innumerable areas from the ground, and the work of

night-flying aeroplanes was gradually co-ordinated with guns and searchlights to such a pitch that, before the Armistice, squadrons working in formation, with the assistance of wireless telephony, had countered the night bombing airship and aeroplane, and established the first line of offensive-defensive night defence of England. In 1914 the average horse-power per machine was 83, the maximum speed 74 miles per hour, and the load about 600 lbs ; by 1918 the average horse-power was 516, the speed had increased to 111 miles per hour, and the load, including fuel for 5½ hours, to 2,750lbs. At the beginning of the war an air vessel had little to fear above 4,000 feet, and its armament consisted of a rifle or revolver ; at the Armistice a single-seater fighting craft carrying several machine guns, had a speed of 121 miles per hour and could climb to 23,000 feet, up to 20,000 feet of which there was no immunity from anti-aircraft fire. In 1918 low-flying attack was taking a very important part owing to the evolution of a powerfully armed machine with a speed of 125 miles per hour, and protected by 650 lbs. of armour-plate. Such action will render it impossible for any formed body of troops to move about or remain in the open during a battle. In addition to the enormous growth of effort in direct tactical co-operation with the army and navy, 1918 also saw the inception of air power in the form of a strategic fleet of bombardment.

Since the war, further development has taken place, especially abroad, and the meaning of air power is beginning to be realised. It is seen that air force, now thought of as the first line of defence, will eventually preponderate over the older services in that, if the air force is successful, the rôle of the army and navy will be a very much reduced one, and if unsuccessful—that is, if the enemy is successful—it may not be possible for the army and navy to operate at all. How then should this power be best organized, developed and directed ? There would seem to be three main factors in the problem. First, the strategic, long range aerial battle and bombardment fleets and local home defence force ; second, units employed in tactical duties with land and sea forces ; and third, of basic importance, the development of imperial and other air communications on economic principles, by means of commercial aviation, thus ensuring the maintenance of a large and flourishing constructional and operational aircraft industry and its attributes of design, experiment and research, and the

building up of a reserve of trained personnel and material. In all three of these factors it is obvious that the greatest air progress and knowledge will be achieved by the greatest amount of useful flying done.

The first, covering as it does all strategic air action is by far the most important from the point of view of war. If the air force were merely of value in direct tactical association with armies and navies there would be few problems to solve. What may be termed the 'new phase and sphere in war' has come into being as a result of the speed, long range, mobility, devastating effect and cheapness of modern aircraft. The new 'phase' of operation is the one before armies and navies are able to strike; the new 'sphere' is the country of the enemy which armies and navies cannot reach. Attack is the best form of defence and, though owing to their mobility and capacity to work in three dimensions the main enemy air formations will probably be difficult to locate and fight, much can be done to break them down by destroying their bases and national aircraft factories. It must be remembered that unless the enemy's air fleets can be crippled the mobilisation and movement to attack of the army and navy will be rendered nugatory. Hitherto it has not been possible to strike the enemy very heavily at home. Under the new conditions the greatest possible number of aircraft will at the earliest possible moment attack with asphyxiating chemical bombs the cities, homes and factories of the enemy if within range, thus creating panic and inaction, and breaking his will and reserve power at its source. Foch says on this subject: 'The arm that will serve the enemy will be the arm that is the newest, the most sudden and the most terrible—the aeroplane.' And again: 'One of the great factors in the next war will obviously be aircraft. The potentialities of aircraft attack on a large scale are almost incalculable; but it is clear that such an attack, owing to its crushing moral effect upon a nation, may impress public opinion to the point of disarming the Government and thus become decisive.' Let us remember the effect of a handful of enemy aircraft over London during 1917 and honestly assess in our minds what would be the result of great systematic blows by some 5,000. This is no fantastic figure. France will shortly possess an air strength of some 2,500 machines, and may be expected to double and treble that number in a few years.

It may be argued that bombing in the form of 'raids' was carried out on a growing, if somewhat spasmodic, scale throughout the war by most types of machines with very little real accuracy and comparatively small result in material damage. But it must be remembered that generally speaking all available machines were required for service at the front and with the fleet, and that aircraft specially designed as day and night bombers were not put into the field and utilised on an organized basis until the later stages.

The inception of the new 'sphere' form of warfare, strategic aerial bombardment in a specialised centralised form, was seen in 1918 and was beginning to prove its value at the Armistice. Though operating under many internal and external difficulties it would undoubtedly have had a preponderating effect had the war continued another few months.

It is ever unwise to overstate a case and there is always a tendency for a new arm to exaggerate its powers; but if the 'pros' and 'cons' are carefully considered there can be no real doubt of the efficacy of long distance bombing. The arguments against its development are that counter-measures can be taken, that its destructive results do not justify the outlay, that it is a sign of weakness and merely leads to retaliation. In favour of bombing it is argued that the new sphere is becoming increasingly open to attack with the improvement in range and aerodynamic and engine efficiency of aircraft. In future it is the whole population at home that will bear the main shock of attack, and not merely armies, navies, and the fringe-frontiers, coasts and fortresses. And this will of course be the more markedly so in the case of highly industrialised communities, pressure against which will directly affect the decision of their Governments. London is both a more vulnerable and a much more valuable target than Paris or Berlin.

Counter-measures will naturally be taken, but the country which can launch a great attack first will have obtained an enormous advantage and may even, by forcing the opponent to give way, render the means of counter-attack useless. That the results of the generally unsystematic small raids of the war had little direct material effect is no argument against long-range bombing on a very large organized scale. That machines operating at great distances from their bases can be attacked in the air is

true, and for that reason they must be protected in the air. Thus it will be seen that two highly specialised branches of the strategic air arm are required—the one for fighting, and the other to use every available pound of lift for bomb dropping.

In brief then it would appear that spasmodic bombing raids have no great utility, that indecisive attack merely produces counter-action, and that while there is power of hitting back, comparatively small pressure can be brought to bear on public morale to effect a general political decision. On the other hand, if properly organized and directed, a powerful long range air fleet may, if able to strike immediately and in sufficient strength, bring the war to a close. It will in any case have a very great effect on the situation from the outset ; and, if operations continue, will greatly speed up the pressure which the navy may be able to exert on the resources of the enemy by closing his external communications. It will, in addition, assist the army and navy by attacking fortresses, defended harbours and fortifications which are the strength of the naval and military defensive.

The strategic air fleet battle and bombardment, must be the first and greatest object of war-time air force. It is clear that the work it has to do will have to be prepared for on a scientific basis in peace. The concentration of every available suitable machine must be aimed at, and dispersion of force avoided.

With regard to the second group—air in conjunction with the army and navy. It is generally agreed that though the functions of close co-operation with the army, and especially the navy, are very complicated and technical, they are quite practicable, and that the operations of war will in future be increasingly dependent on aircraft, and indeed impossible without it. Admiral Lord Beatty says : ‘ The fleet which possesses the best air service ‘ will win the next war.’

Whatever place the air force may ultimately take in coast defence and against capital ships, there is here already ample scope for development, as also in patrolling, low-flying attack, anti-submarine work, escort, torpedo attack, etc. It is clear that the services of observation for the obtaining of information must largely rely on aircraft reconnaissance, and guns whether ashore or afloat can only hope to hit and parry with the help of aerial eyes. For both army and navy, aircraft are necessary as long-range armament to attack otherwise inaccessible targets, and both

require fighting machines to protect their own and hamper enemy aircraft. As in the past, technical development will wait on the uses to which it can be put, and an additional number of specialised tactical units will be required for direct co-operation with the older services. But in order to arrive at the correct economic composition and ratio of air units to be allotted to the army and navy, the essential factor must be borne in mind that every available pound and machine is primarily required for the striking air fleet. These auxiliary units must therefore be kept down to the absolute minimum. The decision as to what is the minimum for the necessary duties is admittedly a difficult problem, and when reached there still remains one equally or even more thorny, that of the control of these auxiliary air units. Are they to be part of the Air Force attached to land or sea organizations? Or must they be integral branches of the army and navy?

The senior services claim with force, and there must be much sympathy with their point of view, that the air functions to be performed are just as much part and parcel of their normal duties; that the initiation of measures for the economic substitution of air for other means cannot so readily be developed; and the navy in particular holds that the present system is uneconomical, inefficient and unworkable, in that there can be little understanding by Air Force personnel of naval requirements, and that dual direction and discipline are impossible. The Air Force argues that since the air is as distinct as land from water, only by retaining control of the 'bedded-out' units can adequate results be obtained. Theoretically the Air Force arguments are right. To revert to the old system whereby both army and navy had their own air service would be unsound in that the widest possible basis for technical progress and development would not be utilised; wasteful, in that the 'minima' would be unnecessarily large, and that useless competition would ensue; and, worse than all, impracticable for that true preparation and concentration for the initial purpose of strategic action.

The last of these arguments might not apply if the 'bedded-out' units consisted only of types of aircraft unfitted for long-range purposes, e.g., small fighters working off the deck of a ship. But troop and torpedo carriers, reconnaissance and army and navy bombing craft would all have great value in swelling the numbers of the striking fleet. On the other hand it may be

argued—since there is a tendency for more and more specialisation and for the old form of general utility machines to die out—aircraft should not be concentrated away from their proper functions, and that even if there were time to do so they could not hope successfully to return to the duties for which they had been trained. These arguments might obtain were it not for the fact that there is not enough money available to supply all three services with what they wish, and that every available unit must be first employed in the new 'phase' on a co-ordinated striking basis for the massed attack of the enemy in the new 'sphere.' If and when initial aerial supremacy is gained, certain units can be returned to closer and more detailed work with the army and navy, but it must be recognised that this, in the sense we understand command of the sea, is unlikely.

Let us now turn to the third factor which, though at first sight it may appear of less importance, is the real basis of the others—commercial aviation.

The air movement has been one of very rapid expansion. From tiny, unwelcome, and unbelievably-in beginnings it has gradually permeated all the tactical activities of the army and navy; and, gaining strength and experience, though tethered by the older services, spread tentatively into the independent strategic field where it will in future find its paramount use in wars between civilised nations.

A further and equally logical development is the building up of air communications—a consummation also viewed with apathy and incredulity.

It is not contended that the next step will be the elimination of armies and navies. That will not come for many years; but it is obvious that the Air Force is here to stay, that its part will increase, and that it may eventually become the decisive arm. Whilst however air growth will probably be at the expense of some of the duties hitherto attributed to land and sea forces, no nation can—though those using conscription have an enormous advantage—bear the financial outlay necessary in peace to enable its air forces immediately to gain superiority if this can only be done by the maintenance of units at war strength. The organization must therefore comprise the smallest number of units of the types required immediately on mobilisation at full establishment, and as many others as may be possible for the amount of money available, in cadre form.

In arriving at the ratio of cadre units to those maintained at war establishment, it must be remembered that, if superiority cannot be expected and a war of attrition is possible, the power rapidly to expand the number of units in the field is an important requirement ; whereas in the case of a war of short duration the power to maintain the greatest number of existing units by strong reserves is the vital necessity, and the nation with the greatest preponderance of craft in the air in the early stages will have the advantage. Long-range civil machines which can be converted to war use in a few hours will here have very great value. But adequate reserve power is essential, whether for filling up cadres or for maintaining existing units. The army and navy have of course the same problem but, as the navy has the mercantile marine from which to draw personnel and material, and as men can be trained for the army at comparatively short notice, the difficulty is much less acute than in the case of the air force which, as we have seen, must be the first in the field and in which wastage in pilots and machines is very heavy, and training a lengthy technical process.

There are two general methods of building-up and maintaining an air reserve. The first is by keeping a number of machines in store and retired pilots on the list. This will have to be done to a certain extent, but if relied on as the normal method on a large scale, has many disadvantages : such as the high proportion of reserve pilots to those on the active list ; the large quantity of very expensive machines, which may never be used or in which in any case the turnover will be very slow, and which rapidly deteriorate in store and tend to become obsolete ; while only a very small designing and manufacturing industry can be kept in being, etc. Territorial schemes and the like are mere camouflage and waste of money as, with a highly technical service such as the air, considerable sums would be expended for little result other than accidents during the week or two's training a year.

The second way to build up a reserve is on the basis of a mercantile air fleet. This method if practicable has few disadvantages and overwhelming advantages. Success will give an incalculable return. Is it practicable ? The experimental period will certainly be an arduous one. As we know, the mainspring of progress has hitherto acted in the direction of war functions, and the machines with which air transport first operated

were of converted war types, and therefore uneconomic. For this and other reasons the cost of services in the incipient stages is too high for operation on a purely commercial basis, and consequently State subsidies are required. In order to attract traffic the range of flight must be sufficient to secure greatly reduced periods of transport as compared with land and sea methods. Further, if the best value is to be obtained safe and regular night flying, as well as day flying, must be developed.

These difficulties, though great, can all be overcome, and the goal is of vast importance to the Empire. Given sufficient encouragement, great advances in aero-dynamics and engine efficiency, which would give economy of operation, are well in sight ; but they are being far too slowly worked out. Operational experience is essential. Improvement cannot come from the laboratory and drawing-board alone. Commercial air transport is the key. Where a service machine flies an average of say three or four hours a week and has a ' life ' of some four years, a transport craft flies thirty hours a week and lives 18 months. This entails rapid replacement and ensures rapid improvement of types. With regard to personnel also, it being clear that pilot efficiency, which can only be gained by actual air experience, is the prime factor for success, those who week in week out fly commercial machines many hours a day in all weathers for their living, form the finest all-round airmen in the world. Though it is to be hoped that the period in the air of service personnel will lengthen, the difference is at present very marked ; the piloting time in the air per head of the corps of officers—the Royal Air Force in England being at a lamentably low figure—is probably not more than so many minutes per week. Thus, not only can a reserve of pilots, personnel and machines, be obtained by means of a mercantile air fleet of large dimensions, but there will be formed a productive peace industry with experimental, designing and constructional staffs, best and most quickly able to assist fighting air expansion in case of emergency.

And what practical alternative is there, if we accept the argument that nations will continue to take up arms, that in an emergency air power must immediately be ready on a large scale, that it cannot be thrown in at the last moment on an extemporised basis, that a fighting service can only exist permanently if founded, as in the case of the navy, on a sound mercantile

footing, and that any country which has a wide preponderance of aircraft in peace will be more than half-way to aerial supremacy in war? Other countries, particularly France and Germany, see the inexorable facts. The words quoted from Marshal Foch indicate the French view, and to meet the changed conditions France has set herself to build up 220 squadrons (more than 2,000 aeroplanes) by the end of this year; civil aviation is being concurrently developed and some 500 to 600 machines can be already counted on from this source, together with an excellent personnel, and the number will rapidly grow; a strong aircraft industry is being kept up. We cannot compete on a conscription basis and can only hope that if our air power can be developed on commercial lines it may be that, as the British Navy backed by the mercantile marine has been a great factor in maintaining peace, so will a great British air fleet, service and commercial, act as a strong deterrent to Powers of bellicose tendency.

The lines of thought most usually urged against commercial aviation are that it is an unnecessary complication of life, that it will never be able to carry out its duties with safety and regularity, and that even if it could, permanent subsidies would be required to enable it to exist. The first of these needs no comment; life may have been less complicated before the invention of steam and the telegraph, but we cannot return to the conditions of those days if we would. The second is, of course, a matter of opinion, and it is quite easy, if no or insufficient backing is given to a movement, to shut one's eyes and say that it is useless or does not exist. Civil aviation, new-born at the Armistice, has been consistently frowned on and belittled like an unwanted child by its political parents and all the available pennies and caresses given to the elder boy. It is quite obvious that the few pilots and machines working between London, Paris and Brussels cannot by themselves form a reservoir for the Royal Air Force, but there are very strong reasons for supposing that, if the ratio of funds and political support to service and civil activities were rightly allotted, regularity and steady expansion could and would be achieved within a few years. Moreover, though cut-throat rivalry is to be deprecated, the spur of competition, one of the pivots of commerce—even more especially in an as yet liquid and unstandardised system of transport—must tend towards efficiency. Any form of monopoly

is to be regarded with suspicion, and for this reason it would appear to be a retrograde step to assign certain spheres to individual companies. On the other hand unbalanced development can hardly attain the desired end. The opening of so called additional air routes will not in itself spell traffic, and without traffic no transport concern can be economic. In regard to the third, subsidies: those who would wish to appear to sympathise with civil aviation but whose thoughts lie in a military direction take cover under the rightly founded British prejudice against direct State assistance, and say that 'civil aviation must fly by itself.'

Subsidies as a general rule are undoubtedly wrong. The closest analogy between service and civil aviation is that of the navy and the mercantile marine. Merchant shipping has in the past received subsidies, and subsidies are still paid for certain ships convertible into fleet auxiliaries, for exactly the same reasons for which it is urged assistance should be forthcoming for civil aircraft. If the principle is right in the case of a vast and long-established concern, it is right in order to assist the beginnings of a new one of even greater relative importance, and which cannot start otherwise. They must of course be correctly applied, or they may tend merely to set up and support a monopoly. But the crux of the whole question is whether it is better to spend almost the whole amount on an entirely unproductive service—in its essence necessarily tending to standardisation and therefore to inelasticity and inability rapidly to develop progressive types—and yet have it without reserve, a spear-point without a shaft; or, whilst ensuring and in no way eliminating an efficient head, devote a reasonable proportion of the total available funds to the necessary driving power.

The development of civil aviation on the lines of Imperial air routes has another direct bearing on the question of air power and Imperial defence. Just as the naval protection of our sea trade routes has resulted in the establishment of bases, and these in their turn with the mobile forces working from them have secured the freedom of movement on which we have existed, so the establishment of air ports along Imperial air communications in peace will form the aerial bases from and to which tactical and strategical air formations can operate in war. Sea protection will in future be insufficient. The bases on the Imperial air

routes may prove of vital importance in the event, for instance, of a distant portion of the Empire being attacked and a concentration of aircraft being necessary in that area. A present disadvantage of aeroplanes in co-operation with the navy against a distant enemy is their limited range of activity from land, and this difficulty is accentuated by the position of England on the circumference of the Imperial system. For this reason and in order to develop the Imperial commercial airways it is very important that the design of long-range economic craft should be encouraged. This truism is being only too clearly and unfortunately demonstrated as these words are written by our inability by air to mass a suitable striking force at the Dardanelles as the most potent deterrent to dangerous Turkish possibilities. Apart from war necessities, it is obvious that second only to setting our home house in order it is important to consolidate the various parts of the Empire, and when one remembers that about a quarter of the habitable globe is included in the British Empire, and that all the Dominions have energetically expressed their readiness to assist in developing Imperial air communications, we see how vast are the openings for co-operative efforts if properly handled. Commercial aircraft flying on an economic basis on the Imperial air routes will be the best outlet for the progress of design, the improvement of long-range service bombers, and the development of the aircraft industry.

The aspects affecting air defence have now been sketched in bare outline. The factors which stand out most vividly are that Great Britain is more directly menaced by the rise of air power than continental nations, in that she is no longer protected by the silver streak, nor the Empire by the seas; that in future our security will depend as much upon superiority in the air as it has depended in the past upon superiority at sea; and that that superiority must be gained along the same lines as we secured our supremacy at sea—by industry and progressive commerce which alone make all forms of defence necessary and possible.

In this, as in most affairs to-day, the first necessity is to regain a sense of proportion, to clear our minds of side issues, and to get back to sound basic principles. The worst conditions for any—and even more especially for this—nation, are those entailed in war. An honourable peace is vital to the British Empire, if we are in any way to rebuild our wonderful reserve power which

was sapped in the great struggle. The atmosphere is still permeated with the smoke of the war, but we shall be unwise if we allow it to distort our vision and start to reorganize and train for an immediate similar conflagration. Specialists in any subject often forget that there are other concomitants of the vast problems with which the world is faced, and in the case of those concerned with war and its instruments there is perhaps a natural tendency for the essential to be obscured and perspective to be lost. The British navy and army exist in peace, not to make war on a continental scale, but as a form of Imperial insurance organized on the most simple and economical basis consonant with immediate and rapid expansion.

In dealing with the junior service also, whilst recognising the new phase and sphere which it has opened, we must work on fundamental principles, and these do not appear to have been followed since the Armistice in the matter of air policy. The organisation recommended by the Minister for Air and his staff at the end of the war was well adapted to meet the case ; but their successors did not carry it into effect, and in the event of war our air position already opens the country to very grave risk. There is, indeed, a small tactical air force existent, consisting of about 20 squadrons abroad, and when recently given promises are carried into effect there will be about 32 squadrons, many in skeleton form only, at home. Thus there is no strategical force whether in the form of fighting or bombardment fleet, and only some 600 machines in all that are available for aerial home defence. At Constantinople, where a great opportunity has occurred for the air to play an important rôle, no well-timed or satisfactory demonstration of strength has been possible. In India the state of affairs in the Air Force is most unsatisfactory and humiliating. In the matter of Imperial air communications the small amount effected has been on independent initiative, and the same applies to what it has been possible to retain of airship material. Most important of all, the great strength—fighting and industrial—in being at the end of the war, has been disintegrated and has almost disappeared ; there is in its place no semblance of a reserve. Civil aviation, design, experiment, research and operation, in which at least one-third of the available weight in influence, work and money should have been employed, has against responsible advice been woefully neglected.

When such criticism is made the usual answer given is that the foundations of the Royal Air Force have been well and truly laid. That is true. The 'foundations' which rendered possible the enormous war development were laid of first-class shape and quality by the Royal Flying Corps, naval and military, in peace. No better foundations for a war-time service are now required. Of what do the new stones which it has now taken nearly four years to lay consist, how much have they cost, what edifice is springing from them? It is true that an Air Staff College has been founded, but the money would have been better expended on a unified Army, Navy and Air College for higher staff defence training. Unnecessarily high rates of pay and pension have been granted; lengthy titles, a new uniform with busby and sword have been incorporated; new buildings have been erected; a numerically strong, senior officer, hierarchy, a large ground staff, a small regularly flying personnel (doing very little flying) have been established. A sufficient junior flying personnel is becoming more difficult to obtain. Perhaps rightly, a new command has been set up in Irak; but its composition is largely of ground units, armoured cars, trains, signal and inland water transport services, etc. It is certainly to the good if thereby efficiency is increased and cost is reduced; but, apart from the fact that its acceptance must be understood to mean that the country is to be held mainly by bombing villages, the transference of responsibility would appear to be a somewhat rash experiment in the existing physical condition of the Air Force, and at a time when there are such disruptive possibilities as the necessity for India to send a large garrison to Irak, a withdrawal from the country, etc. Are these the new stones; and, if so, are they worth the 60 or more millions which have been spent on military aviation since the Armistice?

We have seen that the basic foundations for progress are invention, design, experiment, research and operation. France is rightly allotting money to these heads in approximately a ratio of one to every two spent on military air services. We have been doing so on a ratio of about one to twenty. Such a proportion cannot be justified. During the last four years the primary requirements—the whole-hearted fostering of the only possible reserve, and the strong progressive furtherance of research—remain practically untouched. There is no reserve, and the funds have

been spent without taking into consideration the absolute necessity for creating a reserve. The percentage of the total outlay on research is absurdly small. That so much money has been spent on mere show suggests that an effort was being made by the Air Force to appear very big in order to frighten any hungry marauder, such as the army and navy, and to avoid being swallowed. If this is so, it is a very absurd and uneconomic procedure in dealing with such a problem, and the sooner it is stopped the better.

It is easy to criticise, and the difficulties of the problem are fully realised by the present writer ; but, in view of the great national importance of the subject, the facts must be stated if improvement is to be secured by means of a new policy. This country and the Empire are no longer adequately guarded by sea power, and no real degree of safety will be achieved until we are supreme in the air. Vision, imagination and long-sighted measures are necessary for this purpose ; narrow, dogmatic methods will not meet the case. The present arrangement cannot be a sound one in view of the facts that both army and navy feel that through lack of knowledge and sympathy their requirements are being misunderstood and badly served ; that those whose beliefs lie in the certainty that a soundly-organized, strong, strategical, striking air force is vital have equally well justified mistrust ; and that those who recognise that strength in experiment and research and the sound development of construction and air transport is the joint, fundamental root of air progress, are convinced by indisputable facts that nothing can be hoped for from the existing control of aerial enterprise in Great Britain.

What then can be done to re-direct our air development on to right lines in the hope that it may not yet be too late ? First, there is the immediate necessity of a scientific survey of all the aspects of our defence requirements—navy, army and air. National needs rather than the wishes of a particular ministry must be studied. Neither the naval nor military staffs, in the frame of mind into which they have been forced, will accept the brusque decision of what is to them an untutored, un-understanding, dictatorial newcomer. Nor will the academic disquisitions and resolutions of any number of temporary and necessarily incompletely informed, even if unbiassed, committees carry the navy and army into sustained co-operative effort. The more one studies the problem

the more difficult, owing to the conditions which have been allowed to arise, it appears, and the more clearly is indicated the necessity of a supreme Ministry of Defence to co-ordinate policy. At a time of general unrest the Empire is trying to carry a heavier burden of responsibility than ever in history ; concurrently the cost of fighting services is very much higher ; and the possibility of bankruptcy must be taken into account. Consolidation is imperative. There is no alternative which suggests the semblance of satisfactory results. As the closest possible inter-working of the various arms is essential within the army and navy, so it is vital that questions of defence, which must necessarily concern all three services, should invariably be considered jointly. What body other than a responsible Minister and staff can, with any hope of suitable economical allocation, distribute the available sum voted for national defence ? How else can the ' minima ' air units be enforced on an unwilling army and navy ? How otherwise can the Air Force be made to recognise its place as a cog in the wheel of a general scheme of national defence ? If matters are as they seem, it is obvious that some radical alteration is, in any case, inevitable ; as, on the one hand, the navy and army will continue to try to force the air out of its present position ; and, on the other, the public, who are vitally affected, are beginning to realise that the situation is falsely and dangerously based and cannot be allowed to continue. Unfortunately the creation of a Ministry of Defence touches very strong vested interests, but it is the only sound solution and the difficulties must be overcome.

The alternative which has been suggested in some quarters is to let the army and navy have their own air branches, the Air Ministry being responsible for the building up of the striking force and for civil aviation, supply and research. The proposal, if there were the safeguard of a Ministry of Defence, would have more merits than otherwise in that it would probably mean a greater aggregate of flying and a more rapid economical substitution of air for suitable naval and military services by the Admiralty and War Office themselves. But without the control of a Ministry of Defence, if the meaning of this step is carefully weighed, it is clear that it would only represent the first stage in the dismemberment of the Air Ministry, and a return to the conditions of jealousy, wastefulness and competition obtaining in

1916 and 1917. The matter is urgent, not only from its intrinsic importance, and for the fact that every week makes the position worse, but also to avoid further waste of time over impotent committees and inter-departmental wrangling.

The national propensity to compromise would seem to have no outlet in this question, but a satisfactory solution is quite possible if—but, only if—the problem of defence is clearly thought out and carefully analysed as a whole and definite action taken by the setting up of a suitable, permanent, unifying and co-ordinating mechanism, perseveringly to direct and resolutely to hold the balance between the three services.

The war showed the necessity for military centralised control. There is now a very practical necessity for the principle to be extended if the best results are to be attained for the nation at the lowest cost. There is no other way to effect correlation according to a uniform policy, to minimise overlapping and waste, and to reduce general defence expenditure by the substitution of air forces for sea or land forces where it is cheaper and more efficient to do so.

Under the policy of a broad-minded but firm Ministry of Defence a sound and stable solution would be achieved ; the army and navy would be able to put their views before a responsible joint staff, and to draw their ' minima ' air units in the best mutually agreed form ; the air force would not suffer the constant drain of supplying army and navy co-operating units, and would be helped to develop its true need and strength—a specialised striking branch; finally, a civil air department, incorporating research, design, experiment, technical inspection, supply and civil aviation would be encouraged and developed, thus establishing the roots, trunk and sap of air defence, and the foundations of Imperial air communications.

F. H. SYKES

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE AND THE FAR EAST

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7. *Asia at the Cross Roads.* By ALEX. POWELL. T. Fisher Unwin.
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THE rapidly increasing volume of attention which has lately been directed by journalists and military writers to the Pacific problem (or, as it is alternately called, the Far Eastern question) indicates that public opinion is gradually coming to realise the importance and imminence of the struggle between the great commercial Powers for the actual and potential trade of China and its great 'hinterlands.' The Washington Conference proclaimed an official, world-wide recognition of the fact that, as the result of the European war, the nations which are now most directly and immediately involved in this struggle are the United States and Japan. It also involved recognition of the truth that certain antagonistic elements, whose growth and direction have been manifest to close watchers of the political skies since the beginning of the century, had now come to confront each other so closely that it was necessary for the leaders of a nation which maintains its ardent faith in pacts and conferences to discuss ways and means for preventing the economic struggle from developing into ordeal by battle.

Before proceeding to discuss to what extent and in what way the results of the Conference may be said to have served to diminish the points of friction, and to postpone or modify the inevitable struggle, I would ask the reader to consider an

important aspect of the problem, which Mr. Harding and his colleagues, following the example of all Peace Conferences, tacitly ignored.

As the result of a painful process of education in elementary economics, the modern world has slowly but surely been led to perceive that its collective intelligence has no chance of triumphing over its collective folly, to the extent of making war as 'unthinkable' as many earnest people proclaim it to be, so long as civilisation is subjected to severe and increasing economic pressure. It remains eternally true that *ventre affamé n'a pas d'oreilles*. Governments and statesmen may agree to limit armaments and to subscribe to rules of international arbitration, but they can never stay the hunger marches of virile nations, whose numbers have outstripped their food supply and who look for new places in the sun. Furthermore, the truth is forcing itself into the minds of statesmen and political economists, that the existing intensity of economic pressure—the fundamental cause of war—can never be checked unless and until our collective intelligence, discarding false sentiment and religious prejudices, is prepared to admit that the root cause of this pressure lies in the modern world's unregulated and excessive population. For, as Mill truly says, 'the triumphs of science over the powers of nature can never become the means of improving and elevating the universal lot until, in addition to just institutions, the increase of mankind shall come under the deliberate guidance of judicious foresight.'

The Washington Conference testified once more to the world's belief in just institutions; but again, as at Versailles, a gathering of representative statesmen, endeavouring to devise means for the prevention of war, completely failed to face the fundamental realities, or even tentatively to discuss the only means by which the collective intelligence of humanity can ever hope to remove the root-cause of ever-recurring strife. Many noble sentiments were recorded about 'the torches of under-standing having been lighted,' of 'a public mind and world opinion made ready to grant justice precisely as it exacts it.' Much confidence was expressed in the foundations of world disarmament, so well and truly laid by Mr. Secretary Hughes, and there was a good deal of talk about the hopeful dawn of new eras; but of the 'deliberate guidance of judicious foresight,'

alas, there was neither word nor sign. A very significant indication of the illuminating value of the new 'torches of understanding,' as well as of the persistence of the powers of darkness in high places, was manifested, even while the Conference was beginning its labours, when a public meeting, convened at New York, to discuss the question of over-population as a chronic cause of war, was forcibly broken up by the police. The representatives of a regenerate world, discussing at Washington the limitation of armaments, saw nothing remarkable in the spectacle of the arm of the law at New York illegally preventing any discussion of the limitation of cannon-fodder.

The unwillingness or inability of responsible statesmen to admit, or even to discuss, the obvious facts and inevitable consequences of the law of population is the more remarkable in the case of the Washington Conference, because already on both shores of the Pacific, the evidences of economic pressure, due to rapidly increasing numbers, are matters of common knowledge—undeniable, and generally recognised. Every student of the Pacific problem can readily trace for himself the steady growth of the cloud of impending conflict, which loomed up forty years ago, no bigger than a man's hand, when first the rulers of Japan entered actively upon their policy of expansion on to the Asiatic mainland by challenging China's claims to the overlordship of Korea. Later on, the people of the United States looked on complacently, even sympathetically, while the island Empire of the East made good its foothold in Manchuria and Korea, at the cost of a stern struggle with Russia.

But for some time before that war, and before the question of Asiatic immigration into the white man's countries had produced a rankling sense of injustice in Japan and a feeling of irritation in America, it had become evident to close observers that the increase of population and of industrialism in the United States must eventually create a situation, in which America's interests, and her rulers' conception of national security, would bring her into conflict with Japan's policy of economic penetration on the Asiatic mainland. Long before Mr. Roosevelt's declaration that the destinies of America lay upon the Pacific (1903) or before her own inevitable expansion westwards and need of Far Eastern markets were foreshadowed by the annexation of Hawaii and the building of the Panama Canal, the orientation of American

foreign policy, conscious or unconscious, had steadily been towards the safeguarding of her interests in the Far East. In convening the Washington Conference, Mr. Hughes merely carried to its logical conclusion the policy of a long line of predecessors and proclaimed to the world the fact that the United States, having become a great military Power, intends henceforth to protect Oriental claims that were pegged out by far-seeing prospectors long ago.

It is, indeed, extremely interesting to cast back and to observe how, since the days of President Monroe, successive administrations, while declaring that the interests of America necessitated complete detachment from the affairs of Europe, have never ceased to display an active interest in the affairs of Asia. Almost at the same time as the proclamation of the Monroe doctrine, America sent Edmund Roberts, her first envoy to the East, to make treaties of peace and goodwill with Annam and Siam. After him came Caleb Cushing, who negotiated the first American Treaty with China, and then the opening of Japan to the western world by Commodore Perry. Under President McKinley, America became possessed of the Philippines. Mr. Roosevelt's administration testified to its interest in the affairs of Asia by intervening as peacemaker in the Russo-Japanese war. Thereafter followed a period of diplomatic manoeuvres, during which American statesmen, confronted first by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and later by the Russo-Japanese *entente*, contented themselves with reiterating diplomatic insistence upon Mr. Secretary Hay's principles of the 'open door' and equal opportunity, without any immediate intention of demanding their practical application. With the great European war, came, on the one hand, Japan's opportunity to advance her outposts and to consolidate her position on the Asiatic mainland; and, on the other, the rapid demonstration of America's latent military resources.

The broad shadow of coming events was now plainly cast. In October 1916, at a moment when both Russia and Japan were visibly encroaching upon China's territory and sovereign rights, the State Department at Washington announced its intention of postponing the several questions thus created until the end of the war, 'no matter what conditions might arise in China,' and limited itself for the time being to the collection of information

and records. Upon the conclusion of the war, following once again the line of national interests, American statesmanship detached itself from the League of Nations and from European 'entanglements,' and having done so, proceeded to convene a meeting of the Powers to discuss the limitation of armaments and the arbitrament of differences in the Far East ; that is to say, in that region wherein America's special interests and overseas possessions lie. Seen in this light, the Washington Conference is the natural and inevitable conclusion of a national policy which, despite occasional lapses, may be traced back through successive administrations to George Washington's original conception and justification of purely national interests. In America, as elsewhere, the first object of every statesman must always be national security, and the men of clear vision who direct the affairs of the United States to-day are well aware that henceforward, for the great industrial nations, national security depends more and more critically upon control of raw materials and markets. They know that, within the lifetime of the present generation, America must be confronted, though in a lesser degree, with the same grim problem as that which confronts England and Japan—not to mention Western Europe—namely, the problem of finding and keeping ways and means of selling enough of its industrial products, under increasingly severe competition, to provide daily bread for vast masses of town-dwelling workers, who consume, but do not produce, food.

Since Mr. Secretary Hay first proclaimed the United States' devotion to the principle of the 'open door' in China, many events have occurred and many changes taken place in the balance of power, to emphasise and accelerate the development of America's interests in the Far East, and therefore to increase the probability of conflict between her and Japan, whose 'special interests' are already firmly established in that region. As the result of China's rapid descent down the path of financial and political demoralisation, and of her repeatedly demonstrated incapacity to organize any effective military forces, the defencelessness of the world's greatest undeveloped market has been made manifest, at the same time as its potential value has been enormously increased by reason of the collapse of international commerce in Europe. Appreciation of the value of the pearl which awaits the Power that shall successfully open the Chinese

oyster is no new thing. If China succeeded in escaping political tutelage and economic exploitation at the close of the nineteenth century, it was only because of the neutralising effect of international jealousies. When Russia, in alliance with France moving up from Tonquin, came down upon the Middle Kingdom through Siberia and Manchuria, it was not the moral force of the principle of the 'open door,' but the restraining virtue of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which, for the time being, made the 'integrity of China' something more than a diplomatic catchword.

Again, after the untoward announcement of Mr. Secretary Knox's scheme for the neutralisation of Manchurian railways, when Russia and Japan joined forces in 1910 and declared their intention to support each other's claims to vague but far-reaching 'special interests' in China's loosely-held dependencies, the 'open door' was practically closed in that region—American protests notwithstanding. When, in 1912, the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty destroyed the last remnants of central authority at Peking, China became the happy hunting ground of political adventurers, and a swift process of 'economic gravitation' set in, which threatened to destroy her sovereignty at many points. But once again the kind fates intervened: by the elimination of Russia as a great Power, the European war relieved China from at least any immediate danger of the fulfilment of Mouravieff's dream, and the risks which she ran became obviously less with the disappearance of the Russo-Japanese *entente*. The 'Twenty-one Demands' imposed upon the helpless Chinese Government by Japan in May 1915 showed, however, that the Elder Statesmen at Tokyo intended, should the course of events and the results of the European war favour such action, to take such steps, long planned, as would establish Japan's national security upon a firmly held position of economic and strategic advantage on the Asiatic mainland.

The 'Twenty-one Demands' were, in effect, something in the nature of a gamble on the outcome of the European war. Had it ended in a stalemate or in victory for Germany, Japan's position would undoubtedly have been rapidly extended and strengthened in China. Moreover, the nature and extent of these demands amounted to acceptance in advance of the termination, in any case, of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, for the claims thus advanced were clearly incompatible with the principles of the

open door and equal opportunity. It was a gamble, justified—from the Japanese point of view—not only by the uncertainties and opportunities of the general situation, but because the failures of Japanese attempts to colonise in Formosa, Korea and Manchuria, had led the Japanese Government, naturally enough, to regard the establishment and protection of 'special interests' in China (that is to say, of a position of political and economic advantage) as essentially necessary to national security. Thus the end of the war, and the coming together of the new map-makers at Versailles, found the Far Eastern problem to lie, as before, in the reconciliation of conflicting interests in the race for priority of opportunity in developing and exploiting the trade and resources of China. Only the chief protagonists had changed.

In spite of Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points, and of the benevolent activities of Women's Leagues for Peace and Freedom and of other philanthropists, the truth was clearly manifested at Versailles, and subsequently demonstrated with equal clearness at Washington, that the conditions which Japan considers necessary for her national security and economic existence, are bound to conflict in ever-increasing intensity with America's conception of her own national interests. Disguise the truth as we may with diplomatic phrases, the policy and pronouncements set forth by Mr. Hughes at Washington are intended to confine Japanese expansion within definite limits and, at the same time, so to establish the principle of equal opportunity, as virtually to place China (and, for that matter, Eastern Russia) under a Four-Power protectorate, in the working of which America might confidently look for the support of England and France in opposing Japan's claims to a preferential position. It was equally made manifest at Washington, for those who had eyes to see, that, beneath Japan's attitude of courteous acquiescence, lies an unshaken determination to maintain, at all costs, the position of economic and strategic advantage in Manchuria and Mongolia, which the nation has won for itself at the cost of two great wars and which its rulers consider vital to its future security.* Therefore the Far Eastern problem of to-day, reduced to its simplest expression, lies in the question: how far, and by what means, can the respective interests of America and Japan, and their conflicting

**Vide* 'The Future of Manchuria.' EDINBURGH REVIEW, October, 1921.

conceptions of national security, be reconciled, with a view to the preservation of peace? It is a question which immediately concerns the whole world, and particularly England, to whose manufacturers and merchants the peaceful and early development of China's potential trade has now become a matter of vital importance.

Bearing in mind the grim realities that lurk beneath all the polite conventions of diplomacy and the euphemisms of statecraft, and discarding the fashionable lip-service of sentimental idealism, let us first consider the *raison d'être* and immediate results of the Washington Conference, and then endeavour to forecast its ultimate effect upon the Pacific problem, as above defined. It is unnecessary for our purpose to enquire to what extent President Harding and Mr. Secretary Hughes may have been moved by the exigencies of domestic politics in inviting the Powers to meet at Washington and in endeavouring to secure such a re-adjustment of the Far Eastern question as would fulfil the requirements of American interests. There may be—indeed, there probably is—justification for the opinion, expressed in the American Press, that President Harding's hand was forced, in the matter of the Conference, by Senator Borah, representing a very strong element of public opinion, determined to expiate Mr. Wilson's failure at Versailles and to vindicate American idealism in world politics. But, even so, everything in the attitude and utterances of the administration justifies the conclusion that the Conference was inspired by a national, rather than by a party, conception of foreign policy. Indeed, in proposing to bring the United States into something very closely resembling an alliance with other Powers, for political ends, Mr. Harding undoubtedly took risks which no former President had ever successfully taken. It is only fair to assume that he took those risks in the confident belief that the strength of public opinion behind the disarmament idea, and in favour of anything that might serve to promote the cause of world peace, would eventually secure the ratification of his treaties, even by the 'malcontent third' in the Senate.

As events proved, while the Conference proceeded, the activities of the 'no more war' idealists became an unexpected source of embarrassment at times to the administration, and Mr. Hughes' difficult task was in no way lightened by the necessity in which he found himself of reconciling to his intensely practical

aims a body of public opinion which, while earnestly demanding complete disarmament and a World League of Peace, evidently expected the Government to protect not only China, but the remnants of Russian authority in Siberia, from Japanese aggression. As a matter of vitally necessary policy, based on national traditions and upon a justifiable anticipation of national interests, the administration's first object was to re-affirm and re-establish the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity in China, and, with that end in view, to secure the substitution of a new alignment of the Powers for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Its immediate purpose, which lost nothing of its predominant significance by being omitted from the agenda, was therefore to secure at least the tacit approval of Great Britain and the Dominions for a policy which would aim at putting a check on Japanese expansion and challenging her preferential position. The Conference followed, of course, the conventions of international courtesy; there were the usual references to a new world, regenerate by the 'spirit of generous co-operation,' and the delegates were invited to approach the solution of their problems 'with the full consciousness that they were working in the service 'of mankind'; but, as Senator Lodge justly observed at the conclusion of the proceedings, its success was chiefly due to the fact that its scope was strictly limited to matters of immediate concern to the United States.

On the subject of naval disarmament, which figured first on the agenda, Mr. Lodge was 'more impressed by the limitation 'of the tonnage of ships and calibre of guns than by the reduction 'of the number of capital ships.' It is safe to say that the other naval Powers, and particularly Japan, were similarly impressed by the nature and terms of the agreement proposed with such dramatic unexpectedness by the nation which, not so very long before, through the mouth of its servant Daniels, had announced its intention to build the greatest navy in the world. The administration claimed and received no small measure of warm-hearted approbation for this *beau geste* and for setting so forthright an example of pacific intentions. Throughout the civilised world the Press resounded with eulogies of the statesmanship which had had the courage to take so bold a step on the road to universal brotherhood and shown a practical way to reduce the burden of armaments. But the naval experts who also stood and waited,

and other cold-blooded realists whose minds have been trained to regard all such questions in the light of national security, were not slow to perceive the connection between the limitation of the tonnage of capital ships and the accommodation limits of the Panama Canal. Similarly, they perceived that the practical impossibility of coaling and victualling an unlimited number of battleships and cruisers based on the Philippines, made it a matter of the most vital strategic importance for the United States to secure a proportional reduction of the number of each nation's capital ships, even though, in so doing, Great Britain should be left with a slight numerical superiority over America. As Lt.-Colonel Reboul observes: 'The ideal of President Harding ' is sincere and the programme of Mr. Hughes is certainly capable ' of contributing, if it were possible, to the peace of the world ; ' suffice it to point out that their objects are not incompatible with ' the immediate and imperative strategic interests of the United ' States.'

The Japanese, while fully alive to the strategical significance of the American proposals, were sincerely and quite naturally well-disposed towards any scheme which afforded a prospect of reducing expenditure on armaments, so long as no vital national interests were endangered. They therefore agreed to the disarmament scheme, but their acceptance was made conditional upon America's undertaking to maintain the *status quo* of fortifications and naval bases in her Western Pacific possessions—that is to say, in Guam and the Philippines—a condition which, in the event of war, leaves these possessions practically defenceless against a Japanese *coup de main* and therefore deprives the United States of her only base for carrying out an offensive against Japan in the Pacific. Thus regarded, the results of the Washington Conference undoubtedly make for peace, in the sense that, so long as the Treaty remains in force (which should be till December 1936) they make it practically impossible for either antagonist to do the other any vital injury. So far, so good ; but no useful purpose is served by evading the truth that, while both parties at the Conference showed an earnest desire to find and pursue the path of peace, both were nevertheless obviously manœuvring for position with an eye to the possibilities of conflict. And the ultimate cause of strife—namely, rivalry for the Far Eastern markets—remains not only untouched, but with every prospect

of steady aggravation, as the result of the Treaties and of the contingent resolutions proposed by Mr. Secretary Hughes and adopted by the Conference.

In the political sphere, the chief result of the Conference has been to put an end to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and prospectively to strengthen the hands of the American Government by virtue of British support for the principle of the Open Door. The position in which the Japanese representatives found themselves placed with regard to the Twenty-one Demands, was plainly that of a defendant, and the official statement made by Baron Shidehara on the subject, placed on record with the Treaties, may fairly be regarded as tantamount to a confession that the gamble of 1915 had been unfortunate. On the subject of Eastern Siberia and Saghalien also, Mr. Hughes' exposition of American policy, his solemnly recorded declaration of the hope that Japan's pledges of evacuation would be carried out 'in the near future,' and his expressed intention of re-vitalising the principle of equal opportunity by virtue of the Nine-Power Treaty, all served to emphasise the possibility of Japanese isolation as a result of the new political and economic conditions that have arisen since the war. Finally, in the matter of Japan's 'special interests' (recognised but never precisely defined by the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917), Baron Shidehara, while cheerfully subscribing to the principle of the Open Door, took occasion to reiterate the sufficiently obvious truth, that it is to the Asiatic mainland that Japan must look for the raw materials and market which are absolutely vital to her economic existence. He carefully refrained from introducing any argument or allusion in reference to that aspect of the doctrine of equal opportunity, which has proved such a stumbling block to Mr. Wilson and the peacemakers at Versailles, namely, the question of Japanese immigration into Continents other than the Asiatic.

So far as Japan was concerned, every sleeping dog was allowed to lie undisturbed. With inscrutably smiling faces her delegates went home, to ponder at their leisure over Mr. Harding's eloquent peroration and, in particular, over his assurance that 'the achievement of the Conference had been supreme, because no seed of conflict had been sown; no reaction in regret or resentment can ever justify resort to arms. The very atmosphere was such as to drive national selfishness into retreat.' Mr.

Frank Simonds, whose wide knowledge of foreign politics and affairs makes him a peculiarly distinguished figure in American journalism, was practically alone in pointing out, at the time that Mr. Hughes' policy began to be outlined, that the principles which he was seeking to re-vitalise involve the assertion of a moral guardianship over China, and also a course of action definitely committed to limiting Japanese expansion in the only direction which has been left open for it: a policy which, according to every historical precedent, must inevitably lead to war. Mr. Simonds might well have added that the principal factor in the Far Eastern problem, the unknown factor upon the determination of which Japanese policy now waits, lies in the nature and proclivities of whatsoever national government shall in process of time emerge out of the present chaos in Russia. It must be evident that a renewal of the Russo-Japanese *entente* of 1910, with Germany *redivivus* in the background, would very rapidly devitalise the principle of the Open Door in China.

For the present, however, the principle has been re-vitalised, and in the words of Senator Lodge, an immediate result of the Conference has been 'to render such aid to China as may help her to secure real independence.' Nevertheless, it remains eternally and undeniably true that the *fons et origo* of the Far Eastern question, China's defenceless weakness and lack of constructive initiative, can never be remedied by any number of Treaties and resolutions, whether adopted by four or by nine Powers. The preservation of her integrity and sovereignty can only be achieved, in the long run, by her own efforts and by the growth of a genuine spirit of patriotism which shall aim, in the first instance, not at Constitutions and Parliaments, but at the systematic reform of the administration. And this being so, the future of the Far Eastern problem must depend upon the readiness and ability of the rulers of China to avail themselves of the latest period of grace afforded them by the present position of international affairs and by the aid proffered to them from Washington. And this being so, the outlook is anything but hopeful, for the most prominent groups and individuals who have recently come to the front in Chinese politics give even less evidence than their predecessors of any real appreciation of their country's needs.

For the present, however, the principle of the Open Door has

been proclaimed and accepted by all the Powers concerned ; it remains to be seen how the principle will be worked out in practice, when the various international commissions created by the Washington Conference begin their labours, especially those whose duty it will be to consider economic and railway conditions in the Far East and the revision of the Chinese tariff. In these negotiations, it is safe to predict, the rival Powers will continue, as in the field of strategy, to manœuvre for position. The avoidance in the immediate future of such a divergence of views as might lead to a serious crisis, or even to a *casus belli*, will depend in the first instance upon the interpretation which American diplomacy and the body of public opinion behind it decides upon attaching to the extremely nebulous expression 'equal opportunity.'

Japan, reassured as to the strategical situation created by the limitation of armaments, and sincerely anxious to reduce her national expenditure, will no doubt proceed with the withdrawal of her military outposts in Shantung, Siberia and Saghalien ; but, as I have already said, it is not possible to conceive of any circumstances, or any cause other than decisive military defeat, which is likely to induce her to abandon her position of economic and strategical advantage in Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia. On the contrary, she will undoubtedly continue to develop, with all the resources at her disposal, and to accelerate at every favourable point, her 'peaceful penetration' into that 'field of economic activity,' upon which, as Baron Shidehara frankly told the Conference, she depends for her very existence. It is also quite certain that this process of 'peaceful penetration' will continue, as heretofore, to be facilitated by the incorrigible venality of Chinese officials, a deplorably constant, and apparently increasing, factor in the Far Eastern problem.

The first thing requisite, therefore, for the maintenance of the atmosphere of 'harmonious co-operation' created by the Washington Conference, would appear to lie in a clear definition and recognition of the position of undeniable advantage which, with the help of China's complaisant officials, Japan has been able to build up since her war with Russia, in the region from which she ejected that Power, and of the 'special interests' thus created. At the same time it will be necessary to recognise the simple fact that, say what we will, these special interests (e.g., the control of the South Manchurian railway system) do, in fact, stultify the

principle of the Open Door, much in the same way as America's peaceful penetration of Mexico stultifies it in that country; or as her acquisition of the Panama Canal nullifies the principle of equal opportunity for the maritime commerce of other nations.

Amongst the statesmen gathered together at Washington there appears to have been a sort of tacit impulse or agreement to profess belief in the reality of the Equal Opportunity and Open Door snarks, and to persist very seriously in their pursuit. But, as a matter of fact, everyone at that solemn gathering must have been perfectly well aware that both these beautiful abstractions are in reality boojums. Euphemisms apart, the Pacific problem is the problem of a struggle, a struggle in which each of the rival Powers, desirous of developing and exploiting the Far Eastern markets for its own benefit, is endeavouring by all possible means to obtain a position of advantage. And the struggle is intensified and complicated by the fact that, in the meanwhile, the rulers of China, pursuing their traditional policy, are seeking, in the first place, to reap some material advantage for themselves from this rivalry, and, in the second, to 'set one barbarian against the other,' so that, in the ensuing strife, the Flowery Kingdom may evade the penalties of the concessions or 'special interests' granted to one or other of the rivals, or to both. The very material advantages which Chinese officialdom derived from declaring war, with perfect impunity and no responsibilities of conflict, against Germany in 1917, have not been, and are not likely to be, forgotten. Nothing would suit the Peking Government better to-day than to see the United States at war with Japan and, after a period of watchful waiting, to cast in her lot with America and thus liquidate the large burden of loans borrowed from Japanese financiers, against various concessions, during the past ten years.

Japan's present policy, following the methods inaugurated by Russia in 1897, is that of 'conquest by railway and bank,' a policy whose rapid successes could never have been achieved by either Power without Chinese official connivance. America's policy, unofficial, but nevertheless unmistakable, aims at obtaining a position of advantage at Peking, and thus throughout the country, by supporting the aspirations to rulership of the ultra-modern school of Young China officials, trained to the profession of American 'democratic' ideas in American Universities, and ostensibly pledged to the furtherance of American interests (and

incidentally, therefore, be it observed, to the stultification of the principle of equal opportunity).

The rapidly increasing influence of American-educated Chinese students in Chinese politics, and their quite unconcealed purpose of inciting public opinion in America to increasing hostility against Japan, constitute factors in the general situation whose importance must not be overlooked. The effect of their insidious propaganda has recently been greatly reinforced and stimulated by the sensational, gravely injudicious, and often completely unfounded utterances of the late Lord Northcliffe in Australia and California during his world-tour. Few people realise how far-reaching and powerful is the skilfully organized propaganda of Young China, in its appeal to chivalrous sentiment combined with material advantage, not only upon evangelical and educational societies in the United States, but also upon a large section of the American Press, and, in a less degree, upon public opinion in England. Those, however, who have occasion to study the signs of the times, as reflected in recent American literature dealing with the Pacific problem, can hardly fail to have been impressed by the unvarying similarity of opinions expressed, and policies advocated, by the semi-official propagandists of Young China (e.g., Dr. M. T. Z. Tyau, Mr. S. G. Cheng, Mr. Joshua Bau, &c., &c.) and those set forth in such widely-read works as Mr. Mark Sullivan's 'Great Adventure at Washington,' Mr. Sydney Greenbie's 'Pacific Triangle,' and Mr. Alex. Powell's 'Asia at the Cross Roads.' These last may not represent the official mind of America, but they do most undeniably represent the view of those from whom great numbers of well-meaning but uninstructed readers take their opinions, and ultimately a dead weight of prejudice which in its turn is bound to affect American policy. The tone and temper of these books and others, published in the United States during and since the Washington Conference, are, generally speaking, such that no impartial observer alive to the stern realities underlying the Pacific problem, can easily persuade himself that it is likely to be permanently and peacefully settled; for there is here no evidence of broad-minded, sympathetic, recognition of the real issues involved, nor any definite attempt to solve the problem in a spirit of harmonious co-operation and reasonable compromise. The American writers above-named, and many others, wield the

Big Stick with an exasperating assurance of moral superiority and leave one with the uncomfortable feeling that the Great Republic's Pacific policy is not likely to diminish the rigour of the impending racial struggle for survival, or to avert any of its increasing penalties.

At this point we are forced back upon the question with which our review of the situation began, a question wider than the Pacific, older than Nineveh and Babylon, namely : Is it possible for the idealists' vision of universal brotherhood ever to be attained unless and until the collective intelligence of humanity brings the increase of mankind under the 'deliberate guidance ' of judicious foresight ?'

J. O. P. BLAND

THE PROPOSED ANGLO-FRENCH TREATY

Seaborne Trade, Vol. I. By C. ERNEST FAYLE. (Official History of the War). John Murray.

ALTHOUGH the negotiations have been delayed by more pressing questions, the draft alliance with France has been awaiting discussion and settlement for some months past; and the French have made it clear that they consider a treaty with us to be as important to them as the payment of reparations by Germany. It is certainly a matter of serious consideration for us. If we except the various treaties of alliance which we have made from time to time for specific purposes in war, we have never involved ourselves in so great a responsibility since—more than 200 years ago—we formally pledged ourselves to maintain the Dutch barrier against French aggression. And the form of the new engagement is likely to be as significant as the matter. If, in its final shape, the new compact repeats the treaty of guarantee originally annexed to the Treaty of Versailles, we shall be obliged to conclude that the Government of Great Britain has finally adopted a continental system of war and policy. The treaty will oblige us to raise armies on the continental scale, and to send them to the French frontier, if ever it should be attacked: the military problems of the French general staff will be ours, and we shall have to solve them in common.

It is natural enough that the French, whose history may be described as five centuries of resistance against powerful neighbours, should have very clear ideas about the danger to which they are still exposed. M. Briand, speaking at Nantes on 2nd June, expressed his countrymen's anxiety in very definite terms:—

'I said to Mr. Lloyd George, you don't want to see the Germans in Antwerp . . . so that, in defending the Rhine frontier, it is not France that you are defending, but your own frontier. That frontier is common to you, to Belgium, and to us.'

M. Briand has accurately assessed our responsibilities; for our interest in the integrity of France is beyond all question.

But he foreshadows a means of securing it, which is open to discussion. In other words, if M. Briand means merely that we ought to uphold his country by every means in our power, nobody will challenge him; but if he implies that we must defend the French frontier by sending great armies into France, then it is quite an open question whether that will be the most effective assistance that we can render.

It will at once be answered: these undertakings, however heavy, are, after all, no more than we have successfully executed. However reluctant we may be to begin them afresh, we may, none the less, hope to repeat our performance if absolutely compelled to do so.

Unfortunately, the matter is not quite so simple. The campaigns of William III and the Duke of Marlborough were conceived on the continental theory of war; but the victories gained did not persuade their successors that it was right for us to send great armies across to Flanders whenever we were engaged in war; and, in like manner, before we can decide whether we ought, or ought not, to involve ourselves in the responsibilities foreshadowed in our treaty with France, we must examine closely how the sources of our wealth and existence were applied to the operations in which we have just been engaged; and to what extent they adapted themselves to the form of major strategy which we adopted.

A traditional preference for continental or amphibious warfare may have lurked in the minds of our ministers in August 1914; but the plan finally adopted was shaped far more by the current of events than by the will of a single person. The fortune of war during the year 1915 may fairly be said to have decided what the character of our military effort would be. Had the expedition to Gallipoli succeeded, and had the Russian armies been able to hold their own, the forces which we were then raising would probably have been employed in an Eastern campaign, which would have assisted a final decision in the same way that the Peninsular War contributed to the downfall of Napoleon. It failed, and our war plan took on a wholly continental shape in consequence.

The task before us was then two-fold: to mass forces in Flanders and Picardy so powerful that, in conjunction with the French, they would force a decision; and to keep our allies

supplied with whatever they required in the way of material and equipment. Had it been realised that there was a deep antagonism between these two objects, we should doubtless have struck a balance, and have subordinated our land campaigns to the duties which a great military Power like France might expect a maritime ally to perform. Unfortunately, nobody grasped that the one policy militated against the other ; we strove to do both at the same time, giving a sort of precedence to our commitments upon the continent, because they had come first ; and it is of some importance to trace the consequences of our zeal and good nature.

Two things were needful if our armies abroad were to be maintained and kept efficient : (1) it was necessary that we should have sufficient tonnage to transport and supply them, and at the same time, maintain a sufficiently vigorous flow of trade to feed the population and give them the material for manufacturing munitions and equipment ; and (2) our exports had to be kept at such a level that the state of the foreign exchange would make it possible for us to buy what we wanted abroad at a reasonable price.

Now, the supplying and recruiting of our armies attacked our commercial tonnage as effectively as the submarine campaign itself. At the spring of 1915, 20 per cent. of our available tonnage had been requisitioned for military and naval employment ; in September of the same year the figure had risen to 25 per cent., exclusive of the 250 ships on charter to allied Governments ; and by December, 30 per cent. had been withdrawn from commercial employment. There is in these figures a clear warning that we ought not to engage ourselves lightly in great undertakings on land ; but their full significance can only be grasped by examining the effects of this dislocation to our trade and industries.

A great diversion of international trade produces consequences out of all proportion to the first disturbance ; and our attempts to make good this loss of one-third of our carrying tonnage went to the root of our entire war plan. First, we strove to redress the balance by withdrawing ships engaged in purely foreign trade. But ships thus employed build up a source of wealth which may be called an invisible import, as their freight dues put foreign nations in our debt, and so oblige them to acquit themselves by supplying commodities in return. Before

the war nearly half of our total tonnage was thus employed—by withdrawing a great proportion to make good the deficit caused by the enormous scale of our requisitioning we prejudiced our credit abroad. Our first expedient, therefore, worked in direct opposition to one of our principal duties in the allied plan. Its effects did not, however, end there. By withdrawing ships from their ordinary employment we created a vacuum in various centres of international trade : ships of other nations poured in to fill it—for commerce, like nature, abhors a vacuum—with the result that the supply of neutral shipping upon which we hoped to draw, fell off. This, indeed, was our second expedient, and it was obviously hampered from the outset by the operation of the first.

Next, we tried to use ships employed in the coasting trade round Great Britain for short, easy voyages abroad. This was certainly a mere palliative to the original evil ; but, apart from the fact that it was ineffective in itself, its consequences tended to accentuate a danger of the first order : the congestion of our ports. It is generally known that between 1914 and 1919 vast accumulations of goods and supplies blocked the quays and wharves of our great harbours ; but it is very doubtful whether many people understand what port congestion means to a nation engaged in war.

The following example may, possibly, give some idea. Suppose that a vessel, which carries 5,000 tons of cargo, plies regularly all the year round between Liverpool and Charleston. The voyage is one of 3,600 miles ; so that, if the ship can keep up an average rate of 12 knots, she will cover the distance in 300 hours—or twelve and a-half days ; allowing half a day for the formalities of entering and leaving, and ten days at either end for loading and unloading, the round trip from Liverpool to Charleston and back will occupy 46 days. If we make a further allowance of about a month per year for re-fitting, we can say that the vessel ought to complete seven whole voyages in the year ; and so contribute to our wealth, our industries, or our munition factories by trafficking in 35,000 tons of goods during the course of the twelvemonth.

Let us now suppose that the state of the quays at Liverpool is such that the time spent in port is doubled (it was often trebled) ; and let us suppose further that, owing to shortage of labour at

the yards, the annual refit takes eight weeks instead of a month : the amount of trade undertaken by the ship in these new circumstances will be 25,000 tons per annum ; that is, her normal carrying capacity has been reduced by more than a third. After that the effects spread to the land, and reduce the carrying power of the railways in an equal proportion.*

The dangerous consequences of port congestion only made themselves apparent during the spring of 1915, when every vessel plying to the British Isles began to do so with a reduced carrying power. Those upon whom the responsibility for finding a remedy rested were unanimous both as to the cause and the cure. The cause was the shortage of labour, owing to the enormous scale of our recruiting ; the cure was to get back the dockers and stevedores from the armies in which they had enlisted. This we could not do : the men had disappeared in a trackless labyrinth, and it was impossible to trace them.

Even now we have not grasped the full consequences of our military engagements. Herr von Helfferich has said that the ease and rapidity with which German industry adapted itself to the calls made upon it by the German general staff made a deep and lasting impression on him. Nobody can doubt that our own industrial organization was equally elastic ; and that, with proper warning and assistance, we could have set on foot a programme of intensive ship-building sufficient to make good the first deficit and to have created a surplus besides. Ship-building was, however, not intensified, but crippled : in 1914 our ship-yards completed 1,685,033 tons ; in 1915, 650,919 ; and in 1916, 541,552 ; and this decline in an industry upon which we depended for our very life was attributable solely to the scale upon which we were recruiting armies and making munitions.

Here, then, are the full consequences of plunging without discussion or dispute upon a continental plan of campaign. First, it absorbed one-third of our total tonnage ; next it made it impossible for us to replace it ; then it reduced the carrying

*It would seem, at first sight, as though the railways would only be affected by having less goods to carry ; but this is not so. Capacity for transporting goods depends upon : (i) the amount of rolling stock, and (ii) the rapidity with which it can be loaded and unloaded : reduce the latter and you reduce the resultant of the two :—the total carrying capacity of the railway system.

power of what was left ; and, if we include the secondary consequences arising out of our efforts to make good our first loss of carrying power, it prejudiced our credit abroad, and reduced the supply of neutral tonnage upon which we hoped to draw. It is, therefore, beyond all doubt that there is a deep-seated antagonism between commitments on land and sea ; but the full extent of the opposition between the two is only apparent when we examine our second group of responsibilities in the allied plan of campaign.

It cannot be denied that when the French and Italian Governments found themselves in close alliance with a country like our own, which could not be invaded, which possessed an enormous merchant fleet, and had credit sufficient to buy supplies and materials from every market in the world, they had a right to expect that we should put these special resources at their disposal. Neither France nor Italy had ever been self-supporting in the matter of food, coal, or iron. After they had mobilised their armies they were obviously more dependent upon supplies from abroad than they had ever been before ; for they had neither the means of producing, nor of buying, nor of transporting what they needed. As they could not have fought efficiently for three months without a very large supply of these absolutely essential things ; and, as their combined armies were the principal military capital of the western allies, it was a matter of honour and common sense that we should always have been in a position to give their forces the material support which they required.

What happened ? By the spring of 1916 they presented us with a schedule of their wants. Italy required coal for her entire industries and railways ; 325,000 tons of grain per month, 15,000 tons of frozen meat and 150 steamers of an average dead-weight capacity of 5,000 tons. France required tonnage on an enormous scale for the carriage of coal, wheat, oats, maize, horses, mules, hay, munitions, steel and timber. Each Government supplied statistics to shew that their demands were neither frivolous nor exorbitant : they were simply what was needed if their armies were to be kept in a proper condition.

The figures were examined by our technical experts, who reported that if these requests were to be granted in full, 1,428,000 tons of shipping would have to be allocated to our western allies, and that our own needs and theirs, if completely supplied, would

create a deficit in our merchant fleet of 3,260,000 tons, corresponding to 13,000,000 tons of imports. The Government was, of course, unable to meet the demands ; and it is not within the scope of this article to trace by what shifts and sacrifices we contrived to keep the French and Italians fed and supplied. That we should have found such difficulty in giving exactly that form of assistance which a continental nation has a right to expect from a maritime ally is, in itself, sufficiently remarkable.

The explanation is simple : we had not realised that we cannot escape from our commitments at sea, though what we undertake on land is a matter of choice ; nor had we seen that a continental ally would drain our maritime resources as effectively as a continental enemy. With these facts before us, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that the nation's resources are not sufficient to allow us to press great enterprises, simultaneously, by land and sea, and that our war plans and treaties of alliance had better be devised accordingly.

This enquiry would not, however, be complete without some comparison between past and present. The situation which our alliance with France is designed to meet is not new ; for we have often, before this, been interested in protecting the frontiers of small States abroad against the encroachments of a powerful neighbour. From the date of the first Grand Alliance to the signing of the Peace Treaty of Utrecht, one of our principal aims in peace and war was to keep the boundaries of Belgium intact, as a landmark between the Latin and Teuton. It makes no difference that the direction of the attack should now be from the east instead of from the west. Our concern in the integrity of the Low Countries is the same ; nor does the analogy end here : the means by which we advanced our policy in the past were often debated, and the question in dispute was the one which now confronts us. When Defoe, in his satire 'The True-Born Englishman' argued that we were a continental Power by racial descent and history, he was simply making himself the advocate of a policy of unlimited commitments on land. Swift's fierce attacks upon the Duke of Marlborough drew their force and efficacy from the powerful argument that, in war, our principal effort ought always to be made at sea. How, then, did we register our obligations and responsibilities under a policy to which we still adhere ?

If we examine the terms of the Grand Alliance of 1689, it is impossible not to be impressed by the sweeping nature of its provisions. The signatories state their objects in the most general terms, and do not specify the manner in which they will set about to achieve them, nor the forces which they propose to employ. A treaty drawn up on such lines undoubtedly engaged us quite indefinitely ; and right up to the Peace of Ryswick, we find British negotiators striving to make our responsibilities under the original compact more precise. In our alliance with the United Provinces, dated August 1689, we stipulated that : ‘ the ‘ contracting parties should draw up, as soon as possible, other ‘ articles with regard to the number of their troops and vessels ’ ; in our alliance with Denmark of the same year, the troops to be employed by either side were carefully enumerated ; and, in our naval treaty with Spain, dated October 1692, we specified exactly what force we were prepared to use for common action in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, in 1695, we renewed the Grand Alliance in terms as indefinite as before.

Under these obligations we prosecuted a war more continental in design and execution than any we had waged before. It might be said that the treaties and alliances signed whilst the war was in progress shew a desire to set limits to our engagements ; but the inference is not strong, and the criticism of our war policy is more significant than the treaties themselves. On December 10, 1692, when the House voted aids for the enormous force of 83,000 troops, a few members argued that British armies should be withdrawn from the continent in order that the war at sea might be carried on with greater vigour. Their proposal received practically no attention at the time ; nor was it ever after adopted entirely : it was, none the less, the corner-stone of a great edifice of British policy.

The political condition of Europe after the Peace of Ryswick has this in common with the position to-day : that the States of the continent were divided into two groups whose interest it was, respectively, to uphold and modify the terms of the general peace. During the four years of restive, uneasy peace which preceded the next outbreak, Great Britain signed three defensive alliances ; and, once again, they fluctuated between accepting limited and unlimited commitments. In 1698, Great Britain, Sweden and Holland promised, without conditions, to assist one another if any

of the signatories should be attacked : *neque ab eo auxilio desistant, antequam parti laesae satisfactum sit*. On the other hand, when the treaty was renewed two years later, we were more definite, and promised a force of 6,000 soldiers to the State attacked ; after which a clause was added : ' If it shall happen that these succours ' are not sufficient to establish peace . . . the confederates shall ' treat with one another for increasing the succours.' This is certainly a very marked reaction from our liberal engagements under the first contract ; but, after our manner, we involved ourselves indefinitely, after setting limits to our obligations ; for in 1701 we renewed the Grand Alliance in terms which obliged the signatories to assist one another with all their forces.

Thus our responsibilities in the last phase of our struggle with Louis XIV were as indefinite as they had been in the first ; but the nation did not accept them so lightly. The two parties in the State were now definitely at issue upon the question of our commitments in war, and a debate which affected our policy for two hundred years was fairly opened. Historians have been severe upon the controversy and the combatants. It was certainly carried on with no very nice regard for truth or honour ; but it should be said in defence of the party that won, that they were arguing from a deep intuition into the sources of our strength in war : and that they were the architects of a war policy of which the Earl of Chatham and William Pitt were the builders.

Swift's chief indictment of the continental system came late ; but it is the record of a great victory. He had nothing but ill to say of the treaties of alliance which we contracted during the war preceding the Peace of Utrecht. Yet the treaties, which he denounced so unsparingly, record the steady progress of his own central contention : that responsibilities in war must be defined beforehand, and undertaken with a due regard for the special character of the nation's resources.

There is no need to examine the long list of our alliances with Spain, the Netherlands, the Empire, and the Duke of Savoy. Their general purport is clear ; but it would be idle to pretend that the record is without contradictions. In the first Barrier Treaty, for instance, we undertook to guarantee the frontier established, ' with all our forces if necessary ' ; and though the terms of the Second Barrier Treaty are much more definite, they

also incline towards the old system of unlimited commitments. On the one hand we specify exactly that 10,000 troops and 20 men-of-war are to be employed if necessary ; but, on the other we state that : ‘ If the danger be so sudden and so great as to require a greater number of forces and ships of war, then each party shall be obliged, on being required by the other to augment their succours . . . to join all their forces, by land and sea, with the forces of the party attacked.’

None the less, the policy of accepting these unlimited obligations was dead. The treaties and alliances signed after the Peace of Utrecht, embody the lessons of the contest, and are at once a turning-point of a great controversy and the solution of a great problem. Nor can their relevance upon this enquiry be doubted, if we compare the problems of Europe, as they then appeared to those in power, with the questions which now confront us.

We had struggled hard with a great military Power, and brought it low ; but the extent of our victory was still uncertain. We knew that her finances were in confusion ; that her workshops were deserted, and that her fields were untilled ; but we could not measure her capacity for restoring them. We knew her armies to be ill-disciplined, ill-fed and ill-equipped ; but we could not foretell how soon they would again be animated by their old warlike spirit. Finally, we had kept our rival out of the Low Countries ; but we did not know for how long.

Is not this an exact copy of the present state of Europe as French statesmen see it ? Does not their criticism of our policy narrow itself down to one main contention : that we are acting as though our victory over Germany had been complete and final, whereas it would be wiser to assume that it had only been partial ? Does not M. Briand’s argument about our common frontier with France and Belgium repeat the considerations which persuaded us to sign the Barrier Treaties ? And can we not, therefore, look upon this projected treaty with France as a direct lineal descendant of the leagues and alliances which we negotiated in the years following the Peace of Utrecht ?

If this be so, their testimony is decisive : in the Westminster Treaty of 1716 ; in the defensive alliance with Sweden of 1720 ; in the Triple and Quadruple Alliances of 1717 and 1718 ; and in the defensive alliance between ourselves, France and Prussia of

1725, we bound ourselves to assist the co-signatories with a specified number of troops and vessels, if ever they were attacked ; after which a clause was added, which goes to the heart of the question now before us : ' But if the nature of the war should require rather maritime succours, in whole or in part, the ally shall be obliged to furnish, *instead of the said land forces, so many ships-of-war as shall be equal in expense to the said number of men.*'

Nothing could be clearer : the teachings of the past and the present converge upon a single conclusion, our undertakings in war must be co-ordinated and not pressed independently.

How, then, can we apply these principles to the projected alliance with France, without running counter to the current opinion, that, in war, our entire resources are bound to be engaged? The question is not as paradoxical as it sounds. Experience shews that a continental alliance in itself involves us in unlimited commitments at sea ; so that the problem resolves itself into deciding what military forces we can promise without sapping the main source of our strength.

For this we have reliable and sufficient data. We know in the first place that from the beginning of 1916 our maritime resources could no longer meet the calls which were being made upon them ; and we know, in the second, that it was the unchecked expansion of our military forces which created the deficit. Now, at the beginning of 1915, we were maintaining 11 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions on the western front, and 1 infantry division in Egypt ; a year later we had 49 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions in overseas theatres. This, then, was the expansion which caused the breakdown. The difference between 10 and 50 infantry divisions is too great to make it possible to strike a mean between the two, and say that we can raise 30 divisions with safety, but no more. None the less we can set quite definite boundary posts to our capacity for raising armies for service abroad, and pledge our assistance accordingly.

It will be no small service to ourselves and our allies to do so. Should we ever be obliged to give effect to the treaty by arms, the French general staff will have been able to draw up a war plan upon a reliable estimate of the total forces which they will be able to employ. They will be free to exercise their own skill, and the valour of their troops, in repeating the battle of the

Marne and the defence of Verdun on other battlefields ; but they will have received a fair warning against embarking upon such reckless plans as lost France her best provinces and, later, caused her brave and long-suffering troops to mutiny.* Similarly, it will put it out of the power of our own general staff to devise plans for which our resources are not adapted. Finally, it will do something to correct a curious defect in our constitution. Is it not rather strange that, in a maritime State like our own, the head of the army department is styled the minister for *war*, whilst the president of the Board of Admiralty has no other rank than that of supreme head of the naval forces of Great Britain ; and, is it not stranger still, that their titles should be an accurate description of the duties which they actually perform ?

ARCHIBALD COLBECK

*I refer to the disaster at Craonne in 1917, when General Nivelle attacked the German lines after being informed that his plans had been communicated to the enemy by treachery. Marshal Pétain's name has been associated with the pacification of the French troops who subsequently mutinied.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

British History in the Nineteenth Century. By G. M. TREVELYAN.
Longmans, Green. 1922.

TO write a history of the Nineteenth Century is a most difficult task. It is impossible to give a verdict on an unfinished drama, and all that was vital in the Nineteenth Century is still alive and still in course of development. The final judgments which the historian, who is usually on the side of the gods against Cato, loves to deliver are impossible when nothing has been finally decided. Moreover, unless we are deceived by the greater mass of material which confronts us when we are dealing with recent events, no century in the world's history has been so crowded and so complex as that which ended with the death of Queen Victoria. The philosopher who likes to reduce the course of history to a single formula is baffled by the rapids, shoals and cross-currents through which the river of civilisation has lately pursued its devious course. It was a century of decaying creeds and of reviving faith, of democracy and of military despotism, of humanitarian liberalism and of fierce nationalism, of natural science and of romanticism, of unexampled peace and of unexampled preparations for war. It multiplied wealth and increased misery; it made a religion of progress and generated revolts against civilisation; it studied the beautiful and covered the earth with ugliness. Who can wonder if an historian who aspires to be more than an annalist and desires to give us an interpretation of his period can hardly see the wood for the trees? Even Mr. George Trevelyan, whose three volumes on the Italian Risorgimento have proved him to be a master of vivid and dramatic narrative, has found this subject beyond his arts of stage-management. He has given us something better than a handbook, but something rather less than an adequate portrait of a great nation at the height of its power and energy. The period is in fact too long and too full of events for one volume. Within the limits which he has accepted, the work could hardly have been better done.

It would be possible to regard the Nineteenth Century as a

stage, perhaps the final stage, in a long process of 'emancipation,' which began at the Italian Renaissance. First, the bonds were burst which fettered the human intellect and kept it in the custody of ecclesiastical tradition. The rediscovery of classical antiquity opened to the peoples of Europe a new world within, and, at the same time, the navigators revealed a new world beyond the seas, and the astronomers new worlds above. In this country, the process of emancipation proceeded almost without a break. Religious independence was followed by a successful attack on the prerogatives of the monarchy. Then the territorial oligarchy was struck down, during the first half of the period which we are now considering. Next, the commercial plutocracy was shorn of its power; and before the end of the century, the House of Commons had begun to decline in prestige and popularity. Traditions of every kind, which were only weakened by the Renaissance, the Reformation and the 'Enlightenment,' crumbled rapidly in the last century, and when it closed there was no universally recognised seat of authority anywhere. The individual was a law to himself.

Others will say that the salient feature of the age was the triumph of Democracy. If we consider our own country only, or the English-speaking nations only, this is true. It is not true of the world at large. Even in France, the rival type of government which has flourished under modern conditions—a military monarchy—prevailed against the 'ideas of 1789' for a time, and this time coincided with a restoration of France to her pride of place in Europe. During the greater part of the century, the predominance of land-power was in the hands of the three military monarchies of Central and Eastern Europe. The issue as between these two types of government has not been finally decided even by the Great War, and when Queen Victoria died Europe had certainly not made its choice in favour of popular government. In 1897 the German Emperor was still able to say that he was 'responsible to the Creator alone, without this awful responsibility even being in the slightest degree shared either 'by ministers or assemblies or people.'

It is also necessary to distinguish between three possible meanings of the word democracy, which has been used with almost ludicrous vagueness in popular language, especially in America. Democracy may mean a form of government, a form

of State, or a form of society. As a form of government it is absolutely unworkable, except in small city-states like the ancient Greek republics. Direct government by the citizens debating and voting in a mass could not even be thought of in a modern community. Representative government, which, as Mr. Trevelyan shows, was by no means accepted by all as the principle of the British constitution a hundred years ago, is not strictly democratic government. Parliament for a long time claimed a considerable independence of the constituencies, even expelling members who had been duly elected and admitting members who had been duly rejected. As soon as the representatives lost their independence and became little more than delegates, the House of Commons began to fall into contempt, and is now openly flouted, during industrial disputes, by highly organized sections of the electorate.

It has been said that universal suffrage heralds the death of representative government. It is also plain that the fiction of democratic government leads to various deceptions upon the people, and to mutual shifting of responsibility. The electors are not really allowed to choose their representatives; they have usually only the right of choosing between Tweedledum and Tweedledee, neither of whom would have been their own selection. The most important decisions on foreign policy are carefully kept from them, so that a nation which nominally enjoys democratic government may be hustled at a day's notice into a murderous war with another nation, against which the electors are not conscious of having any ground of quarrel whatever. The press in all democratic countries is an instrument for carefully misleading the people, who can only guess at the truth by comparing the statements of rival newspapers. Abraham Lincoln may have been right when he said that it is impossible to fool all the people all the time; but it is quite possible to fool the majority of the people for a considerable time, and this is enough for practical purposes. Until the end of the Nineteenth Century the government of this country was not even formally democratic, but middle class, with aristocratic elements. Now that it has become formally democratic, the masses show no enthusiasm for democracy, and the most 'advanced' section of political thought repudiates democracy in favour either of State Socialism, which would be an iron bureaucracy, or of class warfare.

But democracy may also be regarded as a form of State.

Whatever the form of government may be, the ultimate power may be in the hands of the majority of the adult population, who by a plebiscite or parliamentary election may get rid of rulers who do not satisfy them. Napoleon III ruled not by divine right but by an overwhelming popular vote in his favour, and in England the electors can reverse the policy of the Cabinet every few years by turning them out of office. Unquestionably it makes a great difference whether the government has a strong sovereign or a powerful army between itself and the popular will, or whether it has nothing at all to shelter it, and it makes a great difference whether the popular will is the will of the middle class or the will of the wage-earners.

The fall of the middle class may be dated from the Reform Bill of 1867, though it was of course a gradual process. All through the reign of Queen Victoria there was an approximation between the old aristocracy and the middle class. Middle class radicalism, which in the first half of the century was assumed to be part of the order of things, took a much milder form when that section of the nation came into power, and before 1900, if radicalism was still urban, conservatism had become suburban. Middle class liberalism for some time carried on its old feud against the established Church and the House of Lords. Bishop Selwyn, of Lichfield, one of the ablest prelates on the Bench, said in 1867 that he would not give seven years' purchase for his seat in the Upper House. But by degrees it became apparent that the life was passing out of these agitations. Dissent, which had been strongly political, began to decline, and in the last decade of the century, liberalism, as it had been understood while Gladstone was in his prime, showed ominous signs of weakness. The middle class had begun, not without reason, to tremble for its pockets, and was no longer able to dictate the policy of the country.

It is not fanciful to find characteristic differences in the mental outlook of an aristocracy, a bourgeoisie, and 'Labour'; and if these differences are admitted, we may expect to see them reflected in the public policy of the periods when these three classes successively directed the government of the country. The British aristocracy, as Mr. Trevelyan says, was the best aristocracy that has governed a great country since the days of the Roman Republic. In many ways these nobles and gentlemen resembled the senatorial families of ancient Rome. They were,

as a rule, cultivated men, with literary tastes and more than insular culture. They were patriotic, with a sense of the responsibilities laid on them by their position ; and they were trained in a fine tradition of political wisdom. Although the Hanoverian dynasty had unfortunately introduced the essentially German prejudice against business or trade as a career for a gentleman, our system of primogeniture and of the inheritance of titles prevented the nobility from ever becoming a caste. Younger sons and their families descended into the upper middle class, and new men were continually joining the ranks of the nobles. The common notion about an aristocracy, that they are highly honourable in money matters, but mulishly inaccessible to new ideas, is not borne out by experience. Punctilious integrity is by no means the strong point of the average aristocrat ; and on the other side, he is more open-minded and less hidebound by convention than the bourgeoisie.

In foreign policy, it may be contended that an oligarchy is more efficient than a democracy, less vacillating, more capable of taking long views, and certainly not more prone to aggression against other countries. The foreign policy of England under aristocratic rule was very successful. The solitary failure on a large scale, the loss of the American colonies, was mainly due to the corrupt influence of an obstinate king. But the true history of that unhappy event has not yet been written. Our historians have, almost without exception, done grave injustice to their own countrymen, who had a fairly good case against the revolted colonists. In dealing with rebellion and sedition during the first half of our period, the government showed firmness without cruelty. It was not yet possible for British subjects to fear that loyalty would bring ruin on themselves, or that the government would shrink from punishing treacherous murders and outrages.

The weakness of the aristocratic government was shown in its tolerance of a thousand administrative abuses. This cannot be altogether excused either by the preoccupation of the country with a long war, or by the suddenness of the industrial revolution. The need for internal reform was hardly recognised until the extension of the franchise gave a voice to the sufferers and brought a new type of men to the front. Even the army and navy were allowed to fall into gross inefficiency ; the machinery of the law was a scandal ; there was no proper police ; and local government

was thoroughly unsatisfactory. The first Reform Bill was followed by an energetic campaign against abuses, which occupied the greater part of Queen Victoria's reign.

Lecky's statement that no country was ever better governed than England between 1832 and 1867 is well known. It is hardly true of foreign polity. The Crimean War, into which the government was partly pushed by popular clamour, was a stupid blunder. Public opinion with Palmerston and Russell was right against the Court in befriending the cause of Italian unity; but the bullying and boasting of Palmerston did lasting mischief to the reputation of the country, and sowed the seeds of several dangerous antipathies. It was also at this time that our policy became, in the opinion of other nations, vacillating and unaccountable. The middle class had had no training in foreign affairs, and the fluctuations of public opinion had begun to exert a prejudicial effect on the Foreign Office. But in finance this period laid the foundation of that immense reserve of strength which filled the business community with just confidence until the insane recklessness of the present Cabinet brought us into a condition in which we are no longer able to help our friends or punish our enemies.

A middle class government is usually more pacific than either an aristocracy—which feels more acutely any loss of prestige—or a democracy, which is more easily carried away by passion, and which, moreover, goes to war with a fixed determination to lay the whole financial burden on accumulated capital. The long duration of the great peace was unparalleled in European history. During the 120 years before the battle of Waterloo this country had been at war for 69 years, at peace for 51. It must, however, be remembered that the Foreign Office has usually been an aristocratic preserve. Lord John Russell, Lord Derby (under Disraeli), Lord Salisbury and Lord Lansdowne have all shown the traditional capacity of their class, and steered the ship of State past several dangerous rocks. Disraeli is an exception to all rules. It is possible to condemn his foreign policy, but it was amazingly clever. Perhaps the English instinct is right, that the country is safest in the hands of a capable and straightforward gentleman, who tries to play no tricks, and has no axe of his own to grind.

We seldom ask ourselves why the world acquiesced with so little jealousy in the British Empire, and formed no coalitions

against it. That we were allowed without protest from other nations to annex Australia and New Zealand by running up our flag on their coasts, now seems utterly amazing. But there is an explanation, and it is worthy of attention. It was not merely that the value of colonies for settlement was not yet appreciated. The maritime ascendancy of Great Britain, with the prizes which went with it, was tolerated by the Continental Powers, on three well understood but unwritten conditions. The first was that we should maintain no army large enough to threaten with invasion even a second-class Continental Power. The separation of sea-power from land-power was an incalculable advantage to the world, and a great guarantee of peace. The British Empire, resting solely on the fleet, was no danger to any civilised State. It was the dread that this happy condition might be terminated by a German victory which more than any other cause led to the vast coalition against Germany in the late war. The Great War, none the less, has brought it to an end. We have sacrificed the naval position which preserved our own safety and the peace of the world outside Europe. The obvious motive of the Americans in claiming from us repayment of the money which we handed on to France, while making no claim against the French, is to make it impossible for us ever to recover the position which we have lost. This may be the most important result of the World War.

The second unwritten condition, in virtue of which our privileged position on the seas was unchallenged through the last century, was free trade. If Mr. Chamberlain's agitation in favour of protection had been successful, complaints against the privileged position of Great Britain outside Europe would soon have been heard. Although the other nations were not willing to imitate our free trade policy, they all profited by it, and would have lost in prosperity as well as in security if the command of the sea had passed into other hands.

The third condition was what we were accustomed to call our splendid isolation. We were not attacked, or even seriously threatened, as long as we were not suspected of having entered into any entangling alliances. It was worth while having no friends on the Continent, at the price of having no enemies. An alliance between the chief naval Power and a great military Power would have altered, and eventually did alter, the whole position. Our navy then at once became a formidable menace to one of the European groups.

Down to the end of the century there was very little talk of a German peril, though warnings had been uttered by Matthew Arnold and George Meredith, and very explicitly by Lord Acton. We were driven out of our splendid isolation not by fear of Germany, but by the persistent antagonism of France and Russia. We still suspected Russia of designs upon India, and the French pursued a policy of pin-pricks at every point where the two Powers came in contact. Lord Salisbury and other British ministers won great credit for settling outstanding differences, first with France and then with Russia. Their diplomacy was both conciliatory and judicious; but there cannot be much doubt that these two governments already foresaw a coming struggle with the Central Powers, and that the net was already being woven in which our Foreign Office and War Office were finally entangled by that most silent and astute of diplomatists, M. Paul Cambon. Lord Salisbury, however, had by no means given up the idea of an entente with Germany. It was only later, when evidence accumulated of the overweening arrogance and ambition of the German militarists, that our ministers were driven to the conclusion that no deal with that Power was possible. If Bismarck had been alive, he would almost certainly have stopped the programme of naval expansion until he had tried conclusions with his dangerous neighbours on the east and west. From 1871 till the fall of the great chancellor, the policy of Germany was pacific and at least ostensibly friendly to this country.

The chief failure of the period of middle class ascendancy was in Ireland. Lord Salisbury was in favour of 'twenty or thirty years of resolute government,' which would have been the policy of the aristocratic era. But there was no resolution among his contemporaries. Perhaps the most hopeful policy, next to that of 'resolute government,' would have been to give a free hand to Parnell, and let him rule the country as dictator. Parnell was no friend to England, but he was a statesman with whom it was possible to deal, as Cecil Rhodes recognised when he called him 'the most sensible man I have ever met.' But the irregularities of his private life gave his enemies a chance, and the Irish priests, true to their hateful policy of wrecking every attempt to settle the Irish question, were glad to overthrow the 'black Protestant' who seemed to have the problem in hand. Later

attempts to settle the question were far less hopeful, partly from the assistance given to the rebels by America, and partly from the rising influence of the working class, which dislikes what it calls coercion, and views with strange callousness the most atrocious crimes for which any political motive can be alleged. However, the failure of the Irish policy in the 'eighties must be set down very largely to our party system. There were, as was said at the time, 85 reasons why Gladstone turned Home Ruler—that being the number of the Nationalist members who could keep him in office or turn him out. It was clearly a case where the two English parties should have stood together, as they did later against Germany; but Ireland was not considered worth a coalition, and the party game went on.

The characteristics of democracy as a form of State were not fully manifested in the Nineteenth Century. The extension of the franchise was granted before the masses were ready for it, and for a considerable time they astonished their critics by their moderation. Although doctrinaire Socialism had formulated its theories of social revolution long before, the new voters did not at once begin to attack capital; they were content with a few measures for their benefit, and for the rest, accepted the middle class programme of legislation.

But the name democracy may be given not only to a form of government or a form of State; it is often, though less correctly, used for a form of society. The changes in this direction between the beginning and the end of the last century belong to social history; they are perhaps not less important than the political and constitutional changes which they accompanied. A study of English fiction, from Jane Austen to Mrs. Humphry Ward, is a pleasant and instructive way of realising the gradual democratising of society. At the opening of the century, the territorial magnate, with an inherited title, was a grandee who expected to be treated as such. The lesser squirearchy, though persons of importance on their own domains, claimed no equality with the great county families, unless they could boast of having been landed gentry for two or more centuries, in which case their pride knew no bounds. Commercial fortunes, however large, conferred but little immediate social advantage; it was said that it takes three generations to make a gentleman. The most rigid line in the social hierarchy was that which distinguished those who could

claim to be 'gentlemen' from those who could not. Those who were above the line had coats of arms recognised by the College of Heralds, and if they had to earn their living were restricted to certain avocations. A connection with retail trade would unfrock even an ancestral *armiger*. Some of the learned professions, especially the Bar and the Church, were not derogatory; the social position of the clergy, which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had been low, culminated about the time when Trollope immortalized them in his Barchester novels. The son of a county magnate could hardly be a solicitor, a surgeon, or a school-master.

These social grades were not forgotten in ordinary intercourse. Lord Chesterfield, not very long before the beginning of our period, held it to be the perfection of good manners to know how to behave to a superior, to an equal, and to an inferior. Dr. Johnson, he said, showed his ignorance of good breeding by treating everybody alike. He would have been astonished to hear that the lexicographer, in spite of his uncouth table manners, was the better gentleman of the two. Lord Byron's letters contain several examples of the insolence which was at that time thought natural to a man of his rank. The 'lower orders' were habitually treated with frigid disdain, and their 'pretensions' were a theme for laughter or indignation. Even the first twenty years of *Punch* (1841-1860) are full of jokes against servants and others who ape their 'betters.'

The movement towards social equality, which has not yet ended, is one of the best features of the Nineteenth Century. Pride of rank not only produced most offensive manners; it had shocking effects on moral conduct. The 'gentleman' thought himself bound to pay his gambling debts, but he had not much scruple about robbing his tradesmen. He would insult or even horsewhip a social inferior, and refuse to accept his challenge. He saw nothing dishonourable in attempting to seduce the daughters of the poor. Sir Timothy Shelley, a typical aristocrat, told his son, the poet, that he would provide for as many illegitimate children as he liked to have, but that he would never pardon a *mésalliance*. Those who fear that the abolition of class barriers may destroy that fine type, the English gentleman, sometimes forget how much that type needed—and still needs—purifying.

Family pride is one of the most curious features in social

history. Protests against it have always been common, from Juvenal's *Stemmata quid faciunt* ? to our own day. But human nature is too strong for reason. Napoleon, in some respects a very modern man, made no attempt to glorify his progenitors ; ' I am an ancestor,' he said. But he wished to found a family. In China, a man who distinguishes himself, ennobles his ancestors, which is much more reasonable than to ennoble his descendants ; for his grandparents may have had much to do with his success, while his grandchildren obviously can have nothing to do with it. The successful Englishman insists on having it both ways. His descendants are to be noble for all time, if they escape being extinguished by marrying into a sterile heiress-stock. But his ancestors are also glorified in the stout red volumes of the ' Peerage, Baronetage and Landed Gentry,' the most characteristic work of fiction in the English language. An Eton boy aptly translated Horace's *Crescentem sequitur cura pecuniam, maiorumque sitis*,—' Increase of money is followed by care and a thirst for ' ancestors.'

In its usual form, family pride rests on a very old physiological blunder. It was believed in antiquity that the child inherits his nature from his father, the mother being only the caretaker of the germ of life—*τροφὴς κύματος νεόσπορου*, as Aeschylus says. In consequence descents are reckoned chiefly through the male line, although, as everyone knows now, the contributions of the two parents to the make-up of their children are equal. It follows that the sixty or seventy thousand persons (the real number may be much greater) who, according to the Marquis de Ruigny, can trace their legitimate descent from King Edward III have as much or as little reason to be proud of their heredity as if they had the right to sign their name Plantagenet. Observation does not bear out the theory that the so-called old families have any intrinsic superiority. Only a few of them have features of what is called the Norman type, and it is not easy to see why Norman blood is better than Saxon. Their beauty, when they have it, may often be traced to some very un-aristocratic but eugenic love-match. And as regards fine manners, a public school and university education will often efface all traces of plebeian origin in a single generation.

Economic inequalities were not reduced in the Nineteenth Century ; social inequalities were far less obtrusive at the end

of it than at the beginning. But much still remains to be done in obliterating what remains of an irrational prejudice. A man of letters who crossed the Atlantic in the steamer about the end of our period was incensed and astonished at the insolence of the ship's officers and of the first-class passengers ; and others who have disguised themselves as day-labourers have reported the same thing. That these faults of manner are a social danger needs no argument. There is still a convention in England that a man who is doing a job for you is treated for the time as your hired servant ; the absence of this convention in America gives a series of shocks to the English visitor. But in this matter we are carrying on an overdue reform which made considerable progress in the Nineteenth Century.

Mr. Trevelyan, like all recent writers, lays great stress on what Arnold Toynbee was the first to call the Industrial Revolution. Earlier historians gave very little attention to a change which ushered in a new phase of civilisation, altering the conditions of living, and even the face of the globe, more profoundly in one century than they had been altered in the two thousand years that went before. Their interest was concentrated on the French Revolution, a noisy explosion in one corner of Europe, which generated such violent reactions that one may doubt whether it really expedited the changes which must have occurred without it. The Industrial Revolution was the creation of applied science. This new and decisive intervention of science in history gives a distinctive character to the Nineteenth Century, as it is destined to give a character to the twentieth. No province of human thought has been unaffected by it. The ' reaction against science,' of which Aliotta and others speak, is but a temporary backwash of a current which still gains strength. Man's control over nature has drawn fresh attention to nature's control over man. We conquer nature by obeying her, and we obey her by conquering her.

No nation, perhaps, has quite so glorious a record in scientific research and discovery as Great Britain. It is characteristic of our country that in pure science the greater part of the work was done by brilliant amateurs, not by university professors. They were men of broad training and wide outlook. They thought as men, while they worked as specialists. As workers, their method was the accumulation of facts, on which the trained intellect was

then allowed to play. Galton, for example, a typical Nineteenth Century savant, whose name may in the future be honoured almost as much as that of his cousin Charles Darwin, 'had far ' more mathematics and physics than nine biologists out of ten, ' and more biology than nineteen mathematicians out of twenty, ' and more acquaintance with diseases and anomalies than ' forty-nine out of fifty biologists and mathematicians together.' (Prof. Karl Pearson : ' Francis Galton, a Centenary Appreciation'). This type, rare in our day of over-specialisation, is especially characteristic of Victorian England.

But it is also characteristic of England that the first application of the new knowledge was to mechanical invention. From this point of view the Nineteenth Century begins soon after George III ascended the throne. From that time the transformation of England began. In the Middle Ages, and down to the middle of the Eighteenth Century, not only was the country sufficient for its own needs ; but each of the small districts into which it was divided up was also self-sufficient. The object of agriculture was not to extract the maximum of produce from each acre of land ; it was to feed the inhabitants of the parish or district. Village trades existed to supply the need of the parishioners for boots, clothing, harness and farm requisites. Then came a generation of 'improving landlords,' of whom Coke of Holkham was the most famous. They invested large sums in draining marshes, and introduced many improvements in the management of crops and of livestock. When these changes had once taken root, the uneconomic institution of common land was doomed. Enclosures were sanctioned by Parliament all over the country, and the new productiveness of the soil enabled our countrymen to stand the strain of the Napoleonic war. Arthur Young, the literary leader of English country life at this time, carried on a crusade against waste lands, though he protested that ' by ' nineteen out of twenty enclosure bills the poor are injured and ' most grossly.' Not only was there much land-grabbing by the adjacent landlords ; innumerable small rights, which had given the labourer a stake in the country and a definite status in his parish, were swept away. Some money was paid him as a compensation when the common passed into private ownership ; but he had seldom any opportunity of retrieving his lost position. On the other hand, the large farmer as well as the landlord became

prosperous. Cobbett complains that 'the English farmer has of late years become a totally different character. . . . He has a servant, sometimes in livery, to wait at his table; a painted lady for a wife; sons aping the young squires and lords; a house crammed up with sofas, pianos and all sorts of fooleries.' This was mainly the effect of war prices. As happened also during the Great War, much good pasture land was ploughed for corn, and the farmers were in trouble after the peace. During the whole of the war, the harvests were bad, and wheat was almost at famine prices.

It is surprising at first sight that just when the labourer was being victimised, and insufficiently fed, the population took a sudden bound forward. This was the effect partly of the new factories, which could absorb large numbers of 'hands,' and partly of the disastrous Speenhamland Act, which introduced the practice of supplementing wages out of the rates. Each poor and industrious person was to receive from the parish enough to make up his wages to three shillings a week for himself, with eighteen pence for every other member of his family. These amounts were to be raised if the price of the loaf became higher. Thus the labourer was pauperised; the small independent man was crushed by the rates, and a direct premium was offered to large families. Until this time, the population had been kept down not only by the very high infant mortality, but by the difficulty of finding cottages, which had made late marriage the rule among the poor. Now, new cottages, or rather hovels, were erected everywhere, and with the loss of hope and self-respect every motive for prudence disappeared. The result of the Speenhamland Act shows, among other things, how easily the growth of population may be regulated by legislation.

The new industry had even greater results in the towns. The principle of mass-production and open competition in the markets of the world was as new as that of the most profitable methods in agriculture. Herbert Spencer speaks of the change as from status to contract, and this phrase sums up the most important aspect of the industrial revolution. The new workman was uprooted from the soil on which his forefathers had worked—*déraciné*, as a French novelist says—and condemned to scramble in an economic chaos where every trader strove to buy cheap and sell dear, hiring his labour on whatever terms he could secure it.

Thus began the deep cleavage between classes which had hitherto lived together on fairly amicable terms.

It must not however be supposed that in the days of 'status' there was no submerged class. The Eighteenth Century mob had been periodically dangerous, and large numbers of men were permanently outlaws, ending on the gallows a short but exciting career of poaching and highway robbery. The difference now was that honest labourers were impelled into crime and revolt by the hardships of their lot.

The alliance of business with science was facilitated by the co-operation of the coal and iron industries. The discovery of coal-smelting is one of the most important in the history of civilisation. The Mediterranean countries had been grievously injured by the destruction of their forests to feed furnaces; the deterioration of the soil and climate thus caused may have had much to do with the collapse of the classical civilisation. In the middle of the Eighteenth Century the English woods had nearly given out, and but for the discovery of smelting by coal our iron trade would have left our shores. From that time, those parts of Great Britain where coal and iron are found near together became, after London, the chief centres of population. The new processes in cotton and wool were organized by men who rose from the ranks—a hard-bitten type of North-country workmen, rough and capable, and none too gentle to their 'hands.' In the second generation the mill-owner was usually a Radical and a Dissenter, the disciple of Bright and Cobden. The miserable conditions of labour in mine and factory during the early part of the century have often been described. The labourers were forbidden by statute (in 1799) to combine for mutual protection. They had no parliamentary votes. The towns which were built to house them were 'barracks for cheap labour—not homes 'for citizens.' The public house and Little Bethel were their chief consolations; and if the former had a merely degrading influence, the dissenting chapel helped to train several of the Labour leaders of the next generation. The need for educating the workmen was soon recognised by some of the employers themselves, but the cause of education was already handicapped by the unhappy squabbles between Church and Dissent. The State was very slow to take up what is now generally considered one of its chief duties: the supervision of the training of the young.

There is however some reason to think that the picture of industrial conditions between 1800 and 1850 is painted too black by the social historians of our generation: Mr. Trevelyan reminds us that the mechanics and engineers were able to make a good position for themselves, and formed a working-class aristocracy, intelligent and ambitious. But a more favourable impression of the state of the country as a whole may be drawn from the writings of competent foreign judges who visited England, such as Louis Simond, a highly intelligent French-American who travelled over all parts of the country during the Napoleonic war, and Emerson, who paid a fairly long visit to England in the year 1847, during what are sometimes called 'the Hungry Forties.'

Interest in Simond's book, which had been almost forgotten, was revived by the Great War; many then turned to an impartial record of the condition of England during the similar ordeal which our countrymen underwent and survived more than a hundred years ago. Simond was especially interested in questions of work and wages; he gives us facts and figures as well as impressions. His picture shows a widely diffused well-being and comfort; he mentions particularly the large wages paid to certain kinds of skilled labour. Emerson was not an economist, but he was a shrewd observer. It is surprising to compare his almost unmeasured panegyric upon England as he saw it with the vehement indignation and pessimism of Carlyle, or with the ingenious and erudite partisanship of the Hammonds, whose books have been received as a fair picture of the wrongs of the working man in the first half of the century. Emerson found the English of all classes a big, fleshy race, distinguished by robust health and superabundant energy.

'The English, (he says), have great vigour of body and endurance. Other countrymen look slight and undersized beside them, and invalids. They are bigger men than the Americans. I suppose a hundred English taken at random out of the street would weigh a fourth more than so many Americans. Yet, I am told, the skeleton is not larger. They are round, ruddy and handsome; at least, the whole bust is well formed, and there is a tendency to stout and powerful frames. I remarked the stoutness on my first landing at Liverpool: porter, drayman, coachman, guard—what substantial, grandfatherly figures, with costume and manners to suit. Beef, mutton, wheat-bread, and malt-liquors, are universal among the first-class labourers. Good feeding is a chief point of national pride among the vulgar, and in their caricatures they represent the Frenchman as a poor, starved body.'

These testimonies are the more valuable because after a visit to Manchester he predicts that the kind of labour which he saw in the mills cannot fail to injure the physique and the mental energy even of the finest race in the world, and this our countrymen seemed to him to be. These impressions of England, at a time when we are invited to believe that the population consisted of plutocrats and paupers, should be given their due weight. The history of the industrial revolution, as written by Socialists, is very misleading, even when the facts are selected from trustworthy material.

The industrial revolution decided for a long time to come the rivalry between the West and the East. The tide began to turn in favour of the European at the end of the Fifteenth Century ; but the conquest of nearly the whole world except China and Japan by the white races was the work of the Nineteenth. The uprooting of the masses from the soil which had supported them, and no more than supported them, in numbers which could not be permitted to increase, led to a rapid augmentation in the population which went beyond what even the new industries could absorb. The second quarter of the century was the great time of emigration to the new countries. With our usual good fortune, we were able to add a white Australia and New Zealand to the English-speaking world. Then followed the race for new markets in lands unsuited for colonisation, and competitive land-grabbing by the great European Powers. The so-called yellow races escaped the fate which overtook the rest of the habitable world, and the swarming period of Europe is perhaps coming to an end. But the Nineteenth Century has set its mark very deeply on the distribution of population and on the destinies of lands which have a great history before them, such as Canada, Australasia and the Argentine.

It is not yet certain whether the new era of human civilisation which was launched in the reign of George III will be a long one, or whether it will be broken up by internal disruption. The Great War shook European society to its foundations, but also revealed the tremendous strength of the social order in the most highly industrialised nations. Few either of its friends or its enemies could have predicted that it would stand such a strain. There can be no question but that the confident faith which inspired the pioneers of industrial expansion no longer exists. The

modern business man of the last century was the product of that peculiar Puritan asceticism which preached the gospel of work and the glory of productiveness. This conception of a God-fearing life is not extinct in America, but has few votaries left in England. We even assume that the men who built up our amazing business prosperity must have been 'materialists' and 'individualists'; so little can we understand their motives and ideals. Without their faith, it is not likely that we shall continue their work with the same energy.

At the very time when industrialism was achieving its greatest triumphs, Socialism was formulating its creed under the guidance of Karl Marx. This disciple of Hegel was content to sum up a most complex problem under a single formula; he was an evolutionist, but believed that evolution had only one more step to take. He and his theories will, it is to be hoped, be buried under the ashes of the Russian holocaust, for which he must be held largely responsible. But the indictment against industrialism still remains, and many think that the verdict must be one of condemnation.

Put shortly, the charge is that the Nineteenth Century solved triumphantly the problem of production, but failed completely to solve the problem of distribution. Carlyle denounced the monstrous folly of a system which suspended the manufacture of shirts on the ground of over-production, and turned the shirt-maker out of employment, when there were thousands of bare backs wanting shirts. The chaotic working of capitalism, with its alternations of good and bad trade, is the cause of great misery. It is also impossible to justify the way in which rewards are distributed. The big prizes are far too big, and they go to the wrong people. A manufacturer of cheap cigarettes, or of cotton thread, may be a public benefactor; but is that a reason for giving him the wages of fifteen hundred agricultural labourers? And yet these are examples of the most respectable among the large fortunes. Many millionaires have rendered no public service whatever. They or their ancestors have bought land under which, as was afterwards discovered, lies a seam of coal. They have been allowed to sell the coal as if it were a crop, though the mineral wealth of the country is capital, not profit, and might fairly be regarded as national capital. Others have seen their fields increase fifty-fold in value by the expansion of some large

town, which they have done nothing to promote. Others have become great capitalists by outwitting and frequently by robbing other capitalists. It would be difficult to name any large fortune which has really been earned. The bloated income of the successful barrister is simply a measure of the incompetence of our tribunals. In a case heard before a first-rate judge, without a jury, it often makes but little difference what counsel represents the litigants. The heavy fees of an operating surgeon are a measure of the scarcity of operators in whom the public has complete confidence. The profits of an author are often in an inverse ratio to the solid value of his books.

It is this ludicrous miscarriage of justice in distribution which makes the strength of the Socialist movement. Before the end of the Nineteenth Century the malcontents had broken up into sections, each with its own nostrum. State-Socialism was the most logical ; but State-Socialism is incompatible with democracy. Anarchism is purely destructive ; and syndicalism, which points back to a revival of the trade-guilds of the Middle Ages, has hitherto produced nothing but thinly disguised civil war levied by federations of workmen against the community. At present, no solution of the problem has been arrived at except by confiscating a large percentage of every fortune, no matter how acquired, in supertaxes and death-duties.

Many think that as equitable distribution is the problem which the last century left to its successor, so the success or failure of the Twentieth Century will be judged by the manner in which it deals with this task. The difficulties which baffled our fathers and grandfathers are enormous. Capitalism is a natural growth. A living body cannot be taken to pieces and put together again like a watch, and the more civilised a nation is, the more dangerous are any attempts at drastic amateur surgery. We have especially to consider that the driving force which keeps civilisation in being is supplied by a variety of incentives to labour. Though there are some who enjoy work, and others who work from sheer habit, and others who work from a stern sense of duty, the large majority need other inducements, among which are acquisitiveness, ambition, the desire to make life easier and pleasanter for their children, and the fear of poverty or want. If any of these incentives are withdrawn or seriously diminished, the output of work will be reduced, and its quality

impaired. A farmer who cannot sell his produce will raise only enough for his own needs. 'I would have taken the Bolshevik 'paper,' said a Russian farmer, 'if my cows could have eaten it.' The Socialists, in spite of their protests to the contrary, have never met this difficulty. Under a system of State-ownership, either the work would be much less efficient than it is now, or new incentives would have to be applied; and the new incentives could only be those of the slave-driver. The objection has never been stated better than in an answer of the Emperor Tiberius to a socialistic proposal, as recorded by Tacitus: '*Languescet alioquin industria, intendetur socordia, si nullus ex se metus aut spes; et securi omnes aliena subsidia expectabunt, sibi ignavi, nobis graves.*' This riddle of the Sphinx has not yet been solved.

But perhaps there is another task, of even greater importance, which the Nineteenth Century has left to us. The boasted progress of that age was almost exclusively environmental. Bad institutions, it was thought, were responsible for human degradation. 'Man is born free, and is everywhere in chains.' Take off the chains, and the innate goodness of human nature will set mankind on the path which leads to 'unimagined 'perfection.' This was the inspiring creed of the French Revolution and of the generations which followed it. This was the conviction of Robert Owen, of the famous New Lanark Mills. 'The character of man is formed for him, and not by him,' he said. Environment makes character. This has been the inspiration of the newer Christian Socialism, which found expression in 'settlements' and 'clubs,' and in active support of Labour politicians. For writers like Victor Hugo, the individual is always innocent, society always the culprit.

The unpopularity of Darwin and the new biology was partly due to a half-instinctive feeling that the doctrines of evolution and heredity undermined this theory of progress. At a time when legislators and social reformers and moralists were devoting all their energies to improving environment, it was disconcerting to be told that science endorses the old proverb that you cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. Biology is to this day an unpopular science; in sociology Darwin has not yet come into his own. And yet if the organization of economic and social life is to be taken in hand in earnest, the two sides of the problem—nature and nurture—must both receive due attention. It is

utterly impossible to reduce the chaos of competition to order while both the quantity and the quality of the population who are to be organized are left to chance. The effects of neglect are at least as apparent and as disastrous on this side as on the side of distribution. It cannot be long before honest Socialists recognise this, and we may hope that they will then cease to support the purely reactionary and obscurantist opposition which the Roman Church offers to the application of biology to social reform. Natural science, in which the Victorian English shed new lustre on their country, is the one genuinely progressive subject of human effort. It must in the future determine the principles of legislation, as it has already revolutionised the methods of production and the life of the people.

The 'Century of Hope,' the *saeculum mirabile*, was followed by a cataclysm in which its material accumulations were submerged. Its intellectual and spiritual achievements remain ; and now that fierce competitive nationalism has ended in universal exhaustion and impoverishment, there is hope that the true lesson of these achievements may be learned by a recognition of the spiritual as well as the economic solidarity of the civilised world. England will live in history as the last and greatest of the world empires resting on a small territorial base. World-power in the future will be with the large countries, and especially with the United States. But our dominions beyond the seas will grow in importance ; and if we are less mixed up than formerly in our neighbours' quarrels, we shall have more leisure to attend to the working out of our own destiny. The peculiar advantages which made our little island the leader of civilisation and our institutions the model for all other nations will no longer be ours. In this sense the Nineteenth Century will be counted by historians the climax of British power and prestige. But there are other triumphs, of a still nobler kind, in which we may show ourselves worthy of our glorious past. The quality of our posterity should be our chief consideration. 'Keep the young generations in hail, and bequeath them no tumbled house.'

W. R. INGE

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT.

1. **English Prisons To-day.** Report of the Prison System Enquiry Committee. Edited by STEPHEN HOBHOUSE and A. FENNER BROCKWAY. Longmans, Green. 1922.
2. **English Prisons under Local Government.** By SIDNEY & BEATRICE WEBB. Longmans, Green. 1922.

IN January 1919 a number of earnest seekers after the truth, members of the 'Labour Research Department,' formed themselves into a Prison System Enquiry Committee with the object of studying the working of the English prison system. Sir Sydney Olivier was chairman; the two secretaries, Mr. Stephen Hobhouse and Mr. A. Fenner Brockway, had themselves had experience of imprisonment as 'conscientious objectors' under the Military Service Acts.

Enquiries were made of a large number of persons, including 50 prison officials and 290 ex-prisoners, and all recent publications on the subject appear to have been very carefully examined. The result is 'English Prisons To-Day,' a book of 728 closely printed pages, crammed with facts relating to every point of the present prison system. Great praise is due to the editors for the way in which the facts have been put together and presented to the public in a form which is by no means so ponderous as the size and character of the book would suggest. It weighs only a little more than 2lbs. and though it is probable that few persons will have the perseverance to read through all these closely printed pages, the material accumulated by the investigators has been arranged in a convenient way and will undoubtedly form an invaluable mine of information for all who take an active interest in the subject.

The conclusions arrived at are, as might easily have been anticipated from the origin and character of the inquiry, an unqualified condemnation of the existing system in almost every particular. The Committee appears to have made an honest attempt to be impartial. Questionnaires were apparently distributed broadcast to persons having a knowledge of prison life, whatever their views on the subject might be supposed to be.

and the editors print replies from some prison officials which express views entirely out of harmony with those generally represented on the Committee ; but it was inevitable that the 'evidence' obtained by the Committee's enquiry should be somewhat one-sided.

Many of the prison officials to whom inquiries were addressed resented being asked questions by an unofficial and irresponsible body relating to the internal administration of the institutions with which they were officially concerned, and the Prison Commissioners in a circular addressed to the prisons on the 13th May, 1920, intimated that they deprecated such a method of seeking information from the subordinate officials of a public department as strongly as many of the officials themselves did. Apart from the Prison Commissioners' circular, it is obvious that the replies received from prison officials, and even more those from ex-prisoners, would come more freely from persons hostile to the present prison system than those who, on the whole, were fairly well satisfied with it. It is the grumblers who are always most anxious to make their opinions known. Moreover, the 'evidence' on which the Committee relies is clearly not evidence in any strict sense ; it was not subject to cross-examination, and no steps were taken to test the accuracy of the statements of fact made to the Committee. Complaints against individuals received from ex-prisoners are presented to the public in this volume for what they are worth, without any opportunity being given to the officials whose conduct is impugned to offer any defence. Further, a large proportion of the 'evidence' from ex-prisoners comes from 'conscientious objectors' imprisoned during the war, who clearly do not represent any large or constant element of the prison population.

Even with regard to others, the average rather illiterate and inarticulate occupant of a prison-cell is not fairly represented by the ex-prisoner who airs his views with regard to prison administration in a volume of reminiscences, the columns of a newspaper, or the report of the present Committee. Complaint, for example, is made that prisoners are not provided with more facilities than the present rules allow 'to help forward their studies and to satisfy their desire for self-expression,' and reference is made on page 162 of the report to the hard case of a prisoner who wished to devote himself to studying the text of

the Greek Testament, but could not obtain a copy until some of his friends had exercised pressure on the Prison Commissioners to let him receive one from them. The supply of books for the purpose of study appears to have been greatly improved since that time, and no doubt it is right that, as prisoners for a long time past have been regularly supplied with books, all reasonable means should be taken to supply books that are suited for their various capacities. But it is not fair to expect a prison library to be ready to supply prisoners with Greek Testaments, and we cannot but smile at the comment that follows this particular prisoner's complaint: 'If the writer had been the average prisoner' he would have had to go without his Greek Testament.

Again, throughout the chapter on 'Education' there is a total failure to appreciate the attitude of 'the average prisoner' towards 'self-culture,' and the blessings of education. In further illustration of this point we may note that after deploring the ugly appearance of most prison buildings the report quotes with approval a Dr. Healy as saying: 'No better illustration of the 'childishness of our efforts to ameliorate criminalistic conditions' can be found than the planning of buildings which does not first 'and foremost take into account the conditions and possibilities 'of mental life.'

Still, when all allowances are made, it cannot be denied that the Report makes out an extremely strong case for condemning the present system root and branch, *provided that the point of view from which the Committee regard it is accepted as reasonable*. That view, expressed or implied throughout the pages of the Report, is that the deterrent element ought to be entirely eliminated from prison life, and the efforts of prison administration directed solely to what—for want of a better word—may be called the reformation of offenders, but which might, as the Committee suggest, be best described as the building-up of character. Much has been done and is being done to this end, especially as regards young offenders on the one hand and habitual criminals on the other, as the Committee itself admits; but it cannot be pretended that as the prisons now are, the reformation of their inmates is the main feature of the system. This is mostly left to Borstal institutions and the special prison at Parkhurst, Isle of Wight, for men under sentence of preventive detention.

In his note at the end of the Report Sir Sydney Olivier writes that in our prisons 'we put away men for our own convenience, and, for the sake of financial economy, control them by mechanical methods which not only deteriorate their own characters and dissipate their inheritance in humanity, but in the majority of cases ensure that if we release them, we shall have to put them away again, and continue the process of their destruction till nothing but animal life can be said to remain to them.' This is a startling statement, and unfortunately the author does not give us the evidence on which it is based. He further asks 'what right have we, when we take these men and women and destroy them (in nine cases out of ten because we cannot forgive injuries, and consistently regard the precepts of Christ as absurd), to refuse to spend what is necessary to mitigate as far as we can our part in that destruction?'

In order to arrive at a right resolution he says 'diagnosis of each particular case to be dealt with ought therefore to begin at the prison gates.' He recognises that a very much more liberal scale of expenditure than has hitherto been found necessary will have to be adopted if we are even to begin to take away the reproach to which our prisons at present subject us. The language used in the rest of the Report is less highly coloured, and an attempt has evidently been made to maintain a sober and moderate point of view. But when we find that the recommendations made by the Committee would involve the closing of almost all our prisons, and the construction of new ones of a very much more costly character, an immense increase of the staff and such an increase in the scale of pay as may be necessary to secure a higher moral and intellectual standard among prison officers, we feel that even to approximate to the ideal prison system set before us would involve an expense which, at all events at the present time, it would be altogether impossible to contemplate. Are we then to submit ourselves to the painful conclusion that our prisons are a grave disgrace to civilisation, that crime exists only because we have not taken the proper measures for suppressing it, and that in the administration of the criminal law we have shown the grossest injustice to the weaker members of the community? Or may we not rather question the soundness of the theories which lead to such a conclusion?

It is the last question that first needs attention, and in order

to consider it, it is necessary to go to the root of the matter and ask what legal punishment is, and how we can justify the punishment of crime at all.

The word 'crime' is here used as meaning everything the law has forbidden us to do, whether it be murder or merely riding a bicycle on a footpath. The gulf between the one offence and the other is immense, but no line can be drawn at which offences against the law cease to be criminal in the ordinary use of the word, and come to be merely contraventions of laws passed for the public utility. It is to be remembered that the acts for which society has imposed a legal penalty are by no means necessarily those which call for the severest moral censure. Some of the men sent to prison are in reality of a higher moral standard than a considerable proportion of those who are left at liberty. Mere selfishness may attain such proportions as to be more detestable a vice than any of the crimes which fill the prisons. The man who wastes his patrimony wholly on his own pleasures and at his death leaves a family totally unprovided for, or a man who could save a child from drowning and refrains from doing so from fear of spoiling his clothes, has shown himself to be a worse scoundrel than the majority of those who go to prison, but the law does not touch these forms of turpitude.

On the other hand, political assassination is one of the very gravest of crimes, because it is one that is most dangerous to the community at large; but from any ethical point of view the man who commits murder from a sincere conviction that his victim was leading the nation astray and was using his influence and authority to injure its true interests, is on a far higher level than the murderer who acts from passion or for the sake of plunder; he may, indeed, stand on a higher moral level than most of us. But our courts rightly refuse to recognise that a 'political' motive extenuates an offence against the law, and a political assassin who firmly believes he has been acting from motives of pure patriotism is rightly punished at least as severely as a common murderer, prompted by personal malice or desire for gain. This view happily commands universal assent in England, except from the assassins themselves and their political sympathisers.

It follows from this that the penalties which contraventions of the law entail do not necessarily involve any grave moral censure on the offenders. They are justified by their efficacy in

preventing the commission of acts which the law in the public interest has thought it necessary to prohibit.

In addition, the human desire for retribution ought not to be entirely ignored. There are certain offences that excite public resentment, such as outrages on women or children, vitriol-throwing, or widespread frauds which bring ruin to poor people. It is for the public interest that resentment of such crimes should be encouraged, and no wise judge in passing sentence on an offender will altogether disregard the retributive element in punishment. But no sound theory of legal punishment can be formed except on the view that its main object is to prevent the repetition of the offence ; that is to say, the State must punish criminals for the purpose of enforcing its laws. Unless society is entitled to enforce the laws it makes, it is not entitled to make them ; but society cannot do this except by punishing law-breakers. In other words, the punishment imposed on offenders is for the interest of the nation, not for the benefit of the law-breakers.

Legal punishment is an essential element of civilisation, and it becomes increasingly essential as the scope of legislation widens, and we are more and more required to do for the general good things which are of no direct benefit to ourselves but a mere vexation and annoyance, and to refrain from doing things which, from the moral point of view, are in themselves entirely unobjectionable. Socialists are more deeply concerned in maintaining the supremacy of the law than others are, in so far as they are desirous of expanding its scope. If the machinery established by long generations to enforce the law were to become wholly inoperative, and Englishmen were left to rule their conduct by ethical considerations alone, it is probable there would not be a large number of the population who would murder their own relations in order to secure an inheritance ; but there would be undoubtedly a larger proportion who would forge a will for the same purpose, if they had the ability to do so with a reasonable prospect of success. When one comes to some of the minor forms of dishonesty, such as evading the income tax collector, or travelling on the railway without paying the fare, or obtaining an unemployment dole by fraud, the proportion of persons who would commit such offences, were it not for the fear of the law, would be considerable.

Lastly, where the law enjoins us to do something which is

troublesome and of no good to ourselves, and possibly (as happens in some cases) of no good, so far as we can see, to anyone else, the number of persons who are only made to comply with the law through fear of the results which disobedience to it entails is very large. It is probable that a large proportion or even the majority of parents in this country would prefer to keep their children at home on occasions when they want their services, rather than send them regularly to school. And how many of us are there who would take out a licence for a dog or a male servant, or send notice of an infectious disease to the proper authority, or register a death, or comply with the regulations for the registration of motor cars, if it were not for fear of the law? This fear of the law which makes us refrain from doing what we want to do, and do things which we do not believe to be worth doing, is only one of the results which legal punishment aims at producing, but it is an important one. There is no such thing as the enforcement of law, whether it be the law against murder or the law for the registration of motor cars, except by the punishment of those who contravene it.

There are four different ways in which punishment can have effect for this purpose; that is to say there are four ways in which punishment may lessen the amount of crime.

First, a criminal may be prevented from repeating his crime by keeping him under restraint, i.e., by passing a long sentence of imprisonment, or penal servitude, or preventive detention. Short of the death penalty, long imprisonment is the only means by which a certain result can be obtained from any punishment the law can inflict. We know that so long as a man is in prison he cannot repeat the offence of which he has been convicted, but we cannot predict for certain anything else about the effect of a sentence of imprisonment in any individual case. Secondly, the punishment may deter the offender from repeating his offence. Thirdly, it may deter others from committing similar offences. Fourthly, it may so reform the offender as to make him anxious not to repeat his offence.

Unquestionably the last method of preventing crime is the most attractive and most humane in the narrower sense of the word, and it is the only one which some of our penal reformers keep in view; but on the other hand, it is the most difficult and uncertain to apply in practice. Those who have had the most

experience in attempting to reform persons of vicious, criminal, or anti-social tendencies, with whom they have been forced into contact, will appreciate the difficulties which beset the prison officials in attempting such a task. It has to be remembered that the prison official has to deal not with persons who wish to mend their lives and are anxious to avail themselves of any assistance that may be given to them to do so, but with persons who, for the most part, have no wish to be better than they are, who resent being sent to prison at all, and look upon imprisonment merely as an unpleasant incident in their lives, which they have to get through as best they can. For them a 'reformatory' process, to begin, as Sir Sydney Olivier suggests, with a 'diagnosis' of each particular case' at the prison gates, would be apt to engender a spirit of rebellion of which the authors of the Report do not appear to have taken much account.

Further than this, it will appear from an examination of the offenders convicted by our courts of law that it is only a very small proportion of them for whom any punishment that is of a purely reformatory character would be in the least appropriate.

Setting aside death and corporal punishment, which are only applicable in a small number of cases, fines and imprisonment (including penal servitude and preventive detention) are the only punishments with which offences against the law can be visited. Fining is, in this country, far more common than imprisonment. Of 532,454 persons convicted in 1920, 495,585 were fined, and only 29,565 were sentenced to imprisonment. Of 495,585 who were fined, over 97 per cent. paid their fines. Of course, of the total number fined in any given year, some will pay their fines the following year, and on the other hand some of those sent to prison will have been fined in the previous year. In some cases, no doubt, the fine might have been levied by distraining on the offender's goods, but this method is not practicable in the majority of cases and is not, in fact, very often resorted to. It might again be possible in a considerable number of cases where distraint is impracticable, to recover the fine by attaching the offender's wages or otherwise making it a charge on his income, if he has any fixed income. This method, however, is not at present authorised by law, and in actual practice it may fairly be said that imprisonment is the only remedy against law-breakers who have been fined and are unable or unwilling to pay

their fines. In 1920 only 13,404 defaulters were committed to prison. It follows therefore that a number of convicted offenders, approaching half a million, were induced to pay their fines by the deterrent effect on them of the imprisonment imposed on others who were unable or unwilling to do so. A small proportion of the 13,404 who were sent to prison paid their fines after they had been received in prison. It cannot be denied that these figures, as they stand, demonstrate that imprisonment is at least fairly effective for enforcing the payment of fines and so maintaining the supremacy of the law over by far the largest class of law-breakers.

Of course there can be no question of 'reformation' in the case of offenders of this class; men who have been convicted only of the minor offences which are properly punishable by a fine, stand in no more need of reformation than the rest of the population, and, if they were in need of it, the term of three months' imprisonment which is, generally speaking, the maximum term that can be imposed in default of a fine is obviously not long enough under any possible system to effect any real and permanent change in a man's character. If he was inclined to break the law before, a few weeks in prison, whatever educational treatment he may there receive, will not make him less inclined to do so, unless the imprisonment has been sufficiently disagreeable to make him anxious to avoid incurring it again.

If for any reason imprisonment were to lose its terror for the more respectable members of the community; if it were no disgrace to be in prison and prisoners were regarded merely as objects for pity, as the Committee whose Report we are considering would wish them to be regarded; if imprisonment were deprived of the many humiliating incidents which it now involves, how much chance would there be of any of the fines imposed for the minor offences being paid? A certain proportion of them might be recovered by distress, but as we said above, the proportion would be but small. Furthermore, what increase in the total number of offenders against the law should we have to anticipate? The loss to the revenue of the fines at present paid and the cost of providing proper accommodation for the influx of prisoners committed in default of payment of a fine, formidable as that might be, would be as nothing compared with the other results that might ensue from a serious lessening of that fear of

imprisonment on which a great part of our social legislation must in the long run depend for its success.

The possible consequences of robbing imprisonment of the terror it now inspires do not appear to have occurred to the minds of the authors of this Report. Throughout the Report runs the assumption that the object of imprisonment should be nothing but the education, elevation and reformation of the prisoner and that anything that stands in the way of the achievement of this object is *ipso facto* condemned. Adults, according to this Report, are to be given instruction in prison by teachers from whom, of course, higher qualifications would be required than are necessary for persons who have merely to teach non-criminal children in public elementary schools. And in every other aspect of prison administration the aim to be kept in view is the benefit of the criminal at the cost of the tax-payer.

That the danger which may arise from lessening the deterrent effect of imprisonment is a real one there are figures to show. As a result of the recommendations made by the Prisons Committee of 1895 and of the Prison Act of 1898, which was founded on their report, prison discipline was mitigated in some important particulars at the end of last century. We do not suggest that these reforms were uncalled for, or that the result of introducing them was on the whole anything but beneficial, but there was one aspect which deserves more attention than 'penal reformers' have been inclined to give it. Before 1901 the proportion of persons who went to prison in default of paying their fines steadily declined from 18.9 per cent. in 1893 to 14.7 per cent. in 1900. This decline is easily explained by the increasing number of offences that might be and are committed by well-to-do and respectable persons, for whom the payment of a fine would be far less burdensome than a term of imprisonment; offences against traffic regulations by bicyclists, which increased steadily from 2,719 in 1893 to 6,499 in 1900, are a notable example. But after 1900 the tendency was reversed and the proportion of persons who went to prison in default of a fine increased year by year from 14.73 per cent. in 1900 to 20.00 in 1909.

The actual numbers as given in the Judicial (Criminal) Statistics for 1909 are as follows :—

Year.	Persons sentenced to pay fines.	Persons imprisoned in default of payment of fines.	Percentage imprisoned in default of payment.
1893	422,369	79,836	18.90
1894	444,459	81,349	18.30
1895	433,595	74,703	16.84
1896	475,962	78,743	16.54
1897	501,520	78,521	15.65
1898	545,283	84,031	15.41
1899	563,378	83,855	14.88
1900	531,843	78,345	14.73
1901	548,292	86,536	15.78
1902	540,108	91,638	16.97
1903	551,232	103,412	18.76
1904	550,560	107,555	19.54
1905	535,208	106,361	19.87
1906	512,598	97,382	18.99
1907	498,401	92,379	18.54
1908	488,569	95,477	19.54
1909	460,015	92,699	20.00

No explanation of these figures has been offered except that the alleviation in the conditions of imprisonment effected at the end of last century diminished its deterrentcy with the result that persons who might by an effort have paid the fines imposed on them, were less and less inclined to do so and were more ready than was formerly the case to go to prison in default. This somewhat alarming result of a mitigation of prison discipline has, however, fortunately now ceased. The provision in the Criminal Justice Administration Act 1914, which requires courts of summary jurisdiction to allow time for payment of a fine in every case where there is no special cause to the contrary, has had a very marked effect in diminishing the number of persons committed in default of a fine, the figure for 1920 being, as we said, only 13,404 out of 495,585, or 2.7 per cent. It seems impossible to attribute this immense decrease to any cause but the Act of 1914,

and it would be difficult to point to any Act of Parliament, the effect of which on the administration of justice has been so immediate and so beneficial. If an offence may properly be punished by a pecuniary penalty, it is from every point of view desirable that it should be so punished instead of the offender being sent to prison. We may be fairly satisfied that this result is attained at the present time in all but a small proportion of the cases, but it can only be attained by maintaining the deterrent aspect of imprisonment and we may be sure that the figures given above would be very different if every prison were to be transformed in the manner advocated by many of the 'penal reformers' into a sort of moral hospital.

But apart from the cases where imprisonment is imposed in default of payment of a fine, and can have no effect except detergency, there are many others where any reformatory effect on the offender must be of small importance compared with the effect it has otherwise in preventing crime. Long sentences of penal servitude passed on men convicted of grave offences unquestionably have the effect of diminishing crime as a whole, and this, as above argued, is the main purpose which justifies the law in inflicting punishment on law-breakers. But long sentences diminish crime not so much by putting the individual offender under restraint or reforming him as by deterring others from committing similar offences. Fraudulent trustees or company directors, solicitors who rob their clients, men who kill their wives under severe provocation, are not likely, once they have been convicted, to have a chance of committing such an offence again. The sentences passed on such offenders are purely exemplary. These men are not necessarily worse than their neighbours; they may have only been exposed to greater temptations. Their sense of honesty may be as strong, their passions as much under control as those of the ordinary man who has never been subjected to circumstances conducive to any breach of the law, and to speak of any need for a rehabilitation of character in such cases savours of a somewhat Pharisaic view of crime. What has to be aimed at in such a case is, in the first place, that the punishment imposed may be such that it may furnish others with a powerful motive for resisting temptation in similar circumstances to crimes of a similar kind; and in the second place that it will at least not make the offender a worse man than he was before his conviction.

It is sometimes asserted, and in this Report it is assumed as an obvious truth, that imprisonment and penal servitude, as now carried out, do in fact have a deteriorating effect on the prisoner ; but no real evidence other than the opinions expressed by 'witnesses' is adduced to support such an assumption. It is often said of an habitual criminal, whose criminal record begins some time in the last century with a sentence of penal servitude, that it was the harshness of the sentence for a first offence that made him a criminal : it would be as fair to say of one who—as is now far more often the case—was treated with leniency on his first conviction, that it was owing to that leniency that he embarked on a criminal career. The one statement probably is just as often untrue as the other would be. However this may be, it can be affirmed at the present time with great confidence that of the offenders of the class last mentioned, i.e., the men who on their first conviction are sentenced to penal servitude because their offence is one of gravity, very few indeed after they have served their sentence come back to prison. If a sentence of penal servitude for a term of years does not make a man a confirmed criminal it is impossible to suppose—if he has previously been of good character—that imprisonment for a few weeks or a few months will do so. Until there is some evidence to the contrary, we may continue to believe that, whether a sentence of imprisonment (including penal servitude and preventive detention) does or ever can of itself have much effect in strengthening the average prisoner's moral fibre, it does not in fact, as at present carried out, have an opposite effect. Statements to the contrary are founded rather on what the speaker thinks probable than on what he knows from experience. In any case the value of such a sentence depends less on the effect it may have on the individual offender than on the effect it has on the community at large. The benefit a criminal may derive in prison must after all be of secondary importance : it is the benefit of the majority that penal systems aim at.

The opposite point of view seems to have been largely derived from America. In an appendix to the Report an account is given of various experiments made by penal reformers in America which are all based on the dictum laid down in an address to the Congress of the American Prison Association in 1919 :

' Unless a prison is curative and makes a man better, so that when

he goes out he will see things from a different standpoint, it has no more right to exist than a hospital which would maim and cripple its patients and send them out a greater burden on the community than when admitted.'

It is to be feared that the attempts made by American penal reformers in the direction suggested have been responsible for some rash and ill-considered proposals made by persons who would apply them to English prisons without considering the difference in the conditions prevailing in the two countries. America has to deal with an amount of serious crime which to us in England is nothing less than staggering. No figures are available for a complete and exact comparison, as there are no criminal statistics at all for most of the American States; but Mr. R. Fosdick in his 'American Police Systems' states for example that Chicago in 1916 with a population of 2,500,000 had 20 more murders than there were in the whole of England and Wales, and nearly 12 times as many as there were in the Metropolitan Police District, which has a population of three times that of Chicago. In 1919 there were 2,146 more burglaries in Chicago than in the Metropolitan Police District; and in 1918 for every robbery in the Metropolitan Police District there were 22 in Chicago. In all the larger American cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Los Angeles and St. Louis, for which any figures are published, the case appears to be much the same. All authorities agree in the conclusion that the bulk of serious crime in America is out of all comparison with that of this country. It would be very unfair to attribute this to a failure in the American prison system; for the experiments that have been made in penal reform are somewhat sporadic and for the most part have been originated too recently to have produced much effect as yet. All we can say is that no evidence has yet been produced to show that these much advertised reforms in penal methods have had any effect in reducing the bulk of crime for which America is so unfavourably distinguished as compared with our own country. Students of penology in America appear to be rather deploring an increase of crime instead of recording a decrease, and we are not aware of any figures that point to any different conclusion.

Be this as it may, it is clear that the persons responsible for prison administration in the United States are faced with a much larger mass of determined and habitual criminals than we have

here, and it is only to be expected that—in the hope of lessening the number—all sorts of experiments should be made at those prisons to which such criminals when convicted are committed. These are all under State control and are used for convicted prisoners sentenced for a long or (in some cases) an indeterminate period. No comparison can therefore be made between them and our local prisons, where no prisoner is kept for as much as two years, and the average term of detention is about five weeks, and which have also to serve for the detention of persons awaiting trial and not admitted to bail, as also for the detention of a certain number of debtors and some other miscellaneous unconvicted prisoners. It is rather the county jails of America that most nearly correspond to our local prisons. They are mostly managed by the sheriff or other county authority without any intervention by the State, and in this country we hear nothing of them or of any reformatory experiments carried on in them. At all events, we may be sure that the doctrine laid down at the Congress of the American Prison Association, that a prison must be nothing but a moral hospital for criminals, would not have been applied to a prison where a number of inmates are not criminals at all, and the average term of detention is only about five weeks. That the authors of the Report appear to think that it could be so applied is only one more instance of the ignorance or disregard of average human nature which is noticeable among so many of the adherents of Socialism. If criminality is a curable disease, it is a disease which takes inore than a few weeks or a few months to cure.

We do not wish to be understood as suggesting that the English prison system requires no improvement. There are unquestionably some improvements among those recommended by the Committee, and others not recommended by them, that are very desirable as soon as the country can afford the money for them. There are also some that can be effected, or are at the present time being effected, without additional expenditure of any serious amount. But reforms carried out in the spirit which animates the Report here reviewed, would not only involve an intolerable and altogether unjustifiable expenditure by the law-abiding majority on behalf of the very small minority of criminals to whom purely reformatory methods are applicable, but would actually prejudice the purpose which prisons are now serving

and which is finally the purpose they can best serve. Prisons are maintained in order to enforce the law which Parliament has enacted. If society is justified in enacting laws for the common good, it is justified in enforcing those laws by punishing persons who break them. Whether this is for the good of the offender or not is a minor matter, so long as the punishment conduces to the diminution of criminality.

Before quitting the subject of 'English Prisons To-day,' reference should be made to its companion volume, 'English Prisons under Local Government,' also published under the auspices of the 'Prison System Enquiry Committee.' The greater part of this consists of a history of English prison administration up to 1877 by Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb. This is written with all the care, lucidity and scrupulous fairness we have learned to expect from the authors when they write on the history of local government in England, and the few suggestions they make for the improvement of the present system are made in the most tentative terms. The record of the successive efforts at reform from John Howard onwards is not inspiring, and we can only wonder that writers who have such an intimate knowledge of the failure of local officialdom to create a prison system that they can regard as satisfactory are able nevertheless to retain their faith in the ability of Government officials to produce such a result. In this as in other respects the belief of the Socialist party in the efficacy of governmental machinery as a means of social reform is rather pathetic, but with all their knowledge of official blunders and inefficiency in the past, Mr. and Mrs. Webb appear to share in the confidence which Mr. Stephen Hobbhouse and Mr. Fenner Brockway feel as to the possibility that somehow by some re-adjustment of the present administrative machinery our prisons can be converted into places 'such as the conscience of the nation can approve.'

Prefixed to the volume for which Mr. and Mrs. Webb are responsible is a long and somewhat diffuse preface by Mr. Bernard Shaw, in which, while admitting society's right to defend itself against law-breakers, he expresses the view that (a) 'intolerably 'mischievous human beings' should be painlessly killed or permanently restrained; while (b) human beings 'defective in 'the self-control needed for free life in modern society, but well 'behaved and contented under tutelage and discipline' should be

put under the requisite tutelage and discipline 'without rancour or insult,' and adds that

'In all cases where detention and restraint are called for, the criminal's right to contact with all the spiritual influences of his day should be respected. Conversation, access to books and pictures and music, unfettered scientific, philosophic and religious activity, change of scene and occupation, the free formation of friendships and acquaintances, marriage and parentage: in short, all the normal methods of creation and recreation, must be available for criminals as for other persons, partly because deprivation of these things is severely punitive, and partly because it is destructive to the victim, and produces what we call the criminal type, making a cure impossible.'

This statement is no doubt intended to be provocative, and we should much like to have Mr. Shaw's answers to the questions it provokes. If the sort of prisoner he has in mind possesses an indefeasible right to the pleasures to be derived from books, pictures and music, intellectual conversation and unfettered scientific activity, have other prisoners an equally indefeasible right to beer and tobacco, heavy meat meals, sporting papers and the other delights for which the criminal of a more ordinary type may have a craving? If not, why not? Or does Mr. Shaw hold that the honest taxpayer is under an obligation to supply these simple alleviations of the prisoner's lot to the persistent burglar or pickpocket because society by placing him 'under tutelage and discipline' has precluded him from supplying his own requirements by the methods to which he is most accustomed?

Further, how are we to treat the criminals who come under neither of Mr. Shaw's two categories? In addition to his human beings who are either 'intolerably mischievous' or 'defective in self-control' there are many human beings ordinarily no worse than their neighbours, but sometimes guilty of isolated acts of extreme violence, or gross breaches of trust, or frauds of a cruel and extensive nature, as a result of provocation, exceptional distress, or of such temptation as other men are free from; there are also many who persistently refuse to obey the subsidiary requirements of the law because the penalties incurred by illegal action are not sufficiently deterrent to outweigh the advantages to be derived from it. How are these to be dealt with? Mr. Shaw's whole dissertation in fact leaves a very confused impression on the mind, and it may be that he considers no isolated offence

against the law to be worth noticing at all, whether it be the defalcations of an Horatio Bottomley or the open defiance of the speed limit by some ducal motorist. At all events his views, such as they are, are decidedly more in place in the preface to 'Major Barbara,' where they have previously appeared, than as an introduction to Mr. and Mrs. Webb's scholarly history of the English prison system. A writer who suggests (p. 38) that rape and arson are at present in England punishable by death, and states (p. 59) that prisons were transferred from the local authorities to the State as a result of Howard's agitation, is not to be taken very seriously. Doubts as to the capacity of the 'Prison System Enquiry Committee' to deal in a practical way with the problems they have set out to solve, are strengthened by finding that Mr. Shaw's dissertation on the principles of 'penology' is given a place of honour in one of the volumes produced under the Committee's auspices.

QUAKERISM

1. *Studies in Mystical Religion.* By DR. RUFUS M. JONES. Macmillans. 1909.
2. *Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries.* By DR. RUFUS M. JONES. Macmillans. 1914.
3. *The Beginnings of Quakerism.* By WILLIAM C. BRAITHWAITE. Macmillans. 1912.
4. *The Quakers in the American Colonies.* By DR. RUFUS M. JONES, assisted by ISAAC SHARPLESS, D.Sc., and AMELIA M. GUMMERE. Macmillans. 1911.
5. *The Second Period of Quakerism.* By WILLIAM C. BRAITHWAITE. With introduction by DR. RUFUS M. JONES. Macmillans. 1919.
6. *The Later Periods of Quakerism.* By DR. RUFUS M. JONES. Macmillans. 1921.

MANKIND may never reach Lord Acton's ideal stage in the development of historical science, when the life of Luther will be substantially the same whether written by a Catholic or a Protestant. The attainment of that stage may even be undesirable, if it be foreshadowed in the cool impartiality of some modern historians. The writing of history is still and must ever be an art which depends much on sympathy. When Robert Southey announced to a Methodist his intention of writing the life of John Wesley, his Methodist acquaintance remonstrated in the words, 'Sir, thou hast nothing to draw with, 'and the well is deep.' Similarly, though less bluntly, the Quaker-poet, Bernard Barton, questioned the wisdom of Southey's projected work on George Fox and the Quakers. He doubted whether Southey was sufficiently appreciative of the central Quaker principle to be qualified for his task. Both Methodist and Quaker may have been unjust to Robert Southey, and yet right in general as to the essential equipment of the historian. Some link of sympathy between the historian and his subject usually underlies great historical writing.

The very fact that historical enquiry is seldom undertaken, and still more rarely carried to a successful issue, unless the subject appeals to the historian's admiration, makes the observance of the discipline involved in Lord Acton's ideal the more imperative. Wherever our feelings are engaged, the service of

truth becomes more exacting, particularly when we are dealing with the history of religion. In a letter to Mary Gladstone, Lord Acton impressively urges this point. 'To be sincere a man must continually grub up the stumps planted by all manner of unrevised influence. The subtlest of all such influences is not family or college or country or class or party, but religious antagonism.'

It is superfluous to remark that the authors of the standard history of Quakerism which has recently been brought to a conclusion by the publication of two volumes on 'The Later Periods of Quakerism,' are fully equipped on the side of sympathetic understanding. They have not concealed their pride in unfolding a story of which any church might excusably be proud, while their hope for the future of the Society of Friends is equally undisguised. It is almost as superfluous to comment on the technical equipment and personal gifts which Dr. Rufus M. Jones and William Charles Braithwaite have brought to their task. Dr. Rufus Jones writes with authority on the philosophy and psychology of religion. The clearness and ease of his style are such as almost to conceal from the delighted reader the thoroughness of the historian's researches and the depth of his religious philosophy. The two volumes on 'The Beginnings of Quakerism' and 'The Second Period of Quakerism' by W. C. Braithwaite make only too clear the loss to historical studies involved in his death in the spring of this year. It may suffice to characterise his work if we say that he is not unworthy to be ranked with two other Quaker-bankers who won distinction as historians—Thomas Hodgkin and Frederic Seebohm. The subject of which he treats will not attract the general reader to the same extent as the history of 'Italy and her Invaders,' or the volume on 'The Oxford Reformers' attract him. But those who take up Braithwaite's narrative will find in it the mastery of original sources, the soundness of judgment and much of the vigour and charm of style which we associate with the work of the other Quaker-historians.

The essential greatness, however, of the historical work before us lies not in the enthusiastic interest of the writers in their theme, not in the excellence of their researches, not in the readableness of their narratives, but in the frankness of their criticism of the Quaker movement, in their attempt to relate it

to other movements, earlier and contemporary, in their readiness to acknowledge debt and admit defect. In other words, they have reached a high standard of sincerity, and in this respect, as in many others, their work is a model of what a history of a particular church should be. This will be easily apparent from a brief review of the leading features of the story they unfold.

The actual history of Quakerism is prefaced by two volumes, 'Studies in Mystical Religion,' and 'Spiritual Reformers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,' both from the pen of Dr. Rufus Jones. This procedure may seem at first to need justification, since nothing is more characteristic of George Fox and the first Quakers than their sense of making an entirely new start. Fox claimed to have received his gospel by inward revelation. He felt himself to be the apostle of a new reformation. By apostleship he meant that his commission and his message came to him direct from God, not by men or through a man. And he asserted his apostleship not querulously or diffidently, not boastfully or jealously, but simply and without affectation, assuming at once a privilege and a responsibility. From his journal he scarcely seems to be aware that any have proclaimed the doctrine of the inner light in the century preceding him, and he certainly is not conscious of any debt to any human teacher. He traces every discovery of truth to the leading of Christ within.

Nor had Fox's followers any doubt as to the sincerity and validity of his claim. William Penn said of him that 'as to man, he was an original, being no man's copy.' To devote two volumes to the expression of the same or parallel doctrines in earlier or contemporary church history is to take the reader a good way behind the account which the first Quakers gave of their own movement. But the justification and even the necessity for this wider survey are not hard to discern. If we are to understand Fox himself, and still more if we are to understand his appeal, we must know the extent to which others had been groping after or even actually expressing the truth of God's presence in the hearts of men, which he set out to preach. From the standpoint of modern psychology, Dr. Rufus Jones describes George Fox as belonging to a distinctly psychopathic type. In his youth, Fox passed through a period of spiritual conflict and mental anguish before he found the truth that set him free. In his journal for the years 1643 to 1647 he describes his distress,

and some of his pathological symptoms point to a psychical constitution of an unstable sort. Indeed, Dr. Rufus Jones suggests that 'if he had not found near the end of his adolescent 'period an organizing, centralizing and constructive power,' he might have become the victim of hysteria. Throughout his life, George Fox was subject to trance-experience and was credited with telepathic powers. But this very constitution Dr. Rufus Jones would hold to be characteristic of geniuses or creative leaders. 'They are always persons who are acutely sensitive to 'the spirit of their time, the subtle currents and inward strivings 'of their period. They are as responsive to group-tendencies as 'a sounding-box of a musical instrument to vibrations : they are '*suggestible* to a degree that ordinary thick-skinned mortals have 'no notion of.'*

This psychological analysis helps to explain why Fox appealed to some of the groups of his own time and why he was unconscious of the direct influence of any human teaching or aspiration. The germ of his gospel may very well have come into his mind either from some Familist source or more probably from the writings of Jacob Boehme, which began to circulate in England about 1645. In any case, there were groups of Seekers scattered through England and especially numerous in Westmorland, who were looking for just such a message as came to George Fox. The two introductory volumes, especially the second, describe a spiritual atmosphere surcharged with the ideas that formed the Quaker-gospel. How the central idea of the inner light first entered the consciousness of Fox we shall probably never know. Probably he himself never knew and could not have told us. How closely his message was related to one side of the thought and need of his age, these volumes make abundantly clear.

They also serve another important purpose. When Cardinal Newman was devising tests of a true development of original Christianity, he put forward chronic continuance as a seventh and final test. A faithful development is marked by duration. Heresies and errors flourish for a moment. It is true that the process of decay is sometimes a long one, but in the end they pass at a breath.

* 'Beginnings of Quakerism,' Intro. p. xxvii.

‘ Thus we see opinions, usages, and systems, which are of venerable and imposing aspect but which have no soundness within them and keep together from a habit of consistence or from dependence on political institutions. . . . And then, at length perhaps they go off suddenly and die out under the first rough influence from without.’*

The history of Quakerism as a distinct movement is not sufficiently long, and its vitality, though real, not sufficiently abundant, to satisfy fully this test of duration. But these studies in mystical religion compel us to recognise in Quakerism one of a series of resurgences of something which may be presumed essential to Christianity.

Perhaps chronic reappearance is a more important test than chronic continuance. Did not John Stuart Mill suggest that this was one of the main advantages which truth has in conflict with the forces from time to time ranged against it? Its defeats are temporary; its resurrection certain. Yet such a test is of very little value. Errors die hard and reappear with subtle transformations. It does however strengthen the claim of Quakerism to consideration that the movement is not isolated in history. It too can point to a kind of apostolic succession, and the many attempts to formulate and live by its principles offer some presumption in favour of its truth. A penetrating observation which L. T. Hobhouse makes on the doctrine of non-resistance in particular may hold good of Quakerism in general. The doctrine of non-resistance, he says, ‘ however one-sided and inapplicable to the affairs of men, enshrines the profound truth that moral influence is distinct from and superior to physical compulsion : that force, however necessary, in immediate exigences, settles nothing in the end, but is a menace to the moral balance of the society and of the individual that employs it : that men are capable of being influenced, not only by retaliation, but also, and more profoundly, by the deliberate refusal to retaliate. The system of Quietism gave an extreme expression to these truths. The world will always reject its ideas, and will always be haunted by them until the time comes, when disregarding the extravagances of form in which they are uttered, it begins to ask itself in sober earnestness what truth they contain.’† If

* ‘ Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine,’ p. 92.

† ‘ Morals in Evolution,’ Vol. II., p. 117.

Quakerism cannot substantiate all its original claims, at least it embodies some of those truths that perpetually haunt the conscience of the world and of the Church.

These anticipations of, and parallels to, the Quaker position, do not explain the enthusiasm with which Fox was received in the time of the Commonwealth. It is not easy from a modern standpoint to see why the original Quaker message was welcomed as a gospel on the one hand, or why it was denounced as a dangerous heresy on the other. To-day if men admit the idea of God at all, the assertion of God's presence in humanity offers no particular difficulty. To say that there is something of God in every man does not now sound revolutionary. But in the time of Cromwell, the doctrine of the saving inner light in every man came as tidings of great joy to thousands and filled many others with the direst misgivings for the future of religion. The appeal of Fox and the reaction against him can only be understood in the light of the religious condition of England at the close of the Civil War.

The military triumph of Puritanism was to some extent its undoing. On the death of the king, the Puritans found themselves the dominant party in a national situation which they could not really control. They had only achieved success by the aid first of the Scots and then of Cromwell and his Ironsides. The support of the Scots had been secured by promising an ecclesiastical settlement along the lines of the Reformation in Scotland. Such a settlement went beyond the desires of English Puritans. The services of Cromwell and the Ironsides who were mostly Independents brought a further complication into the situation. For the Independents wanted toleration, and toleration was even more distasteful to the Puritan than a Scottish Reformation. Cromwell had made himself the indispensable autocrat. As such, he freed the Parliament from its obligations to the Scottish covenanters, but forced them to make concessions to the Independents.

In consequence the licence in venting new and strange opinions which prevailed owing to the practical breakdown of authority during the war was not effectively restrained during the Commonwealth. It was a golden opportunity for the sectaries and they made the most of it. Calvinism had to struggle intellectually and morally for its existence against a crowd of

novel and conflicting interpretations of Christianity. There followed an extraordinary embarrassment of riches in religious life and thought, so that not a few individuals entirely lost their bearings. Many were asking for a simple clue to the chaotic maze of religious speculation in which they were wandering. Then Puritanism itself as a religious system did not come through the war untarnished. There was a marked decay in its religious fervour and in its moral prestige and sensitiveness. Some of the finer spirits, like Richard Baxter, felt and recorded this lowering of the pulse and coarsening of the fibre of Puritanism. Those who had been dissatisfied with Puritanism before the war, found their dissatisfaction increased rather than diminished by the issue of the conflict. Then, as in later wars, men talked of a failure of Christianity, and there were many in England, who, like Fox, found their central religious problem, not in the question of personal salvation, but in the question of the apparent powerlessness of traditional Christianity to create a regenerate society. The condition of the Puritan movement convinced such men that war and political intrigue could not advance the cause of true religion and that some new principle must be tried, if progress was to be made.

The message of Fox appealed in particular to those who were bewildered by sectarian controversies and dissatisfied with Puritanism, which seemed to have become a form of religious knowledge without the power of true religion. The experience of one typical convert to Quakerism will serve to illustrate the conditions which predisposed many to listen to Fox. The religious pilgrimage of Mary Proud is thus described in 'The Beginnings of Quakerism':

'In 1641, a gentlewoman of Puritan convictions, named Mary Proud, married Sir William Springett, a young man of twenty, who shared her zeal. They refused the use of a ring, and during their short married life scrupled many things then in use amongst those who were counted honest people, as, for instance, singing David's Psalms in metre, and when, like others, they tore out of their Bibles the Common Prayer and forms of prayer at the end of the book, they tore out also the singing Psalms as the inventions of vain poets. They were also brought off from the Bread and Wine, and, looking into the independent way of worship, saw death in it; nor did baptism with water answer the cry of their hearts. At this time, about the year 1643, her husband died, and when their child was born Mary Springett would not allow her to be baptized, though Puritan preachers were

sent to persuade her. 'Through this,' she says, 'I waded, after some time, but soon after this I went from the simplicity into notions, and I changed my ways often from one notion to another, not finding satisfaction.' She had been a Puritan, zealous in what were called the 'duties,' keeping the Sabbath, fasting often, praying in private thrice a day, hearing sermons and 'lectures' daily, and reading much in scripture. 'I was so vehement in prayer,' she writes, 'that I chose the more remote places to pray in, that I might not be heard to pray, and could not but be loud in the earnest pouring out of my soul.' Now, in her weariness of heart, she became disgusted with all religious exercises, and abandoned their use, both in her family and in private. She consorted with persons of no religion, and grew to loathe outward profession; and in this restless state let in every sort of notions that rose in that day, and tried in turn to get good out of them, but only sorrow and trouble were the end of all, till she came to the conclusion that though God and His truth existed they were not known to any on earth, and so gave up the search in despair. A time of frivolity followed, 'carding and dancing, singing and frequenting music meetings,' but with much trouble of heart. She believed that there was no revelation since the Apostles' days—nothing that she knew to be of God so certainly that she could shed her blood in defence of it. Once, watching the vanity of a Lord Mayor's show, she asked a Puritan bystander, 'What benefit have we by all this bloodshed, and Charles's being kept out of the nation, seeing all these follies are again allowed?' He answered, none that he knew of except the enjoyment of their religion, to which she rejoined that that was a benefit to those who had a religion, but none to her. Through all her darkness, however, she held a trust in the Lord, even when she owned herself to have no religion which she could call true; she could not, indeed, call God Father, but cried to Him as her Creator, and when melted into tears at such times supposed it must be some influence from the planets that made her tender, for she could not own anything in her to be of God. In this state she married her second husband, Isaac Penington, in 1654, a man like herself, 'who saw the deceit of all notions, and lay as one who refused to be comforted by any appearance of religion.' A few years later both husband and wife found in the Quaker experience of an indwelling Christ that for which their souls had been thirsting.*

It will be apparent from this instance that Quakerism restored the reality of religion to those who felt that in striving for religious liberty they had lost religion itself; that it replaced elaborate creeds by a simple experimental truth; and that, through accepting it, those who were wearied with controversy found themselves pavilioned from the strife of tongues. Quakerism, especially Quaker worship on the basis of silence, has had this

* 'Beginnings of Quakerism,' pp. 13-15.

appeal throughout its history. Thus Caroline Stephen, in the period of fresh religious controversy initiated by the discoveries of Darwin, found in Friends' meetings the refuge and the healing which she needed. 'What I felt I wanted in a place of worship ' was a refuge or at least the opening of a doorway towards the ' refuge, from doubts and controversies ; not a fresh encounter ' with them . . . It seems to me that nothing but silence can ' heal the wounds made by disputations in the region of the ' unseen.* So in the seventeenth century, though Friends did not by any means escape or even seek to avoid controversy, yet the attraction of their position was that it placed men beyond most of the current controversies. Quakerism set men free from Puritan theology. It also liberated them from the morbid self-consciousness towards which Puritanism tended. Fox turned the thoughts of his hearers away from their sins to the light that dwelt in them and showed them their sins. In thus concentrating attention on positive good, Fox has much support in modern psychology. Historically, this aspect of Quakerism saved many from despair.

How, it may be asked, did the gospel of Fox differ from previous doctrines of the inner light ? If it differed at all, the difference must be found in the closeness of his attention to the practical consequences of his principle and in his resolute endeavour to build up a Christian fellowship on its basis. In other words, he grasped more firmly than most the social applications and the social significance of the doctrine of the inner light.

It has been said that the mystics have saved religion and destroyed the Church, and it may be affirmed with truth that a long succession of mystics have been in conflict with institutional Christianity, while those whose mysticism has not clashed with institutionalism have yet been unable to affirm the type of authority set up in the older churches. But if Fox is to be classed with the mystics, he cannot rightly be accused of destroying the Church. In contrast with the Ranters and others who claimed to follow the inner light, he perceived that no man could honestly claim the guidance of God for himself without recognising it in others. To believe in the inner light meant to believe in a fellowship and to accept its obligations. Fox had to face extreme

* ' Later Periods of Quakerism,' p. 968.

individualism among his own followers, but he himself believed that in setting himself to organize the Society of Friends in 1666 he was initiating a development in strict conformity with the principles he had been proclaiming for nearly twenty years.

George Fox, like John Wesley, was great not only as a prophet, but also as an organizer. And the kind of organization he founded is extraordinarily true to the ideas of his gospel. The somewhat cynical observation, that organizations seem designed for the painless extinction of the ideas of their founders, is less applicable to the Society of Friends than to many other institutions. The Society of Friends is thus Fox's real achievement. He showed that it was possible to combine the deepest respect for individual personality with a very close and even highly organized fellowship. Those who accepted the leadership of George Fox found themselves committed to a somewhat unconventional and yet simple way of living, and united in a society through which they hoped to transform the world.

The early successes of the Quaker evangelists were very striking. By the time of the Restoration of the Stuart monarchy, there were some 60,000 Friends in England, 'drawn principally 'from the trading and yeoman classes, though there were also 'some artisans and labourers, a fair number of merchants, and a 'few gentry.' To-day the membership of the Society in England is about 20,000. We have seen some of the reasons of the response to its appeal. We must now examine the causes of the halt or decline of the movement. These latter have been a matter of concern to the Society in recent generations and they are fully discussed in the history. At the very beginning of the movement, the Quaker appeal was limited by certain transient features. The early Friends were carried to a dangerous pitch of enthusiasm. The extravagance of James Nayler in riding into Bristol in 1656 in imitation of Christ's triumphal entry into Jerusalem was really not so alien from the temper of early Quakerdom as Fox's emphatic condemnation of him would suggest. W. C. Braithwaite prints a letter of Margaret Fell of Swarthmore, 'which shows 'the excesses of language into which ardent devotees might be 'led.' One sentence may illustrate the nature of these excesses. She writes thus to Fox on behalf of the Swarthmore group :—

'Our dear father in the Lord . . . we thy babes with one consent being gathered together in the power of the Spirit, thou being present

with us, our souls doth thirst and languish after thee and doth challenge that right that we have in thee, O thou bread of life, without which bread our souls will starve.*

There is in this a very dangerous identification of Fox with Christ, parallel to the case of Nayler. Nayler suffered a cruel and unjust penalty by special resolution of Parliament. His case became notorious, and men were repelled by a movement which seemed to be extravagant to the verge of blasphemy. Another characteristic of the first Quakers was their confident and often abusive criticism of opponents, especially ministers. Unfortunately their attacks were frequently directed against really good men, like Richard Baxter, who legitimately complained of the railing words in which Quakers indulged, like drunkards or common scolds, and who with some justification suggested that 'no 'servant of Christ who hath learnt of Him to be meek and lowly 'can believe, if he be well in his wits, that this is the language of 'the Spirit of Christ.' W. C. Braithwaite's treatment of this point is typical of his fair-mindedness. He says :—

'It is unfortunately the case that the intense conviction and the faithfulness, which gave Friends the courage to publish their message through storms of persecution, were also expressed in unwarrantable interference with the religious practices of others and in harsh and uncharitable condemnation of their lives. The opposers of Friends were often equally unrestrained in their language, and in addition enforced their words with the iron mace of an intolerant law. Some of them poisoned the wells of controversy with the lies of personal slander. The verbal violence of Friends was singularly free both from the spirit of persecution and from the filth of private scandal. Its excesses sprang not from bigotry or malice, but from the honest-hearted conviction of half-educated men who were the champions of a great truth.

We deplore these early polemics, yet we should do well to recognise that this insobriety of speech was incidental to an age when religious passion was convulsing Europe . . . †

These two elements of extravagance in early Quakerism ceased to determine public opinion towards the movement by the time that William Penn became one of its leaders. His adhesion in itself was a kind of guarantee of respectability. But the suspicion and jealousy of other Christian bodies continued,

* *Beginnings of Quakerism*, p. 105.

† *Beginnings of Quakerism*, p. 284.

largely because Quakerism grew at their expense. As we have seen, men passed from Puritanism and Independency to Quakerism, and from among the Baptists came many good Quakers. Consequently the relation of Quakerism to other Christian bodies was not unlike the relation of the early Christian Church to the Jewish missions in the Roman Empire. The first Christian missionaries entered the synagogues of the dispersion and carried off the best proselytes. Similarly, the Quakers were held to be preying on other denominations. This fact accounts for some of the prejudice their movement encountered, and for the isolated position among Nonconformists which they tended to hold.

But other factors must be taken into consideration if we are to explain the arrest of the movement. The long and costly fight for toleration in the time of Charles II absorbed the energies of Friends. Admittedly they bore the brunt of the two periods of persecution 1662-1668, 1670-1673. They suffered heavily. Their financial losses were considerable but were the least part of their troubles. Most of their best leaders spent many years in prison and not a few of them died there. We have only to reckon up the years of imprisonment in the life of George Fox, or Isaac Pennington, to realise the strain of the conflict. The Quakers won the battle of toleration in this country, but they won it at a price. The society came through the trial with a desire for rest and intent on consolidating its position rather than on undertaking new campaigns. It must also be remembered that after William Penn acquired the colony of Pennsylvania in 1681, large numbers of Friends, especially the more adventurous, left England. The Quakers in America who number more than 100,000 are the real descendants of the first 60,000 as well as the smaller society in England. Quakerism in England entered the eighteenth century impoverished in numbers and personnel by persecution and emigration.

Other influences hastened the numerical decline of the Society in the eighteenth century. The atmosphere of the century itself was unfavourable towards religious enthusiasm and mystical religion. Friends themselves developed the idiosyncrasies of speech and dress, and insisted on their special testimonies against oaths and tithes and the like, in such a way as to make their practices and tenets the badges of a peculiar

people. In this connection the history of the Quaker-dress is perhaps of special interest. As the Society developed, the more strictly did they insist on simplicity and uniformity of dress. It is not true, as an American writer has suggested, that Fox designed a form of dress for both sexes, and set the example of wearing it himself. His famous leather garments were chosen for durability and not as a model for his followers. But from the first Quakers discarded superfluous ornament, especially ribbons, in their clothing, and the supervision of dress became a serious part of their discipline. Some however of the early Friends realised the danger of this tendency towards strict outward uniformity. Margaret Fell, who was married to George Fox in 1669, in her old age protested against the narrowness and strictness that were entering among Friends. She felt that they were drifting into Judaism. One of her letters of 1698 contains this fine passage on the attempt to regularise the cut and colour of Quaker clothing.

‘ But Christ Jesus saith, That we must take no thought what we shall eat or what we shall drink or what we shall put on ; but bids us consider the lilies, how they grow in more royalty than Solomon. But, contrary to this, we must not look at no colours, nor make anything that is changeable colours, as the hills are, nor sell them, nor wear them. But we must be all in one dress and one colour.

This is a silly, poor gospel. It is more fit for us to be covered with God’s eternal Spirit and clothed with His eternal Light, which leads us and guides us into righteousness ; and to live righteously and justly and holily in this present evil world. This is the clothing that God puts on us, and likes, and will bless. This will make our light to shine forth before men . . . for we have God for our Teacher ; and we have His promise and His doctrine ; and we have the apostles’ practice in their day and generation ; and we have God’s Holy Spirit to lead us and guide us ; and we have the blessed Truth that we are made partakers of to be our practice . . .

Friends, we have one God, and one mediator betwixt God and man—the man Christ Jesus. Let us keep to Him or we are undone.

This is not delightful to me, that I have this occasion to write to you ; for wheresoever I saw it appear I have stood against it several years ; and now I dare neglect it no longer. For I see that our blessed, precious, holy Truth, that has visited [us] from the beginning, is kept under ; and these silly, outside, imaginary practices is coming up, and practised with great zeal, which hath often grieved my heart.*

* ‘ The Second Period of Quakerism,’ pp. 518-519.

It is pleasant to know that Margaret Fox was a true interpreter of her husband on this issue, for he did not scruple to buy her some scarlet cloth for a cloak, while on one of his many journeys from home. But the tendency towards uniformity became too strong, and the curious anomaly resulted that a form of Christianity which set out to emphasise the inward became identified with a particular colour—grey; with a particular bonnet and shawl for women; with a particular collarless coat for men. The essence of Quakerism was held to be its uniform. That the old Quaker-dress had a certain charm about it is undeniable. Charles Lamb's tribute to the troops of the shining ones who whiten the easterly streets of the Metropolis at Whitsun—'every Quakeress is a lily'—is sincere and deserved. Yet it was easier to admire the troops of the shining ones than to join them. Many ladies must have been glad that some women adopted this dress, without feeling in the least inclined to turn Quakers themselves. And all the while the real meaning of Quakerism was being obscured by the prominence of the dress. Not many critics of Quakerism have shared the insight of M. Raoul Allier, who has seen that the Quakers may be laying aside their traditional garb to-day in obedience to the same spirit which led them to cultivate simplicity in the first instance. In any case, their peculiarities of dress and manner tended to keep Quakers apart from other people without adding to the attractiveness of their fellowship. An even more disastrous mistake in discipline thinned the ranks of the Society, especially in the nineteenth century. Up to 1859, Friends made it a condition of membership in their society, that Friends should only marry Friends. Any man or woman who married a non-Friend was disowned, i.e., declared no longer a member of the Society. John Stevenson Rowntree found in this factor alone the chief cause in the numerical decline of the Society of Friends.

'A careful analysis of marriage statistics leads him to the conclusion that fully one-third of all members of the Society who have married during the previous fifty years have been disowned for marrying persons not Friends. The heaviest penalty imposable by a Christian Church has been ruthlessly inflicted for the violation of an autocratic rule of Discipline dealing with one of the most sacred acts of human life. 'Rich indeed must be that Church which can spare such members for such a cause.' With keen irony the essayist declares that while Friends have had such an active part in reforming the criminal code

of the nation, it is a pity that they did not see their way to reform their own criminal code.*

The loss caused by this policy was almost irreparable. Persistence in it must have resulted in practical extinction.

There still remains, however, the deeper question whether the appeal of the Quaker evangelists was not limited by the essential nature of their message or at least by the form in which they presented it. The authors of this history attribute the comparative failure of the movement to a defective formulation of its doctrine. Seventeenth century Quakerism produced or discovered one theologian, a Scotchman named Robert Barclay. In his famous Apology, which became the standard intellectual statement of Quakerism for two centuries, he defines the Quaker position by contrast and agreement with Calvinism as interpreted by the Westminster Assembly of Divines. His work might almost be described as an attempt to find room for the message of George Fox within the framework of the theology of John Calvin. Barclay accepts the doctrine of the Fall almost unreservedly, though he cannot believe in the damnation of infants. Starting out from the total depravity of ordinary human nature, he regards the inner light as essentially supernatural. He distinguishes it from reason on the one side and from conscience on the other. It is a miraculous illumination granted to men from time to time and warranting itself by a kind of self-evidencing power, so that men are as sure of the truth of its messages, as they are of the laws of thought. If men recognise the season of their visitation and obey the light, it leads on to salvation. It is best discerned in quietness. 'Be still and know that I am God.' This saving light is given to all men, and is a gift won for mankind by the life and death of Jesus Christ.

Such is Barclay's theology in outline, and from this account of the inner light, he could deduce and defend the main Quaker positions: their form of worship on a basis of silence, their open ministry for which all were responsible and in which all might share, their independence of the sacraments or of any outward rite, their form of church-organization and discipline, their insistence on the inwardness of salvation and its realisation

* Later Periods of Quakerism,' p. 949.

in daily response to divine guidance. But in the judgment of our authors, this formulation of the Quaker-doctrine was defective and even disastrous. It makes a clean cut between the outward and the inward, the natural and the supernatural, the human and the divine, which raises insoluble problems both for psychology and philosophy. The actual association of the Quaker message with the thought-forms of Calvinistic orthodoxy proved dangerous when that orthodoxy crumbled away in the nineteenth century, while the concordat between Fox and Calvin which Barclay established did not satisfy the Quakers who came under the influence of the Evangelical revival. Like Barclay, these Evangelical Quakers accepted the doctrines of the Fall and of human depravity, but they were not content with his view of the scriptures as a secondary authority in religion, nor were they satisfied with his account of the meaning and effects of the death of Christ. While then Barclay was building on Calvinism, his theology did not go far enough to satisfy the Evangelicals, and went too far to escape the assaults of modern criticism. On the other hand, his formulation of the doctrine of the inner light opened the door to Quietism, both for good and for evil, encouraged a distrust of higher education, and tended towards a doctrine of Election which differed little from Calvin's. The inner light itself was set forth in a forbidding or repellent form.

These limitations of Barclay's theology are well illustrated by the great separation which unhappily split the Society of Friends in America in 1827-8. Both sides in the controversy could and did appeal to Barclay: neither really stood within the lines he had drawn. On the one side were the Evangelical Friends proclaiming the necessity of belief in the inerrancy of Scripture and the atonement effected by Christ's death. They could fairly point to the element of orthodox doctrine in Barclay, particularly to his view of the Fall. But the inner light did not really mean to these Evangelical Friends what it meant to Barclay. On the other side stood Elias Hicks and his followers, proclaiming the all-sufficiency of trust in the inner light as the way of salvation. Unlike Barclay, Hicks repudiated the Fall, and along with it, the orthodox views of Scripture and the Atonement. Like Barclay, he regarded the inner light as essentially supernatural. He was intensely Quietist, he distrusted all outward helps and ordinary knowledge, he leaned to a doctrine of Election. Dr. Rufus Jones

describes the position of Elias Hicks in the following terms:—

'We soon discover that this 'Light' or 'emanation of God' in man is not an elemental possession of human nature, but that man is a being of double compartments. The Light is a 'gift' superadded to mere man so that we still have here as in so many other theologies, a dualistic world. Reason is barren and sterile until it is assisted by the Light The mind is one reality or entity and the Light is another.

This dualistic view made Elias Hicks quite naturally set a very slight value on education or on any kind of human contrivances for the advancement of moral and spiritual causes. The following conclusions flow out legitimately from his fundamental idea: . . . 'A great deal of learning is rather a hindrance than a help' (Q. i. 226). 'All these human sciences are mere nonsense. They have not part nor lot in finding out the will and mind of God, which we cannot know till we know him' (Q. i. 226) . . . He vigorously disapproved of Bible societies, even of agricultural societies, and in fact of any institutions that exist solely for the purpose of enlarging man's natural powers and skill in temporal matters (J. 383; Q. iv. 131). Even colleges and academies are a doubtful blessing since 'they take away 'the mind from its right director' (Q. i. 230). We can learn more from this inward teaching than we can from 'all the books and men 'on the face of the earth' (J. 238).*

This criticism of Elias Hicks is in effect a criticism of Barclay and the traditional theology of Quakerism. It was too rigidly dualistic. It gave no satisfying account either of the relation of the life of the soul to outside nature, or of the relation of the religious experience of the present to the religious experience of the past. It discounted nature and it discounted history. We shall not be surprised therefore if to many Quakerism proved unattractive because it seemed to ignore essential spiritual values.

It must further be admitted that men are reluctant to recognise in themselves a supernatural presence, partly from a reverent modesty and partly from a fear of self-surrender. We may see the first reflected in a passage from the letters of Charles Lamb:—

'Tell Lloyd (he writes to Coleridge in 1797) I have had thoughts of turning Quaker and have been reading, or am rather just beginning to read, a most capital book, good thoughts in good language, William Penn's 'No Cross, No Crown'; I like it immensely. Unluckily I went to one of his meetings, tell him, in St. John Street, yesterday, and saw a man under all the agitation and workings of a fanatic who believed himself under the influence of some 'inevitable presence.'

* 'Later Periods of Quakerism,' pp. 446-447.

This cured me of Quakerism : I love it in the books of Penn and Woolman, but I detest the vanity of a man thinking he speaks by the Spirit, when what he says an ordinary man might say without all the quaking and trembling.'

If, as Mr. E. V. Lucas suggests, this letter refers to the one occasion on which Lamb in his famous essay tells us he witnessed 'a sample of the old Foxian orgasm,' he described this specimen of the vocal ministry among Friends with more sympathy in the later essay than in the earlier letter. But the first impression given in the letter did not pass away. The silence rather than the preaching attracted him to the Quakers' meeting. 'Speaking by 'the Spirit' seemed to him to savour of vanity. This was the ultimate barrier between Lamb and Quakerism.

It is not only modesty that leads men to withhold assent from the central Quaker doctrine. To believe in divine guidance involves or seems to involve the loss of self-direction. In his book on the 'Religion of the Roman People,' Mr. Warde Fowler has an illuminating chapter on Virgil, in which he discusses the dullness of the hero of the Aeneid. He suggests that Aeneas is voted dull precisely because he is *pius*. His *pietas* suppresses his personality. He is the agent of Jupiter rather than himself. This is, of course, peculiarly exasperating when the responsibility for the desertion of Dido is transferred to the god. But there is behind this verdict on Aeneas more than a distaste provoked by a particular incident. There is the sense of something uncanny and forbidding about a life shaped by some external influence. Mr. Warde Fowler rightly says, 'So too it is in Jewish history : 'we feel with Esau more than with Jacob, and with David more 'than with Moses, who is none the less the grandest typical 'Israelite in the Old Testament.' Men love to choose and see their path ; they do not readily seek the kindly light.

The Friends themselves in the eighteenth century were acutely conscious of the burden of responsibility involved in their central belief. The contrast between George Fox and John Woolman on this point is certainly significant. The presence of Christ within was revealed to Fox as a liberating and triumphant reality. Fox describes himself as 'travelling on a road cast up 'and well-prepared.' Woolman on the other hand felt himself to the end of his life to be 'as a man walking through a miry 'place, in which are stones here and there to step on, but so

'situated that one step being taken, time is necessary to see where 'to step next.'

This transition from the joyous confidence of the seventeenth century to the sober caution of the eighteenth century undoubtedly meant a decline in the attractive power of Quakerism. To the leading Quakers in the eighteenth century, obedience to the inner light meant the acceptance of a cross, the denial of even the lawful self, as W. Penn put it. This grave sense of responsibility was no doubt accentuated by the idea of the supernatural which shaped Quaker theology. If the modern Quaker theologian with the help of psychology and religious philosophy can break down the crude separation between human and divine, natural and supernatural, which obsesses the mind of the average man, he will be able to present the doctrine of the inner light in a less repellent form than it assumes in traditional Quakerism. A re-formulation of the doctrine should make it easier for men to see within the common, the divine. But there is a danger in any re-interpretation which completely identifies the witness of the divine in man with the ordinary processes of conscience and reason. Such a re-interpretation could not altogether remove the initial prejudice of the average man without at the same time impairing the dynamic of Quakerism. The essential Quaker-testimony will still be 'No Cross, No Crown.'

We have dwelt at length on the limitations and comparative failure of Quakerism, partly in order to illustrate the candour with which the history of the movement has been written, and partly because, alike for the student of history and for the student of religion, there are few more baffling problems than that suggested by the lofty ideals and the limited appeal of Quakerism. When we recall the fewness of their numbers, the record of their actual influence and achievement becomes the more remarkable. We have already touched on the important, not to say the decisive, part which the Quakers took in the struggle for religious liberty in this country. We have also noted their contribution to colonisation in Pennsylvania. But in almost every department of moral and social progress we find Friends among the pioneers.

In the movement for the abolition of slavery, in prison reform, in securing justice for backward peoples, in developing the more humane treatment of the insane, in the promotion of international arbitration, Friends have led the way. Names like those of John

Woolman, Joseph Sturge, J. G. Whittier, and William Forster, will always be remembered among the protagonists of the Anti-Slavery Crusade. John Howard and Elizabeth Fry will not be less honoured for their work in changing the conditions of prison life. The labours of Friends in America for the Indians in that country deservedly claim ten pages in Rufus Jones' concluding volume, while the foundation of the Retreat in York by William Tuke marks a turning-point in the medical handling of lunacy. The cause of international arbitration owes much to Quakers like Sir Edward Fry and Joseph Gundry Alexander. The outstanding service of Friends to peace is doubtless John Bright's ever-memorable protest against the Crimean War. From the first, Friends led the campaign against the British policy of forcing the sale of opium on China. Joshua Rowntree in his book, 'The 'Imperial Drug-Trade,' provided an unanswered exposure of the Royal Commission which reported in 1895, and a Friend, Sir John Edward Ellis, was associated with Lord Morley at the India Office when the policy of a tardy reparation of the wrong to China was initiated.

In enlightening public opinion on social issues, Friends have taken a noteworthy part, as witness such books as 'The 'Temperance Problem and Social Reform,' by Joseph Rowntree and Arthur Sherwell, and Seeböhm Rowntree's book on 'Poverty.' In initiating new and hopeful experiments for the improvement of industrial and social conditions, Friends bear an honourable record. It is only necessary to mention the contribution of the Cadburys and the Rowntrees to housing and to the better social organization of factories, and the less known but hardly less significant work of Malcolm Sparkes in organizing the Guild in the building trade.

On the side of education, Friends early developed schools. Fox himself had emphasised the importance of a good education for the children of Friends. Of their existing schools, Ackworth dates back to 1779. To the development of national education, a Friend, Joseph Lancaster, made a valuable contribution, and the name of Lindley Murray was for two generations a household word, since his English Grammar was in almost every school. Friends' interest in the higher education of adults developed more slowly. But the colleges like Haverford and Swarthmore in the United States are proof of the interest of Friends to-day

in University education, while in England the honour of starting the Adult School movement belongs to Joseph Sturge, and the present development of Fircroft and other educational settlements is largely the work of Friends. It is perhaps significant of the genius of Quakerism that it has produced a long list of scientists including such names as those of John Dalton, Silvanus P. Thompson, Lord Lister and Sir Jonathan Hutchinson. The habit of close attention and the love of nature have been widely cultivated among Friends.

Beyond any particular services, and beyond any list of distinguished names lies the success of the Society of Friends in maintaining and fostering a particular type of character: quiet, unaggressive and yet determined and self-reliant, with a real reverence for men and a deep loyalty to truth, a character which usually wins respect and often inspires love. The assertion of the spiritual equality of the sexes has given a quiet strength to womanhood which has enabled Quaker-women to discharge responsibilities from which most women shrink. It is impossible to read a history like this or to come into close contact with Friends without wishing that there were more of them.

It is perhaps futile to ask whether there is any prospect of a Quaker-revival in the present generation. The name of Friend is held in respect throughout Europe on account of the Society's work for the relief of war-victims in every stricken land. And it must be increasingly recognised, one would suppose, that there is little hope of reconstruction in Europe except in the spirit in which Friends try to live. Some conditions favourable to Quaker Evangelism certainly exist. Whether the Quaker-Evangelists exist, is a question that only time can answer. But if a new generation of prophets should arise in the Society, they will certainly draw inspiration and guidance from this splendid history.

HERBERT G. WOOD.

THE MESTA

1. **The Mesta.** A Study in Spanish Economic History, 1273—1836. By JULIUS KLEIN, Ph.D. Harvard University Press. 1920.
2. **The Alcalde Entregador de la Mesta.** By JULIUS KLEIN, Ph.D. Bulletin Hispanique-Tome XVII. Bordeaux. 1915.

IT is safe to assume that whoever has read anything about the history of Spain has seen the name of 'The Mesta.' He has even known it by its full name, 'El Honrado Concejo de la Mesta,' and then he has been told that it was the cause of the ruin of Spanish agriculture, and had a chief share in the impoverishment of the country. Some measure of curiosity must have been excited from time to time in the minds of more than a few readers as to what the destructive thing was, how it arose, how it contrived to last so long, how it worked its mischief. But the means of obtaining an answer to these questions, though not absolutely lacking, were few and fragmentary, before Mr. Julius Klein, who is assistant professor of Latin-American History and Economics in Harvard University, published his long article on 'The 'Alcalde Entregador of the Mesta,' in the *Bulletin Hispanique* of the 'Faculté des Lettres de Bordeaux' for the first quarter of 1915. He there promised the detailed history of the institution which has since been published by the Harvard University Press in 1920 under the title of 'The Mesta: a study in Spanish 'Economic History, 1273-1836.' The article (which, by the way, was written in English, though it appeared in a French periodical) and the volume of 1920 are two excellent examples of scholarly research work, and there would be a certain meanness in failing to record that these successful studies could not have been accomplished without the aid of the University of Harvard, which endowed Mr. Klein with the Woodbury Lowery and Frederick Shelden Fellowships, and so enabled him to carry out his researches in Spanish archives.

If the Mesta and its honourable council were purely and simply things of Spain, they would still have had some of the attraction which is rarely lacking in those same *Cosas de España*, even when they are particularly wrong-headed, but the interest aroused would have been one of mere curiosity. They are more than that, for they are examples of a State control of industry and of all it

means. Therefore, as Mr. Klein observes at the beginning of his preface, they have a practical application for us to-day, when so many fluent and confident persons are exhorting us to 'nationalise.'

What was the Mesta? The reply usually given is only a weakening in prose of the old Spanish distich

'Que es la Mesta ?

Sacar de esa bolsa, y meter en esta.'

'What may the Mesta be ?

It fleeces you and gives to me.'

Some enemy, someone of the small change of Martial, which has always been current in Spain, let that off by way of saying that the Honrado Concejo was a bully and extortioner. But this is obviously not enough for an explanation. We get a little further, though by no means all the way, when it is defined as a corporation of sheep and cattle owners, dating from the 13th century. It developed the merino sheep; it created the wool production of Spain, a great industry for a long time; and in the end it became the hated enemy of the husbandmen. When it was fully grown it was indeed as much a *Cosa de España* as the Spanish Inquisition. But the Mesta was not peculiar to Spain any more than was the Inquisition. Both were adaptations, carried out to extremes with that intensive fury, that rabid pressure of logic to a chosen object, which has always been a note of the Spaniard. Just as he took the medieval or Papal Inquisition and persecuted to the utmost, so he took a method of dealing with the pastoral industry which arose from natural conditions in other lands as well as his own, and pushed it to its logical extreme. Therefore the two are particularly fine examples of what comes of religious persecution, and of the control of industry, when worked to the full extent. When not so worked they are futile for their own purposes; when they are, they are destructive.

To understand how the Mesta could rise to the height it did we have first to appreciate natural conditions. Wherever the topography and the climate of a country are such that there is good pasture and good water supply on the hills in summer, but less or none in the valleys and on the plains, then all cattle must be driven to the uplands during the hot months, and brought down when the snow begins to fall or the rain to set in. There is migration, which the Spaniards call

'trashumacion' and the French 'transhumance.' In all countries there is some such migration of stock; it may be merely from valley to adjoining hillside; or it may involve a journey from mountain-chains or lofty table-lands to plains lying hundreds of miles off. The latter is the case in all the three Peninsulas of Southern Europe, the Iberian, the Italian and the Balkan; but most sharply and most peremptorily in the first of that three. Whenever there has been any pastoral industry in these lands, there has inevitably been 'trashumacion.' And whatever Government the countries have had was, by the nature of the case, called upon to protect the movements of the herds, to secure them free passage, and with its best vigilance to hold the balance even between Cain the husbandman, who must needs enclose to bar out trespassers, and Abel the shepherd, whose advantage lies in the great open spaces and the sure access to water. The Roman had his *praetor* who kept open the 'calles' or sheep tracks, and Southern Italy has had 'tratture' and the 'Dogana della mena delle pecore di Puglia.' Some understanding or ancient use and wont must have qualified the anarchy of the Balkans.

The Italian 'trashumacion' has, one gathers, been a small matter. It has been a very great one in Spain, and that from the earliest times. The flocks and herds have ranged from the mountains along the Bay of Biscay on the north down to the valley of the Guadalquivir, and also from the 'Mesta' on the table land of Cuenca on the east, from times before the campaigns of Carthaginian and Roman generals. Visigoth kings found the migrations in full swing, and gave them legal protection, both for coming and going, and for the use of pastures and water. Five-sevenths of Spain belong to the central tableland which reaches a height of three thousand feet in the north and sinks by long steps to fifteen hundred feet at the Sierra Morena. Take the city of Leon far up in the north, as starting point, and draw a line south of the valley of the Guadalquivir, then turn to Leon again, and strike another line east to Logroño on the Ebro; from there mark a third line sweeping out freely to the east before heading south till the Guadalquivir is reached again, and join the two extremes. There you have the great quadrilateral where the *reses trashumantes* once wandered to and fro, and do now travel, but in railway trucks three storeys high. The

race of men who go with them has assuredly not altered since it supplied guides to Hannibal.

I am afraid that Spanish is not so generally known among us as to justify me in quoting from Don Antonio Machado's poem, 'Tierras de España'; to give a mere prose version of his sonorous amphibrachs would be to inflict *caput mortuum* on the courteous reader. He will find the original on page 416 of the 'Oxford Book of Spanish Verse.' Hard marchers, small, enduring, astute, with deep-sunk, shifty eyes, and suspicious, often bad, capable of insane crimes and bestial vices, they are probably of African origin—not immigrants of the times of the Mahommedans, but descendants of those first Spaniards who were Libyans, and were there before Rome was founded.

But if the men have remained the same, the sheep have changed. Till the Middle Ages the Spanish sheep was the 'churro,' a small animal with reddish-brown wool of straight staple. The sheep we associate with the Mesta is the 'merino.' His origin, and that of his name, have both been accounted for with an equal confidence and lack of historical evidence. Popular etymology, guessing in its fantastic way, has derived 'merino' from 'marina,' of or belonging to the sea, because the etymologists of this uncritical school were pleased to assume that the ancestors of the 'royal flocks' were brought into Spain from oversea and from England by Eleanor of Aquitaine, daughter of our Henry II, who married Alfonso VIII of Castile; or, failing that lady, then by Catharine, daughter of John of Gaunt, who married Henry III of Castile. And it has been asserted that our Edward I gave a flock to Alfonso X of Castile, when he married that sovereign's half-sister Eleanor, at Burgos. Another supposition is that the sheep were 'merinos' because they were under the peculiar care of the royal judges, who also were so called by contraction from 'majorinus.'

Mr. Klein shows that there is neither evidence nor probability to support any of these guesses. But he himself favours an explanation which is not much more acceptable than those he rejects. He is much inclined to believe that the word came from the name of the 'Beni-Marin,' a people of Northern Africa who certainly were among the invaders and enemies of Castile from the twelfth to the fourteenth century. There is this to be said in favour of his view, that the Spaniards had imported breeding

rams from Africa in Roman times, that throughout the Early Middle Ages the connection between the two was very close, and that the vocabulary of the Spanish pastoral industry is full of words of Arabic and Berber origin. The very names for a shepherd, 'Rabadan' and 'Zagal,' are Arabic, and there are others which must be looked for, not in ordinary dictionaries, but in special treatises, such as the 'Voces Forestales' of Señor Jordana. It is wise to go carefully in deciding as to the first beginning of Spanish words. There are not a few which have a very Arabic air, but are none the less Latin or Greek. The Arab took them, transformed them and handed them on to the Castilian by way of the Christian 'Mozarabes' of Spanish descent who lived under this rule, and who spoke the jargon of Arabic, Berber and romance elements combined, known as 'Aljamia.' You must not judge lightly by appearances in this or any field. If you do you are constantly liable to fall into the error of a certain countryman of our own who saw the word 'aceite.' He thought it must mean vinegar because 'acetum' is Latin for vinegar, and Castilian is a Latin language. Now aceite is oil, and comes from the Arabic for the fruit of the olive tree. Prosaic common sense is tempted to conclude that 'merino' is from *majorinus*, but simply because that post-Augustan word means 'rather larger.' The merinos were bigger and more important than the 'churros,' and since it was so, why not say so?

As for the origin of the breed, probability, analogy, and downright good sense, join to convince us that there was no single starting-point. The merinos, one may be pretty sure, were formed in the course of generations by cross breeding, and selection. Perhaps English stock had a share with African in the combination finally evolved. Indeed, why not? Castile had a regular connection with England of a political kind by way of the Plantagenet possessions in South-Western France, and English pilgrims came with men of other races to Santiago de Galicia, partly by the road of the Good Baron Saint James, which began at Bordeaux, but also directly by sea. It was an easy four or five days' sail from Dartmouth to Las Sisargas and Corunna. The pilgrim traded, and if he could come along the well-known road, or by sea to Corunna, so could rams for breeding. The field is open for unlimited guessing. What is not a matter of guesswork, but a manifest fact, is that the famous Spanish breed of

sheep was formed by native breeders who may have sought stock animals from anywhere between the Atlas range in Africa, to the north-side of the channel, before the Kings of Castile began to encumber the 'Mesta' of the shepherds with their royal protection.

At this point it is high time to consider what the word 'Mesta' means and where it came from. We have already seen that it was an association. But how made, and for what purposes? Mr. Klein, who tends to trace as much as he well can to African origins, thinks that the word may be the Berber 'Mechta,' the autumn encampment of nomadic flocks and herds. Even so, was not *Mechta* perhaps just the Latin 'Mixtus.' *Mixta* is constantly used for *Mesta* in Latin documents, 'Mistus' is another form. The sound of 'x' in old Spanish was 'sh' or 's.' Martin de Salinas, who visited England in the reign of Henry VIII, says that he passed through 'Xalusberri' when he went from London to Southampton. The sibilant 'sh' has fallen out of modern Castilian, and is generally replaced by the guttural 'j.' So it was natural that the Spaniard should say Mista and not Mixta, whatever he wrote. And from Mista to Mesta is a very brief step. But how did an association of shepherds come to be called a 'mixture?' The supposition is that they began by meeting at the end of their two-yearly migrations for the purpose of sorting out those strays (mostrencos, i.e., mustangs) which had become mixed with flocks not their own during the marches to and from the pastures of summer and winter. This also has much the look of popular etymology, and is far-fetched. The meeting of waters, where streams flow into one another is a 'mesta' in Spanish, a flowing together, a confluence. Surely it is more probable that the shepherds called their meetings 'mestas' because they themselves had flowed together.

Be this as it may, the fact which stands out as undeniable is that the shepherds had already worked out a system of co-operation for themselves long before the kings, making use of elements which lay ready to their hands, gave charters and encouragement (for what purpose most of all we shall soon discover) to the famous, the much-belauded by some and fiercely hated by others, 'Mesta' of later Spanish history. They would combine to redistribute strays, and for all such other aims as were profitable to them. And this capacity for co-operation was not peculiar

to them. Their 'Mesta' did not stand alone in medieval Spain. We always get a better grip of a human activity when we can judge it by analogy. There was another such spontaneous organization in the kingdom of Castile, which throws some light on the Mesta. This was the 'Cabaña Real de Carreteros,' or Royal Association of Teamsters. Observe that they were not endowed with a charter till the Catholic Sovereigns, moved thereto by considering the value of the Teamsters to internal commerce, and the use which might be made of them for the transport of baggage in war gave them one in 1497. For centuries, perhaps from Roman times, and certainly from the days of the Omniade Emirs at Cordova, they had been carrying over the length and breadth of Spain, on a system described by themselves in a lawsuit during 1730. They testified that :—

'They usually spent the winters south of Toledo, where their oxen rested and regained their strength until April. On the first stage of their annual journey they carried loads of charcoal from the woodlands of Toledo to Talavera, the home of the famous potteries, where they arrived about June. Thence they journeyed as far south as Seville (presumably, Mr. Klein thinks, with tiles, terra-cotta ware, etc., for shipment to America). They then started north across the Guadiana Valley, bringing salt as far as Coria and Plasencia. Thence their route lay south-east to the highlands of Alcudiva with wood for the mines of Almaden, whence they carried quicksilver to Seville for transportation overseas to the Mexican mines. Another circuit, after wintering near Toledo, led northward to Madrid, to which point grain was brought, and exchanged for wool at Segovia. This wool was taken up to Vitoria ; and the carts were there loaded with iron for the north coast, where they took on salt and carried it to Vierzo and Ponferrado (in the upland sheep country, west of Leon). Then they returned eastward to Pozo, near Burgos, where salt was loaded for Valladolid, Salamanca, and other parts of Castile.'

The references to the trade with the Spanish West Indies, which were all their possessions in America, do not of course apply to the activity of the teamsters during the Middle Ages. That commerce was but just beginning when they received their charter of incorporation in 1497. The point is that they were in being long before the Catholic Sovereigns cast eyes upon them, and saw what use might be made of them to supply an army service corps in war-time. And they had risen by their own strength, and had so far shown no lack of capacity to manage their affairs. With them we may place the curious population

of African origin known as the 'Maragatos,' who occupied sixty villages round Astorga. They have ever been muleteers and carriers, having a head man and an organization of their own.

The 'Mesta' of the shepherds, the 'Cabaña' of the teamsters, and the traditional half-concealed polity, for that it was, of the *Maragatos*, are our credible witnesses to the fact that there was a time when business capacity, foresight, enterprise, and power to govern themselves were not lacking to the subjects of the king of Castile and Leon. Incidentally the three help to explain why a whole *guerrillero* army with its elastic and sufficient organization for transport could spring up around, and on the lines of communication of a foreign invader. Here was a whole population of men who spent most of their time on the march, camping in the open ground, masters of every detail of the country, armed to protect their beasts from the wolf and the bone-breaker vulture, as well as from the sturdy beggars and masterful rogues, whom the Spaniard named 'golfinos.' The fringe of rascality and violence which hangs on honest industry everywhere was of course not unknown in Spain. The Duke of Wellington created his army transport out of these old established muleteers and 'trajineros.'

Since he had these useful and, because spontaneous, vigorous and wholesome activities, ready to his hand, it ought, one would think, to have been easy for the Rey Prepotente de Castilla y Leon, to let them work for the general good. The Maragatos and the Cabaña de Carreteros, suffered comparatively little from him, but he ruined the Mesta. Mr. Klein, who has not wholly escaped that form of the *Lues Boswelliana* which is incidental to historians of particular institutions, goes much astray in his judgment of what the royalty did with the Mesta. He sees in their policy the attempt of a central government to promote a great national industry, and he thinks that their wisdom was defeated by the 'particularism' of Spain. Let us look at the facts, as told by Mr. Klein himself with more knowledge and a better use of real authorities than anyone who has hitherto treated the subject, and then draw our deductions for ourselves.

When Alfonso X, called El Sabio, the learned, became king in 1252, the great reconquest was over. His father, Fernando III, had regained Andalusia, and had reduced the Moors to Granada and Niebla. The kings of these remnants of the Moslem power

did him homage, and attended Cortes as barons. He was by instinct a legislator and he no doubt honestly desired the well-being of his kingdom. It was clearly his duty to protect the great sheep-breeding industry. The task was, to be sure, no easy one. To keep the tracks open for the movements of great flocks which migrated across the central plains for 450 miles from north to south, and 250 from Cuenca on the east to the valley of the Guadalquivir, and yet not to allow them to eat up all agriculture, was a task which called for even-handed justice as between herdsman and husbandman.

Moreover, impartiality was needed as between the herdsmen themselves. Some of the migratory sheep alternated only between valley and hillside just over the border of the parish. Where there was a good permanent water supply from a river (which is the exception in central Spain) the pastoral industry was represented by standing flocks (*estantes*), which did not migrate. The 'Mesta' was for ever striving to force all owners of sheep and cattle to come in. All were not willing to come. The sheep tracks—the 'cañadas' was the Castilian name for them—ran along the borders of the tableland, or diagonally from Logroño on the north, and Cuenca on the east, south-west to the Sierra Morena, to Extremadura, and the Guadalquivir. These *cañadas* must not be understood to have been roads. Where they crossed the rings of cultivated land lying round cities or big villages they were strips of pasture which could not be lawfully enclosed.

But these belts of town land, though they were in some cases extensive enough to include forty or even sixty hamlets, did not cover by any means the greater part of the surface of the central tablelands. Between the 'comarcas' of widely-scattered towns there were long stretches of 'dehesa,' which is more or less pampa or prairie, 'tierra baldia,' belonging to no known owner, and high downs, 'páramos.' When it ran across the cultivated land, the 'cañada' was fixed by law at a breadth of six 'sogas.' Now the *soga* (a word which a well-bred Castilian avoided when speaking to the relatives of a man who had been hanged, because it could mean a halter) was a measure of forty-five spans, or quarters, of the 'vara,' which is to the English yard as 836 millimetres are to 911. That is to say that six sogas would be a little less than 250 feet. There was no such limit on the 'dehesa.'

The flocks could wander freely accompanied by the ox

wagons, filled with the nets used to pen the sheep at night, with rations, and with salt, and guarded not only by *rabadanes* and *zagales*, but by the 'mastin,' the strong Spanish sheep dog which can tackle a wolf. But if they could range to right and left, there might be, and were, questions as to how many of them might come at once. The records of the Mesta, carefully preserved, show that in the sixteenth century the flocks of migratory sheep ranged in number from two and a-quarter to three and a-quarter millions, at the time of their greatest prosperity. It is a modest figure judged by the standard of to-day, but large in its time. Parts of the open lands belonged to the common pastures of towns. There is no difficulty in understanding that when hundreds of thousands of merinos came browsing along, the townsmen might find themselves squeezed off their own pastures. In short, shepherds, townsmen and ploughmen had plenty to quarrel about, and it was the duty of the king to see that each had his rights and no more.

If Alfonso X and his successors had confined themselves to the part of 'judicious bottle holder' they would have done not so ill. El Sabio did no harm when he gave a general charter of incorporation to the Mesta, and drew all the traditional and use and wont little Mestas into one 'honourable council,' which had its 'quarters' at Leon, Soria, Segovia and Cuenca. At its general meetings all who paid certain royal dues and owned sheep or cattle, whether men or women, voted alike. The evil was that from the very beginning the kings looked to the Mesta to provide them with money. As time went on they called on it more and more as a source of supply. The encouragement of this great native industry came in the end to mean that the king endowed the Mesta with privileges so that it might, sponge-like, suck up the utmost possible amount of money, and then be the more profitably squeezed by him. The derisive line, 'Sacar de esa bolsa y meter en esta,' was not far from the truth.

The judicial system, or rather no-system, of Castile in medieval times did, we must allow, make it very difficult for the king to enforce one law on all in an even-handed way. He may have done the only thing he thought he could when he created the 'Alcalde Entregador' of the Mesta to protect the migratory flocks and shepherds. Alcalde did not mean municipal officer in medieval Castile, but a magistrate. There were alcaldes,

great and small, ranging from the Alcaldes de Corte who were in a very limited way a kind of king's bench, down to Alcaldes de Corral, who were the superintendents of pounds and pinders of a district, or the Alcalde de Los Pastores, and the Alcalde de Rafala, who were by way of being Courts of Piepowder at the sheep fair of Ucles, and the horse fair of Cáceres.

Mr. Klein translates Alcalde Entregador by Judge of Awards. He was appointed by the king to protect the Mesta by amercing all who offended against it, and it was his function to hand over (entregar) the ameracements, partly to himself, and partly to the king. By the very nature of his office he was not an impartial judge.

In later times angry foes of the Mesta denounced him as being a sword put into the hands of a madman. It is obvious that it was his interest to find excuses for amercing all the sedentary population living along the *cañadas*. There were of course developments and modifications in the history of the office. Several *entregadores* were needed to itinerate along sheep tracks which collectively amounted to thousands of miles. A chief entregador was developed in time. Then by a process very general in the Middle Ages the office became hereditary in a family, or rather a succession of families, until it was sold by the last hereditary tenant Pedro de Acuña, Count of Buendia, to the Honourable Council of the Mesta in 1568 for 750,000 *maravedis*. It cannot have been very valuable to the count, seeing that the *maravedi*, a money of account which began by being the hundredth part of eight ounces of silver, had sunk to the two thousandth and something by 1568 on its way to its lowest point, the seven-thousandth. In all the distracting story of medieval moneys of account there is no more striking example of their alacrity in sinking than that of the *maravedi*. When the office was acquired by the Mesta, the Honourable Council was judge in its own cause without a shadow of restraint, till an enemy arose in later days.

If it were the purpose of the kings to promote a national industry and to abate 'particularism' they took the very worst course they could possibly have chosen when they created the Alcalde Entregador. A moment's reflection is long enough to show anyone that what they had done was to create one more particularism—and a very bad one too. The others were content

to act in a given district. This one was spread like a net from the course of the Ebro to the course of the Guadalquivir, from Cuenca on the east to Cáceres on the west. The map of the *cañadas*, given by Mr. Klein, shows how they scored the whole land up and down and across. All along these routes the Mesta was in actual or possible contact of irritation with town councils, villages, nobles, military orders, husbandmen and local pastoral industries.

If ever there were a case when the need was for an impartial authority standing above all, and holding the scales even among them, this was one. And what the king gave was a fritter of justices in Eyre who came to amerce in the interest of the Mesta, of the king, and of their own pockets. There were, as there have ever been in the history of human institutions, ups and downs, modifications, adaptations, changes in the thing though the name was preserved. During the succession of anarchical minorities and weak kings which distract the history of Castile from the death of Peter the Cruel to the accession of the Catholic Sovereigns, the Mesta sought its interest by working with disorderly nobles, or any other 'man with a stick' who was predominant for the time being in the general scuffle of kites and crows. When the crown won then the Mesta was the eager supporter of the king, from whom it could hope for favours. The evils it produced reached their height under the Austrian sovereigns who followed Isabel and her husband.

We are not bound to assume that the Mesta was made up of wicked capitalists and greedy profiteers. As a matter of fact the vast majority of the migratory flocks were small, and were conducted by their owners. A few nobles and religious houses owned many thousand heads of sheep, but their combined flocks made much the lesser part of the whole of the 'reses trashumantes.' The Mesta was in a way a democratic body. It did evil in pursuit of its own interests no doubt; but it was told, and encouraged to believe, that it was itself the great national interest to which others must give way. It paid for its privileges. The map of the *cañadas* in Mr. Klein's book is dotted with circles which mark the places where the king's officers sat at the receipt of customs, and levied the kings' dues, 'servicios' and 'montazgos.' What was more natural, more inevitable, than that the Mesta should take a large view of its rights, which cost it no small sum,

and having its own judge to grant awards for its good, should push its demands to the utmost? The Catholic Sovereigns helped it too much. But it owed more to their immediate successors, Charles V and Philip II. Isabel and Ferdinand were resolute in enforcing their authority, and were encouraged to rule vigorously by their subjects, who had suffered unutterably from lack of governance for a long time. But they were capable of moderation and had some respect for the rights of all their subjects. Charles V and Philip II were more despotic by nature, and were also more pressed for money to meet the demands of their far-ranging, complicated and ruinously costly adventures abroad.

In 1500 the Catholic Sovereigns did the Mesta the great favour, the signal honour, of endowing it with a president, who was always to be the senior member of the Royal Council. This was the outward and visible sign of their affection for their cherished pet. They did it other good turns of a less ornamental but more highly appreciated kind. They exempted it from payment of transit dues to the towns, hitherto levied on the flocks as they crossed the *comarcas*. They repressed all new enclosures of land, whether for agriculture or for the use of non-migratory sheep and cattle. Of course these grants to the Mesta were simply confiscations of old established rights of the cities, for they amounted to oppression of all rural industry other than the Mesta. It was the settled policy of the kings to encourage the production of wool for export as being the great source of national prosperity and of revenue. For of course the sovereigns did not remit payment of the royal 'servicios,' 'montazgos,' or other dues. For a time the Honrado Concejo found the arrangement most acceptable. The Mesta profited greatly. Its well-kept accounts show that the migratory flocks increased by one million head during the first years of the sixteenth century, and for a time all was well as well could be, for the sheep-owners of the corporation and for the crown.

It was not long before the Council of the Mesta had good cause to reflect on the inner meaning of the ancient fable concerning the horse, the stag, and the man. When a government protects a particular industry (so the process is decently named) it is with an intention to share the profits. Even before the death of Ferdinand the Catholic in 1516 the calls of the crown had

begun to press. Under Charles V they grew by leaps and bounds. The young king began by calling on the Mesta for a benevolence to be repaid, and he ended by imposing more taxes. The Mesta was provoked into making loud and angry expostulations to little or no purpose. Charles began, his son Philip II continued, and the later Hapsburgs went on. The Mesta was impoverished, together with the rest of the country.

No doubt the kings granted benefits which were meant to compensate the Mesta, necessarily at the expense of their other subjects. There was the privilege of possession which dates from the Catholic Sovereigns. What that meant was that when a member of the Mesta had leased a pasture, he, his heirs and assigns were entitled to keep it as a possession for ever at the same rent. When the flooding of the market with silver from the Indies was depreciating the metal at a great rate this amounted to a confiscation of the landowners' property. If sheep had been allowed to pasture once without payment, then their owner acquired possession. Philip II consoled the Mesta by granting it the right to insist on being supplied with fodder at the same rate, good year or bad. Of course the rate was fixed at the lowest possible figure. The details of the process are many, and are fully told by Mr. Klein. We cannot give them all, but enough has been said to display the character of the thing.

It will not be supposed that all this confiscation, this sacrifice of the community at large to one industry, was allowed to pass without protest, or some measure of opposition. Both were common in law courts and in the Cortes. During the times before the reign of Charles V a chartered town had generally been able to insist that the Alcalde Entregador should be accompanied by one of its magistrates while he was making his visitation within the bounds of its franchises. Some towns, Sigüenza for one, obtained exemption in return for services or payments. Under the early Hapsburgs all rights were subordinated to the favoured industry. The Cortes was always hostile to the Mesta, but its outcries were disregarded. The Cortes of Castile, which Harley once defined as 'magni nominis umbra,' had always been a feeble institution. It was a mere medieval representation of classes. When only one class was concerned in what was to be done, it alone need be summoned. Now as the nobles refused to pay direct taxes, and the Church

taxed itself, the king need summon only the delegates, or, in Spanish 'personeros,' of the eighteen good towns having voice and vote in Cortes when he was asking for a subsidy. It was easy for him to overbear or to bribe thirty-six men, two for each city, particularly as some of them sat by hereditary right, being by law chosen from certain families and having no cause whatever to fear their constituents. So the Cortes protested in vain.

None the less, in the end the Mesta was broken down by popular resistance, and the story is both curious and illuminating. The ruin of the institution was wrought in three ways. One was the bankruptcy of the crown due to insane finance, and what goes naturally with that, insane foreign policy. The second was the unforeseen but perfectly natural action of institutions created by the kings for their own service. The third was the tardy, but in the end effective action of the community at large, which amounted to a kind of veiled revolt.

Let us take them in that order. When the kings had so effectually shorn the Mesta that nothing more was to be got from it, they began to favour its victims for money down. In their distress the kings had sold jurisdictions and 'juros,' that is to say perpetual annuities given for a price, to the Mesta as well as to other purchasers. When their distress grew worse they played the fraudulent bankrupt and repudiated their obligations. The loss to the Mesta was cruel. Then, since money they must have, they took to selling the right to enclose land hitherto open to the migratory flocks. And again the Mesta lost. By the end of the seventeenth century it was nearly as bankrupt as the king.

The second cause of ruin was of a more interesting nature. The Catholic Sovereigns had striven to create better order in the incoherent judicial no-system of Castile. They had organized two courts of appeal, the Chanceries-'Cancillerias'-of Valladolid for the north, and of Seville, which they transferred to Granada, for the south. They thought, very justly, that these courts would be effective in the way of amending that 'lack of governance' which had brought their kingdom to downright anarchy. They did not foresee that when the 'Cancillerias' were well established they would become two strong tribunals which would insist on acting by law, and with independence. And that is what happened. The Cancillerias would hear appeals against the decisions of the Alcalde and Entregadores of the

Mesta, as they heard appeals from other inferior courts ; and they quashed the Alcaldes' awards without hesitation. The judges were generally drawn from the burgher class, and their sympathies were not with the Mesta. The king rebuked them ; they were wiggged by the Royal Council. The judges listened to the king and the council with every appearance of deference, and went on as if nothing had happened. 'Obedecida y no cumplida,' obeyed and not executed, was the Castilian formula for the process, and that was the humour of it. Here again many details must be omitted. But we see the nature of the thing. The dignified and independent courts would not be coerced.

The third cause of ruin was most materially aided by the first and the second. The towns, big and little, which suffered from the Mesta, soon found that there were judges at Valladolid, which was close by the summer pastures in the north, and at Granada, which was no less handy for the east and south. They appealed against the decisions of the Alcalde Entregador. The big towns acted each for itself from the first. The little towns combined, after a time, and later than they need have done, to make up a purse and fee lawyers. It was a long fight. The Mesta strove hard to keep its footing by fighting in the Cancillerias and by appealing to a judicial committee of the Royal Council known as the 'Mil Quinientos'—the 'Fifteen Hundred.' The name does not imply that there were fifteen hundred judges in the court. It was a court which heard appeals in civil suits when the appellant was prepared to pay into court fifteen hundred gold ducats. This tribunal was more favourable to the Mesta than were the Cancillerias. Yet in the end the towns and the Chanceries of Valladolid and Granada smashed the Mesta. It lingered on in name till 1836, but its power was broken by the end of the seventeenth century, and during the eighteenth it was deprived of its jurisdiction by the Government of King Charles III, who by a strange turn of fortune brought about the practical abolition of the Honourable Council, by the hands of Campomanes, the able minister whom he appointed as its President.

We think of Spain as having been torpid all through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Mr. Klein's book shows that there is exaggeration in this view. Under the surface, apart from foreign affairs, there was life and energy in the country. The part for instance taken by the city of Badajoz in the final

struggle with the Mesta, reveals a singularly clear-headed and resolute agitator in a good cause in the person of Paino, of Badajoz, who organized the Government. It is to be observed too that the opponents of the Mesta abstained almost wholly from violence, even in the weakest days of the monarchy. There are a few cases in which intruding agents of the Mesta were roughly handled, but in the main the fight was carried on by law and argument.

The story includes far more than we have had the space to tell. Mr. Klein's book may be confidently recommended to anyone who wishes to learn something of a history which has no exact parallel, and is full of the 'terruca,' the peculiar flavour of the soil, and the things of Spain. But, we allow ourselves to repeat, it has a general interest; it gives in an extreme form, and therefore clearly, an illustration of what must happen when Government goes beyond its functions of impartial judge, and takes to controlling industry. All Colbertism, whether of Colbert himself, or before him, or after him, means in practice either fussy interference and regulation, which tie the arms of industry behind its back, or the unjust favouring of some one industry which appears most capable of putting money into the pocket of the rulers, at the expense of the community at large. Nothing is more probable or indeed inevitable than that the protecting authority should first suck its protected industry dry, and then throw it over; which is precisely what the kings in Spain did with the Mesta.

The folly of the whole thing stands out with extraordinary clearness when we see what has followed in Spain. When the Mesta came to its end as a body having jurisdiction and power to injure, it was followed by the 'Asociacion General de Ganaderos del Reino,' the general association of cattle owners, which preserves its archives, and acts as a voluntary Society of Cattle Breeders. Under the régime of freedom, the number of sheep in Spain has increased to fifteen millions. Now whatever the real number of all the sheep in Spain, taking the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon together, was in the sixteenth century, it was less than this figure, and though Spanish agriculture is much behind what it well might be, it has improved enormously since it has ceased to be checked and repressed in the interest of a pastoral industry which was supposed to be so valuable that everything was sacrificed for its advantage.

DAVID HANNAY.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FAITH

WHEN that formidable ecclesiastic Tertullian coined the epigram *credo quia impossibile*, he probably did not realise that those three words alone, of all his voluminous writings, would make his name immortal. The theological tomes still indeed exist, but only the most indefatigable students of Christian dogma are courageous enough to open them; and perhaps some even of those whose profession compels them to consult the profundities of patristic literature permit themselves a sigh at the inscrutable nature of the providence which has ordained that so much of Tertullian should survive and so much of Livy perish. However that may be, the bishop's epigram is as famous as the most familiar lines of the most familiar poets; but it is celebrated on very different grounds from those which have preserved the poignant sweetness and sadness of Virgil and Catullus through the ages. It is remembered for the same reason that the cold uprightness of Brutus, the cruelties of Nero, and the bestialities of Heliogabalus are remembered: not necessarily because we admire or wish to imitate, but because they are unique.

Tertullian, in fact, reached the high-water mark of conviction. All men believe something. Some men will believe almost anything. But Tertullian alone has gloried in believing a thing because it is impossible. Compared with this, the ferocious faith of Athanasius was like water at the side of wine, or moonlight to the mid-day sun. Athanasius only damned those who would not believe the incomprehensible. He had no thunderbolts for those who could not believe the impossible.

The psychology of faith has been insufficiently studied, for it has been one of the ruling factors, perhaps indeed the decisive factor, in human history. It has founded churches and overthrown kingdoms; its influence is writ large in politics as well as religion; the whole practice of medicine is built upon it;*

* At least on the patient's side. A very great doctor once remarked that there were only three kinds of cases: 'those who die whatever you do; those who get well whatever you do; and a third and, fortunately, a very small class, that you may kill or cure by your own exertions.' Luckily, the profounder truths of every profession are only for the initiates.

and even the economist, who deals with tangibles, is forced to admit the working of this intangible when he discusses the theory of credit. Every government rests on faith ; every pulpit demands faith ; every propagandist, whether political or religious or even commercial, strives to create it. Yet nobody, except William James, has attempted to analyse its common elements, far less written its history ; for Mr. Balfour in ' The Foundations of Belief ' seems to stress a little unduly the part played by custom and its children, tradition and authority, in the establishment of faith. Yet these are in fact the consequences rather than the causes of belief. The building may be made of these materials, but the foundations are of different stuff. It is true that we believe a thing upon authority, but the original authority must rest upon experience, and further experience, or a new interpretation of the old experience, may depose the hitherto unchallenged authority. In that sense, as the pragmatists would say, the faith is sound which works. But it is always subject to the qualification that the faith which works out better is still more firmly grounded.

This omission to analyse the elements of so potent a force is a singular one until we recollect that, in anything more than its first dimension, faith is generally what the other man does not believe. One man's faith is another man's poison.

Faith is purely psychic ; there is no such thing as a physical belief. But, since it is the mainspring of every human enterprise, it is an essential element in the idea behind every purposive physical or mental action ; and in its definite form, it reveals itself as a settled and consistent cast of thought that trenches at times a little on the proper territory of instinct. It runs ahead of reason, but in the long run it is subject to reason. Therein lies the key both of its strength and weakness.

We are accustomed to regard thought as the parent of action, and in a sense this is true ; our present thoughts do in fact direct most of our future actions. But our present thoughts are no more than the result of our past actions and reactions to circumstance : they are the summation and contemporary stabilisation of a whole series of precedent actions and reactions, ancestral and individual ; and therefore it is ultimately more true to say that action is the parent of thought than that thought is the parent of action.

But action necessarily varies with the individual and with circumstance, and consequently thought also varies. Admittedly it varies rather slowly ; but the opinion of yesterday is not quite the opinion of to-day, the mental attitude of last year not quite the mental attitude of this, and the thoughts of youth are notoriously not the thoughts of age. A whole series of actions and reactions has insensibly changed them day by day, adding here, diminishing there, perhaps entirely demolishing one long-cherished idea, and slowly modifying another by the ceaseless erosion and accumulation of fact.

Faith is not entirely exempt from this process of accretion and decay, but it always resents and resists the change ; it manifests itself as the static element in a dynamic mental life. Fundamentally, belief is nothing more than a thought that has crystallised into a conviction. In its highest power it will confer a certainty that may last a lifetime and control the whole personality, but it shades off by insensible gradations to a mere estimate of probabilities. In these debatable regions the sharpness of its outlines becomes steadily more blurred, but the moment it passes from the probable to the merely possible it ceases to be a belief, and becomes an opinion, a supposition, or merely a passing fancy.

The subject has been obscured both by its emotional element, and by the desire of men to claim a consistency of principle to which few are in fact entitled. But when the study of religious conversions and political convictions yields similar results, we are entitled to assume, unless the contrary can be shown, that the causes underlying both phenomena are the same. In each faith plays its essential part ; in each it is built on the same basis.

What makes the drunken village atheist become a sober, church-going Christian ? The conviction of sin, replies the evangelist. But what makes the Liberal turn Conservative ? Surely not a conviction of sin, even vicarious sin on the part of his leaders. In both cases there is a change of opinion, but it may be transitory or permanent. Frequently the change is almost instantaneous, and due to the appeal of a sermon or a speech combined with the emotional pressure of a crowd ; in which case the revivalists assure us that backslidings are frequent, and the prudent politician does not rely on that particular vote if the election is postponed. The astronomer who strives to

calculate the baffling orbits of variable stars has not a more difficult task than the propagandist who wishes to know how many of his audience will be of the same mind a month hence.

The faith that is born in a night may die in a day; the suddenness of the change merely argues an unstable will. These are not the stuff of which history is made. The memorable conversions that have changed the face of the world have been the slow products of time and circumstance; they have grown in solitude and tribulation of spirit, and been born in travail and anguish of soul. It is true that they may appear to be the work of an instant, since there must be a decisive moment in every great change, but the decisive moment is in fact but the summation of a long series of precedent tendencies, hesitations and doubts—for the abiding paradox of every faith is that it is rooted in doubt, the doubt of its predecessor—and that culminating moment is remembered when the previous history, no longer regarded as important, is forgotten. In the same way the lightning which issues from the cloud is photographed on the brain; but the oppression before the storm, the gathering darkness, and the rustling wind which heralds the convulsion, are almost obliterated from the memory. There is a popular theory that conversion changes a man's very nature. It may do so—for in the deep recesses of the soul even Tertullian's epigram becomes almost plausible—but what it changes is usually not so much the man as the direction of his energies.

When we put these theories to the test of fact, we shall find that for the real exemplars of faith in a superlative degree we must look to religion rather than politics. The reason is simple. Politics, like religion, are very largely matters of opinion; but politics are to some extent susceptible of proof by the event. Religion is not. No sensible man now believes in the divine right of kings. Many sensible men believe in transubstantiation and the apostolic succession.

Faith, like loyalty, can only flourish on sterile soil. It is rooted in difficulty, it grows in doubt, and it will not flower into full conviction unless surrounded by utter darkness. The greater the difficulty of believing, the greater the belief; the demand creates the supply.

Doubt is thus the parent of every creed; and by some paradoxical necessity of human nature, it is only the things that

are doubtful that need constant affirmation. The double procession of the Holy Ghost is affirmed—and denied—every Sunday by the two great divisions of Christendom. But nobody has made the multiplication table a rule of faith ; mathematics has no territories *in partibus*.

In all the great conversions of which history gives us details the records harmonise with our interpretation that the change is in the direction of the man, not of the man himself. There was a pregnant moment when Saul the persecutor became Paul the apostle. Unfortunately, we have no knowledge of the thoughts which preceded the vision in the road to Damascus ; but they were almost certainly coloured by vivid recollections of the last oration of St. Stephen, with the addition of remorse at the part which Saul had taken in bringing the first Christian martyr to his death. It would be difficult to imagine anything more likely to move a man of sensitive spirit than the auditory and visual memory of such a scene ; and it is significant that the conversion itself took both auditory and visual form. But while we can only conjecture the turmoil of St. Paul's mind on that fateful journey, we do know that the man of action, who was engrossed in religious affairs before his conversion, remained the man of action, engrossed in religious affairs for the remainder of his life. Saul of Tarsus was a devout Jew who travelled much on the business of his faith ; Paul the Apostle was a devout Christian who travelled more on the business of his faith. The faith was different ; the essential man behind the faith was the same.

There was a decisive moment in the lives both of the Emperor Constantine and St. Augustine which marked their conversion. Gibbon professes to doubt the former story, but there is little reason for scepticism ; Augustine has left his own experience on record, and despite an unacknowledged plagiarism from Plotinus elsewhere in the 'Confessions,' truth is stamped on every page of the autobiography. The Emperor was a great soldier ; the future Bishop of Hippo was a great scholar ; both had for some time been interested in the Christian faith. It is clear that in each case the moment of spiritual decision was the culmination of a long series of precedent tendencies, hesitations and doubts ;*

* In the case of St. Augustine, the previous chapters of the 'Confessions' furnish abundant proof.

and in each case the crisis was in keeping with the character. The soldier's vision bids him conquer ; the scholar's vision bids him make a book.

More than a thousand years later, a young soldier of Spain was stricken with illness. His health shattered and his career broken, he too saw visions and dreamed dreams and was converted. But he remained a man of action, and when he rose again, Ignatius Loyola founded a new and potent army for the Church. Other orders had required obedience from their members ; the Jesuits alone were organised on military lines, and submitted to the strict discipline which had made the Spanish troops the terror of the Continent. The purpose of the convert changed ; but the first general of the Jesuits was still a soldier beneath the cassock.

It would be easy to multiply examples, but in almost every case the process is the same. The faith makes the man, in the sense that his new conviction gives him a unity of purpose, and therefore a concentration of energy to one sole end which apparently redoubles his strength. The zeal of the convert is proverbial, but the results depend ultimately on the original character. Where this is naturally weak and unstable, enthusiasm soon cools, and old habits resume their sway ; but when it is strong, it may possess its possessor with a terrible conviction that blazes from his eyes, charges his every word with fire, and almost consumes his soul—of such heroic stuff are fanatics and martyrs made.

But in fact the faith only makes the man because the man has first made the faith that inspires him. While it is in the making—that is, while he is still assailed with doubt—he suffers agonies, he avoids his fellows, he almost hates himself ; when it is made he rejoices greatly, for he has found the certainty which to him is peace. But he suffers these transports, not because he is possessed by devils or succoured by angels ; but because for the time being he is, in the most literal sense of the word, not himself.

Almost every man prefers decision to indecision, even if he is not quite assured that the decision is sound ; a shaky bridge is better than a bog. But there is a type of positive character which actively hates doubt as the owl hates light or the cat hates water ; it must have certainty or perish. When doubt intrudes

in such a mind, as it sometimes will with beliefs which have been adopted in childhood without enquiry, like the rest of our mental furniture, it is as though civil war had broken out in the soul. The victim fights and struggles, he protests that he is the chief of sinners, and accuses himself of the unforgiveable sin against the Holy Ghost. The world may laugh, but to such a nature the strife is deadly earnest, for it is striving not with spirits but with its own flesh and blood; the house is divided against itself. Presently the doubts increase, and the whole universe seems to lie in ruins, for there is no longer certainty anywhere; follows a period of utter despair. But the positive character instinctively repels despair, which is the property of the weak and feeble; and the worst phase of the struggle is now over. Unconsciously the doubter has touched the bottom of his abyss, and he begins to climb the other side of the dark valley towards the mount of conviction. At last a light breaks in, a vision is seen; friendly voices welcome the pilgrim, and his feet now tread firmly the way of certainty. The mental balance, which abhorred doubt yet tolerated it against its will, is suddenly restored; but the new conviction is to the old belief as granite is to sandstone. It is the difference between belief founded on direct experience and belief inherited from tradition.

The furnace of suffering and desire has strengthened the convert; henceforth he cares nothing for ridicule or opposition, mere acquiescence is abhorrent to him, and he sets out to reform the world. What more natural than that he, who has trembled before the terrors of doubt, should now insist on belief as the one thing needful? It was the one thing needful—for him.

The great converts, in fact, were sceptics in spite of themselves. Reason, or its relative remorse, made them doubt—these are the 'obstinate questionings' of Cromwell and his kind—but doubt was alien to their very nature. Their whole being demanded certainty of conviction, and it is the first law of religious psychology that what a man seeks with all his heart he shall some day find. But it is only, in Tennyson's splendid phrase, 'through darkness and storm and weariness of mind and body there is built a passage to the gates of life'; and as the doubt of the convert has been greater than that of others, so his assurance becomes greater. This is the faith that can move mountains; but it can only do so because it has driven through the sands of doubt to

the rock beneath. Faith does not make the weak man strong, for the weak man never doubts, he merely exchanges one belief for another, like a pair of gloves ; but it makes the strong man stronger. The malleable multitude believes what it is told ; the strong man who has doubted and found assurance finds it literally true that his faith has made him whole. He has healed himself.

The man who seeks God finds himself. It is not certain that he finds God. For at bottom what he seeks is not God but the certainty that he has found God. Now many have found certainty of conviction. . . .

Faith is therefore the result of experience ; it must always rest itself on an interpretation of the evidence as seen. But this is merely the earthen root of the tree whose branches aspire to heaven ; St. Paul's great definition indicates that the tree itself is much more. Faith is not only an interpretation of the evidence as seen : it is its own evidence of things not seen. That alone accounts for the stark divergencies of belief ; for every man's interpretation of things seen differs slightly from his neighbour's, but the image he forms of an unseen world will differ far more radically. Yet this image itself becomes evidence for faith ; and for that reason it is the substance of things hoped for, since imagination ever follows closely at the heels of desire. Hope by itself is nothing : a mere bubble in the stream of consciousness ; but faith can transmute hope with conviction as surely as cold will change water into ice.

But there are others who have passed through no such crisis, because they have demanded no such certainty ; men who have been content to suspend judgment in face of the unknown, and watch the clash of creeds with tolerant or cynical or calculating smile. These are the natural agnostics, a smaller but still a goodly band of thinkers and men of action. Tertullian would hold them in contempt ; yet the world has learnt to respect some of them more than its Tertullians, for a few at least have dug deeper even than the great positives, and found that the rock on which faith rests is itself perched upon the void. The elephant supports the earth and the tortoise supports the elephant. But what supports the tortoise ?

But doubt has often been a dangerous trade,* and it has from its very nature few heroes and hardly any martyrs—for neither Gallio nor Galileo, the proverbial instances, can claim sacrificial rank—and some of its most prominent examples have been kings whose politic nonconformity has both scandalised and satisfied the intolerant opinion of their day. Henri Quatre is the classic type, but our own Henry VIII's title of Defender of the Faith also rings sardonically down the ages. Yet in fairness Leo X, who conferred it, must also be included. The whole temper of the Renaissance was in fact inclined to doubt.

But it is the thinkers rather than the men of action who have captained the doubters, and in Socrates and Bruno we find the only martyrs of agnosticism. Strange and unexpected names claim entry in the list ; but at their head unquestionably stands Horace, whose gentle scepticism, felt rather than expressed, has exempted him from pious censure ; and not far behind the present day will rank old Khayyam, more positive in his negations than the Roman poet—

‘ There was the door to which I found no key :
There was the veil through which I might not see.’

Voltaire and the encyclopædists, whose wicked wit fathered the age of reason—and passionate unreason†—have less of the stuff of permanence than these ; but a greater Frenchman still must be included. Pascal, for all the splendour of his style, which has deceived the very elect, was at heart a doubter rather than a devotee ; none that had found absolute conviction could employ his argument of the odd chance of salvation. Neither in Calvin nor in Bossuet shall we find so insecure and unstable an appeal. But our English Newman, too, must be added : a shy and wistful figure who lamented ‘ the tokens, so faint and broken,

* Partly because it has been confused with atheism. But the atheist is not a doubter ; he is as positive in his negation as the religious in affirmation. He, too, has found certainty, albeit in nothing. Probably the only reason why he does not persecute as bitterly as the theologian is because he is in a hopeless minority.

† It was Goya, the Spanish artist, who remarked truly that the dream of reason produces monsters.

' of a superintending design ; the blind evolution of what turn ' out to be great powers of truth ; the progress of things, as if ' from unreasoning elements, not towards final causes.*' One understands why the man who could write that was regarded with some suspicion by the Vatican ; these are far from the required accents of certainty.

But the greatest of all the agnostics remains : an inscrutable figure, despite his many pages, yet assuredly a doubter cast in the tolerant Horatian mould. There are many expressions of conventional religious sentiment in Shakespeare ; there are none which indicate the slightest interest in the religious controversies that had devastated Europe for a century past and were soon to devastate England. But the man who could write :—

' We are such stuff
As dreams are made of, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.'

spoke a language which the agnostic of every age instinctively understands, yet which no man with certainty of conviction could even think. It is the very creed of doubt.

It is probable that this temper is increasing ; the heroic ages, when faith saw itself in a mirror and fought its own likeness, are gone. Like a wondering child, it is now beginning to recognise its familiar features in the face that angered it, and is more chary of attack. Perhaps one need not regret the change, for a heavy indictment could be brought against faith by the historian. If it has saved many, it has destroyed not a few. Although born in suffering, it has no natural sympathy ; it is essentially hard and cruel. Its stark certainty makes it bellicose and intolerant, and it will persecute and slay rather than permit infidelity—which, like faith, is only a name for another opinion. It will persuade if it can ; but if not, it will willingly force ; it is ready to die for the glory of God, but equally ready to kill for the salvation of man. It will ape humility, but is proud and tyrannical at heart, for it will rank itself above morality, and despise its gentler but greater sister, charity ; instinctively it dislikes the idea of salvation *quia multum amavit*. If it has exalted the saints, sinners have ever found it a cloak of comfort ; more crimes have been committed in the name of faith than the

* Apologia.

name of liberty, and more oppressions by the hand of faith than by the hand of autocracy.

The poets tell us that the strength of woman is in her weakness, but the weakness of faith lies in its strength. It will break but not bend. And therefore it knows little of justice and less of mercy; bigotry and superstition are its natural children, for the one thing that faith cannot believe is that the truth will prevail. It doubts the power of the very God whom it professes to serve.

A. WYATT TILBY.

LITERARY STUDIES OF GREATER FRANCE

1. *Batonals : a Negro Novel from the French of René Maran.* Jonathan Cape. 1922.
2. *Koffi.* Par GASTON JOSEPH. Paris : Monde Nouveau. 1922.
3. *La Randonnée de Samba Diouf.* Par JÉROME ET JEAN THARAUD. Paris : Plon. 1922.
4. *Le Chef des Porte-Plume.* Par ROBERT RANDAU. Paris : Monde Nouveau. 1922.
5. *La Délivrance de Zacouren.* Par PHILIPPE MILLET. Paris : Plon. 1922.
6. *Marrakech, ou Les Seigneurs de l'Atlas.* Par JÉROME ET JEAN THARAUD. Paris : Plon. 1922.
7. *Rabat, ou Les Heures Marocaines.* Par JÉROME ET JEAN THARAUD. Paris : Plon. 1922.

DURING the war every kind of wood had to be made into arrows, and some of the literary arrows were very effective shafts. The war is over, but habit persists ; and the stamp of propaganda is strongly marked upon the literature, fast increasing in volume, which concerns itself with France in Africa, and Africa in France. Propaganda, though rightly suspect, may be a source of knowledge. These books, even when they are works of fiction, illustrate for us the immense French dominions in that continent from which Europe is divided only by the Mediterranean ; what is more important, they help us to comprehend France's attitude towards this vast extension of French power and responsibility.

Are the French going to bring Europe into Africa ? or Africa into Europe ? If either happens, their still-spreading conquests will have a far greater significance in history than all that England ever did in India. In any case, conquest will go on : for France there can be no looking back. Various forces and motives pushed her forward in the sudden career of expansion from 1880 onwards ; but now, one fact dominates the whole. Victorious France knows that even after her victory the Germans are six to four against her and will soon be two to one : she knows also that one of the chief aids to her Pyrrhic victory was the unexpected resource found in her African soldiers.

Ludendorff's saying ' France waged the war, especially in ' 1918, largely with coloured troops ' is quoted with acceptance

by General Mangin in his 'Comment finit la guerre.' The chapter of that work dealing with the colonial contingents has gone straight home to the French mind. In addition to 220,000 men enrolled for labour under military conditions, France used 545,000 dark-skinned fighters, of whom one in every five fell. They came from all her possessions, Indo-China, Madagascar, the Pacific Islands, Guiana; but the vast majority were African. 'The military annexation of our colonies is a fact,' says General Mangin, 'we must face it and give effect to all that follows from it.' 'France of overseas' has a population of fifty millions and a growing population. 'We must contemplate an army in which there will be as many coloured Frenchmen (*Français de couleur*) as white Frenchmen.' The burden of military service must, in his judgment, be equally distributed wherever France bears rule; but it must carry with it the advantages and opportunities of citizenship, chief among which is education. Forms of government must vary according to the needs and traditions of the varying countries and peoples. But the end is clear: the creation of 'a Greater France, placing at the disposal of civilisation the weight of a hundred million men.'

'*Hommes*': human beings, all of them *Français*; all of them 'at the disposal of civilisation.' Is this rhetoric? It would, I think, be canting rhetoric for any English writer to speak of Sikhs, for instance, as coloured Englishmen; and both Sikhs and English would resent it. But the Frenchman means by '*Français*' something similar to what Imperial Rome meant by '*Romanus*.' There is involved the idea of common citizenship based on the acceptance of a common authority and common principles. Without going back to Rome, we all know that the United States can turn an Italian, a Swede, a Pole, or a Roumanian into an American citizen, who thinks like an American, long before he can be said to speak like an American. The absorption of individuals from Europe, even by hundreds of thousands, into American citizenship is no doubt a very different problem from that of imposing the mould of French citizenship upon vast African populations in their own surroundings. But it is well to remember two facts.

The first of these is the extraordinary power of assimilation which France possesses. Look at Alsace and Lorraine—German countries Gallicised, and more Gallic than ever after forty years

of German occupation. Look at Savoy: how much 'Italia irredenta' is left in Nice, Garibaldi's native town? Secondly, even if we admit that French statesmen and administrators by no means interpret literally the ideas of 'liberty, fraternity and equality' in dealing with coloured races, yet the French are much less affected than the English-speaking and German-speaking peoples by the sense of a colour-bar. The English mind, as well as the German, has felt some dislike to the employment of African troops in European war, and actual repugnance to the occupation of conquered Germany by black battalions. The best answer which the French can make is that their policy, as expounded by General Mangin, contemplates maintaining a considerable proportion of African troops in France itself. If that policy be carried into effect, it is a real proof that France is willing to regard these soldiers of hers, not as coloured men, but as coloured Frenchmen.

Yet the claim to consider African troops as being to all intents and purposes European soldiers is a formidable new departure. There is nothing new in the proposal to make soldiers of them. Every European Power has done it, and at least one remarkable Englishman plainly contemplated the doing of it on a much larger scale. Sir George Taubman Goldie possibly knew more about Africa than any European of modern times, but his knowledge was chiefly expressed in action: he put very little of it into print. Yet in the twenty pages of his preface to Vandeleur's 'Campaigning on the Upper Nile and Niger' will be found the pith of his views concerning the regions of the Sudan. He emphasised that these vast populations, 'one-thirtieth of the human race,' had essential homogeneity, and close inter-communication. For many centuries they had played no part in the life of Europe; but now

'The barriers which from time immemorial have separated the Sudanese races from the remainder of the human family have at last been effectually broken down and it may be safely prophesied that within twenty years the union will be complete, provided vital errors of policy are avoided.'

This was written in 1898. Sir George Goldie went on to say that 'The entire northern belt from Senegambia to the Red Sea is inhabited by races at once capable of fighting and amenable to discipline.' His inference, as an Englishman, was that instead

of relying on Indian troops for service in all tropical climates, Great Britain should treat these 'regions bordering the southern 'limits of the Great Sahara' as 'an independent source of 'military strength.' He would assuredly have held that African troops drawn from 'the well-clad and intelligent and fairly 'civilised races of the interior' might for all purposes rank with those of British India; and he would no less certainly have admitted that no European Power had a better right than France to utilise this reservoir of man-power. But this is not to say that he would have regarded it as possible to make Frenchmen even of the most advanced among the Sudanese peoples—still less of the very different races along the Guinea coast, among whom France has recruited and purposes to recruit a great part of her African army.

According to General Mangin, there were in Europe, at the armistice, eighty-three battalions from Algeria and Tunis, twelve from Morocco and ninety-two more from West Africa. That is to say that about half the African contingent was furnished by men from the belt which runs along the Mediterranean and the Moorish coast; a very large proportion of whom in European dress might easily pass for Italians, Spaniards, or Frenchmen of the Southern provinces. The other half, broadly described as the Senegalese, includes many who in Sir George Goldie's sense belong to the Sudan; but it includes also many of the peoples who have practically no clothes, practically no civilisation, and if one of their own blood can be trusted, practically nothing that we could call intelligence.

If one asks whether France can conceivably make Frenchmen out of her African subjects, M. René Maran's 'Batouala' is in the strangest way a document to support either answer. For the author of the book is by race a pure African negro, but by position an official serving the French Government in Equatorial Africa, and the book which he has written was last December awarded the *prix Goncourt*. On the other hand, 'Batouala' is the picture of a race so unfit for European civilisation that mere contact with that civilisation has so far only tended to ruin and destroy it.

Controversy about such a work was inevitable and has been violent. Even the literary merit is denied. A foreigner's judgment must count for little, yet a foreigner, even if he did not happen to know that M. Maran's first work was in verse, could

see that 'Batouala' lies much nearer to poetry than to prose: it is the prose of a poet, and a poet whose language may be French but whose temperament is tropical. This story of some few days in the life of a petty negro chief, ending with his death, is an African idyll; hot, savage, violent, ugly, having rhythm and having vitality; but a rhythm and a life that are not ours. All through seems to run the pulsation of that drumming which is articulate language for the African bush, but for European ears mere frenzy. The life depicted has nothing in common with ours but the sun and the moon. Through this sole link is conveyed what we can recognise as beauty; yet at the same time we are made to feel that it is not our sun or our moon. There are many books about tropical Africa, but this story in its few concentrated chapters seems actually to give the sensations which the other books endeavour to describe. Its literary value has nothing to do with its value as a document, except this, that M. Maran has created literature for France. Rabindranath Tagore, the only native of British India who counts in English letters, has, I imagine, written primarily for Indian readers. Tagore most certainly is not an Englishman. M. Maran is really a Frenchman.

But it was not in Africa that M. Maran became French. The 'petite patrie adoptive' which he invoked when news of the war reached him, far south of Lake Tchad, was Bordeaux. Thirteen or fourteen years ago, he was one of a student group there, who played football together and together talked literature. From Bordeaux he sent his first attempt in verse to the *Beffroi*, a review published in Lille, whose editor, M. Leon Bocquet, wrote for the *Monde Nouveau* of last February an article from which these details are derived. In 1910, the young *Français de couleur* went out to take up an administrative post in the country from which he came and which was to him native, yet alien. 'For now,' he wrote to M. Bocquet, 'though French at heart, I feel myself on 'the soil of my ancestors—ancestors whom I reject because I 'have neither their primitive mentality nor their tastes, but they 'are my ancestors for all that.'

It is a pity that M. Bocquet has not told us from what ancestral stock in Africa this descendant came. We could judge the power of France to make a Frenchman out of African material much better if we knew how many generations divide M. Maran from

an ancestor who lived in Africa ; and also if we knew what life that ancestor lived. For the people he chooses to describe, because they are the only native Africans whose way of life he has seen intimately, are, as one of his assailants justly says, ' one of ' the most backward races in Africa.' They are pagans, in no way touched by the Mahomedan influence. All their life is ruled by instinct and by tradition. All they know of the European is that he has supernatural power and does not let them live their lives according to their custom. They must obey his orders—orders harshly given, enforced by heavy penalties. In return they get nothing.

So at least Batouala thinks, for Batouala is the chief, the man in power, whose power is only limited by the presence of white men. But when Batouala's chief wife is going to be submitted to the ordeal which shall discover if she caused the death of Batouala's father (who died of drink), she knows that her enemies will certainly use the opportunity to torture and kill her ; and if all things happened according to custom, there would be no escape. M. Maran would agree that when France is fully in control this is not possible, and even the neighbourhood of a French post offers a way out. Yassiguindja proposes to her lover, Bissibingui, who also is threatened by Batouala's jealousy, that he shall fly with her to the white man's town and sign on as a native soldier. ' Once a *tooroogoo*, what *mbi* will dare to make ' any claim against you ? ' Bissibingui admits the attraction. As a militiaman, instead of paying taxes, he will collect them ; he will be powerful ; he can carry out the Commandant's order to punish and can tell the Commandant stories to make him give profitable orders.

So one gets to the other aspect of this book, which is not only a work of art but an indictment. For the most part the indictment is confined to a preface ; in the scene between Yassiguindja and her lover, it gets into the work of art,—perhaps justifiably. Bissibingui is a black who knows that the Europeans have power ; but he knows it only as a power to oppress, with which he can league himself. That is part of the picture. Yet we must not take M. Maran as proposing that France should go out of Africa, or as desiring to maintain for ever the type of existence lived by Batouala and his tribesmen. The preface makes its indictment directly, not by implication. M. Maran appeals as a Frenchman

to Frenchmen ; he cries to his ' brother writers of France ' for support against the methods of colonial rule and the type of men employed in it. Administration by white men who are drunken, who are ignorant, who understand neither the language nor the customs of those whom they rule may indeed be a worse oppression than even the most barbarous native customs. It may exterminate the native Africans : it cannot make Frenchmen of them. Bissibingui may enter the French service as a *toorooogoo*, but the fez on his head is not going to civilise him any more than the rifle in his hand. And M. Maran is in revolt against the idea of sending these unfortunate people to be butchered in defence of a civilisation to which they do not belong, which is to them of no value.

So far then as this document says anything, it is negative. The Africa which M. Maran has known is desperately remote from civilisation ; it feels no need to change, it resents change ; and the methods and men that civilisation is employing will never civilise it. Yet the book is written by a negro, carrying out laboriously the duties of a French administrator, and as passionately concerned for the fate of France as any other Frenchman. It is doubtful whether England has so completely assimilated any British Indian. Certainly no negro has ever created artistic work of the first importance in the English tongue. M. Maran's indictment cannot be disregarded ; it has too much authority. Yet in the great task to which France is committed, nothing is needed so much as an interpreter between the peoples. M. Maran is an interpreter ; the existence of him and of his book is of more hopeful augury than anything to be found in other studies of France's work among the negro races.

Take ' Koffi,' by M. Gaston Joseph, for whose authority on detail M. Angoulvent—sometime Governor-General of the colonies—goes warrant. This *roman vrai d'un noir* describes, according to him, a truly typical career. Nor is the ex-Governor-General unduly optimistic.

' Many West coast natives (he says) leaving their villages, go to the towns, find places in the households of white men, rise in that employment, pass into the lower grades of public service, finally get the chance to go back and guide the development of their own people—and, as a rule, for one reason or another, come to a bad end.'

In truth, Koffi, the black boy, who wanted to be like a

Frenchman, might be quoted as an awful example. A naked little Pagan, living in an inland village of the Ivory Coast, he was fired by the conversation and appearance of a somewhat older youngster who returned from town to swagger about in European clothes and talk about the shops and gaities. Finally, Koffi bolted. Following the telegraph wires, in four days he reached Aboisso, and was taken on as supernumerary scullion in the house where his friend was employed. When he got a place on his own account, a kindly master saw to it that he got schooling. His next employer was a district magistrate, and in his service, Koffi, now in European kit, travelled far through the bush, and after many experiences of love, finally married a lady who had been attached to a white man. They married because neither wanted to go back to the native way of life and the old outlook. When his administrator goes home on leave, Koffi finds a place as cook in the house of a timber speculator and has difficulties, some of which arise from the speculator's wife's temper and some from his own proneness to drink. On the return of the administrator, promoted to charge of the district in which is Koffi's native village, Koffi presents himself, and is welcomed back as a person of influence and importance. He shortly becomes so in good earnest, for the district interpreter is broken for malpractices, and Koffi takes his place. 'It is impossible to demand from an administrator who generally stays no more than two or three years in one district 'a knowledge of all the dialects used among its peoples.'

In short, the transmission of ideas, through which the Africans are to be turned into *Français de couleur*, cannot be direct. Yet M. Gaston Joseph indicates that in the settled Ivory Coast, a good many Africans have been converted at least to the desire to be French. Koffi, in the days when he was cook in a civilian household at Abidjan, attended the meetings of '*La Jeunesse Intellectuelle*'; he listened with admiration to speeches in the equivalent of Baboo English. His knowledge of French, however imperfect, enabled him when acting as interpreter for a capable and wise magistrate, to help on the work of civilisation. But, finally, when the chief of his tribe died, Koffi contrived to be chosen as his successor. Then the trouble began. On the moral side, Koffi's conversion had been genuine. Where the chiefs before him had given judgments based on custom, and on a superstitious tradition, the *Français de couleur* decided according

to equity, following the example of his late master. Further, he never called in the aid of fetish diviners. Naturally he had the fetishmen up in arms. They succeeded in giving him a dose of poison, enough to frighten him and send him for advice to his mother—against the opinion of his Europeanised wife. The mother passed him on to a witch and between the two all the fetish belief was revived in his mind. Still, he continued to be the advocate in his tribe of white men's ideas. His fellow tribesmen come to him and complain of increased taxes for which they get nothing. He tells them they get protection which gives them peace; they get free dispensaries and attendance—and schools where the children can be taught what the parents never knew. We learn thus what the good French official desires to fix in the native mind. Special stress is laid on the value of roads, and of vehicles for transport to replace human portorage. But though Koffi can argue, he cannot enforce, and when his people strike against their taxes, he must take their part. His worries bring on drunkenness, he loses all authority, and in the end is arrested by the orders of his old chief and sentenced to banishment in the far-off and dreaded Congo. It is pleasant to learn that he achieved peace and prosperity there by manufacturing and selling an aphrodisiac, until he died of drink. Still, considered as an apostolate his career was not a success, and M. Angoulvent, admitting it as typical, can only declare his faith that all the unsuccessful Koffis, all the *Français de couleur* who end by being indifferent Africans, go like fallen leaves 'to form a rich humus 'out of which will spring one day the Tree of Life and the Tree of 'Knowledge.'

'Koffi,' though published in 1922, takes no account of the new factor introduced into African life by France's military necessities. How much has service in Europe, as part of the French army, contributed to make Frenchmen of the black soldiers? One turns to 'La Randonnée de Samba Diouf,' by MM. Jérôme and Jean Tharaud, whose power of interpreting exotic peoples is even more remarkable than their gift as writers. But in this book they are not interpreting what they have observed themselves; their picture is constructed from materials supplied by the talk of an African administrator, one of the exceptional magistrates who have acquired the native tongues. Samba Diouf, whose 'roving' the book chronicles, is a fetishist negro, but of

the well-clad and cultivated peoples who speak 'rich and flexible' languages capable of rendering fine shades of meaning.' A river fisherman by trade, he sets out on his roving to claim the heritage left him by his mother's brother, across the Niger, in the country of the Fulahs. But already the news had reached Africa that there was war among the white men. MM. Tharaud tells us how, flashed by cable to Dakar, it was flashed again by wires that penetrated the deep bush until in far-away posts black men came to the bureau and found the message automatically written down. Samba pushed on his road, making surprising discoveries of people whose language was unintelligible to him and who wore no clothes. Others again, the Mandingoes, were of his mother's people and as well clad as he, but were Mahomedans, despising him for an infidel. To them a further message had just come, saying that France, who had made the roads safe so that all could travel freely, and who had stopped slave-raiding so that each man could cultivate or trade in peace, now demanded a proof of their gratitude: one soldier for every hundred inhabitants. So, profiting by the vice of the heathen, they make Samba Diouf drunk and hand him over as the village conscript.

That was how his roving took him to France, where he found himself part of a battalion formed from men of twenty different races, many of whom understood each other only through the few words of French they had acquired. There is one man whose tongue no one in the battalion knows, and when he goes, mortally sick, to the doctor, he cannot explain his trouble nor have it explained. He dies among a frightened mob, who believe him to be a vampire. But broadly speaking, all this strange muddle of races, who still maintain their own racial identity and keep their racial feuds, recognise two things in common to them: first, that they are black; second, that they are French. Something like this must have existed in the armies of imperial Rome. One of the surprising facts that Samba reports when he comes back, maimed and medalled, is that all races, all classes, all religions are equal in the army: 'no one sits higher than his neighbour, unless he has the corporal's or the sergeant's stripes.' Further: 'All the races of the world are assembled in the white men's country. But of the men who have not red ears, we are the most in number, and we are the stoutest-hearted, and that is why the white men of France will destroy the white men of Germany.'

All are equal in the army. Also, blacks are not whites, but they are the allies of the French white men. Perhaps in these facts there is the germ of an idea of liberty, equality and fraternity.

In the remainder of Samba's adventures, before he brought home his heritage of cattle, it is to be noted that he had no fear of being robbed in a journey of many days, through many peoples. The 'pax Gallica' created by the power of France is unchallenged. But the MM. Tharaud are too faithful to suggest that the presence of this power is welcomed by those who submit to it. Neither do they attack the question whether such power in the hands of unworthy agents may be oppressive.

M. Robert Randau's novel, 'Le Chef des Porte-plume,' has a bearing on this question. It is a detailed study of French officialdom in tropical Africa; and though the author does not canvass directly the character of French rule in its relation to the negro people, his impression of the rulers cannot be called reassuring. M. Maran says hard things about the prevalence of drunkenness among French officials. M. Randau's picture is charged with alcoholism. But that is only one count in what may fairly be called his indictment of French human nature, as exhibited under tropical conditions. Like M. Claude Farrère in 'Les Civilisés,' a book dealing with colonial life at Saigon, M. Randau holds that the Frenchman is apt to run wild sexually in the tropics. Yet, after all, though these French writers say it with the detail in such matters characteristic of the French novel, what do they say more than Mr. Kipling?

'Ship me somewheres east of Suez, where the best is as the worst, Where there ain't no Ten Commandments, an' a man can raise a thirst.'

M. Randau makes it very plain that in his opinion West Africa is no country for the white man, still less for the white woman. He shows us indeed a hero, but a hero in premature decay. Ledolmer, Governor-General of West Africa, in his career—and he is not fifty—has converted a group of African cantons into an Empire, 'une France noire.' Single in authority, working through picked assistants, he has 'grown into an African king,' still unrivalled in the native policy which has been his life's work; breaking up the tyranny of aggressive sovereignties, grouping races after such a fashion that the weaker shall be independent of those who before oppressed them, obliterating

feudal lordships by progressive emancipation of their serfs, friendly to Mahomedanism, yet curbing the power of the Mahomedan priesthood, which sought to replace the hereditary nobles. All these old problems the Governor-General can handle with the same mastery as he stops a dangerous faction-fight between two parties of native workmen. But the new problems, though they actually grow out of his own work, need a new effort and find him lethargic. Ceasing to be a master, he becomes no more than a 'chief of quilldrivers'; a bureaucrat maintaining the department's tradition, and surrounded by a petty camarilla, in which he tolerates rogues and blackguards, because, though knowing them for what they are, he has known them a long time, in a country where few last long. And though he loves like brothers the men who have worked for him and with him in the bush, he is furiously jealous of new brains when they threaten to rival his own ascendancy. Especially is he jealous of their attitude to the new Africa. With the establishment of peace and the destruction of feudalism, 'a middle class begins to be established, eager for European ideas.' Trade develops; the negro who used to carry his stuff by human portage to the coast, now finds the dealer coming to his door; labour is specialised and with the growth of commerce come new petty dealers competing with the old established firms, jealous of them, and prepared to ally their interests with those of the blacks.

The scene of the book passes at Keurdoul, that is St. Louis, the new town that has superseded Goree; and this old settlement has, like a few transmarine colonies, direct representation in the Chamber. An election is described. The sitting member, a Europeanised mulatto, is defeated by a negro candidate. M. Randau indicates that this is a good thing and a complete innovation. The successful candidate is of noble stock, from one of the best races; he speaks French perfectly and has served in local administration. If he claims equality for himself and for his electors, his first demand is that they shall be on the same military footing as other Frenchmen. This may sound improbable. Yet M. Gaston Joseph represents his hero Koffi as going off to ask leave to pay capitation-tax, so that he may have stamped papers of citizenship. Probably the claim to be conscripted would be less enthusiastic now than in 1914; but at all events, M. Randau may be quoted for the opinion that

among the superior negro races, and in a centre where French influence has been felt for several generations, there is emerging 'une France noire'—a society which is black and which is French.

I do not propose to go into the scenes of this extremely disagreeable novel, which describe how a Governor-General and his associates behave when off duty. On duty they are, M. Randau implies, as different as Jack at sea from Jack ashore. But I must quote one passage in which Ledolmer asks himself why Frenchmen should risk their lives in West Africa, where their race can never be acclimatised, and can only atrophy through crossing bloods.

'What are we here for? To make the fortune of a few dozen more or less honest traders? To teach the negroes Rousseau's paradoxes about human goodness and the social contract? These folk were used to simple ideas and beliefs; we upset their psychology—to what end? Are they some day to create republics like Liberia, or the South American States? We shall have spent ourselves only to bring about the triumph of race hatred. The half-civilised townspeople have their mouths full of the principles of 1789; they make only one inference from them: that you must push out the European. And what pains me most is, that among them no man of mark arises, no thinker, writer, or artist; the tropics never produce anything that counts in the scale of human thought.'

One may observe that Dumas' father was half a negro, and there is now M. Maran. Still, this point of view needs an answer, which M. Randau puts into the mouth of a younger man. Rousseau's doctrines, says this philosopher, are everywhere challenged by 'the new pragmatism,' which allows nothing to be real except what is serviceable. 'The African blacks hold the 'great reserves of raw materials; at this moment their best blood 'is being shed with ours against the Boche; therefore we need 'them; therefore they will commit themselves to our path; and 'for us to guide them in it, is only the last item in the menu of 'our policy.'

That puts it plain enough. France's need (not her impulse to take up the white man's burden) is decisive; she needs Africa and Africans; therefore she will guide them in her own way—perhaps without too rigid application of the doctrines of 1789. All the same, the ideas of 'liberty, equality and fraternity' have more influence with the French than is generally realised outside

France. Those ideas dictated the grant of direct representation in the Chamber to coloured communities, and a negro is much less out of his element in the Chamber of Deputies than he would be in the House of Commons.

It is pretty clear, however, that although M. Randau is glad to see black men chosen as deputies where representation exists, he would not desire that Senegambia should be organized as if it were part of France. This has been done long ago in Algeria; and no one seems enthusiastic over the result. Algeria is a white man's country. M. Philippe Millet makes us feel this in 'La Délivrance de Zacouren.' A southern country, yet a Mediterranean country; a country where Frenchman and Kabyle do the same manual labour side by side, know each other and fraternise, and, with a change of clothes, might be mistaken for each other; a country moreover where all the real business of life, all the fast-growing, economic prosperity, brings the races together. Yet M. Millet's novel is a piece of propaganda to show how they are kept apart; and if he is right, the inclusion of Algeria in the home country's political system has made for estrangement rather than for union. Perhaps he would rather say that a nominal union has been carried out in a spirit of ascendancy. The problem which concerns him is not one affecting the labouring classes: it touches those Africans who have genuinely assimilated French culture, but remain Mahomedan. They may, if they choose, accept naturalisation; yet even then they are still, in colonial slang, '*bicots*.' If there is not an Anglo-Indian equivalent, it is because 'native' is apt to have a quite sufficient inflection of contempt—much more than goes into *indigène*.

The story hinges on the fortunes of a young doctor, Paris-trained, who has come back to practise near the home of his father, an Algerian noble, sometime Caid. Son and father alike speak French to perfection, but the father remains a devout Mahomedan; the son retains only the fez, wearing this headgear with European clothes. Their attitude is so well known (for the father wears the ribbon of the Legion of Honour) that the son has been appointed physician to the local State dispensary; and he is even recognised as enjoying the favours of the handsomest lady in Zacouren. At this peaceable little port, where everybody is on friendly terms, one fine day there arrives a blackguardly

journalist, who, whipping up an anti-Moslem campaign, assails the doctor's father. The son demands an apology, is insulted, and smacks the face of his insulter, who joyfully takes this as the starting-point for inventing an anti-European plot. M. Millet constructs a fantastic adventure, such as George Birmingham might have devised about the West of Ireland, with the police playing their inevitable part. Nothing comes off; the *agent provocateur* can elicit no more than a few expressions which even police methods cannot torture into evidence. The whole organization to defend a town which no one thought of attacking is covered with ridicule, and finally the blackguardly journalist who refused to fight the doctor has to meet one of the doctor's European friends in a duel, described with admirable gusto.

M. Millet does not spare the type of Frenchman whom a publicly humiliated coward can still lead by the nose. But his satire has a more serious mark. Appeals to the Governor-General end in withdrawing the proclamation of martial law, in the rout of the journalist and the removal of the police inspector. Yet Belkacem, the doctor, returning radiant from Algiers, where the Governor-General has been more than civil, and has issued an excellent proclamation, is promptly sent for by the local sub-prefecture, and is informed that the Governor must dismiss him from his medical post. It is a mistake to suppose that the policeman was removed; on the contrary, he has been promoted. Still, to counterbalance the appearance of a removal, the doctor also must disappear. Algerian administration must remain constant to its traditional methods. Governors-General come and go. Knowing nothing of Algeria, in spite of this or that fine speech about generous treatment of the natives, they cannot reject the advice of their experienced permanent colleagues. 'And, permit me to add, doctor,' says the French official to the son of the old Caid, 'that if you knew this country as I do, you ' would agree that our methods are the only ones that suit it.'

French society follows the Government's lead. Belkacem's European patients forsake him, his friends give him the cold shoulder, his mistress deserts him. His father rejects with scorn the idea that he should become naturalised.

'What use? There is nothing to be done with the French. Every ten or twenty years we imagine they are on the point of treating us as something else than a conquered people. I thought it in my youth.

I thought the French Revolution a finer gospel than Islam ; I told myself the Republic would be more liberal than the Empire. In the end my eyes were opened and I saw that these people will never rise high enough in spirit to make room for the best of us by their side.'

He wants his son to come back to the native life, take charge of his ancestral estates, marry in the traditional way. But what the father did, the son cannot do. Europeanised as he is, he could not endure such a life or such a marriage. Since in Algeria he can be neither fish nor flesh, he is on the point of leaving the country when a word of counsel stops him. It comes from a real *colon*, the old Alsatian inn-keeper and farmer :—

' I know you, doctor (he says), for you were at school with my sons. All the small settlers know you and they know there is not a better man. Enemies of France ! They aren't where they are being looked for. How many real settlers are there among these politicians who are ruining the country ? All the lot are men that live in the cafés, and never had their hand on a plough. What would I do in your place ? What I've always done : I'd face it out. In this country the hardy man always gets his way in the end.'

And so Dr. Belkacem decides to face it out—knowing that he and the generation for whom he stands can have no comfort in life. Just one thing he has gained : the respect and friendship of those Northern Frenchmen, who before misfortune had tried him, ranked him, at best, as ' about three-quarters of a *Français du midi*.'

Clearly M. Millet thinks it not impossible to make either an Algerian or an Arab into a French citizen : French with a difference, yet not less French than the African saint, Augustine, was Roman. But he does not think France has gone the best way about doing it in Algeria. Clearly again in his view, the barrier is not racial. Islam is the difficulty ; and his hope seems to lie in the chance of liberating the native African from his creed. I do not find in his book that feeling for the charm of Mahomedan culture, and appreciation of its human value, which marks the two brilliant studies of Morocco by the brothers Tharaud.

It is very significant that their two volumes of descriptive essays should have each gone through nearly forty editions. They have indeed great beauty as literature ; but, would any descriptive essay run into forty editions, unless popular interest in the subject were wide-spread and keen ? Morocco is a

possession for which France risked much, to win it finally under the most romantic conditions. Naturally, France is more than willing to be told how the exploit was achieved ; and the first book 'Marrakech, ou les Seigneurs de l'Atlas' tells it with extraordinary picturesqueness. Her people are ready also to listen to descriptions of the strange country, a cannon-shot from Europe, yet inconceivably remote and mysterious, which it is now their admitted privilege to subjugate and penetrate. They do well to study the subject ; for a genuine success in Morocco might solve their whole African problem. In winning for France the willing allegiance of Moorish peoples it might enlist on the side of France the influence that Islam can exercise in Africa.

For France, as for Great Britain, but more sharply for France, Islam is the difficulty and the hope. Very few deny its efficacy to raise the negro races in the scale of civilisation. Its spread by peaceful means to-day in Africa is rapid and continuous ; and when it converts, it admits to a religious brotherhood that knows no colour-bar. Christian Europe, even when it ceases to be officially Christian, is less welcoming. We know the position of the Christianised negro ; and if M. Millet is right, the Europeanised Mahomedan is not much better off—neither fish nor flesh. But in Morocco, before the conquest, a negro might become anything : he might rise from slave to ruler. The Moorish noble is considered no less noble because his mother was black and he himself has negroid features. In Algeria there existed presumably a culture, through contact with which the native of the blackest tribe in Guinea might rise to a high level of civilisation. That path, if it still exists at all, leads only to a dead end. 'In Algeria (say the MM. Tharaud, on almost the last page of their 'Rabat : les Heures Marocaines') we have created 'an organization for a century without taking Islam into our reckoning, and we have killed things that cannot be restored. 'There, the high days of Islam are over.' In Morocco only there exists still among an African people the civilisation which five centuries ago was dominant in Spain ; whose monuments in Spain are still Europe's admiration. With that civilisation the black man, if he is Mahomedan, can identify himself fully. Is it possible to graft on to this culture those ideas which modern Europe regards as essential and so to make it possible that a Moor may become genuinely a French citizen, without ceasing

to be Mahomedan? If so, a bridge will have been thrown over the chasm between black and white; and also, as the MM. Tharaud make us feel, some rare and distinctive excellences will have been saved for mankind.

What then are the conditions of possibility? First, of course, superior power. Islam everywhere, but nowhere so fiercely as in Morocco, fights against alien penetration. The French have shown their power in a fashion whose dramatic splendour the English-speaking world has not realised. How many are aware that on July 25, 1914, General Lyautey received an order to withdraw from the country over which conquest had been spreading for ten years, and retain hold only of the coast towns. His army was strung out far in the interior along a vast chain of posts in the Atlas mountains. To withdraw would have meant certain attack from the mountain tribes upon the retreating battalions; it might have meant fighting their way through a rebellion behind them to the sea, to reach the coast, at best, already war-worn. And if France retreated in Morocco, the word would run like fire along the fringes of her vast African possessions from Tunis to the Congo. General Lyautey took his decision. He would send the twenty battalions asked of him; he would send more, but he would not withdraw an inch. More than that, he must even push on: in such a war there is no standing still. And so, with certain elements of the Foreign Legion, mostly German, not desired in Flanders, with a few territorials from the South of France, and with the levy of every Frenchman in the Coast towns, but mainly by Algerian and Senegalese troops, the line was held; and when the European war was over, France had advanced and not receded along the Atlas chain, where German propaganda was constantly busy with news of German triumphs and French defeats.

The fighting still goes on, like the wars on the British Indian frontier, but the power of France is not in debate; and the MM. Tharaud describe how to-day the Sultan whom France supports receives allegiance from tribes whom the greatest of his predecessors never forced to pay homage. But they tell also how these Berbers, the most purely African and least Arab of the Moorish people, are also the most tractable to European civilisation: they come and go readily to buy and sell, become artisans and labourers, taking service even in towns of France.

Passage after passage in 'Marrakech' renders admirably the aspect and manners of these fierce mountaineers, who yet may be brought more easily into European communion because their Mahomedanism is little more than skin-deep. What lies at the base of their beliefs is the animism, the nature-religion that all through Africa has so many forms, and that is not Oriental. Morocco is a western country, and the seigneur of whose personality we have so full a study—the lean ascetic-looking feudal noble with blazing eyes in a pale face—the man whose influence decided the Moorish nobles for France at the critical hour in 1914—he is a kind of link between Morocco of the fields and that Morocco of the towns which is described in 'Rabat.' If I read the MM. Tharaud rightly, the towns lying so much nearer, are yet the more difficult for Europe to reach.

Or perhaps it is that in 'Marrakech' the writers take their standpoint among General Lyautey's staff; they can interpret there without guesswork at least one side of this interplay of forces. We are told half of what is happening in this pageant, if we have to listen while they seek to divine the rest. But in 'Rabat' they stand, as the foreigner must stand, outside the closed door. With wonderful skill they build up a picture from visual observation, from every scent and every stench, and from the strange music of the pageantries. Those who know Mr. Henry Bishop's exquisite studies of these white and blue-washed towns, shimmering in a haze beside the Atlantic, with something of the Atlantic's coolness to abate the sultry glare, will here find the same insistence on the delicacy and charm which lingers in these old homes of pirates.

Yet, in the end of the book on 'Rabat,' a door opens. Where less than a generation ago, ambassadors of the great Powers were kept dancing attendance, now a printed invitation card summons guests to tea in the Sultan's palace. The first impression which the writers wish to convey is that General Lyautey comes to the Moorish Sultan with no underthought of ultimately replacing him and the order for which he stands by the best conceivable arrangements of governors and sous-préfets, but with a genuine desire to save the distinctive life of Islam in all its dignity and refinement, and leave to it the system of rule which best suits its genius.

There is no reluctance now among the greater Moors to adopt

Europe's mechanical inventions. The great seigneur of the Atlas has his costly motor cars; and if motor tractors can add a new granary to the world by ripping up fertile soil which has only been scratched in patches by such a plough as Virgil would have despised, Morocco is not likely to resist the prosperity that follows. The essential difficulty does not seem to be there. M. Millet shows us in Algeria the old noble, embodying all the dignity of his race and faith, and willing to make friends, yet wounded beyond endurance in his very dignity, till he can find no resource except in a fatalistic resignation, which leaves him of no service to Africa or to France. Can the French in Morocco make such a conquest as shall safeguard the dignity of those whose resistance they overcome?

Mary Kingsley, whose wisdom in dealing with problems of Africa such as those which 'Batouala' raises, has affected British policy deeply, thought that the two qualities by which Europe could justify its work were justice and science; even dealing as between humans, which, she held, all humans understand; and science, because without knowledge there can be no comprehension, and without comprehension no justice. I think she would have said that liberty and equality were less useful words than justice, because the European in dealing with a man of other race may quibble about what right is involved in the first two claims, but knows perfectly well what, as between man and man, is just; and no man, she would have held, need ask for more. 'Fraternity' she might have jibbed at as unscientific; but I can think of no other word which better expresses her own attitude towards Africans. And these two books of the MM. Tharaud are certainly towards Islam at least a gesture indicating the will to a fraternity, based upon recognition between two strong and ancient races of what is attractive in each other. If they correctly interpret the mind of General Lyautey, and if French policy in Africa continues to be guided by his inspiration, it is at least possible that the Moorish race, a true link between Europe and Africa, may without loss of pride, accept French citizenship. If that were so, the Moors might as easily impart to negroid Africa the civilisation which they had themselves assimilated, as other Mahomedan races from the north have imparted that of Islam.

STEPHEN GWYNN.

INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS AND TRADE UNIONS IN INDIA.

Labour in Madras. By B. P. WADIA. Madras : S. Ganesan & Co. 1921.

THE late Mr. Keir Hardie visited India in 1907 with some idea of trying to start trade unions there, but he found industrial conditions so different from those prevailing in England that he was driven to the conclusion that his purpose was premature. It is only recently that the trade union movement in India has achieved a limited measure of success. The purpose of this article is to point out some of the differences between English and Indian industrial conditions ; to show how far the Government has interfered between capital and labour by means of factory legislation, and to give some account of the development of trade unions in India up to the present time.

In India, agriculture is not the occupation of a diminishing minority, as in England ; roughly speaking, 90 per cent. of the manual workers in India gain their living directly from the soil. The bulk of the agriculturists work on their own account, and the number of agricultural labourers working for wages is relatively small. The handicrafts are largely domestic industries and the workmen have not yet been concentrated in factories, but remain their own masters, and support themselves by their own industry. The agricultural and artisan classes are not therefore for the most part directly interested in questions of wages, and have no object in joining trade unions which aim at raising the rate of wages.*

The classes to whom wages are of importance, and who are therefore likely to form trade unions, are the industrial workers, of whom the unions have as yet enrolled but an infinitesimal minority. These include persons employed in the cotton mills of Bombay, Ahmedabad, Nagpur, and Madras, etc., in the jute

* One exception to the general rule that agriculturists do not form unions, is that of the Kisans or tenant farmers of Oudh, who have formed a Sabha (union) to obtain for themselves better conditions of tenancy from the Talukdars or superior landlords.

mills of Calcutta, the cotton and woollen mills of Cawnpore and the Panjab, persons employed in the Government services, who have formed the Railway, Postal Service, and Telegraph Associations, workers in public utility services like the tramways, and the members of the Miners' Federation.

Mr. Wadia, in his 'Memorandum on Labour Problems in India,' presented to the Trades Union Congress, which sat in Glasgow, September 1919, describes Indian labour thus :—

'Labour conditions in India are exceptional; for in that vast country labour is not organized; it is exploited by the capitalistic class; its interests are not watched by the Government; the working hours are extremely long; the wages are miserably low; the housing problem is in the stage of mere academic and theoretic discussion.*'

The labour force in an Indian cotton or jute mill is not a more or less constant quantity, locally recruited, as in the English manufacturing districts, but its units are constantly changing. The workers do not come from the neighbourhood of the factories where they are employed, but from distant districts.† They nearly always own a small plot of land in their own villages and periodically absent themselves 'to go to their country' to attend to the cultivation of their own land. They only take service in the mills to earn extra money for some special need.‡ They are essentially rural and agricultural in their outlook, and are seldom lifelong workers in the mills like the Lancashire weavers.

Their labour, though cheap, is expensive to supervise. They are as a rule disinclined to strenuous toil, but do not mind long hours of labour provided the bonds of discipline are not drawn too tight, and they are allowed, at frequent short intervals, to drink water, smoke their hookhas, and chat with their friends. The Indian unions are often mere strike committees; they are not the result of spontaneous effort among the workers themselves, but have usually been formed in accordance with the advice of outside demagogues. As the Government of India points out,

* 'Labour in Madras,' p. 177.

† The cotton mills of Nagpur are an exception, as they recruit their labour force from places close at hand.

‡ On this ground, the Bombay Industrial Disputes Committee came to the conclusion that 'the evolution of any means of preventing and adjusting strikes and trade disputes, in such a floating and illiterate body lacking any homogeneity, is exceedingly difficult.'

the unions ' frequently represent little more than the aims of ' third parties, whose motives are not always disinterested.' They are therefore somewhat of an exotic growth. They are as yet very loosely organized and are bound by few rules ; they do not insist on the publication of accounts, and give no sick or unemployment benefits.* Owing to want of education among the trade union members, such officials as the unions possess have not risen from the ranks of labour, like the officials of English trade unions, but are outsiders, with little experience or sympathy with manual labour, and only anxious to exploit it for political purposes.

The All-India Trade Union Congress, in its reply to the Government of India's request for its views as to the recognition and registration of trades unions, claims the right to include among the members of trades unions, outsiders, who are not workers or employers, on the ground that the ordinary workers are not yet sufficiently educated to keep accounts or act as officials.

Another difference is that the English worker is always afraid of losing his employment and adopts the expedients of ' ca' canny ' in the hope of making more work, and so of providing employment for some of his unemployed mates. In India, on the other hand, there is little or no unemployment, except among Europeans.

Work in the mills or factories is only a secondary occupation ; therefore Indian workmen are not very keen to pay subscriptions to their unions, or to sacrifice their personal liberty to union discipline, at the bidding of officials, who are often not themselves Labour men. They are unwilling to take personal trouble to ensure the efficient working of their unions. An instance of this lack of interest in their unions shown by workmen was quoted by the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, in reply to the Government of India's enquiry as to its views on the registration and protection of trade unions. The Bombay Central Labour Federation, the largest union in the Bombay Presidency, recently asked the local mill owners to allow the union officials to do their work inside the mill premises, as otherwise they found it impossible to get their members to sign their membership forms outside the mill gates.

* The Calcutta Employees' Association is an exception, as it is a benefit society rather than a trade union.

Thus the unions have little power over their members, and are not sufficiently trusted by the rank and file to do much in the way of 'collective bargaining.' Mr. F. G. Ginwalla's evidence before the Bombay Industrial Disputes Committee bears upon this point. He recommended that rules should be passed :

- i. Giving union officials power to make agreements with employers, which should be binding on the men ;
- ii. Prohibiting strikes, unless there was a two-thirds majority of the workers in favour of striking.

The want of such rules shows how rudimentary, when judged by English ideas, Indian unions must be.

Indian Labour may be divided into three classes according as it is employed in : (1) factories ; (2) mines ; (3) agriculture, including plantations.

There are three main problems connected with it :

- i. The improvement of the conditions under which children and adults work in factories ;
- ii. The organization of workmen's unions and Conciliation Boards for the prevention of industrial strife ;
- iii. The provision of compensation to workmen for injuries received in the course of their employment, and of a payment to their families in the event of the injuries proving fatal.

The first point is provided for in the Indian factory legislation, which has been modelled upon that of England, and has given protection first to children, then to women, and afterwards to adult workers against the enforcement of excessive hours of labour. This legislation should be a sufficient answer to Mr. Wadia's charge against the Indian Government of neglecting to watch the interests of labour. But the factory inspection which it prescribes is said by Mr. Wadia to be ' more or less superficial.*' On the other two points mentioned above, the Government of India is consulting the local governments and employers' and workers' associations.

A few facts may be given to show the gradual extension of the protection given by the law to the workers.

In the Factory Act of 1881 the minimum age for employment

* Labour in Madras, p. 218.

of children was fixed at seven years, and the working day for children at nine hours. The Act was applicable to all factories using steam or other mechanical power in which 100 hands habitually worked. Shortly before 1888 Lancashire began to take an interest in the hours of employment in Indian mills, and in 1888 the Manchester Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution that 'in view of the excessive hours of labour now worked in the cotton mills of British India, the British Factory Acts, in so far as they relate to the employment of women, young persons and children, should be extended to and include the textile factories of British India.' This interference was resented by Indian mill-owners as resulting from interested motives and the apprehension of Indian competition, but it was largely instrumental in bringing about the Factory Act of 1891.

By the Act of 1891 the minimum age for children was raised to nine years, and the working-day reduced to seven hours. This Act also brought adult women under the law, limiting their working day to eleven hours, and providing for intervals of rest of one and a-half hours every day. The law was also extended to include all factories in which 50 hands habitually worked. Previous to the Act of 1891 the custom was to collect the workers on Sunday to clean the machinery without extra pay, thus depriving them of any opportunity of rest during the week. By the Act of 1891 Sunday was made an obligatory day of rest for all classes of Labour.

In 1907 the Factory Commission reported that the hours worked by adult male labour were appalling: cotton mills worked 13 to 14 hours a day; jute mills worked 15 hours a day.

In 1911 another Factory Act was passed. Its main effect was to extend the law to all factories working more than four months continuously. Thus cotton ginning mills, which do not work all the year round, were brought under the operation of the law.

In January 1922 a much more drastic Act received the assent of the Legislature. By this Act adult male labour has been brought under legal regulation. The working week for all adult labour is fixed at 60 hours with a maximum of 12 hours on any one day, with an hour's interval for rest. This Act also raises the minimum age for child workers to 12 years, and fixes their maximum working day at 6 hours, with half an hour's interval

for rest. The Act applies to all factories employing twenty persons.

The miners in the Indian coal mines form another important wage-earning class. For their benefit, the Indian Mines Act of 1901 was passed, which subjects all mines penetrating more than twenty feet below the surface to Government inspection, and provides that they must be under the control of managers possessing prescribed qualifications. Further rules for coal mine management were issued in 1906-1907. In 1911 manganese, mica, and limestone quarries, and in 1918 tungsten and tin mines in the Tavoy district of Burma, were brought under regulation.

The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms did not leave the Indian industrial workers out of their consideration. The Joint Parliamentary Committee recommended that 'an effort should be made to secure better representation of the urban wage-earning classes.' Mr. Wadia suggested that all factory workers in Madras drawing wages amounting to Rs.15 a month and over should have a vote. The draft rules drawn up by the Government of India proposed the creation of a special constituency in Calcutta, for which workers in factories drawing wages between Rs.25 and Rs.35 a month should be eligible to vote, and of a similar constituency in Bombay City, for which workers in textile factories drawing wages of Rs.40 a month should form the electorate. The Joint Parliamentary Committee substituted for these elective representatives two members, to be nominated to the Legislative Councils of Calcutta and Bombay, to represent Labour, but nothing was done for the workers of other important industrial centres, such as Ahmedabad, Cawnpore, or Madras.

The Treaty of Versailles brought about an important change in the estimation of Labour questions by giving them an international as well as a domestic aspect. India claims to be one of the eight chief industrial States, and so to have a voice in choosing the Governing Body of the International Labour Office.

At the International Labour Conferences held at Washington in October 1919, India was represented by Messrs. Wadia and Joshi, Sir Louis Kershaw (for the Government of India) and Mr. Murray (for Indian employers); at the Genoa Conference in June 1920, by Sir William Meyer, the Maharao of Kutch, and Mr. Srinivasa Sastri; and, at the Geneva Conference in

October 1921, by one of the secretaries to the Government of India, Mr. Chatterjee.

The recommendations of the first two conferences have been ratified by the Indian Legislature, and were passed into law in January 1922.

The Government of India and the Provincial Governments have provided themselves with administrative machinery to enable them to deal with Labour questions, such as labour bureaus, which are intended to keep in touch with similar organizations in other countries, and to collect statistics about strikes, wages, and the cost of living. They have also, in accordance with Article 427 of the Peace Treaty, recognised all associations of their subordinates which comply with certain rules, and have permitted the formation of Works Committees, on which workmen are represented, in the Government printing presses.

The Government of Bombay is better equipped on the Labour side than any other Provincial Government. In Labour matters it has availed itself of the advice of Mr. F. H. McLeod, Chairman of the British Industrial Court, and the Bombay Labour Bureau publishes a *Labour Gazette*. In July 1921, Mr. J. B. Petit carried a resolution in the Bombay Legislative Assembly recommending Government to appoint a committee to consider and report on the practicability of methods for the prevention and early settlement of labour disputes. The Industrial Disputes Committee was appointed accordingly, and it recommended the appointment of Courts of Inquiry and Conciliation, consisting of three members chosen from the employers and three members from the workers, with a chairman chosen from a panel of chairmen, which would be kept in the Labour Bureau. Three members to represent the general public may be added to the Court, if a Government Department or public utility company or corporation is involved. The Court of Inquiry may sit at the request of either party to the dispute. The Court of Conciliation requires the consent of both parties, the Government appoints it, and then leaves it free to investigate the dispute and promulgate its findings, which are left to be enforced by public opinion. The Bombay Committee was presided over by Sir Stanley Reed, and its report concludes with a valuable testimony to the influence of welfare work in softening the bitterness of industrial disputes.

The Bengal Industrial Unrest Committee of 1921 recommended the establishment of similar Courts at Calcutta, and Courts of Inquiry and Conciliation have also been set up at Cawnpore and Madras.

In his speech to the Imperial Legislative Council in August 1920, Lord Chelmsford appealed to Indian employers to prevent strikes by removing their causes, and to bring about a closer union between Capital and Labour, by persuading the workers that their true interest lies in co-operation, not in conflict, with Capital. He reminded them that the workers demand 'not merely the right to live in comfort but a living interest in their work.'

The India Office has also created a new branch, to deal with industrial questions, which is called the Industries and Overseas Department.

The report of the Indian Industrial Commission published in 1919 had a section entitled 'The Indian in Industries,' in which a statement was made that the low wages paid to the Indian worker were counterbalanced by his comparative inefficiency.* The remedies proposed were to remove this inefficiency by raising the Indian worker's standard of living, by better education, better housing, and a system of apprenticeship 'in the manipulative industries.' Improved industrial hygiene in India is a political as well as an industrial necessity, as Sir Ronald Ross has shown in his 'Wretchedness a cause of political unrest.†

The Indian worker can no longer be looked upon as a mere machine and socially neglected. Welfare work, such as that undertaken by the Servants of India and the Social Service League, and the Salvation Army in Ahmedabad and Nagpur, is needed to improve his moral and physical environment.

Mr. Wadia points out the connection between overcrowding

* This inefficiency is largely to be accounted for by the fact that he has often to work with obsolete machinery, and raw materials inferior to those used by European workers. Major F. Norman White, I.M.S., Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of India, is of opinion that 'a large part of the relative inefficiency of Indian labour is due to removable pathological causes.' Indian Industrial Commission, Appendices to the Report; Appendix L, p. 164.

† *The Survey*, Feb. 1911.

and the death rate. In Bombay 744,000 working men live in single rooms, often not more than 8ft. by 10ft., in the *chauls*, or tenement houses. These are totally deficient in all conveniences for sanitation, and the death rate amounts to 60 per 1,000 every year.*

The Bombay and Calcutta Improvement Trusts, in opening up the cities by constructing new thoroughfares, have demolished many insanitary workmen's dwellings, but have recognised that these must be rebuilt outside the city areas, and connected with the industrial centres by tramways.

Sir George Lloyd, Governor of Bombay, in his speech at the Municipal Corporation Dinner on the 9th March this year, alluded with gratification to the fact that the Bombay Improvement Trust had provided housing for 5,000 out of their 15,000 coolies, and intended to spend 10½ lakhs of rupees in the coming year on providing houses for the working classes. Outside Bombay, where space is not so limited, the mill-owners are erecting model villages to accommodate their workmen. The Gokak cotton mill, on the Ghatpurba River, has just erected a model village to accommodate 3,957 workers.

Merely from the point of view of wealth production it is important to raise the worker's standard of comfort, for he looks to support himself and his family on his wages, during the period for which they are paid, and, if the wages are raised and his standard of comfort remains the same, he can keep himself and his family on fewer days' work per week or month, and the product of the industry falls off. This has been notably the case lately in the Bengal coalfields. The means of improving the workers' surroundings were lately considered in an All-India Industrial Welfare Conference, held at Bombay in April 1922, and presided over by Mr. Chatterjee, Secretary to the Government of India. The Conference insisted strongly on the necessity for co-operation between the Government, the employers, and the employed on this question.

All things considered, the housing question seems to have passed beyond what Mr. Wadia calls 'the stage of mere academic' and theoretic discussion.' He considers that the worker should have a legal claim to these amenities, and should not owe them to the 'patronage' or generosity of his employer.

* 'Labour in Madras,' p. 190.

We have hitherto dealt with attempts to improve the Indian workers' condition by State or other agency. It remains briefly to notice the progress they have been able to make for themselves.

The first Indian workers to appreciate the advantage of combination and to form a trade union were the Bombay cotton mill workers, who formed the Bombay Central Labour Federation. The report of the Factory Commission presided over by Surgeon A. S. Lethbridge, I.M.S. (Inspector-General of Jails, Bengal), which enquired into the wishes of the workers before the passing of the Factory Act of 1891, mentions the assistance rendered to the Commission in their enquiries by the Chairman of this union, Mr. Narayan Meghaji Lokhanday. This is the more noteworthy, as, at the present moment, Bombay City possesses no active union of cotton-mill operatives, though they constitute a large majority of the workers and most of the industrial disputes concern them.

The Bombay presidency has more unions than any other Indian province. There are in it 22 unions with a membership of 57,914. In Bombay City alone there are nine unions with a membership of 27,675, mostly under the Central Labour Federation, which is affiliated to the All-India Trade Union Congress, of which Lala Lajpat Rai is President. The other Federation is the Central Labour Board, which is non-political and includes the Great India Peninsula and the Bombay, Baroda, and Central India Railway Unions. The last two unions have workshop committees, of which workmen can be members. But the Bombay unions are not well organized. The Strike Committee which conducted the textile workers' strike of January 1919, met day after day and night after night for a long period, but never in the same place for fear of outside interference. An English union would have arranged a meeting-place for its executive as one of the first essentials.

In Ahmedabad the unions are better organized, and are financially stronger. There are 10 unions with 24,185 members, and 70 per cent. of the unions are composed of various sections of the textile workers, which pay regularly subscriptions amounting to Rs. 75,000 a year. They secured by strikes, with Mr. Gandhi's help, a substantial rise in wages, and even went so far as successfully to claim a bonus in specially prosperous times.

There are three unions with a membership of 6,054 in the rest of the presidency.*

In Bengal, a Trade Union Congress was held in Calcutta in April 1922, which included 15 unions representing, amongst others, mercantile clerks, railwaymen, postal workers, tramwaymen, khansamas (butlers), seamen, dock labourers, iron workers, and ooriya coolies. This conference passed resolutions in favour of: (1) peaceful picketing; (2) the repeal of the Breach of Contract Act; (3) the establishment of an eight-hour day and a forty-eight-hour week; (4) a minimum rate of wages for various classes of workers.

In Madras there are the Textile Workers' Union, the Rickshawallas' Union, the Tramwaymen's Union, the Printers' Union, and the Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway Workshops Union.

In 1917 the progress of the European war, and the sight of the high profits that were being made by employers, greatly unsettled Indian Labour, and led to a universal claim on the part of the workers to share in these profits by means of an increase of wages.

In 1918 labour unrest was aggravated by the high prices of salt, cloth, and oil, and the lack of transport facilities owing to the war, and the failure of the monsoon. In this year there was an epidemic of strikes in Bombay among mill hands, railway men, postal employees, and domestic servants. As a result, wages in the cotton mills were increased 20 per cent. and all the other trades received a rise to meet the increased cost of living. The movement spread to Calcutta, and, in consequence of threats of similar action, wages in the Bengal jute mills were raised 10 per cent. By the 1st January 1920, the Calcutta jute mill workers had obtained three increments of wages amounting to 40 per cent. above pre-war rates, and in September 1920, after a three-days' strike, they gained another rise of an additional 10 per cent.

* The figures given are those of the Bombay *Labour Gazette*, which include only active unions. The larger figures of the Industrial Disputes Committee include many unions, which are unions only in name.

In April 1918 the first attempt to exploit labour for political purposes was made by the non-Brahman wing of Mrs. Besant's Home Rule League, under the leadership of Mr. Bahman Pestonjee Wadia, who started a union in the Buckingham and Carnatic Mills at Madras. Assaults on mill officials were punished by lock-outs, one in September, and the other in November and December, in consequence of which 5,500 men lost their employment, but after the second lock-out, the union was recognised in December by the employers.

Since then there have been constant riots and quarrels between those who wished to strike for political purposes, namely, the caste Hindus and Mahomedans and the low caste workers who wished to work in peace and earn their wages. The low caste men objected to being coerced to strike, and the consequent strife between these two sections of the workers is a perennial source of trouble at Madras.

Mr. Wadia denies that caste enters into economic questions, and asserts that men of all castes will fight shoulder to shoulder in industrial disputes. He instances the dinner he gave at Adyar to 200 members of the Textile Union at which—according to his statement—men of the highest and lowest castes sat down to eat together without reluctance.

But in 1921 the men employed in the Buckingham and Carnatic Mills in Madras were again on strike from May to October; the discussion that then arose between the two sections, namely the caste Hindus and the Mahomedans on the one side and the low caste men on the other, was so bitter that the low caste men ultimately seceded from the Madras Labour Union, on the ground that though they were in the majority they were allowed very little control over the policy of the union.

The *Times* correspondent at Delhi, telegraphing in December 1918, alluded to the political attempt to aggravate labour unrest, and to use it for political purposes. A statement appeared in the *Madras Mail* on the 10th December, 1918, quoting extracts from Mrs. Besant's paper *New India*, which asserted that the Labour Party would help the Indian Labour cause as soon as a sister movement in India was started through which it could

work, and that when India gained Home Rule all Labour troubles would cease.*

An effort was made to enlist the support of the British Labour Party for the agitation in India. A Home Rule deputation, consisting of Mrs. Besant and Mr. B. P. Wadia, visited England in June 1919. Mr. Wadia addressed the British Trade Union Congress, which was sitting at Glasgow, in September 1919, and was invested with the gold badge of merit to mark the approval of organized labour. A British branch of the Indian Home Rule Association was formed, and a Committee of Labour members of the House of Commons, with Colonel Wedgwood as chairman, took up the cause of Indian Labour.

In 1919 strikes still continued ; in May the Calcutta postmen, and in November 15,000 workmen belonging to the Cawnpore 'Mazdur Sabha' (or Workmen's Union), came out on strike.

In December, the Bombay mill-hands held a congress, in imitation of the British Trades Union Congress, and delegates from 75 mills attended. The English Labour Press continued to support the movement, and on the 9th October, 1919, published an article by Mr. Shapurji Saklatwala attacking capitalism in India for its huge profits and swollen dividends, arguing in favour of the solidarity of Labour throughout the Empire, and insisting that every Indian worker should have a vote, the statutory right to organize, and a minimum rate of wages. In 1920, Colonel Wedgwood and Mr. Spoor visited India as a deputation from British Labour. Addressing the strikers on the Bombay *Maidan*, Colonel Wedgwood said : 'Comrades and 'brothers, I bring you from British Labour, not only the right 'hand of brotherhood, but a hope for the future.'

* Some of the passages quoted were (*New India*, 3rd July) : 'Above all it should be remembered that the Labour Party of England will be able effectually to help us when it has a good vehicle of a sister movement in India to work through. The fruition of the present labour movement will be in the Home Rule administration, an administration, let us hope, of the near future.' As usual, political and economic questions are mixed up.

New India of the 15th July has the following passage : 'If we get Home Rule, all of us will be free men instead of slaves. Home Rule is a big problem, your labour troubles included in it are a part of the big problem. If we gain Home Rule, all your labour troubles will be solved.'

Both delegates also attended the Congress held at Nagpur in 1920. The effect of their visit was to aggravate labour unrest, as the Indian workers were convinced that British Labour would support them. The year 1920 was also one in which the monsoon was deficient, and the discontent caused by the continuance of high prices of food stuffs caused a ready response to be made to the efforts of the agitators; strikes increased in frequency and in the extent of the area affected. The year commenced with the strike of the mill-hands in Bombay and Ahmedabad, followed by that of the workers at the Tata Steel and Iron Foundry at Jamshedpur in Singhbhum in February and March, the railway men on the North Western Railway in the Panjab in June, and the gas workers, railway men and postal employees at Bombay in November and December. In the midst of the disturbance caused by the last mentioned strikes, the first All-India Trades Union Congress was held in Bombay in November 1920. Ninety-two unions were said to have sent delegates to this congress, but enquiries by Sir George Lloyd, Governor of Bombay, elicited the fact that many of these were in a very early stage of their development. Sir George Lloyd received a deputation from the congress, and took advantage of the occasion to explain the attitude of his Government towards trade unions, as follows :—

‘ I regard the organization of labour on sound economic lines as an unquestionable advantage to labour, to the community, and to government, and progress in this direction will receive my sympathy and support.’

In Calcutta, between July 1920 and March 1921, there were strikes in the Government of India and Government of Bengal printing presses (September and October), among the gas workers and tramway men (October), and among the hydraulic crane men and stevedores at the docks (December). In the course of the tramway strike, a Board of Conciliation was asked for by the men and refused by the Bengal Government, on the ground that the men intended to use it as a court of appeal against the decisions of the company in individual cases.

The Assam tea garden coolie strike of June 1921 was the work of political agitators, and intended to embarrass British capital, in pursuance of the programme announced by Mr. Achariar in his presidential address at the congress held at Bombay, 1920,

in the following terms : ' We can starve English planters, ' merchants, traders, manufacturers with an increasing scarcity ' of labour, into gradual exhaustion and a satisfactory mentality ' towards our claims.' There had been some small reduction of wages on the tea gardens, in proportion to the diminution in the production of tea which the state of the market required, but the coolies had nothing else to complain of. They receive free housing, medical attendance, and medicine in addition to their pay. The general health of the coolies, the water supply and sanitation of the coolie lines, and the regular payment of their wages are always carefully inquired into at frequent intervals by Government Inspectors of Labour. They are also allowed to buy rice and cloth at concession rates considerably lower than the market price, and to cultivate garden land at a low rent.

The Assam Government has appointed a committee to consider :

- (1) Whether the money wages paid on the gardens, in addition to their indirect emoluments, are sufficient to maintain the coolies in reasonable comfort ?
- (2) Whether it is possible or desirable to commute these indirect emoluments into additional money wages ?

With regard to the connection of these industrial troubles with politics, Lord Ronaldshay, late Governor of Bengal, in a speech to the Associated Chambers of Commerce at Calcutta on January 30, 1922, quoted the words of a striker who took part in the Assam-Bengal railway strike, which was connected with the Assam tea garden coolie strike :

'All that is left to us is to tell our brother labourers in India how we have been treated, so that they profit by our experience. Let them not be persuaded by our leaders—leaders being, of course, politicians—to strike for political reasons only, and, like us, be made pawns in the game of politics. Like us and like the Khalassis (crew of the flats and steamers) at Goalando they will be sacrificed to the prestige of our political leaders.'

An Indian Trade Union Congress was held in December 1921, at Jharia in the Bengal coalfield, under the presidency of Mr. Joseph Baptista. The account given of the proceedings illustrates the danger of mixing up industrial with political questions in the

minds of ignorant persons.* The Congress, after receiving greetings from British Labour, unanimously passed a resolution in favour of Swaraj (Home Rule).† Mr. Gandhi himself has not yet defined Swaraj, so we cannot suppose the word conveys any distinct idea to the 20,000 illiterate Sonthals and Kholas assembled at the Congress. The meeting went on to recommend to Indian workmen to use Swadeshi (country-made) goods, and to adopt Mr. Gandhi's scheme for the use of the Charka (native spinning wheel), whereby all are to manufacture their own Khaddar (country-made cotton cloth), and so to oust the products of the Lancashire mills from the Indian market, and incidentally raise the price of cotton cloth to the Indian consumer. Things so utterly unintelligible to the Indian miner as the Taff Vale decision were also discussed. A bid was made for the miners' support by a resolution regretting the miserable conditions under which the colliery workers live. The astute politician is here seen taking advantage of the workers' discontent at high prices, or bad housing, or some such cause, to induce them to put forward political demands which they do not understand, by the argument that, when Swaraj is achieved, cheapness and good wages will automatically follow.

The strike on the East Indian Railway which has only just come to an end is another instance of a political strike, as it was proved after a magisterial inquiry that the assault by a European shunter upon an Indian fireman at Tundla, which was the ostensible cause of the strike, was a trumped-up charge. It is a real danger to the future of Indian trade unions that the political agitator should be able to find, in the excitement of labour troubles,

*With reference to the Jharia Congress, Mr. Roy Chaudhuri, a member nominated to the Bengal Legislative Council to represent labour, proposed on February 21, 1922, the appointment of a committee to enquire into the political exploitation of labour during the past twelve months. He also called attention to the employment of jute mill coolies as Congress volunteers, during the Calcutta *Hartal* (cessation of business) of December 1921, to parade the streets of Calcutta, court arrest, and go to jail for the sake of the Motherland.

† Mr. Joseph Baptista remarked in his presidential address: 'We may have Swaraj without Swadeshi, but never Swadeshi without Swaraj. True Swadeshi can only be reached by tariffs, but tariffs mean fiscal freedom, which is utterly incompatible with foreign rule. Therefore we must first seek Swaraj.'

a weapon ready to his hand to use against the Government. If they will confine themselves to their legitimate economic functions and eschew politics, Indian trade unions can do much to improve the position of the Indian worker.

The Bombay Labour Bureau is of opinion that wages in Bombay have risen more than in proportion to the increase in the cost of living, and that the workers are therefore better off than before the war. This rise has been mainly brought about by strikes, but the latest statistics show that the percentage of strikes which have been successful in bringing about a rise in wages is falling, thus showing that strikes have been indulged in to excess. The unions demand protection against the law as it stands at present, as regards strikes. In 1920 an injunction was obtained from the Madras High Court to restrain a trade union organizer from persuading the workers to break their contracts with their employers by striking to obtain high wages. On this account, Mr. N. M. Joshi, of the Servants of India Society, on the 1st March 1921, carried a resolution in the Indian Legislature recommending the Government of India to introduce legislation for the registration* and protection of trade unions, and the payment of compensation to workmen for injuries received in the course of their employment.

Discussion is also going on whether it is advisable to 'remove the criminal liability for breach of contract of service, in a large number of cases accompanied by advances of money,' by the provision that Section 27 of the Indian Contracts Act shall not apply to registered trade unions, and the repeal of sections 490 and 492 of the Indian Penal Code.

In answer to inquiries by the Government of India, the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and the Mill-owners' Association have expressed their views on trade unions. Both bodies agree that registration of trade unions must be compulsory, but the Chamber considers it doubtful whether trade unions exist in India on such a scale as to justify their recognition, and whether their members really desire to associate themselves in organizations working for a common object. As an instance of the lack of interest felt by the workers in the unions, they quote the

* By registration, trade unions would obtain a right to sue and to control their own officials and funds.

application of the Bombay Central Labour Association to the Bombay mill-owners referred to above. The Bombay Mill-owners' Association and the Bengal Chamber of Commerce accept in principle the proposed legislation for employers' liability to pay compensation to workmen for injuries received by them from accidents in the course of their employment. Both bodies, however, deprecate slavish copying of English legislation on these subjects, till it has been ascertained by strict enquiry how far it is suited to the special circumstances of India.

The reply of the executive of the All-India Trades Union Congress to the Government of India's inquiries represents the views of militant labour. The Congress considers that 'no protection can be too large in the infancy of trade unions.' It claims the right of picketing and of including non-workers in trade unions. It demands that trade unions should not be liable for damages for torts or breaches of contract committed by or on behalf of unions, and objects to the qualifying clause, that these wrongful acts must be committed 'in contemplation or furtherance of trade disputes.'

In protecting and fostering Indian trade unions, it is desirable not to follow English trade union legislation too closely. English Labour, with a high standard of education, and a long period of trade union precedents behind it, has been granted certain privileges, but it does not follow that similar rights must necessarily be granted to trade unions in India, where they are but an exotic growth of yesterday. The British Trades Union Congress and the Workers' Welfare League sent a deputation to the late Secretary of State for India, just before his resignation, asking that Indian trade unions should be granted the right of picketing and immunity from civil liabilities. Mr. Montagu, by way of caution, alluded to: 'Bodies which are spontaneously brought together under the name of trade unions, and then proceed, because they understand strikes are things connected with trade unions, to organize strikes, very often for mixed motives, and sometimes for purely or mainly political motives.' In saying this he put his finger on the tendency to meddle in politics, which is the chief danger which menaces the growth of Indian trade unions, and loses them the sympathy of many well-wishers.

MICHAEL PROTHERO.

GEORGIA

1. *Histoire de la Géorgie.* By M. F. BROSSERT. St. Petersburg. 1856.
2. *Mission Scientifique au Caucase.* By J. DE MORGAN. Paris. 1889.
3. *La Démocratie Géorgienne.* By W. Woytinsky. Paris. 1920.
4. *Documents and Materials relating to the Foreign Policy of Trans-Caucasia and Georgia.* Tiflis: Foreign Office. 1919.
5. *Voyage autour du Caucase.* By DUBOIS DE MONTPÉREUX. Paris. 1828.

THE events of the Russian Revolution, and the extension of the principles of nationalism to the most remote parts of Europe and Asia, have attracted attention to a number of obscure and hitherto insignificant races. Of these races the inhabitants of Georgia are among the most interesting, and at the same time the most neglected by English writers. During the last century their history was elucidated by several French scholars, chief of whom were M. F. Brosset, Dubois de Montpéreux, and Vivien de Saint-Martin. But no satisfactory work on Georgia has appeared in English, while it is only during the last few years that examples of its rich and beautiful medieval literature have been published under the auspices of the Oriental Translation Fund.

Georgia lies between two mountain systems which have been areas of supreme significance in the history of Western Asia. On the north the Caucasus in past ages formed a barrier between the nomad peoples of the steppe and the settled folk of the Iranian and Anatolian plateaux. On the south the Armenian plateau constituted the great battlefield of Western Asia. The eastern Armenian passes command the military and commercial routes leading into Persia and Mesopotamia; the western passes give access to western Asia Minor and the coasts of the Mediterranean.

The history of the Georgians, and also of the Armenians, occupying as they did the strategic key positions of Western Asia, is mainly a history of the struggle between their neighbours. In the Caucasus, the races of the south—the early Semites, Persians, Greeks and Arabs—were always at issue with the northern nomads, such as the Cimmericians, Scythians, and Huns; while in recent centuries Turks and Persians were in conflict

with Russians. In Armenia, a perennial conflict was always in progress between West and East ; between Rome and Parthia ; between Byzantium and Persia or the Arab Caliphate ; between Seljuk and Mongol ; Osmanli and Persian.

The Georgians themselves in all probability represent a racial type which, five thousand years ago, was widely spread over the Middle Eastern lands. Muller attempts to connect them with the Sumerians, while de Morgan and others associate them with the Hittites and Lydians. Sir Harry Johnston, in a note to Mr. H. G. Wells' 'Outline of History,' goes so far as to suggest an affinity with the Basques and with certain primitive tribes of India. Such theories are, of necessity, hypothetical. But there are grounds for believing that the ancestors of the Georgians occupied a very wide extent of territory : in some cases they were absorbed by conquerors ; in others expelled by later comers. In all the country, from Lake Van to Lake Sevan and the Pontic Mountains, the Armenians supplanted or absorbed them during the six centuries preceding Christ. The Armenian pressure continues to this day in Tiflis and other regions, and is one of the fundamental causes of the political differences between the two races. In Eastern Trans-Caucasia, the cultural influences of Iran were always predominant, and the effect of centuries of military and commercial contact with Persians and Arabs, and of the infiltration of Turkish elements was eventually to change the ethnical nature of the whole of the eastern region. In this eastern region in the days of Strabo and Pliny, tribes of Georgian affinities, known as the Albanians, inhabited a stretch of country which is now occupied by a Turko-Tatar population with a Mussulman culture. On the other hand, in the Western Caucasus, along the coast from the Sea of Azov, Greek influence was great, and it was here that the culture of Christian Georgia was evolved. By the tenth century the whole of Eastern Trans-Caucasia had become a Mahomedan country ; while in the Western region Byzantine civilisation had been firmly established, and Christianity had become the national religion. Churches and castles, after the Byzantine style, were being built everywhere ; princes and ecclesiastical dignitaries affected the Greek dress, Greek arms, Greek titles and Greek education. Tiflis itself, and the country around, passed alternately under the influence of Arab and Greek, but constituted at the date of the rise of the Georgian Kingdom an independent Arab emirate.

It was towards the end of the tenth century, when the Byzantine Empire was in process of decay, and when the Mussulman Sultanates were being assailed by nomad peoples from Central Asia, that an independent Georgian kingdom came into existence. This kingdom was formed round a nucleus of the small principalities along the Black Sea coast, all of which were protectorates of the Byzantine Emperors.

During the eleventh century a powerful feudal State, with its centre at Tiflis, was formed under the Bagratid dynasty. These Georgian kings were useful allies of the Crusaders, and for a brief period exercised an influence on Byzantine and Persian politics, while a degree of civilisation, quite equal to that of the contemporary monarchies of Southern Europe, prevailed at the court of Tiflis. But the Georgian kings had not the time, even had they the ability, to consolidate a stable State, and in the middle of the thirteenth century the greater part of Georgia was easily overrun by the Mongols.

The Mongol power collapsed at the beginning of the fifteenth century and a united Georgian kingdom was revived—but only for a short time. In 1442, Alexander, the last king of all Georgia, divided his lands among his three sons, and the country soon afterwards split up into no less than three kingdoms and six principalities. The unfavourable reaction of external political events on a State whose geographical position was always dangerous, was the primary cause of the collapse of the Georgian monarchy. The decline of the Georgian kingdom only preceded by a few years the final downfall of the Byzantine Empire, which had for so many centuries dominated and civilised all the Black Sea regions. Constantinople fell in 1453, and in the following decade the Turks made themselves masters of the Black Sea, and occupied the once flourishing entrepôts that had been established by the Genoese and Venetians. Meanwhile, to the north of the Caucasus, Mussulman Khans still held the valley of the Volga. Georgia was thus deprived of all communication with European civilisation, and remained a Christian enclave in Mussulman lands.

The Georgian monarchy had never effectually consolidated the royal power. Consequently when Georgia was threatened from the west and east by the powerful military organizations of Turkey and Persia, a diversity of local interests developed

which soon resulted in internal dissensions, and prevented co-ordinated military action. About the middle of the fifteenth century a prolonged period of hostilities had commenced between Turkey and Persia, and Georgia and Armenia—as in Roman-Parthian and Byzantine-Arab times—became the battlefield of the contending empires. In this conflict the interests of the different feudal princes of Georgia were at variance. The Eastern princes maintained a flourishing commerce in timber, livestock, wines, nuts, raw silk and saffron with the Persians; while the Western tribes on the Black Sea coast traded in pelts, timber, wax and honey with the masters of Constantinople, whether Christian or Mussulman. Further, many of the local rulers grew rich on the trade in slaves—a trade which was not necessarily as gross as has been supposed, for many Georgians were willing recruits to the Janissaries, as they had formerly been to the Mamaluks, and their womenfolk often were not loth to exchange the sordid domesticity of peasant hovels for the comparative ease and luxury which lay beyond the slave markets of Trebizond and Tabriz.

Depopulation and demoralisation must further be considered as causes contributory to the collapse of the Georgian kingdom. It is true that during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the notoriously destructive policy of pillage and massacre generally adopted by the Mongol conquerors was not carried out in Georgia, which escaped the worst horrors of invasion. Nevertheless, the population of Georgia must have been reduced, first, through the levies for military service with the Mongol armies, which bore off thousands of young peasants to die in Asia Minor, Syria and India, and consequently affected the productive capacity of the country; and secondly, through the deterioration of large stretches of country from agricultural into pastoral lands, in order to support the horses of the nomad armies, who frequented particularly the Eastern Caucasus between Derbend and the Aras. Once fertile plains passed completely out of cultivation, and wealthy cities fell into ruin. The Black Death and the invasions of Timur followed quickly upon the Mongol period, so that the country had no time to recover. Venetian travellers at the end of the fifteenth century give a miserable picture of Georgia, devastated, uncultivated, and depopulated—a very different scene from the prosperity and industry described by

the Arab geographers in the tenth century. The subsequent Turko-Persian wars and the regular export of slaves—which was in reality an emigration—tended still further to ruin and depopulate the country.

Towards the end of the sixteenth century, when the Russians were gradually extending their territories southwards across the Steppe, intelligent opinion in Georgia began to look towards the Tsar to redeem them from their position of dependence on the Mussulman Powers. Throughout the seventeenth century Georgian princes were intriguing with Moscow, but it was not until the eighteenth century that co-operation with Russia became practicable. Between 1722 and 1730 the Russians first pushed down the west coast of the Caspian, and for a time occupied the Eastern Caucasus. The effect was immediately felt among the Christian races south of the range. An insurrection broke out among the Karabagh Armenians; and in Georgia one of the princes made himself independent of the Persians. This movement was followed during the third quarter of the eighteenth century by a patriotic literary revival at Tiflis. In the same period Georgian armies occupied Erivan and other Mussulman towns. But this revival of Georgian national life did not last long. Between 1790 and 1800 the new Georgian kingdom built up by Prince Irakli was overrun by the Persians, and the King at Tiflis, Giorgi XIII, had to appeal for Russian protection.

During the first thirty years of the nineteenth century the Russians were engaged in conquering and organizing the Trans-Caucasus. They absorbed one by one the ancient Georgian principalities, until by 1828 they held practically the whole territory of the former Georgian kingdom. A statement was presented to the Peace Conference at Paris in 1919, which attempted to represent the Russian acquisition of the Georgian principalities as a gross breach of international law. Such a statement is a mere travesty of established historical facts, and few Georgians will deny that the Russian conquest of Trans-Caucasia probably saved both the Georgians and the Trans-Caucasian Armenians from the virtual extinction which has overtaken the Armenians across the Turkish frontier. Further, the Georgians and other Trans-Caucasian races benefited both morally and materially from the establishment of a Russian régime. Association with the Russian bureaucracy in the

Caucasus brought the local aristocracy in contact with the new ideas which were then only just penetrating to Petersburg and Moscow from Western Europe, while a younger generation grew up which had been trained in the Russian services and universities. In the latter half of the nineteenth century began an economic exploitation of Trans-Caucasia, which was to develop the contact of the Georgian with Russian and Western ideas, and to accentuate still more the differences between the state of civilisation of the Caucasian nationalities and that of their Mussulman neighbours—differences which at the opening of the nineteenth century had been scarcely perceptible.

In 1870 European capital was directed towards the exploitation of the petroleum fields at Baku, and in the following year foreign firms began to undertake the working and export of the great manganese deposits at Chiaturi. Later, deposits of oil were discovered at Grozni and Maikop, and the Caucasus became one of the principal petroleum producing areas of the world. The construction of a railway line from the Black Sea coast to Tiflis had been begun in 1867, and in 1883 the line was continued to Baku. At the same time foreign capital, chiefly that of the French Rothschilds, became interested in the construction of a port at Batum.

This economic development of Trans-Caucasia, and the transition from feudalism to industrialism, were productive of immediate political changes. Until 1870 the aristocracy and the priesthood had retained the national leadership of Georgia, and such opposition as there had been to Russian rule had been essentially patriotic and conservative. The abolition of serfdom (1864) and the successive measures for the suppression of the autonomy of the Georgian principalities, culminating in the abolition of the separate formation of the Georgian army (1884), were fatal to the prestige of the Georgian princes. Gradually the political power passed to the bourgeois intelligentsia, and the Tsarist bureaucracy discovered, in Georgia as in Poland, that in suppressing the conservative patriotism of the aristocracy they had prepared the way for the class-war of the new intelligentsia.

The younger generation of Georgians soon began to participate with the larger Russian groups in the political struggle against Tsarist absolutism, working through the arbitrary power of a bureaucracy which was both corrupt and inefficient, and at the

same time unimaginative and unreasonable in its policy, rigid, crude, and often unjust in its methods.

The Social Democratic movement, which professed to despise the nationalist ideals of the aristocratic patriot-poet, Chavchavadze, and based its principles on the class struggle as enunciated by Karl Marx, began to gain strength about the same time that the Imperial Government was initiating fresh anti-national measures, such as the forced emigration of the Ajars to Turkey (1880), and the enforcement in the Caucasus of conscription for the Russian Army (1887). These measures doubtless drove many adherents into the Socialist ranks. During the following ten years the leaders of Georgian Social Democracy were busy organizing unions and founding ephemeral journals. Their policy was always social rather than national, though it was generally the national grievances of the workers against the Imperial Government which constituted their most suitable material for propaganda. Thus, in 1900, Prince Galitzin's Military Law, imposing liability to military service in Siberia and the remoter parts of the empire, was the occasion of the first serious strike campaign.

When the revolutionary crisis, which had begun in Russia in 1904, spread to Trans-Caucasia, an example was afforded of the different tendencies and policies of the Socialists, the peasantry and the Imperial Government. The Socialists appealed to the people to overthrow the Tsarist bureaucracy and to establish either constitutional or revolutionary régimes; the peasants rose first against the tax-collector and the policeman, then turned to despoil the land-owner and the bourgeois, and ended—Georgians, Armenians and Tatars—by massacring each other. The Imperial Government began in its weakness by favouring first one nationality and then another, and ended in its strength by submitting the whole country to several months of Cossack 'Bloody Assizes.'

During the period 1906-17 while Russia was enjoying a lull in the storm of the social revolution, the Georgian leaders maintained their attitude of co-operation with the Russian political groups. They were, in fact, far less nationalistic in their conceptions of the special status of their own race than were the Poles or Finns. Indeed the two Georgians, Chkeidze and Tsereteli, may be regarded as two of the foremost figures in Russian Social Democracy. It was rather the Imperial Govern-

ment, by a policy of fostering the national hatreds of the three races of Trans-Caucasia with the object of dividing and diverting violent currents among the workers, who maintained and encouraged national self-consciousness.

When, in 1917, the Russian revolutionary movement again entered upon a critical phase, the Georgian Social Democrats were unanimous in their support of the Russian movement. The whole region of the Caucasus, after the overthrow of the Russian Viceroy, the Grand Duke Nicholas, was administered by a 'Committee of Four,' consisting of four bourgeois politicians, who represented the four national interests—Russian, Georgian, Armenian and Tatar. The Georgian Social Democrats participated actively in the Kerensky régime, Chkeidze and Tsereteli holding important positions in Petrograd. At the same time, separatist tendencies gradually developed in Trans-Caucasia, and the three races were each represented by National Committees, mostly composed of bourgeois members, who shared a precarious and varying influence with the proletarian 'Workers' and Soldiers' 'Committees' in the three national centres, Tiflis (Georgian), Erivan (Armenian), and Baku (Tatar). In November 1917 the Georgian National Congress at Tiflis, following the example of the Tatars at Baku, affirmed their loyalty to Russia. 'As a part of Russia,' said Mr. Noah Jordania, the veteran Social Democrat and future Minister-President of the Republic, 'we keep staying on an All-Russian platform . . . the interests of all Caucasians require a regeneration of the Central Power in Russia.'*

With the fall of the Kerensky régime, and the development of civil war in Russia between the Bolshevik group and the 'White' generals, the situation as regards Trans-Caucasia was fundamentally changed. Various writers, particularly those in the extreme Labour interest, have maintained that the Georgian Social Democrats were animated by party bias against their Bolshevik rivals, and that they only adopted the principles of Georgian nationalism after they had been disappointed as Russian politicians. It is necessary to refer to this view, since in discussion of Russian problems it has been elaborately exploited, but it is unsupported by facts. With the outbreak of civil war in Russia all the border races, not only the different Caucasian

* Quoted from *New Russia*, July 1, 1920.

groups, but also Poles, Finns, the Baltic groups, and the Ukrainians, were compelled to pursue policies adapted to local conditions. With the fall of Kerensky the Russian Empire ceased to exist, and it was the duty of the leaders of every national group to preserve the area in which they were interested from the imminent chaos and anarchy, and to carry out measures calculated to settle local domestic problems, and to conciliate foreign neighbours. Thus Finns, Letts and Poles were called upon to meet their own internal crises, and since they were not in a position to continue hostilities, to come to some understanding with Germany.

In Trans-Caucasia the position was particularly acute. After the Bolshevik coup, the 'Committee of Four' was replaced by a 'Trans-Caucasian Commissariat' of a slightly more extremist shade and some attempt was made to maintain a semblance of Trans-Caucasian unity. But the interests of the different groups were utterly at variance. While the Erivan Armenians were involved with their Ottoman compatriots in a desperate struggle against the Turks, the Tatars of Baku and the tribes of the Eastern Caucasus tended towards an understanding and co-operation with the Turks. The Georgians, on the other hand, had no material object in continuing the war, either as the enemies or the agents of the Turks, and they were anxious for an understanding with the Central Powers which would allow them to concentrate their strength, such as it was, on their Northern Frontier, with the object of preserving their immunity in the Russian Civil War.

Accordingly, in the spring of 1918, the so-called Trans-Caucasian Republic was dissolved. The Tatars joined with the Turks in an effort to annihilate the Armenians, while the Georgians, taking advantage of the differences between the German and Turkish commands, concluded unheroic but sensible agreements which preserved them from actual military invasion. These agreements have been condemned, somewhat unreasonably, by critics who appear to neglect the consideration that the first duty of the political leaders of a small nationality is not to precipitate the people whom they represent into forlorn hopes, but to preserve them from virtual extinction.

The conclusion of the Armistice, and the temporary assumption by the Entente authorities of political control of

Trans-Caucasia, did not greatly modify the situation. The two great obstacles to a satisfactory settlement, the Russian Civil War and the Turko-Armenian feud, continued to prejudice the whole political and economic life of the region. Meanwhile the Allies intrigued with, or supported variously and alternately, the contending groups, Russian 'Whites,' Georgians, Armenians, Tatars and Kemalists. And the three republics failed, in the face of common danger, to come to even a temporary understanding, which was the first essential of their continued existence. The representatives of each pressed outrageous claims at the Paris Conference. The Tatars concerted action with the Turks against the Armenians; the Armenians relied on British or American assistance, rather than on an understanding with their neighbours, and intrigued alternatively for Russian assistance against their Turko-Tatar enemies; the Georgians neglected a rapprochement with Armenia, in the vague hope of receiving support from the French or the Kemalists against the Bolsheviks. Thus the situation dragged on until the spring of 1920 in an unwholesome atmosphere of frontier incidents, vindictive tariffs and preposterous territorial claims. The Georgians did indeed make several efforts to unite the Caucasian groups in common action against the Bolsheviks, but the Turko-Armenian feud always proved an insuperable obstacle. When finally the conclusion of an understanding at last seemed possible, the Bolsheviks suddenly descended upon Baku (April 27, 1920) and with its recovery they were in a position to reconquer the whole of the Caucasus. The Armenians succumbed in the autumn of 1920 to a combined attack by the Bolsheviks and Kemalists. The whole valley of the Kura then lay open to a turning movement by the Bolsheviks, and they only awaited a favourable moment to establish Soviets in Tiflis and Baku (March 1921).

The collapse of Georgia and the other Caucasian Republics was mainly a result of the failure to attain political and military collaboration. This failure, in itself the result of inadequate political perspective on the part of local leaders, had its basis in the violent racial antagonisms and undeveloped sense of unity of the three nationalities. The failure to co-ordinate political action resulted in an economic disorganization which was the immediate cause of the collapse of resistance to Russia. The railways were disorganized; the peasants were hungry and

demoralised ; and the industrial workers, especially those of Baku, were suffering from the severance of economic relations with Russia.

On the other hand, the Allies, by their neglect to formulate any definite policy in regard to Trans-Caucasia, and their casual treatment of the Turkish problem, failed to contribute to the stabilisation of conditions.

The eclipse of Caucasian Nationalism may well be regarded as temporary. The ideals of Nationalism, and the revolt against standardisation, constitute a force so cogent in the political history of the twentieth century, that it seems improbable that their development will be permanently checked in Trans-Caucasia. At the same time, the economic interdependence of Trans-Caucasia and Russia—the dependence of Trans-Caucasia on the Kuban and Don regions for cereals, and of the Volga Basin on Caucasasia for oil—appears to make it impracticable to sever the link which has been soldered during the last hundred years.

The representatives of the exiled Caucasian Governments concluded last year a Treaty in Paris, which provided for their independence and union on a federal basis, and for an economic understanding with Russia. This Treaty has been ignored by the Soviet Government, and it does not appear likely that the contingency will arise in which the Soviets would be prepared to voluntarily forego their military control of Trans-Caucasia. At the same time, Moscow has made certain concessions to the principles of Caucasian nationalism in the establishment of autonomous Soviet régimes in the three Caucasian capitals, and in the delegation of control to local Soviets. Recent visitors to the Caucasus speak highly of the native Bolshevik officials, who, they state, are handling a difficult situation with energy and foresight. The more violent elements, it is stated, who usurped all the offices at the beginning of the Soviet régime, are gradually being eliminated. Such conditions are, from a national aspect, to be preferred to the unmitigated centralisation of the Tsarist régime. It appears however that Moscow is gradually usurping the power of the local Soviet Governments, and developing a tendency to reduce the Caucasus again to the complete dependency of the former viceroyalty. Whether in the future the Caucasian nationalities can be persuaded to forego their demand for independence, and to recognise the conditions of political

association, must depend on the generosity of the attitude of Moscow in regard to the degree of their autonomy.

Both the Georgians and the Armenians have well marked racial characteristics. The Georgians, with their poetic temperament, their emotionalism, their versatility, their joy of life, mingled with irresponsibility and instability, might be compared to the Irish; the Armenians, with their thrift, their capacity for affairs, and their devotion to family life, to the Belgians. Both races differ so essentially from the Slavs and Mussulmans who surround them, that their suppression or eventual submersion would be a grave injury to the economic development and the future culture of the whole of the Middle East.

W. E. D. ALLEN.

LABOUR DISILLUSIONMENT

1. *Labour Policy, False and True.* By Sir LYNDEN MACASSEY, K.C., D.Sc. Thornton Butterworth. 1922.
2. *British and Continental Labour Policy.* By B. G. DE MONTGOMERY. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1922.
3. *The Outbreak on the Witwatersrand.* By Captain WILLIAM URQUHART, M.C. Johannesburg: Hortors, Ltd. 1922.

THE most noticeable fact in connection with the labour movement in Great Britain is the rapid decline in the membership of trade unions as compared with the record year 1920. According to figures appearing in the *Ministry of Labour Gazette* the total membership of trade unions at the end of 1920 was 8,493,000. By the end of 1921 that figure had fallen to 6,793,000. There are no precise later figures, but there is good reason for believing that in the current year the decline has been continuous. This rapid decline is all the more significant in view of the previous rapid growth. In 1913 the membership of trade unions was 4,189,000. That figure increased slightly during the succeeding three years; but in 1917 the rate of growth increased rapidly: in 1919, the figure of 8,000,000 was first passed; in 1920, the record of 8,493,000 was reached.

Whether the present decline from this record is due to temporary or to permanent causes it is too soon yet to state. Widespread unemployment and a general reduction of wages are by themselves sufficient to deplete the ranks of trade unionists; for in the first place men who find themselves out of work or with reduced wages are naturally less willing to spend money on anything other than their immediate wants, and in the second place the mere fact of a decline of wages makes many men doubtful of the industrial value of trade unions. Another factor, which possibly may prove to be of a more permanent character, is the contrast between the boastful promises which Labour leaders and other politicians have been in the habit of making, and the actual facts as to-day realised. When men have been promised a new heaven on earth, and many of them find themselves drifting back to what seems very much like an old hell,

the spirit of disillusionment spreads and they begin to revolt against the leaders whose promises have proved so deceptive.

As an example of the way in which the masses of the population were deluded by political promises during the war and in the period immediately following it, it is worth while here to quote an extract from a paper called *The Future*, which Mr. Lloyd George issued during September 1919 as a Government statement of national needs and national policy. In this paper is contained a message to the British people headed 'The Old World Must End.' The message, after referring to the losses of life in the Great War and to the misery existing in the old world through poverty and unemployment, went on to say: 'If we renew the lease of that world we shall betray the heroic dead; we shall be guilty of the basest perfidy that ever blackened a people's fame; we shall store up retribution for ourselves and for our children. The old world must and will come to an end.'

The old world has not come to an end, and everybody knows it. In spite of all the rhetoric we remain where we were: in some ways we are worse off, in some ways better; but the present is not appreciably different from the past. Is it surprising that disillusionment should be widespread, and that the rank and file of the wage-earning classes should feel embittered towards the men who have filled their minds with false hopes?

Added to the rhetorical phrases in which Mr. Lloyd George and minor prophets have so lavishly indulged are the specific proposals that were proclaimed by Labour leaders and are now demanded in vain by Labour followers. These proposals are the groundwork of the subject with which Sir Lynden Macassey deals in his 'Labour Policy, False and True.' In this volume, which is packed with well-authenticated information, lucidly displayed, Sir Lynden examines in detail the various schemes put forward by Labour leaders, and shows how in many cases they have no solid foundation and could not possibly achieve any valuable results. But his criticism is by no means wholly negative. He also discusses the numerous practical difficulties of industrial organization in this country, and makes suggestions as to methods by which some at any rate of those difficulties can be solved.

His book is the result of his own personal experience. During the war Sir Lynden Macassey was again and again entrusted by the Government with the duty of reconciling employers and

employed where labour troubles had arisen which threatened to hold up the supply of materials necessary to national safety. That he accomplished this task with remarkable success is a matter of common knowledge, and the secret of his success undoubtedly lay in the fact that in the many labour disputes with which he had to deal he always appealed to the human element on both sides. In the same spirit the main teaching of his book is that labour problems cannot be solved merely by some change in industrial organization, but that their solution must always depend on appeals to common humanity. Another important lesson outstanding in his pages is the impossibility of securing any hopeful solution of labour problems as long as the masses of wage-earners are so completely ignorant of the fundamental conditions of modern industry. For example he writes :—

‘When in retrospect I recall my impression of the outstanding characteristic of the British working-man as I knew him in the workshops, I unhesitatingly fasten on his appalling ignorance of economic matters. Few of the ‘rank and file’ have any conception whatsoever of the factors and forces which constitute that type of economic activity known as industry, still less of the contribution of industry to our national prosperity. And in regard to commerce and its part as the handmaiden of industry, their ignorance is even more profound. There never plays upon their imagination the least glimpse of the wonderful complexity of the mechanism of finance, nor of the amazingly intricate organization of buying and selling. Who can blame them? They have never been told. I have kept a meeting of workmen keenly interested for an hour, after the conclusion of some official business, in a simple explanation of the functions played by finance in industry, and of the various kinds of financial operations entailed in the marketing of the product of their particular factory. Workmen respond to sympathetic education with cheerful alacrity. One of the expedients to which the Department of Shipyard Labour resorted was the institution of talks with workmen in various ship-building districts of the rôles being played in the stirring circumstances of the times by naval and merchant ships which were in dry-dock in those particular districts for reconditioning or repair. It had a most stimulating effect : men found themselves no longer sluggishly working upon an uninspiring metal hulk, but upon a living ship, redolent with stirring associations, engaged in performing for the nation functions and duties which they could readily understand. There was less time lost, less sleeping on night-work, fewer stoppages of work, greater expedition, larger output.’

The ignorance referred to in the above passage is mainly due

to the fact that the ordinary man seldom troubles to look beyond the week's end and the week's wage. Unfortunately, however, there is another and a still more mischievous kind of ignorance, an ignorance that is deliberately inculcated by false prophets. It is impossible to measure the amount of mischief that has been done throughout the world by the false teaching of the leading prophet of modern Socialism, Karl Marx. The theories which he laid down are demonstrably false. Yet they have been taught with enthusiasm by thousands of apostles, some young, some old, some belonging to the ranks of manual labour, some drawn from the middle classes. And large numbers of manual workers have imbibed this teaching as if it were a divinely inspired gospel. The results have been disastrous. The labour troubles that followed the Armistice in this and other countries were due not to any actual discontent with the conditions of life at the moment, but to a wild fanaticism inspired by Marxian theories. This fanaticism led the coal-miners into prolonged strikes against their own interests and the interests of the nation; it provoked the revolutionary movement of the Sozialisti in Italy, only tardily quelled by the counter-revolution of the Fascisti; and above all it accounts for the famine and misery that have desolated Russia. Sir Lynden Macassey is therefore quite right in pleading that 'the first essential is boldly and openly to challenge this Marxian doctrine of the parasitic character of capital. There will never be, there cannot be, co-operation between capital and labour until labour has learnt what capital is and the function it plays in production.'

The Marxian theories with regard to the function of capital are comparatively modern in origin, but the whole labour movement in England has long been misled by a less elaborate but equally false theory with regard to the relation between output and employment. It seems to be a tradition among wage-earners, at any rate in England, that increased output means diminished employment. That is the basis of the whole doctrine of *ca' canny*, which affects the mentality of an enormous number of manual workers and is the definitely accepted creed of most trade unions. The almost inevitable result of the *ca' canny* doctrine is sheer dishonesty. The workman, dominated by the false belief that he can secure prolonged employment for himself, or a wider range of employment for his fellows, by diminishing

his rate of work, instead of honourably doing a fair day's work deliberately aims at doing the minimum that will pass muster. In Sir Lynden Macassey's phrase : ' To-day the moral obligation ' to work seems inverted into a duty to do as little as possible for ' the wages.' Or, as he happily remarks in another passage, ' Formerly men worked to benefit themselves ; now they are apt ' to refrain from working for fear they may benefit other persons.'

It might be imagined that the *ca' canny* doctrine would break down wherever the workman is paid by piece rates, for then his direct personal interest is in favour of his doing the maximum amount of work so as to increase his daily earnings. But here comes in another consideration, for which many employers are themselves directly to blame. It is unfortunately true that in a considerable number of firms, whenever the management observes that a man is earning an appreciably higher wage than is customary in the trade, his piece-rate is cut so as to bring down his weekly earnings to the average level. The necessary result of this practice is that workmen go slow in order to protect themselves. By contenting themselves with a moderate income earned with little effort they avoid the risk of being compelled to work at top speed to earn the same income or possibly less. On the other hand it must be recognised that very often piece-rates cannot be fairly adjusted until the possible output of the machine has been tested by experience. The attempt to standardise piece-rates which was made during the war proved disastrous ; for quite unskilled workpeople—men, women and boys—were able, without any particular effort, to earn on simple repetition work much larger wages than mechanics, necessarily paid by time, could earn on work requiring both skill and intelligence. In other words, piece-rates must be adjusted from time to time, and the problem is how to adjust them without creating in the minds of the workmen concerned the impression that they are being robbed by a grasping employer. This emphasises the necessity for a human understanding between employer and employed. If each side knows that the other side wants to play fair, a friendly agreement can always be reached.

But however much the folly and greed of certain capitalists may be to blame for labour unrest, there is overwhelming evidence that the substitution of the State for the private employer leads to even worse results. On this point Sir Lynden Macassey's

testimony is peculiarly valuable, because of the wide experience which he has had. He writes :—

‘The suggestion that the workers would work harder for the community or for the State is so absolutely contrary to my own experience that I find it difficult to treat the suggestion with respect. It was never so during the war—in Government factories, dockyards, arsenals, there was just as much restriction of production as in the works of private employers, and considerably more strikes. In none of our municipal services is it found to be a fact. The railway strike of September 1919, while the railways were under Government control, is only another illustration of the falsity of the suggestion.’

A book of somewhat similar purpose, but rather different in character, has been produced by Mr. B. G. de Montgomery, who is apparently a Frenchman, although he writes most excellent English. This book sets out, with much useful historical detail, an account of labour movements in France, Great Britain, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. It deals with labour legislation, with socialistic theories, and with trade union organization. Such a survey of labour problems and movements in different countries brings home the fact that industrial developments must always be greatly influenced by local conditions. Great Britain, with large supplies of coal, an extensive sea-board, and many natural harbours, is a manufacturing and commercial country. France, with comparatively small coal supplies and with a much greater internal area, is primarily an agricultural country ; though even in France it is to be noted that the rural population is declining relatively to the urban population. In Sweden and Norway the place of coal is to a large extent being taken by the development of natural supplies of water power. Denmark, with no coal and little water power, is almost exclusively agricultural.

These factors have a very far-reaching influence on social movements ; for the agriculturist, by the necessities of his occupation, is constantly up against the facts of life, and is therefore less likely to be led astray by unfounded theories. Such complete ignorance of his own industry as Sir Lynden Macassey refers to in dealing with the urban worker, is almost inconceivable in the case of a peasant farmer, or even of a farm labourer.

That the modern socialistic movement in England is traceable to Karl Marx, Mr. de Montgomery shows in detail. He gives a summary history of the Social Democratic Federation, founded

in London in 1881, and records that among the first members of the Federation was Miss Eleanor Marx, a daughter of Karl Marx. He mentions also how Mr. Hyndman's book, 'England For All,' published in the same year, expounded the doctrines of Marx for English readers.

Mr. de Montgomery also describes the birth and growth of the Fabian Society, and expresses regret that the intellectual ideals of its early life have deteriorated in later years :—

' There is one important point about the Fabians which has not yet been considered, and that is their difficult dual position as Socialist politicians and as economists. This undoubtedly involves a danger that economic investigations may be used to further the ends of Socialism and not in order to obtain unbiassed knowledge ; in other words, that the premises may be arranged so as to lead up to Socialist conclusions, whereas the genuine economist draws his conclusions from the existing premises, irrespective of his political views. When we consider the writings of modern Fabians in the ' Fabian Essays ' and compare them with those of twenty years ago, we are struck by noticing the extent to which their standard of scientific accuracy has declined, save in some honourable exceptions. Probably this decline is due partly to the increased political activity of the Fabian Society and partly to the growing influence upon its members of extremist Socialist ideas. There is little doubt that the Fabian Society will lose its world-wide reputation as a scientific and intellectual body unless the standard of work produced by its spokesmen and leaders is raised to its old level.'

The principle of the Fabian Society, at any rate in its original conception, was to follow the policy of Fabius Cunctator, and to advance gradually. How far the Fabian Society to-day as a body has departed from this ideal it is not easy to say, but there are undoubted signs that many Fabians have been influenced in their policy by the more revolutionary projects of the extreme Socialists. Happily they, like most English Socialists, still repudiate the violent methods that Socialists in other countries have advocated, and in some cases put into operation. As an example of the lengths to which the extreme Socialists are willing to go, Mr. de Montgomery refers to a group in Sweden which calls itself the ' Young Socialist Party,' and quotes the following declaration from one of its leaders :—

' Why should we be afraid of revolutions and violent methods when we shall in any case have to use violence as a means of obtaining our demands ? No, let us consider and examine which kind of violence we shall use, and teach the working-man how to produce and make

use of both dynamite and dagger. As for myself, I consider murder on a small scale excellent, and such attacks fill the governing class with terror. We shall envenom the hearts and minds of the people with the poison of hatred in order to make them ready to commit any kind of violence whatever.'

To the credit of most of the Swedish Socialists these barbarous threats were repudiated by the Social Democratic leaders. Nevertheless the Young Socialists have maintained their existence, and in the General Election of 1917 succeeded in securing eleven representatives in the Swedish Diet.

Very similar is the record of the Socialist extremists in Norway. At a conference in 1912 in Christiania one of their leaders recommended placing dynamite in machines in order to prevent 'blacklegs' from working. Mr. de Montgomery records that in spite of the opposition of the Labour members this extremist movement gradually gained ground, not only in the Labour Party, but also in the Nationalist Confederation.

Of this, the ugliest side of contemporary labour movements, a ghastly revelation was furnished in the present year by the outbreak on the Rand. The story of this outbreak is told in detail by Captain William Urquhart, whose 'journalistic duties,' to quote his preface, 'kept him in close touch with the manifold 'phases of the situation from day to day.' The outbreak on the Rand was essentially due to the fear of the highly paid white workers that they might be undercut by native labour. During the currency inflation of the war period, gold, as measured in English currency, obtained an enhanced value. Taking all the economic facts of that time into account this meant that the effective purchasing power of gold went up, so that the South African mines were making large profits and could afford to pay high wages. With the gradual movement of English currency towards the gold standard this special advantage of the gold producer has disappeared, and by the end of 1921 many of the gold mines on the Rand had reached a point where they could no longer carry on at a profit. The owners therefore proposed—as an alternative to closing their mines altogether—to employ native labour in certain work which had previously been, at any rate in most mines, exclusively entrusted to white labour. This proposal was construed by the Labour leaders as an attack on white labour, and by appealing to racial passion they stirred up

an angry spirit of revolt. The South African Government and the employers tried to negotiate a settlement which would clearly define the division between white jobs and coloured jobs, but the Rand Labour leaders preferred to organize a revolutionary movement based on the cry: 'A White South Africa,' in spite of the fact that even in the mines there had long been a recognised ratio of about ten blacks to one white. Many murders were committed; much property was destroyed. Some of the details given in Captain Urquhart's book are peculiarly horrible, showing that men and women who professed to be proud of their white complexion were not ashamed to indulge in the worst practices of Afghans.

This example, with all its brutality, is interesting because it shows to what length any social or political movements may go if once the leaders of the movement depart from what may best be called the elementary principles of morality. Again and again in the history of the world it is found that the enthusiasts for any movement absolutely disregard fundamental moral obligations in order to advance their own ideals. The doctrine that the end justifies the means is a curse that hangs round the neck of almost every religious or social movement. Even if the doctrine were true, it would be a horrible truth, but as a matter of fact the people who start out with that doctrine, rarely, if ever, reach the end at which they aim, for human nature revolts against the crimes to which that doctrine leads.

A similar consideration applies to the attempt to solve economic problems by preaching theories that are in conflict with the facts of life. The doctrine that all wealth by right belongs to 'labour,' and that the capitalist is merely a robber, directly conflicts with the patent fact that a large part of the daily production of wealth is directly attributable to capital, and therefore in equity belongs to the owner of the capital. A farm labourer with a spade would take nearly a fortnight to dig a field that could be ploughed in a day. The difference between these two results is due to the capitalist who provides the plough and the horses. In practice the capitalist rarely, if ever, gets the whole of the increased wealth produced by the use of his capital. The agricultural labourer, poorly paid though he be, gets a much better income than he could possibly earn for himself without the aid of the ploughs and horses and barns and working

capital that the farmer provides. Often when improved machinery is introduced into a factory the earnings of the workpeople rise appreciably, though the introduction of the new machines, provided at the expense of the capitalist, involves no additional exertion to the labourer, and may even involve less exertion. More generally, the economic history of the world shows that the growth of capital is as a rule accompanied by the growth of wages. In other words the labourer gets part of the wealth that the capitalist produces.

In addition, the growth of capital, by facilitating production, multiplies commodities and so tends to lower their price. The labourer, so far as he is a purchaser of these commodities, obtains, in this respect also, part of the wealth due to capital. Indeed, it not infrequently happens that capitalists get nothing at all for their contribution to the production of wealth. The ordinary shareholders in several English railway companies have never drawn a penny of dividend in return for the services they rendered in paying for the cost of constructing the line. They invested their money in the hope of making a profit; they have lost it all. But the labourers who did the work of construction received the full current rate of wages, and the permanent way remains for countless multitudes of other labourers to use for their pleasure or convenience. Therefore if there were anything to be gained by bandying abusive epithets, the capitalist might plausibly argue that it is the labourer who is the robber.

As a matter of fact, there is no robbery on either side, if the game is fairly played. The capitalist invests his money in the hope of making a profit; if he makes a loss through his own misjudgment, or the misjudgment of those whose advice he took, he is not entitled to accuse the rest of the community of robbing him. In the same way if the labourer receives the full wage that he freely agreed to accept he has no ground of complaint if the capitalist's investment turns out favourably. Robbery only comes in when the labourer fails to give a fair day's work for the agreed wage, or when the capitalist deals dishonestly either with the labourers whom he employs or with the customers to whom he sells.

A more difficult problem is opened up by the constantly repeated statement that the present economic system stands condemned because on the one hand there are thousands of men

seeking work and on the other thousands of families with wants unsatisfied. Surely—it is argued—there must be something fundamentally wrong in an economic system which fails to bring the willing worker in touch with the anxious wanter. But the whole weight of this argument rests on the assumption that it is an easy thing to bring worker and wanter, producer and consumer together. It is not at all an easy thing. The wants of the consumer vary from time to time, partly from fickleness of desire, partly from external facts, such as variations in climate which, by damaging the cultivator's crop, may destroy his power to pay for the things he still would like to have. If producer and consumer are living in the same village they are mutually cognisant of these influences, and if their lives are organized on simple lines they can to some extent re-adjust their activities to meet changes of circumstance. But when industries are highly specialised, and goods produced in one country have to find their market in other countries, to secure complete equilibrium is practically impossible. For example, calico producers in Lancashire spend a large part of their time in working to supply the wants of calico consumers in India ; but who can guarantee that the Indian consumer will be prepared to buy exactly the quantity of calico that the Lancashire producer is prepared to sell ?

Even when producer and consumer are living in the same country the problem is not simple. In the present year in parts of England many tons of plums have been left unpicked upon the trees because there was no market for them. No doubt if those plums could have been sent to London many people would have been willing to pay a low price for them ; but that price would not have begun to cover the cost of picking the plums, together with the cost of packing them in baskets, sending them by rail, and distributing them through the streets of London. Consequently the plum gatherers were without a job, while possible consumers went without plums. It would be interesting if the Socialists who blame the capitalist system for this and every other evil, would explain in detail precisely how they propose to guarantee that the world's output of goods of every kind shall always exactly tally with the world's demand for goods of that kind. Is it seriously suggested that a Government department—even if exclusively manned by young Socialists—is capable of so regulating the production and consumption of wealth that every

producer will always receive adequate remuneration for his work and every consumer adequate satisfaction of his wants ?

As a matter of fact the capitalistic system, with all its imperfections, does by its reliance on the law of supply and demand, tend towards a solution of this problem. The intelligent producer, whether he be a wealthy capitalist, or a peasant farmer, knowing how price affects demand, acts accordingly. If he has a good supply of anything that he wishes to sell and if the public demand is slack he will lower his price to stimulate demand. In that way his business as a producer is maintained, and the wants of a larger number of consumers are satisfied. He may suffer loss in the process, but he hopes for the time when the balance will swing the other way and he may recover, or more than recover, his losses. One of the great advantages of the capitalistic system is that the risks involved in these necessary operations of commerce are largely taken by people who have comfortable bank balances and can therefore afford to take the risk of loss in the hope of gain. Consequently it is possible to relieve the manual worker to a very large extent from the discomforts occasioned by the inevitable fluctuations of commerce. The manual worker can go on drawing his regular wage for a considerable period, even though the business at the moment is losing money.

There is however a necessary limit to that process. The capitalist cannot continue indefinitely to go on paying wages for the production of goods which he is unable to sell at a price sufficient to cover cost. The time comes when he must either reduce wages, which are generally the principal item in the cost of production, or shut down his works altogether. It is here that the capitalist comes into conflict with the illusions of the Labour Party. Large sections of the wage-earning classes seem to be obsessed with the idea that the wage they receive depends solely on the goodwill, or illwill, of the capitalist who employs them. They imagine that he can pay whatever wage he chooses, and they demand that—whatever be the state of trade—their wage shall be maintained at a figure sufficient to provide them with what they consider an adequate standard of life. This demand is constantly put forward at meetings of the Labour Party and is usually accompanied by the further demand that if the workman is unable to find work the State shall pay him this standard wage while he is idle.

There is a certain touch of humour in the fact that the men who formulate this demand are the declared enemies of the capitalistic system. For before the days of capitalism no such idea could have entered the brain of even the wildest dreamer. When man hunted his food in the forest, there was no one to pay him a standard wage if he failed to catch his quarry; in the Middle Ages the peasant cultivator had to starve if his crops failed. It is only because the organization of industry on a capitalistic basis has enabled large sections of the population to enjoy comparative security, that the idea has arisen that every wage-earner is entitled to complete security in fair weather and in foul, in peace and in war, whether working or idling. The thing is impossible, and the whole idea is illusory. In the final resort we all have to be content with what the world thinks our work is worth.

Of course it may happen, and often doubtless does happen, that the capitalist—even after allowance has been made for his risks—obtains an undue share of the price paid by the consumer. That is where the value of the trade unions comes in. By collective bargaining based on a careful examination of the actual facts of trade, they can often secure for their members better terms than an individual workman could secure for himself. But the permanent effectiveness of trade union action depends on the willingness of trade unions to co-operate loyally in the work of production. Such loyal co-operation has a double advantage. In the first place it helps to create a larger sum total to be divided between capital and labour; in the second place it relieves the capitalist of the anxiety created by the constant threat of strikes, and by thus diminishing the risks against which capital has to provide, it diminishes the cost of capital and thereby leaves a larger share of the total product for labour.

Instead of offering this co-operation so as to secure mutual advantages, those trade unions which have been captured by the Socialists deliberately devote their energies to a war against capital. Some of them go to the length of encouraging actual sabotage, putting grit into delicate machines, and even wrecking trains by falsifying the signals, as was done in France a year or two ago. These methods of warfare are by no means exclusively directed against private capitalists. For example, methods of sabotage have recently been adopted by Irish postal strikers

against the Free State Government. The practice is approved by Socialist extremists in all countries. The Socialists, in fact, while denouncing war between nations are eager for war between classes. They have imbibed the belief that by means of violent action it is possible to destroy the capitalist class, and they assume that the wealth of the rich will then be available for the benefit of the poor. It does not seem to occur to these enthusiasts for a new world, that by the spoiling of machinery, the wrecking of trains, the flooding of mines, the wealth itself is destroyed.

Happily some of the followers of these apostles of revolution have been disillusioned both by the tragedy of Russia and by the sufferings they have themselves had to endure as the result of strikes wantonly forced upon wage-earners by their political leaders. It has now become apparent to men who a few months ago were thirsting for a fight, that war between classes may be quite as destructive as war between nations, and even less justifiable. For nations are divided by clear-cut frontiers, and if one nation invades the territory of another the only remedy is war. On the other hand, between classes in most modern countries there are no clear-cut frontiers. The poor man often rises into the ranks of the rich ; the rich man often sinks into the ranks of the poor.

More important still is the consideration that the division between capital and labour is not a division of personalities, but a division of functions. The same man can be and often is both a capitalist and a labourer. In Lancashire, for example, very large numbers of cotton operatives deposit money with the mills, and this fact helps to maintain the excellent organization of the Lancashire cotton industry. If the same conditions could be secured in other industries a good many labour troubles would disappear. It would be better still if the wage-earner could afford to take the risks of an ordinary shareholder. A movement in this direction would give a far better prospect of permanent industrial peace than the numerous schemes that have been devised for profit-sharing. For experience shows that when wage-earners receive an annual bonus as a share of the firm's profits, many of them quickly come to believe that they are entitled to the bonus as an addition to their wages, regardless of the prosperity of the business. Whereas if a workman invests his money in an industrial undertaking he must be treated exactly

like any other shareholder, and very soon begins to understand the part that capital plays in the work of production and the necessity for friendly co-operation between capital and labour.

Unfortunately comparatively few wage-earners are willing to take the risks that the ordinary capitalist has to take. Even those who are fairly prosperous, and have something of the spirit of the profit-seeker, prefer to speculate on horses rather than in mill shares; while those who buy, not on the chance of an immediate profit, but for the sake of a permanent investment, prefer to lend their money on deposit at a guaranteed rate of interest. Before the war there was, it is true, one purely capitalistic investment in which large numbers of wage-earners invested their savings, namely, the building of houses. But all owners of houses have been so shamelessly robbed by various government schemes for fixing rents, that it is doubtful whether people of moderate means will again venture on this form of investment for many years to come. The necessary result will be that the builders of houses will require a higher rate of interest for their money, and that will have to be paid, either by the occupants of the houses, or,—if the housing industry is again to be subsidised—by the taxpayer. In this, as in other matters, probably further disillusionment is necessary before the country gets back to economic sanity. Many of our middle-class politicians, as well as most of the labour leaders, have apparently not even yet grasped the fact that national prosperity depends on hard work and careful economy, not on political hot air. It is perhaps a dull doctrine, but it is true.

EDITOR.

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